Police helicopter crashes onto Glasgow pub: final AAIB report
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SID. Answer your own question. Picking on me because you can't accept the conclusions in the AAIB report is lamentable.
Give it And grow up a bit. It's a big bad world and sometimes things go wrong. If you keep bleating on about the aircraft etc STOP FLYING IT,
Give it And grow up a bit. It's a big bad world and sometimes things go wrong. If you keep bleating on about the aircraft etc STOP FLYING IT,
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SID. Answer your own question. Picking on me because you can't accept the conclusions in the AAIB report is lamentable.
Give it And grow up a bit. It's a big bad world and sometimes things go wrong. If you keep bleating on about the aircraft etc STOP FLYING IT,
Give it And grow up a bit. It's a big bad world and sometimes things go wrong. If you keep bleating on about the aircraft etc STOP FLYING IT,
I can assure you, that if I was unhappy, I wouldn't fly. Anyone that actually knows me and knows the events immediately post crash, will verify this.
Both of your accusations are made with absolutely nothing to back them up and should you actually take the time to read what people at posting here, you would realise the folly of your mistaken accusations.
Based on your wrong answer to my question, you clearly haven't bothered to read the report. Where on Earth did you get your answer from?
There is a great difference between cruise speed and endurance speed, a difference of 55 kts in fact. This also results in a fuel consumption difference of 30 kg/hr, hence endurance. The company policy in force at the time of the incident is that "aircraft should not led with less than 60kg of fuel in the tanks."
Just to give you a little more information, last night we briefed that the fuel load would give us 1:40 flying time. While returning to base after 1:20 of 'transit to' type tasks, orbity type tasks and pursuit type tasks, we still had another 100kg/30 mins fuel left in the main tank. Both supply tanks were indicating full, however in transits they did reduce.
What is wrong here?
Should I accept a local task if it comes in before we land, or should I ground the ac and report a fuel system problem?
With those facts now available to you, read the bit in the report about NWEM on page 53 and come back to us in reference to SPAO .... not forgetting that the company policy was that "fuel checks were to be carried out at intervals of not less than 10 minutes. "
Oh, and please try to be a bit nicer to those trying to clear the many murky waters here, we need to support the facts, and not the fiction.
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I have read it SID and it is an irrelevance given the that the pumps supplying the tanks were OFF and the pilot acknowledged, and cancelled, multiple backstop low fuel warnings continuing to accept tasking as if nothing was wrong. Knowledge of that fuel system had to be lacking to operate down to less than 80 kegs total with tranferumps selected OFF.
I Have a fair few police hours myself back in the days when we were tasked none stop, just before and after FLIR was introduced. No NVGs in unstabilsed AS355s and BO105s. Fuel management has not just been invented. It's always been priority number 1.
What tries my patience with this thread is the underlying tone that the machine let that guy down when the AAIB reports concludes the most likely scenario was fuel in the wrong tank and many many warnings, sounds and lights telling that story.
I do not want to be unkind to the parties involved but ignoring the facts and therefore the conclusions in this case just hides the underlying message.
Sid you keep presenting cryptic half baked clues as if you are the font of some well of untold knowledge. Well stop it because the report is out. We are all able to draw inference from its conclusions without any more smoke and mirrors.
Learn what you can and a good start is measuring the fuel you put in each time and start the damn stopwatch just like the rest of us do when chugging down those last few kgs of fuel at the end of the flight.
Now Sid spit out whatever cryptic clues you have or stop chastising those who accept at face value what happened.
Finally Sid, working out you minimum fuel based on "Loiter" burn is for fools. Long long time back I worked out that if I ever ended up having to use that fuel I most probably would not really be wanting to slow Down. I take, and preserve, a very healthy MLA that is a personal limit and is absolutely nowhere near the legally required minimums.
MLA is a limit. Not a target! I have not met a single sensible pilot who does not take a bit for the wife and kids and never met one, who when approaching the MLA is not gripped with a sense of urgency and care over where that fuel is in the tank system.
So Sid bleating on about the calculation of MLA is totally lost on me. I would never plan a flight in full knowledge that only MLA would be left at the end. The simple law of averages dictate that 50% of the time you would land below the MLA.
I Have a fair few police hours myself back in the days when we were tasked none stop, just before and after FLIR was introduced. No NVGs in unstabilsed AS355s and BO105s. Fuel management has not just been invented. It's always been priority number 1.
What tries my patience with this thread is the underlying tone that the machine let that guy down when the AAIB reports concludes the most likely scenario was fuel in the wrong tank and many many warnings, sounds and lights telling that story.
I do not want to be unkind to the parties involved but ignoring the facts and therefore the conclusions in this case just hides the underlying message.
Sid you keep presenting cryptic half baked clues as if you are the font of some well of untold knowledge. Well stop it because the report is out. We are all able to draw inference from its conclusions without any more smoke and mirrors.
Learn what you can and a good start is measuring the fuel you put in each time and start the damn stopwatch just like the rest of us do when chugging down those last few kgs of fuel at the end of the flight.
Now Sid spit out whatever cryptic clues you have or stop chastising those who accept at face value what happened.
Finally Sid, working out you minimum fuel based on "Loiter" burn is for fools. Long long time back I worked out that if I ever ended up having to use that fuel I most probably would not really be wanting to slow Down. I take, and preserve, a very healthy MLA that is a personal limit and is absolutely nowhere near the legally required minimums.
MLA is a limit. Not a target! I have not met a single sensible pilot who does not take a bit for the wife and kids and never met one, who when approaching the MLA is not gripped with a sense of urgency and care over where that fuel is in the tank system.
So Sid bleating on about the calculation of MLA is totally lost on me. I would never plan a flight in full knowledge that only MLA would be left at the end. The simple law of averages dictate that 50% of the time you would land below the MLA.
Last edited by DOUBLE BOGEY; 7th Nov 2015 at 23:11.
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I found 8Pieced 13 para narrative to represent the most likely scenario and sequence of events. Thank you for a well articulated and plausible scenario.
The one point I will make is that no-one is faultless, not even the AAIB. Unfortunately they chose to highlight the position of the primer switches as they found them, in the early interim report that they issued. This was seized on by many and inadvertently induced a torrent of speculation around potential confusion by the pilot between the position primers and xfer pumps switches. Literally hundreds of posts on the original thread were devoted to this line. Without that first responders photo it would still be a possible factor for some commentators even now. Unfortunately the position that they found them in was not the position that they were in when the first responders arrived. The position of any of those switches after a 100G impact and the loss of integrity of the scene based on unintentional human interference can not in any way be relied on. Far too much time and effort was spent on this line by many on here, with the finger being pointed at the pilot and it has taken a long time to get to the point where many of us now recognise that in all likelihood he was being presented with conflicting information that makes his inexplicable behaviour explicable, although not necessarily excusable.
The one point I will make is that no-one is faultless, not even the AAIB. Unfortunately they chose to highlight the position of the primer switches as they found them, in the early interim report that they issued. This was seized on by many and inadvertently induced a torrent of speculation around potential confusion by the pilot between the position primers and xfer pumps switches. Literally hundreds of posts on the original thread were devoted to this line. Without that first responders photo it would still be a possible factor for some commentators even now. Unfortunately the position that they found them in was not the position that they were in when the first responders arrived. The position of any of those switches after a 100G impact and the loss of integrity of the scene based on unintentional human interference can not in any way be relied on. Far too much time and effort was spent on this line by many on here, with the finger being pointed at the pilot and it has taken a long time to get to the point where many of us now recognise that in all likelihood he was being presented with conflicting information that makes his inexplicable behaviour explicable, although not necessarily excusable.
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Attack the best form of defence I see DB, again full of false accusations and assumptions 
I say again, I've only repeated the facts from the report and straightened out the misunderstandings that have been going on.
You seem to be in complete denial of the facts presented to you, in particular those on pages six & seven of the report;
At 22:06 they arrived at Bothwell after having two low fuel warnings, with approx 122kgs of fuel, which would normally be indicated as 32 kgs remaining in the main. They then went on to do three separate tasks.
At 22:09 they called complete in the Bothwell area and that they were returning to base. At this time the fuel was calculated to be 86kgs, which would normally be indicated as zero in the main.
Three minutes/10kgs later, both engines flamed out.
Now, look at figure 1 on page 7 one.
If they had gone straight back to base they would have made it, but they didn't did they. So why did they all feel ok enough to go back via the tasks at Bothwell Uddington and Bargeddie?
As you haven't flown the 135, I wouldn't expect you to realise the significance of this part of the report and I suspect this is why you have this problem understanding. However I would like to think that a reasonable person might like to lend an ear to those of us that do, in the same role as SPAO, day in night out, constantly recalculating bingo fuels due to the distances of tasking areas. Times have changed since you dipped your toes into police aviation and don't forget, you don't have the monopoly of flying around a force area in the 355 NVG-less.
As for flying close to what we are calling MLA's (90kgs) these days, that is what we base the decision on whether we can make an in flight task or not. If you want to swing the lamp around stories of 'I learnt about fuel management because of that', well I have my tale to tell as will everyone else, but you probably wouldn't listen to us anyway. You also don't have a monopoly on swinging the lamp, pull up a sandbag story either.
I say again, I've only repeated the facts from the report and straightened out the misunderstandings that have been going on.
You seem to be in complete denial of the facts presented to you, in particular those on pages six & seven of the report;
At 22:06 they arrived at Bothwell after having two low fuel warnings, with approx 122kgs of fuel, which would normally be indicated as 32 kgs remaining in the main. They then went on to do three separate tasks.
At 22:09 they called complete in the Bothwell area and that they were returning to base. At this time the fuel was calculated to be 86kgs, which would normally be indicated as zero in the main.
Three minutes/10kgs later, both engines flamed out.
Now, look at figure 1 on page 7 one.
If they had gone straight back to base they would have made it, but they didn't did they. So why did they all feel ok enough to go back via the tasks at Bothwell Uddington and Bargeddie?
As you haven't flown the 135, I wouldn't expect you to realise the significance of this part of the report and I suspect this is why you have this problem understanding. However I would like to think that a reasonable person might like to lend an ear to those of us that do, in the same role as SPAO, day in night out, constantly recalculating bingo fuels due to the distances of tasking areas. Times have changed since you dipped your toes into police aviation and don't forget, you don't have the monopoly of flying around a force area in the 355 NVG-less.
As for flying close to what we are calling MLA's (90kgs) these days, that is what we base the decision on whether we can make an in flight task or not. If you want to swing the lamp around stories of 'I learnt about fuel management because of that', well I have my tale to tell as will everyone else, but you probably wouldn't listen to us anyway. You also don't have a monopoly on swinging the lamp, pull up a sandbag story either.
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Sid I suspect you believe the supply tanks were indicating full. Is that what you are referring too? If it is then are you also telling me the main tank was indicating empty?
However if the supply banks indicated full and the main tank was also indicating its actual contents then the the helicopter would have "made" and extra 30-40 minutes of fuel during the tasks. Surely this would be obvious to a regular 135 pilot such that when the low fuel aural and visual warnings from the supply tanks activated a penny would drop.
Also with still 80 kgs indicating in the main tank the TRFR pumps should have been on.
Above all Sid the lesson here is that none of us should try routinely to second guess the FM Emergency Responses. If the pilot followed the requirements of the FM that night he should have RTBed at the first Low Fuel Caption. There are good reasons for the procedures being written this way. They are written in respect of the design failure modes of the aircraft.
I come across this a lot these days. Pilots who operate falsely believing the FM is flawed or inadequate because the manufacturer is hiding something or can't be bothered. In the major manufacturers this is very far from reality as the TPs who post on this site will tell you. Safety in design or procedure, or lack of it, is devastating to business.
In the last few years we have had other instances where FM procedures are not respected leading to loss of life. The Newfoundland S92 for eg.
The problem is that afterwards the naked and awful truth seems so hard to accept. People look for answers as to why the individual may have behaved the way they do. In the Newfoundland case, flying over a cold inhospitable ocean, it's not too hard to forgive a pilot who, armed with a little ****e knowledge, choose to press on for home hoping he could spare his pax a ditching ordeal.
In this case, accepting routine tasks over land when the warnings the helicopter was issuing required a land ASAP within 10 minutes seems very different.
Sid the acid test here for you is this. Armed now with the detail of the report, flying tonight and the Low Fuel Warnings illuminate would you check you pumps and land within 10 minutes OR just carry on accepting task.
Which action conforms to the FM.
thats really all I have to say and sorry Sid if you think I am accusing you of something. It's just the white noise you perpetuate confuses what is a simple issue.
Sid I did manage 5 years Police and HEMs so I hope that qualifies as more than a toe dip! I will give you one war story though. Arriving in BAOR as a young Subaltern Pilot I was asked by my new OC to pick him up in my car on my way to work. I had never met the guy before and he was really upset that on the way to work we ran out of fuel! I could not understand why he found this such a big problem especially as I had gone out of my way to get him. Then my QHI explained it to me. A lesson I never forgot.
However if the supply banks indicated full and the main tank was also indicating its actual contents then the the helicopter would have "made" and extra 30-40 minutes of fuel during the tasks. Surely this would be obvious to a regular 135 pilot such that when the low fuel aural and visual warnings from the supply tanks activated a penny would drop.
Also with still 80 kgs indicating in the main tank the TRFR pumps should have been on.
Above all Sid the lesson here is that none of us should try routinely to second guess the FM Emergency Responses. If the pilot followed the requirements of the FM that night he should have RTBed at the first Low Fuel Caption. There are good reasons for the procedures being written this way. They are written in respect of the design failure modes of the aircraft.
I come across this a lot these days. Pilots who operate falsely believing the FM is flawed or inadequate because the manufacturer is hiding something or can't be bothered. In the major manufacturers this is very far from reality as the TPs who post on this site will tell you. Safety in design or procedure, or lack of it, is devastating to business.
In the last few years we have had other instances where FM procedures are not respected leading to loss of life. The Newfoundland S92 for eg.
The problem is that afterwards the naked and awful truth seems so hard to accept. People look for answers as to why the individual may have behaved the way they do. In the Newfoundland case, flying over a cold inhospitable ocean, it's not too hard to forgive a pilot who, armed with a little ****e knowledge, choose to press on for home hoping he could spare his pax a ditching ordeal.
In this case, accepting routine tasks over land when the warnings the helicopter was issuing required a land ASAP within 10 minutes seems very different.
Sid the acid test here for you is this. Armed now with the detail of the report, flying tonight and the Low Fuel Warnings illuminate would you check you pumps and land within 10 minutes OR just carry on accepting task.
Which action conforms to the FM.
thats really all I have to say and sorry Sid if you think I am accusing you of something. It's just the white noise you perpetuate confuses what is a simple issue.
Sid I did manage 5 years Police and HEMs so I hope that qualifies as more than a toe dip! I will give you one war story though. Arriving in BAOR as a young Subaltern Pilot I was asked by my new OC to pick him up in my car on my way to work. I had never met the guy before and he was really upset that on the way to work we ran out of fuel! I could not understand why he found this such a big problem especially as I had gone out of my way to get him. Then my QHI explained it to me. A lesson I never forgot.
Last edited by DOUBLE BOGEY; 8th Nov 2015 at 07:17.
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You're generally preaching to the converted here DB, however;
Mmm, as the warning caption did not stay on when acknowledged, the land within 10 minutes or rtb on the first low fuel 1 warning wouldn't apply as the FM only goes as far to say that if the caption remains on, so I would suggest to you that the actions were initially correct because the light extinguished. Same applies for the second no1 warning, that also cleared on acknowledgement.
What was that about second guessing responses?
The problem we have is that according to the report they had two low fuel warnings that were on for at least 15 minutes, with no action or indication ATC/radar trace/police radio/knee pad - paper note or otherwise to indicate that this was the case, except for a warning unit's nvmemory after the event that had just undergone a 100g impact. One thing I would go out on a limb and say is that this is unit memory, a unit that sends a signal to the lamps to illuminate, it doesn't actually say in the report anything about the condition of the lamp filaments themselves prior to the testing so we'll never know if they actually were illuminated. The test is reported on page 58, which in itself is interesting.
Either action could conform with the FM, depending on the situation;
Do the warnings go out when acknowledged?
What do the gauges tell me?
What do I see when I check the pumps/cb's?
Do the warnings go out if I had to switch on the transf pumps?
How long have I been flying already?
In a direct answer to your scenario; I could check the pumps and carry on tasking or I could check the pumps and land within 10 mins, both conform with the FM .... it depends on what information I have, what action I take and what subsequently happens after those actions.
Anyway what I think you're after is; I would acknowledge the warning, inform the crew, check the gauges, check the pumps and check the cb's. (Me being me would also mention something to atcu 'for the tape' ... as I do). As you have kindly allowed me the benefit of our newly acquired hindsight, if this happened tonight, on the first caption whether it clears or not, I would land wherever I could as soon as I could.
I thought you'd have a better analogy than that one
Basically you left home on your 'task' without enough fuel to complete that task, it's not as if you were asked to pick him up while you were already on your way to work and then had to make a substantial diversion.
Above all Sid the lesson here is that none of us should try routinely to second guess the FM Emergency Responses. If the pilot followed the requirements of the FM that night he should have RTBed at the first Low Fuel Caption. There are good reasons for the procedures being written this way. They are written in respect of the design failure modes of the aircraft.
What was that about second guessing responses?
The problem we have is that according to the report they had two low fuel warnings that were on for at least 15 minutes, with no action or indication ATC/radar trace/police radio/knee pad - paper note or otherwise to indicate that this was the case, except for a warning unit's nvmemory after the event that had just undergone a 100g impact. One thing I would go out on a limb and say is that this is unit memory, a unit that sends a signal to the lamps to illuminate, it doesn't actually say in the report anything about the condition of the lamp filaments themselves prior to the testing so we'll never know if they actually were illuminated. The test is reported on page 58, which in itself is interesting.
Sid the acid test here for you is this. Armed now with the detail of the report, flying tonight and the Low Fuel Warnings illuminate would you check you pumps and land within 10 minutes OR just carry on accepting task.
Which action conforms to the FM.
Which action conforms to the FM.
Do the warnings go out when acknowledged?
What do the gauges tell me?
What do I see when I check the pumps/cb's?
Do the warnings go out if I had to switch on the transf pumps?
How long have I been flying already?
In a direct answer to your scenario; I could check the pumps and carry on tasking or I could check the pumps and land within 10 mins, both conform with the FM .... it depends on what information I have, what action I take and what subsequently happens after those actions.
Anyway what I think you're after is; I would acknowledge the warning, inform the crew, check the gauges, check the pumps and check the cb's. (Me being me would also mention something to atcu 'for the tape' ... as I do). As you have kindly allowed me the benefit of our newly acquired hindsight, if this happened tonight, on the first caption whether it clears or not, I would land wherever I could as soon as I could.
I thought you'd have a better analogy than that one
Basically you left home on your 'task' without enough fuel to complete that task, it's not as if you were asked to pick him up while you were already on your way to work and then had to make a substantial diversion.
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Fuel at Low Fuel Warning point
Don't get confused, the report states an approximate fuel at Bothwell, not the point at which the Low Fuel Warnings activated. As we know, the Low Fuel Warnings are set to operate between 26-34kgs in supply tank 1 and 22 - 30 in supply tank 2.
Therefore the Low Fuel Warnings were activated at somewhere between 48 - 64 Kgs, in the supply tanks.
Assuming the GNWEM/GXMII fuel sensor fault (which I am certain of in this case and in this case there is no FUEL caution and the supply tanks are indicated as always full at 90 kgs) and knowing 76 kgs was in left trapped in the main tank, basic maths shows that at the time of activation of the Low Fuel Warnings, there was a difference between gauge readings (falsely presented due to fault) of between 76 + 90 = 166 and 76 + 64 =140 (smallest error) or 76 + 48 = 124 (biggest error).
Therefore at the time of the pilot dismissing the Low Fuel Warnings as being contrary to his fuel displays, he could have had a difference of just 166 - 140 = 26 Kgs or 7:41 minutes of flying time (smallest error case) or 166 - 124 = 42 kgs or 12:25 (largest error). I put it to you that at the point of getting the low fuel warnings, the fuel error may have easily been part of the process of dismissing the Low Fuel Warnings as spurious, if they had suffered the GNWEM/GXMII fault.
I've said this before, but thought I would show the maths this time and its certainly not a difference of 44 minutes as per a previous post!
As time goes by, the error in the faulty displayed fuel and what you actually have increases. Having dismissed the warnings as spurious, there isn't long left to monitor that fuel, and actually realise that the main tank indication is remaining the same at 76kgs. There may have been quick glances at the fuel to check it whilst tasking, at a quick glance displays will be coloured blue, showing that there is some fuel in them. Meanwhile, unseen to you, the fuel is actually emptying from your supply tanks which feeds the engines.
I said before, that errors were made, but I now know this fuel sensor fault (GXMII) had occurred before so its disgraceful that we as an aviation community had not placed it firmly in the memory banks of everyone.
If we think for a second that this fault didn't happen in GSPAO, then this pilot, ignored Fuel Caution, ignored his displays showing his supply tanks were emptying, ignored Fuel Warnings, his crew also ignored all these warnings too, then we might as well say that he didn't bother to control NR too??? In this case I would have no lessons to learn, that would be a purposefully caused accident like the German Wings airliner.
It is extremely important that we learn the correct lessons, yes the pilot made some errors, but the crew was not helped by the whole aviation community.
As reassurance now, things are being looked at and I'm sure they will be redesigned, checklists have been altered, Instruction Notices (INs) issued. If we have anything, and I mean anything wrong, the most minor snag, they are grounded instantly until Airworthiness authorities release them to fly again. Safety systems in the newly formed NPAS are brilliant with open, free reporting. Operator/Manufacturer links are so important to prevent these things happening again.
Therefore the Low Fuel Warnings were activated at somewhere between 48 - 64 Kgs, in the supply tanks.
Assuming the GNWEM/GXMII fuel sensor fault (which I am certain of in this case and in this case there is no FUEL caution and the supply tanks are indicated as always full at 90 kgs) and knowing 76 kgs was in left trapped in the main tank, basic maths shows that at the time of activation of the Low Fuel Warnings, there was a difference between gauge readings (falsely presented due to fault) of between 76 + 90 = 166 and 76 + 64 =140 (smallest error) or 76 + 48 = 124 (biggest error).
Therefore at the time of the pilot dismissing the Low Fuel Warnings as being contrary to his fuel displays, he could have had a difference of just 166 - 140 = 26 Kgs or 7:41 minutes of flying time (smallest error case) or 166 - 124 = 42 kgs or 12:25 (largest error). I put it to you that at the point of getting the low fuel warnings, the fuel error may have easily been part of the process of dismissing the Low Fuel Warnings as spurious, if they had suffered the GNWEM/GXMII fault.
I've said this before, but thought I would show the maths this time and its certainly not a difference of 44 minutes as per a previous post!
As time goes by, the error in the faulty displayed fuel and what you actually have increases. Having dismissed the warnings as spurious, there isn't long left to monitor that fuel, and actually realise that the main tank indication is remaining the same at 76kgs. There may have been quick glances at the fuel to check it whilst tasking, at a quick glance displays will be coloured blue, showing that there is some fuel in them. Meanwhile, unseen to you, the fuel is actually emptying from your supply tanks which feeds the engines.
I said before, that errors were made, but I now know this fuel sensor fault (GXMII) had occurred before so its disgraceful that we as an aviation community had not placed it firmly in the memory banks of everyone.
If we think for a second that this fault didn't happen in GSPAO, then this pilot, ignored Fuel Caution, ignored his displays showing his supply tanks were emptying, ignored Fuel Warnings, his crew also ignored all these warnings too, then we might as well say that he didn't bother to control NR too??? In this case I would have no lessons to learn, that would be a purposefully caused accident like the German Wings airliner.
It is extremely important that we learn the correct lessons, yes the pilot made some errors, but the crew was not helped by the whole aviation community.
As reassurance now, things are being looked at and I'm sure they will be redesigned, checklists have been altered, Instruction Notices (INs) issued. If we have anything, and I mean anything wrong, the most minor snag, they are grounded instantly until Airworthiness authorities release them to fly again. Safety systems in the newly formed NPAS are brilliant with open, free reporting. Operator/Manufacturer links are so important to prevent these things happening again.
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There are hundreds of ec135 operated in other countries in the same role as UK police air support units. They do not seem to have any problems with fuel management, never heard from the drivers there is a design fault with switches or potential misleading fuel management due to cad information and or warnings.
Well, in most of these countries where ec135's don't fall of the sky because of fuel starvation, people drive on the right side of road...
Well, in most of these countries where ec135's don't fall of the sky because of fuel starvation, people drive on the right side of road...
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100 G
Rantanplane, I think UK drivers will agree with you on that 
However misinformation has been proven, perhaps for some reason the other countries don't have the sensor problems. Do you know if any have been tested elsewhere?
However misinformation has been proven, perhaps for some reason the other countries don't have the sensor problems. Do you know if any have been tested elsewhere?
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To find out lot of stamperl (schnaps) is needed especially with the Austrian pilots, many stones of beer with the Bavarians and unquantifiable bottles of red wine with the French. Or why haven't we been told here already?
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ratanplane, Bond test their aircraft sensors every month. I'm not 100% certain, but I believe aircraft are still failing the test. I believe there is a fault, but if you dont look for it, you dont see it until the main tank is emptied.
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Practical Example of Fuel Conservation, not always 203kg/hr!
I just looked back at my logbook and had a Police flight of 2:00, initial fuel of 450kgs landing at 91 kgs, 1 kg above my night FRF.
So I 'gained' to use the speak of a previous post, 47 kgs of fuel! So this is why I had said previously that with the fuel sensor fault like GXMII/GNWEM, the fuel showing in the displays at the time of the Low Fuel Warnings could be entirely reasonable to dismiss the low fuel warning as being spurious (especially if you didn't know about this particular fault, which this crew did not).
Actually, apart from the dashes between Glasgow and Edinburgh, there was the earlier portion of tasking where some of this fuel saving may have occurred, although not sure of the profiles and speeds flown initially.
My first aircraft where I had my 'both transfer pumps off' event described in my first post happened in an aircraft which interestingly flew left hand orbits, so if it had gone any further (I was ground running after having been flying) but with a fault like GXMII/GNWEM, I definitely would have got my 4 minutes ish between engine failures.
We now all fly right orbits, so for a start, we could remove the indentation causing the current supply tank fuel split specifically for right orbit police helicopters, but to serve both Police and Passenger Transport communities properly, can AH put my larger supply tank on the right side please? I'd rather not just accept 32 seconds between engine failures, can it be shifted further apart 'again' please?
So I 'gained' to use the speak of a previous post, 47 kgs of fuel! So this is why I had said previously that with the fuel sensor fault like GXMII/GNWEM, the fuel showing in the displays at the time of the Low Fuel Warnings could be entirely reasonable to dismiss the low fuel warning as being spurious (especially if you didn't know about this particular fault, which this crew did not).
Actually, apart from the dashes between Glasgow and Edinburgh, there was the earlier portion of tasking where some of this fuel saving may have occurred, although not sure of the profiles and speeds flown initially.
My first aircraft where I had my 'both transfer pumps off' event described in my first post happened in an aircraft which interestingly flew left hand orbits, so if it had gone any further (I was ground running after having been flying) but with a fault like GXMII/GNWEM, I definitely would have got my 4 minutes ish between engine failures.
We now all fly right orbits, so for a start, we could remove the indentation causing the current supply tank fuel split specifically for right orbit police helicopters, but to serve both Police and Passenger Transport communities properly, can AH put my larger supply tank on the right side please? I'd rather not just accept 32 seconds between engine failures, can it be shifted further apart 'again' please?
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Photographs taken by the first responders appeared to show at least one of the prime pump switches in the off position. When examined by the AAIB after the accident site had been stabilised, both the No 1 and No 2 prime pump switches were found to be in the on position.
Since there is no shortage of people willing to chip in with theories about why things were or were not done or seen, who wants to have a go at explaining why the AAIB think it relevant to include the word appeared?
Perhaps it is because the photo is not clear enough to say, one way or another. Some posters seem to ignore facts, and have distorted the report to fit their theory.
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Error Trap
Whether the switches were manually switched or their positions were the effects of the 100 G, will be a discussion that no doubt will continue to run; however there is, imho, action that should be taking place to prevent future inadvertent switching but isn't. In our aviation world this is clearly not safe practise;
How to blame less and learn more
We have a yellow rubber cover for the 'sprung to off' Hyd Test switch to make it different from the others (FLM- do not operate the test switch while airborne), but over a year after the first detailed report came out S2/2014 mentioning the 'incorrect' fuel switch positioning, as far as I am aware, there has been no action taken to differentiate the two sets of switches.
How to blame less and learn more
... it pays to pause to look beneath the surface, to challenge the most reductionist narrative. This is what aviation, as an industry, does. When mistakes are made, investigations are conducted. A classic example comes from the 1940s where there was a series of seemingly inexplicable accidents involving B-17 bombers. Pilots were pressing the wrong switches. Instead of pressing the switch to lift the flaps, they were pressing the switch to lift the landing gear.
Should they have been penalised? Or censured? The industry commissioned an investigator to probe deeper. He found that the two switches were identical and side by side. Under the pressure of a difficult landing, pilots were pressing the wrong switch. It was an error trap, an indication that human error often emerges from deeper systemic factors. The industry responded not by sacking the pilots but by attaching a rubber wheel to the landing-gear switch and a small flap shape to the flaps control. The buttons now had an intuitive meaning, easily identified under pressure. Accidents of this kind disappeared overnight.
This is sometimes called forward accountability: the responsibility to learn lessons so that future people are not harmed by avoidable mistakes.
Should they have been penalised? Or censured? The industry commissioned an investigator to probe deeper. He found that the two switches were identical and side by side. Under the pressure of a difficult landing, pilots were pressing the wrong switch. It was an error trap, an indication that human error often emerges from deeper systemic factors. The industry responded not by sacking the pilots but by attaching a rubber wheel to the landing-gear switch and a small flap shape to the flaps control. The buttons now had an intuitive meaning, easily identified under pressure. Accidents of this kind disappeared overnight.
This is sometimes called forward accountability: the responsibility to learn lessons so that future people are not harmed by avoidable mistakes.
We have a yellow rubber cover for the 'sprung to off' Hyd Test switch to make it different from the others (FLM- do not operate the test switch while airborne), but over a year after the first detailed report came out S2/2014 mentioning the 'incorrect' fuel switch positioning, as far as I am aware, there has been no action taken to differentiate the two sets of switches.
I would assume that the use of 'appeared' is due to the apparent uncertainty of the evidence in comparison to the AAIB's own.
I disagree with 8pieced that all of aviation has let this crew down. Aviation is unfortunately built on evidence of errors, mistakes and misunderstanding. The Comet Mk1 being a prime example of new technology bringing new issues and unrecognised problems.
It is known that some components, on every aircraft you could name, occasionally fail and that, on return to the OEM repair station, there would be a test and nothing found. The item would be retested and reissued as serviceable "No Fault Found".
I put it to you that this was happening with Fuel sensors too...but no-one knew why because no evidence of water was present at the factory test...the water was probably displaced during the Tank Drain to remove the sensors.
I believe that no-one could have reasonably forseen this issue.
I disagree with 8pieced that all of aviation has let this crew down. Aviation is unfortunately built on evidence of errors, mistakes and misunderstanding. The Comet Mk1 being a prime example of new technology bringing new issues and unrecognised problems.
It is known that some components, on every aircraft you could name, occasionally fail and that, on return to the OEM repair station, there would be a test and nothing found. The item would be retested and reissued as serviceable "No Fault Found".
I put it to you that this was happening with Fuel sensors too...but no-one knew why because no evidence of water was present at the factory test...the water was probably displaced during the Tank Drain to remove the sensors.
I believe that no-one could have reasonably forseen this issue.
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Everyone involved in this investigation and this forum have made one basic assumption; that this was not a deliberate act. There is no evidence from an FDR or CVR to assist the investigation, so a lot of the evidence in the AAIB report has been inferred or cross referenced to other sources. Repeated cancellation of low fuel warnings may have been deliberate, and the botched auto rotation was certainly below the standard expected of an experienced pilot.
So if people want to nit pick over the minutia of the report, as to display indications and possible faults, it might pay to consider that perhaps the biggest fault lay with the pilot?
The AAIB quite rightly address the possible mechanical reasons for an accident, but if there are no real faults there, the cause must lay elsewhere.
These helicopters have been flying for years without a major accident being caused by them running out of fuel. A couple of near misses and major discrepancies between what the display read and what was in the tank, but no fatalities or serious accidents.
If the low fuel light comes on, land within 10 minutes - end of story. If you second guess the manufacturers instructions or decide to become a test pilot then that is gross negligence. That will be for the FAI to decide.
Having been involved on the periphery of police aviation, I have every sympathy with the crew and their families, but sometimes you have to call it as you see it. I had quite a few highly trained colleagues killed in high speed road accidents over the years, and it wasn't always their fault, except it was. They took the decision to conduct the pursuit or answer the emergency call and they were responsible for the speed they were driving at.
I was a passenger on one blue light shout in a Rover SD1 when we hit a cat that ran across the road. The impact destroyed the front of the car, which gives some idea of the speed we were travelling. The cat had a collar, with the name 'Rover'. No one injured, but the car was off the road and the driver suspended.
The point being, no call is urgent enough to have an accident. We were running to the scene of a suspected burglary, but other officers had surrounded and contained the scene. We were just bringing lighting for a search. So was it necessary to be driving at over 120mph down an urban city road?
The red light comes on - land, don't accept another tasking.
So if people want to nit pick over the minutia of the report, as to display indications and possible faults, it might pay to consider that perhaps the biggest fault lay with the pilot?
The AAIB quite rightly address the possible mechanical reasons for an accident, but if there are no real faults there, the cause must lay elsewhere.
These helicopters have been flying for years without a major accident being caused by them running out of fuel. A couple of near misses and major discrepancies between what the display read and what was in the tank, but no fatalities or serious accidents.
If the low fuel light comes on, land within 10 minutes - end of story. If you second guess the manufacturers instructions or decide to become a test pilot then that is gross negligence. That will be for the FAI to decide.
Having been involved on the periphery of police aviation, I have every sympathy with the crew and their families, but sometimes you have to call it as you see it. I had quite a few highly trained colleagues killed in high speed road accidents over the years, and it wasn't always their fault, except it was. They took the decision to conduct the pursuit or answer the emergency call and they were responsible for the speed they were driving at.
I was a passenger on one blue light shout in a Rover SD1 when we hit a cat that ran across the road. The impact destroyed the front of the car, which gives some idea of the speed we were travelling. The cat had a collar, with the name 'Rover'. No one injured, but the car was off the road and the driver suspended.
The point being, no call is urgent enough to have an accident. We were running to the scene of a suspected burglary, but other officers had surrounded and contained the scene. We were just bringing lighting for a search. So was it necessary to be driving at over 120mph down an urban city road?
The red light comes on - land, don't accept another tasking.
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Sid I see now you change your tack and suggest the warning lamps were not working. If so, how can you account for the aural and the multiple times the warnings WERE acknowledged and cancelled. The AAIB are very very thorough and have clearly described what they have determined happened and not described that which they do not know.
Are you reading the right report?
GOULI good post!
Are you reading the right report?
GOULI good post!
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Good morning DB, sorry but can you tell me which post you are referring to please, thanks.
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SilsoeSid
In an earlier post you mention that the report does not comment on the condition of the lamp filaments prior to testing, so we can never know if they were illuminated.
Page 58 of the report states that the lamps illuminated correctly during testing, but that the audio warning did not sound. It was found that the unit was drawing excessive current and after several minutes a tantalum capacitor blew and became open circuit. The electrical current draw returned to normal and the unit then functioned correctly.
Only one previous failure of this component has been noted and tantalum capacitors are suspectible to extreme mechanical stress. On the balance of probability, this capacitor was damaged by extreme deceleration in the impact sequence.
So it is possible to say that the lights were working correctly before the accident but there is a faint chance that the audio warnings did not sound, although this is very unlikely.
You did comment that you were going out on a limb making that assertion.
In an earlier post you mention that the report does not comment on the condition of the lamp filaments prior to testing, so we can never know if they were illuminated.
Page 58 of the report states that the lamps illuminated correctly during testing, but that the audio warning did not sound. It was found that the unit was drawing excessive current and after several minutes a tantalum capacitor blew and became open circuit. The electrical current draw returned to normal and the unit then functioned correctly.
Only one previous failure of this component has been noted and tantalum capacitors are suspectible to extreme mechanical stress. On the balance of probability, this capacitor was damaged by extreme deceleration in the impact sequence.
So it is possible to say that the lights were working correctly before the accident but there is a faint chance that the audio warnings did not sound, although this is very unlikely.
You did comment that you were going out on a limb making that assertion.