Attack the best form of defence I see DB, again full of false accusations and assumptions
I say again, I've only repeated the facts from the report and straightened out the misunderstandings that have been going on.
You seem to be in complete denial of the facts presented to you, in particular those on pages six & seven of the report;
At 22:06 they arrived at Bothwell after having two low fuel warnings, with approx 122kgs of fuel, which would normally be indicated as 32 kgs remaining in the main. They then went on to do three separate tasks.
At 22:09 they called complete in the Bothwell area and that they were returning to base. At this time the fuel was calculated to be 86kgs, which would normally be indicated as zero in the main.
Three minutes/10kgs later, both engines flamed out.
Now, look at figure 1 on page 7 one.
If they had gone straight back to base they would have made it, but they didn't did they. So why did they all feel ok enough to go back via the tasks at Bothwell Uddington and Bargeddie?
As you haven't flown the 135, I wouldn't expect you to realise the significance of this part of the report and I suspect this is why you have this problem understanding. However I would like to think that a reasonable person might like to lend an ear to those of us that do, in the same role as SPAO, day in night out, constantly recalculating bingo fuels due to the distances of tasking areas. Times have changed since you dipped your toes into police aviation and don't forget, you don't have the monopoly of flying around a force area in the 355 NVG-less.
As for flying close to what we are calling MLA's (90kgs) these days, that is what we base the decision on whether we can make an in flight task or not. If you want to swing the lamp around stories of 'I learnt about fuel management because of that', well I have my tale to tell as will everyone else, but you probably wouldn't listen to us anyway. You also don't have a monopoly on swinging the lamp, pull up a sandbag story either.