AW139 G-LBAL helicopter crash in Gillingham, Norfolk

[G550 driver]

RWB

Excellent info, seems like the offshore operators may need to review their Ops manuals.

I think many suspect that the intention of the 50 kts limitation was for IMC and not IFR.

There would not seem to be any logic for preventing departures from airports that are IFR only.

[AnFI]

yup - and if the vis is 1.5k+ with no visual references you are permitted to fly VFR, by sole reference to instruments, so the MinIFR speed limit would not prohibit flight by sole reference to instruments (provided you elect to fly iaw VFR)

IMC/IFR and VMC/VFR have been confused for years and have lead to 'broken rules'. (ie rules that are disfunctional)

[helimutt]

yup - and if the vis is 1.5k+ with no visual references you are permitted to fly VFR, by sole reference to instruments, so the MinIFR speed limit would not prohibit flight by sole reference to instruments (provided you elect to fly iaw VFR)

Surely VFR below FL100, requires Clear of Cloud and in sight of the surface for helicopters? NOT 'No visual references'

but if the rules have changed in the UK recently you'll have to excuse me as I no longer fly in this country.

[pohm1]

I simply stated the fact that you can not operate under IFR, [therefore by definition IMC], below 50 KIAS. T

IFR is not, by definition, IMC. You can operate an entire flight IFR and never once encounter IMC. IFR is a set of rules not met conditions.

Does the flight manual state not below 50kts in IMC or IFR?

P1

[RedWhite&Blue]

I have been doing some more digging as something didn’t sit well, with my last post.

With regard to VFR minima I said that “During the day one would be limited to 1500m (Class G)…”

While this generally holds good for the JAR-OPs people, it is not the whole story, so here’s chapter and verse under JAR-OPS.

‘Helicopters may be operated in flight visibility down to 1500 m [by day], provided the appropriate ATS authority permits use of a flight visibility less than 5 km, and the circumstances are such, that the probability of encounters with other traffic is low, and the IAS is 140 kts or less. When so prescribed by the appropriate ATS Authority, helicopters may be permitted to operate down to a flight visibility of 800m by day’. See Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 3.465 Minimum Visibilities for VFR Operations.

But for a private flight under the ANO it is “For helicopters operating at a speed which, having regard to the visibility, is reasonable: Clear of cloud and in sight of the surface.” Is it not?

I also said you need 3km by night in Class G (from CAA Info Notice IN-2012/145). While this holds good for a private flight it is 5km for JAR-OPS operations. See JAR-OPS 3.465(a)(2) and Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 3.465 Minimum Visibilities for VFR Operations.

Unless, that is, you know otherwise...

Apologies, I shall try harder next time. I'm beginning to wish I'd stayed in 'lurk mode'.

[Boudreaux Bob]

You wonder if a CAA Tenured Civil Servant might be so kind as to set forth in layman's language exactly what the regulations are re this discussion.

After all, it should be extremely straightforward in every regard as Air Regulations are set forth in basic terms not subject to ambiguity, confusion, or mis-interpetation are they?

Surely, Weather Minima are contained in a single document?

US FAR 91.155 discusses VFR Weather Minima

http://www.risingup.com/fars/info/part91-155-FAR.shtml

[wigglyamp]

UK VFR definitions

Flight outside controlled airspace: Rules of the air regulations 2007.

28. (1) Subject to paragraph (6), an aircraft flying outside controlled airspace at or above flight level 100 shall remain at least 1,500 metres horizontally and 1,000 feet vertically away from cloud and in a flight visibility of at least 8 km.

(2) Subject to paragraphs (3), (4), (5) and (6), an aircraft flying outside controlled airspace below flight level 100 shall remain at least 1,500 metres horizontally and 1,000 feet vertically away from cloud and in a flight visibility of at least 5 km.

(3) Paragraph (2) shall not apply to an aircraft which—

(a)flies at or below 3,000 feet above mean sea level;

(b)remains clear of cloud with the surface in sight; and

(c)is in a flight visibility of at least 5 km.

(4) Paragraph (2) shall not apply to an aircraft which is not a helicopter and which—

(a)flies at or below 3,000 feet above mean sea level;

(b)flies at a speed which, according to its air speed indicator, is 140 knots or less;

(c)remains clear of cloud with the surface in sight; and

(d)is in a flight visibility of at least 1,500 metres.

(5) Paragraph (2) shall not apply to a helicopter which—

(a)flies at or below 3,000 feet above mean sea level;

(b)flies at a speed which, having regard to the visibility, is reasonable; and

(c)remains clear of cloud with the surface in sight.

(6) Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply to a helicopter which is air-taxiing or conducting manoeuvres in accordance with rule 6(i).

[AnFI]

helimutt
yea - kinda - for VFR you do not need 'visual references', you just need to have a visibility of 1500m (these days). (and surface in sight, regardless of whether there is anything to see)
(unless above 3000ft, then there are a different set of illogicalities to deal with)

BB "it should be extremely straightforward in every regard as Air Regulations" yup it SHOULD be... but it is not

You've got to remember that rules are often written by people who don't fly

[AnFI]

and wigglyamp !!


they have changed the ANO since then!


AND the 3000ft is AMSL (not AGL) SO it really depends on the height of the ground abouve sea level - doesn't make much sense but those are the rules!

[Two's in]

It's ironic that after every one of these tragedies pages and pages of often conflicting and seldom useful rules and regulations are examined in excruciating detail. But nowhere in this morass is there anything even close to a definition of what constitutes good airmanship and captaincy. Having a concrete grasp of these 2 components of professional aviation in the first place often avoids the need to further analyze this mass of seemingly abstract and remote legal concepts.

[terminus mos]

Twos in

I agree with you to some extent. Fact is that regardless of the rules, this Captain made the decision to depart and then compounded the poor decision by applying poor technique. Where was the FO in the decision making process? There was a technique which could have been applied which would have prevented this accident, regardless of the departure itself being legal or not.

Poor Captaincy and airmanship decisions are not uncommon and good intelligible rules can prevent poor decisions and save lives. This is very prevalent in your fine country where lax night flying rules result in frequent EMS accidents.

[tistisnot]

terminus mos

Please don't spoil your post with childish cross-pond sniping - last sentence. Two's in simply made a general comment about regulators.

[Boudreaux Bob]

Oh no....by all means let's discuss that statement. it very much is relevant to what is being said here.

This is very prevalent in your fine country where lax night flying rules result in frequent EMS accidents.

Two very correctly notes "Rules" get discussed to death. The UK has no shortage of "Rules" as shown by all the discussion extant.

The UK has some very convoluted hoops for folks to leap through in order to be certified as proficient, current, and qualified to perform the duties of a Captain and Co-pilot.

One might even opine that if "Rules" and "Hoops" prevented accidents the UK would be one of the safest places in the World to ride in a Helicopter.

All that being said, we are confronted with multiple situations recently that would indict that line of thinking would we not?

As a Defense Lawyer in this PPRUNE Court, I would have to offer up the defense that notwithstanding any amount of "Rules" to compare with the UK, the US EMS Accident Rate during Night Flight is irrelevant to the case at hand.

I would also submit that the very absence of such "Rules" as the UK enjoys in conjunction with the US EMS Night Flying Accident Rate would prove the absolute failure of the UK "Rules" in effectively preventing fatal accidents.

I would submit to his honor the judge that Two stands falsely charged by Terminous when accused of thinking Judgement and Piloting skills trump "Rules" in importance.

Two is very much correct. We should spend far more time looking at "Why" the decision to depart in the manner it was was done. (I raised that point way back when in this thread as you might recall along with asking why the Take Off profile flown was chosen...as you may also recall.)

The US EMS Helicopter Accident Rate is filled with fatal examples of horrible decisions re flight in minimal weather conditions...dozens and dozens of them.

I say it again, we cannot legislate judgement. It is impossible. Pilot decision making is always going to be an Achilles Heel for us. It matters not whether it is the UK, the USA or Upper Mongolia....Pilots are going to make bad decisions.

As to the First Officer in this tragic crash, all he had to do was have the courage (assuming he was not happy with departing) was to tell the Captain his reasons and if the Captain insisted, Tip his Cap, collect his belongings and call for a Taxi.

Lots of factors played into his agreeing to go along no doubt but he always had that choice no matter how awkward and bad for his career it might have been.

We Pilots do live and die by our decisions don't we?

[terminus mos]

tistisnot

You mis read my post.

It is not intended to be cross pond sniping, far from it. Its a genuine comment that stronger rules which disallow single engine (and by association non fully IFR equipped) night "VFR" commercial and EMS flights would have and still can prevent accidents in the USA.

[chopjock]

Its a genuine comment that stronger rules which disallow single engine (and by association non fully IFR equipped) night "VFR" commercial and EMS flights would have and still can prevent accidents in the USA.

Ah but are the single engined helos less well equipped for night "VFR" simply because there is no market for them (in the UK), since the rules forbid it?
In other words, if single engine IFR and night commercial VFR were permitted, then the market would have a better demand for such and singles would therefore thus become better equipped.

[Boudreaux Bob]

Term, that is not what you said.

You said lax rules for night flight and made no mention of engines.

The vast majority of the fatal crashes at night in the USA EMS business are IIMC events and most of them are the result of bad decision making.

With a fleet of over 800 EMS Helicopters operating 24/7 we have far more exposure to the risk of flying at night than do you in the UK.

Yet we see two very clear examples of the fallacy of your argument with the Glasgow Crash and the one that evoked this thread.

Despite your "Rules", you still lose aircraft, crews, and passengers during night flight.

[Camp Freddie]

I was in the simulator the other day and we set the weather at minimums so we went IMC during the vertical climb for an onshore helipad departure departure with a TDP of 35 feet.

We didn't crash but it is is disorientating manoeuvre, particularly during the rotation point and shortly after.

I think this thread has focused a little too much on "rules" and not enough on sensible decision making.

For me it's quite simple, if there is an expectation of going IMC before Vmini then just say no, any employer who doesn't respect the Pilots decisions should not get the benefit of your experience.

[terminus mos]

Boudreaux

I am not in the UK.

I was not really intending to refer to # of engines pre se but single engine helicopters are usually mostly VFR equipped with VFR rated pilots so IIMC at night and the system which allows night flight in lesser equipped helicopters is, in my opinion, in need of tightening up.

However, your point is well taken that the UK currently has an appalling IFR twin engine fatal accident record, the A109, the EC135, the 332L2 and now the 139 all in just over 12 months. Moreover, they are all human factor and decision related to one degree or another.

[Art of flight]

Rules, lack of rules, single, twin........not the major cause of these accidents in UK, USA, and other places by any means. Pilots making decisions and running out of safe flight options that are commensurate with their personal skill levels continue to be the main reason for 'accidents'.

I say 'accidents' as at least here in England, the police no longer use the term accident to describe vehicular crashes. They're now known as collisions......as there is always a cause, and often someone or something to blame.

[alouette3]

So, after 32 pages and 600 odd posts we are all agreed then ? This was poor decision making and airmanship and had nothing to do with the type of aircraft or its sophistication or the number of regulations.
Funny, when I made that assertion on page 11 (#202) I was chewed up and spat out by Shy Torque.
No wonder this forum is getting a reputation.
Alt3.