Police helicopter crashes onto Glasgow pub: final AAIB report
 

Well the legal profession have had six months to sharpen their quills since the draft final report was released in April. After such a long delay and with all those interested parties allowed to address their concerns, I do not believe that much more will be revealed than was in the preliminary findings. I hope to be proved wrong.

AAIB report imminent
 

Clutha helicopter crash families to get answers in report this week

STV reports the AAIB report will be published tomorrow (Wednesday)

Clutha helicopter crash families to get answers in report this week | Glasgow & West | News

Despite the date mentioned in Pitts' link above, it looks as though today isn't the day.
When the final report is finally released, the link to it will be found here;

https://www.gov.uk/government/public...lished-reports

Telly
 

It says on the telly - family briefings today n tomorrow, report issued on Friday.

The families had a briefing tonight, those who could not attend will be briefed tomorrow.

BBC News

Clutha crash: AAIB say onboard switches turned off before tragedy

STV gets it wrong again
 

The standard of "journalism" at STV is matched only by the depths that BBC Scotland plumbs. Not at all surprised they got it wrong.

From the comments quoted in the media, it would appear that there will not be much more revealed in the accident report than has already been released.

Since the AAIB are only concerned with reporting established facts and not apportioning blame, any further details may only come out if there is a fatal accident enquiry.

Publishing the report on Friday will ensure any officials that might be targetted by the media for comment will be safely unavailable until after the weekend. A popular practice in government and civil service circles (been there, done that).:oh:

I presume the relatives were not given copies of the report so the reporters might be relying on what non-technical people can remember of what they were told.

We're about to get the results tomorrow and we already know that the AAIB have flagged crew error for the position of the fuel management switches - but it will be interesting to see how they describe the period between donks stopping and moment of impact with NIL rotor energy.

Was the pilot directly employed or contracted?

TC has hit the Nail on the Head: it's not the position of the switches that I'm interested in, but what happened to 'practiced' emergency drills when the fuel indications and engine issues commenced.

Police helicopter crashes onto Glasgow pub: final AAIB report
 

Here it is.

Summarised, in part, as:

Read on.
After second engine failed, Nr warning went on and off 3 times, indicating that he was attempting to control Nr. Forward speed was reduced to zero, possibly indicating he flared the aircraft and then pulled collective. They imply that as the RadAlt and Landing Lamp had failed, the pilot would have difficulty judging height.

So, whilst none of this is CERTAIN, the board have concluded that Dave MAY have carried out a low level autorotation, misjudged the flare height and ended up at a couple of hundred feet with the lever in his armpit.

JUST LIKE MANY PEOPLE CONCLUDED 2 YEARS AGO AND WERE FLAMED BY THE 'EXPERTS' OF THE INTERNET.

So please, lets lose this 'he didnt autorotate' rubbish

The report states that when No. 2 engine stopped the radalt and the lamp failed soon after. The point between No. 2 engine stopping and radiant failing has probably never been tested and subject to spurious indications.

I have no doubt that an autorotation was attempted, but the mystery still remains why the pilot left both those XFER pumps off even after indications of fuel starvation being imminent.

We just have to accept that we will never know.

Really?
We can't understand why the xfer pumps were off?
Also we can't understand why both prime pumps were selected on?

It was dark and they are right next to each other?

Really?

Yes really.

There was ample time to crosscheck the flicking of the right switch. A possible reason not to switch on the XFER pumps but switch on the PRIME pumps is if there is no valid reason to, that is, that 75Kg fuel remaining was presented as 0kg or unusable - which we will never know.

Good point DG. I wondered at the adjacent switches potential for incorrect selection. A VERY long time ago, in 1979 at UK (CAA) certification of the Agusta A109, I was involved as co-ordinator and I remember only too clearly that, on the fuel management panel (between P1 & P2 seats), CAA required that the fuel valve shut-off switches were to be made "tactilely discernible" from the adjacent ones. This comprised 1, 3 & 2, 4 fuel boost pumps and, centrally, a latched fuel-cross-feed switch. The rationale was based on UK certification requirements for IFR operation and at night; it was to be another, physical, cue of what service you had just selected even if you couldn't see it.


I have had the locations in the EC135 demonstrated to me; seems it would not be difficult to select the wrong switches, and, convinced you had selected the correct ones, just fail to believe all the warnings subsequently presented.


I should add, clearly, this viewpoint comes from an engineer, NOT a pilot. Ready to accept any criticism that may abound _ VFR

Drinks girl: nail on the head. It's been said before in this thread and it is as close to what probably happened as it's going to get:
He switched the wrong switches on/off, he ignored the 10 minute warning to land and he failed to auto correctly.
Frustrating for those left behind who need answers.

Financially catastrophic for BOND.

Even the best make mistakes.................................................... ......

How hard is it to judge height above Roof Tops in the Dark?

There are Street Lights and other light sources visible to aid in judging height.

Add that to the definition of angle by looking at building shapes, streets, vehicles (moving and parked)....there is still a lot to see that would aid in determining height.

Somehow I find it hard to accept that the Pilot would misjudge aircraft height by Hundreds of Feet even without a RadAlt or Landing Light being functional.

I thought very little was made of the error in the manufacturers manual regarding the length of time between engine flameouts. Stated as 4 mins, yet even with the supply tank contents as prescribed in ideal conditions, it was nearer 1 min 30, MAX. Manual has now been corrected, but if I had been over a city centre and that close to base, I know how I would have been thinking of using those 4 minutes ... And it doesn't involve an emergency landing in the city centre.