AW139 G-LBAL helicopter crash in Gillingham, Norfolk
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I'm not sure this is relevant to this accident but the timing is questionable.
31AgustaWestland: Lower Half Scissor Spherical Bearings
News Staff posted on March 31, 2014 11:25
An EMERGENCY airworthiness directive (EAD) 2014-07-51 is being sent to owners and operators of AgustaWestland S.p.A. Model AB139 and AW139 helicopters. This EAD was prompted by reports of certain Lower Half Scissor Spherical Bearings (bearings) dislodging from certain Main Rotor (M/R) Rotating Scissors.
This EAD requires inspecting the M/R Rotating Scissors for play of the bearing. If the play is beyond allowable limits, this EAD requires removing the affected bearing and re-identifying the M/R Rotating Scissors. This EAD also requires removing all affected bearings.
The actions of this EAD are intended to detect excessive play of the bearing and prevent failure of the M/R Rotating Scissors and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
31AgustaWestland: Lower Half Scissor Spherical Bearings
News Staff posted on March 31, 2014 11:25
An EMERGENCY airworthiness directive (EAD) 2014-07-51 is being sent to owners and operators of AgustaWestland S.p.A. Model AB139 and AW139 helicopters. This EAD was prompted by reports of certain Lower Half Scissor Spherical Bearings (bearings) dislodging from certain Main Rotor (M/R) Rotating Scissors.
This EAD requires inspecting the M/R Rotating Scissors for play of the bearing. If the play is beyond allowable limits, this EAD requires removing the affected bearing and re-identifying the M/R Rotating Scissors. This EAD also requires removing all affected bearings.
The actions of this EAD are intended to detect excessive play of the bearing and prevent failure of the M/R Rotating Scissors and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
I'm not sure this is relevant to this accident but the timing is questionable.
31AgustaWestland: Lower Half Scissor Spherical Bearings
News Staff posted on March 31, 2014 11:25
An EMERGENCY airworthiness directive (EAD) 2014-07-51 is being sent to owners and operators of AgustaWestland S.p.A. Model AB139 and AW139 helicopters. This EAD was prompted by reports of certain Lower Half Scissor Spherical Bearings (bearings) dislodging from certain Main Rotor (M/R) Rotating Scissors.
This EAD requires inspecting the M/R Rotating Scissors for play of the bearing. If the play is beyond allowable limits, this EAD requires removing the affected bearing and re-identifying the M/R Rotating Scissors. This EAD also requires removing all affected bearings.
The actions of this EAD are intended to detect excessive play of the bearing and prevent failure of the M/R Rotating Scissors and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
31AgustaWestland: Lower Half Scissor Spherical Bearings
News Staff posted on March 31, 2014 11:25
An EMERGENCY airworthiness directive (EAD) 2014-07-51 is being sent to owners and operators of AgustaWestland S.p.A. Model AB139 and AW139 helicopters. This EAD was prompted by reports of certain Lower Half Scissor Spherical Bearings (bearings) dislodging from certain Main Rotor (M/R) Rotating Scissors.
This EAD requires inspecting the M/R Rotating Scissors for play of the bearing. If the play is beyond allowable limits, this EAD requires removing the affected bearing and re-identifying the M/R Rotating Scissors. This EAD also requires removing all affected bearings.
The actions of this EAD are intended to detect excessive play of the bearing and prevent failure of the M/R Rotating Scissors and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
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It was CFIT, and didn't hit anything en route:
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...4%20G-LBAL.pdf
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...4%20G-LBAL.pdf
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seems like disorientation?
I am curious to know the PIC's multi-engine IFR time ... presumably not just the 580 hours on type?
The total time is perhaps a little on the low side .. personally if I owned a 139, I'm not convinced I would be happy with 2300 hour Capt ....
Actually, I would probably go for a 6k plus Captain and a 3k plus FO, both with five years onshore relevant experience .. and even then I would be careful !
I am curious to know the PIC's multi-engine IFR time ... presumably not just the 580 hours on type?
The total time is perhaps a little on the low side .. personally if I owned a 139, I'm not convinced I would be happy with 2300 hour Capt ....
Actually, I would probably go for a 6k plus Captain and a 3k plus FO, both with five years onshore relevant experience .. and even then I would be careful !
My post #276 on Page14 stated:
"An IFR departure was legal, according to my understanding of the ANO Rules 32 to 34. However, the inference I get from this thread, given their non-mil background, is that they probably had little or no initial or recurrent training in the necessary techniques.
Is it reasonable to assume that 'zero/limited' vis take-offs are occasionally carried out, quite legally, on Private category flights by potentially 'untrained' crews? Given that the required technique isn't brain surgery - the mil do it - but it is a skill that requires careful instruction and recurrent training. Is there not a case for including it the civilian IR syllabus and recurrent IRTs?"
Anyone care to comment?
JJ
"An IFR departure was legal, according to my understanding of the ANO Rules 32 to 34. However, the inference I get from this thread, given their non-mil background, is that they probably had little or no initial or recurrent training in the necessary techniques.
Is it reasonable to assume that 'zero/limited' vis take-offs are occasionally carried out, quite legally, on Private category flights by potentially 'untrained' crews? Given that the required technique isn't brain surgery - the mil do it - but it is a skill that requires careful instruction and recurrent training. Is there not a case for including it the civilian IR syllabus and recurrent IRTs?"
Anyone care to comment?
JJ
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Very sad, and very predictable.
G550 driver, I think you'll find that a few with the experience levels you quoted as being desirable for this operation had already given it a go and moved on.....
G550 driver, I think you'll find that a few with the experience levels you quoted as being desirable for this operation had already given it a go and moved on.....
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The total time is perhaps a little on the low side .. personally if I owned a 139, I'm not convinced I would be happy with 2300 hour Capt ....
Actually, I would probably go for a 6k plus Captain and a 3k plus FO, both with five years onshore relevant experience .. and even then I would be careful !
Actually, I would probably go for a 6k plus Captain and a 3k plus FO, both with five years onshore relevant experience .. and even then I would be careful !
JJ, IMHO I don't believe you should destinguish between ex mil and civ. trained, only what the rules says about min. vfr wx for t/o. It's the same minima no matter your background and experience. End of story. If the rules were broken, and the accident wouldn't have happend if the crew had followed the rules, then all I can say is: Too bad, you paid the ultimate price, but it was your own fault. The rules are there for a reason.
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Rather a sobering report and one that sketches a worrying trend, though one unlikely to continue in this outfit by the sound of it.
I just re read the Haughey air S76 accident report, and the similarities in terms of unsuitable operation using unsuitable procedures in unsuitable weather (and, quite possibly with unsuitable/insufficient planning or briefing) is striking.
In both this thread and others there are repeated references to extreme pressure put on Haughey pilots to operate outside their comfort zone, to their pilots refunding training bonds in order to leave early, to pilots leaving immediately after joining, to their recruiting "every six months" and so on. It's far too widespread not to be true. It doesn't take a psychic to picture the sort of operation that inspires that sort of behaviour of it's pilots, does it?
Further, testimonials from acquaintances of the pilots tell the all too familiar story of how professional they were, how they strove for perfection and took such pride in the job - none of which I doubt for a moment but sadly after so much repetition of these sentiments from the Mull to Battersea, Sumburgh, that S76, possibly Glasgow and now this latest incident it seems to show that no matter how professional, careful and dedicated pilots are they (we) are frighteningly susceptible to "company pressure" to do things we don't like or know we shouldn't be contemplating.
I've worked for some dodgy operators and made myself unpopular by saying No and i'd do it again if I had to, but I only got there by frightening myself on previous occasions. I've sat and watched others being browbeaten into it, I've talked to dozens on long night sectors about past shenanigans, and the same old company names keep coming up. Rarely have they had two fatals like Haughey which is perhaps how they get away with it but it is often so blatant that one wonders how on earth it isn't dealt with.
I'm loathe to suggest more legislation but I can't see how we can carry on like this. Full blown corporate 2 pilot ops in complex all weather aircraft just can't be allowed to continue under the same rules as a private R22 just because they mainly carry the same pax - just as the authority can't continue turning a blind eye to the known mavericks out there on the basis that they haven't had a accident yet. The CAA need to take charge, just for once but I'm not holding my breath. How we get over the company pressure think I frankly have no idea, except for us all to perhaps be a bit more bolshie about pushing the limits. Fat chance of that.
I note from the S76 report the almost grateful remark that the presence of a CVR made all the difference their investigation. No one would have had a clue what had happened otherwise. The investigators working on the Glasgow accident will be shaking their heads ruefully at that. Coming soon, CVRs for all, I hope. It has to happen.
As an industry I do believe we need to address the pressure aspect though, we owe it to our fare paying passengers, our principals and our industry whether we are flogging a pipeline in a Jetranger, hauling Sheikh Yerbouti to his donkey-walloping or driving a 737 to Malaga.
I just wish someone could figure out how.
I just re read the Haughey air S76 accident report, and the similarities in terms of unsuitable operation using unsuitable procedures in unsuitable weather (and, quite possibly with unsuitable/insufficient planning or briefing) is striking.
In both this thread and others there are repeated references to extreme pressure put on Haughey pilots to operate outside their comfort zone, to their pilots refunding training bonds in order to leave early, to pilots leaving immediately after joining, to their recruiting "every six months" and so on. It's far too widespread not to be true. It doesn't take a psychic to picture the sort of operation that inspires that sort of behaviour of it's pilots, does it?
Further, testimonials from acquaintances of the pilots tell the all too familiar story of how professional they were, how they strove for perfection and took such pride in the job - none of which I doubt for a moment but sadly after so much repetition of these sentiments from the Mull to Battersea, Sumburgh, that S76, possibly Glasgow and now this latest incident it seems to show that no matter how professional, careful and dedicated pilots are they (we) are frighteningly susceptible to "company pressure" to do things we don't like or know we shouldn't be contemplating.
I've worked for some dodgy operators and made myself unpopular by saying No and i'd do it again if I had to, but I only got there by frightening myself on previous occasions. I've sat and watched others being browbeaten into it, I've talked to dozens on long night sectors about past shenanigans, and the same old company names keep coming up. Rarely have they had two fatals like Haughey which is perhaps how they get away with it but it is often so blatant that one wonders how on earth it isn't dealt with.
I'm loathe to suggest more legislation but I can't see how we can carry on like this. Full blown corporate 2 pilot ops in complex all weather aircraft just can't be allowed to continue under the same rules as a private R22 just because they mainly carry the same pax - just as the authority can't continue turning a blind eye to the known mavericks out there on the basis that they haven't had a accident yet. The CAA need to take charge, just for once but I'm not holding my breath. How we get over the company pressure think I frankly have no idea, except for us all to perhaps be a bit more bolshie about pushing the limits. Fat chance of that.
I note from the S76 report the almost grateful remark that the presence of a CVR made all the difference their investigation. No one would have had a clue what had happened otherwise. The investigators working on the Glasgow accident will be shaking their heads ruefully at that. Coming soon, CVRs for all, I hope. It has to happen.
As an industry I do believe we need to address the pressure aspect though, we owe it to our fare paying passengers, our principals and our industry whether we are flogging a pipeline in a Jetranger, hauling Sheikh Yerbouti to his donkey-walloping or driving a 737 to Malaga.
I just wish someone could figure out how.
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The bare facts of this report point to pilot decision making in poor weather again. If any shred of good could be taken forward from this, it would be in future CRM studies of owner/pilot pressure. I remember attending a CRM session involving an aircraft accident from the same owner around 5 years ago. Perhaps owners should have to attend a CRM session annually with their crew. Other than that I would not want to see increased regulation.
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Minima
ANO minimum for private /aerial work take off = 150m R(unway) Visual Range implies measured and reported. How does this work in a non-runway environment?
Vmini for AW139 = 50KIAS is a FM limitation(?) below which VMC/visual references required?
Vmini for AW139 = 50KIAS is a FM limitation(?) below which VMC/visual references required?
Tango 123
Forgive me if I gave the impression I was trying to turn this into a civ/mil pissing match. That was never my intention.
I have just reacquainted myself with Rule 28 and you are indeed correct, unless they had written permission from the CAA in respect of that site.
However, we are agreed that VFR was probably not an option, I believe it could have been legally conducted under IFR Rule 33. At least that's my interpretation and I stand-by to be corrected. If my understanding of Rule 33 is correct, surely crews should receive training in techniques they, on the face of it, seem likely to employ.
JJ
Forgive me if I gave the impression I was trying to turn this into a civ/mil pissing match. That was never my intention.
I have just reacquainted myself with Rule 28 and you are indeed correct, unless they had written permission from the CAA in respect of that site.
However, we are agreed that VFR was probably not an option, I believe it could have been legally conducted under IFR Rule 33. At least that's my interpretation and I stand-by to be corrected. If my understanding of Rule 33 is correct, surely crews should receive training in techniques they, on the face of it, seem likely to employ.
JJ
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Tango123, blunt summary, but correct.
The last 2 posts have it.....when we start looking for the 'implied' version of a regulation or an 'interpretation' to allow flight in otherwise out-of-limits weather (IMC?) we really need to think again about wether it is a VFR departure.
The last 2 posts have it.....when we start looking for the 'implied' version of a regulation or an 'interpretation' to allow flight in otherwise out-of-limits weather (IMC?) we really need to think again about wether it is a VFR departure.
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AW139 G-LBAL helicopter crash in Gillingham, Norfolk
Another accident where an improper trim-technique was a contributing factor. Even the best AFCS cannot improve handling qualities when FTR is continously pressed.
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Posts from about 260 to 285 or so in this thread are worth having a second look at.
Add in the useful benefits of a fully slaved Autopilot system and this take off should have been an easy maneuver to accomplish.
Set heading, set pitch attitude, pull power and monitor the Autopilot. At some previously decided height/altitude (known to clear all obstacles) and beep in a bit of nose down trim from that set originally and off you go. In no time at all you would be VFR/VMC over the Fog.....or at least entering Controlled Airspace under IFR.
Attitude Hold is your friend.
Add in the useful benefits of a fully slaved Autopilot system and this take off should have been an easy maneuver to accomplish.
Set heading, set pitch attitude, pull power and monitor the Autopilot. At some previously decided height/altitude (known to clear all obstacles) and beep in a bit of nose down trim from that set originally and off you go. In no time at all you would be VFR/VMC over the Fog.....or at least entering Controlled Airspace under IFR.
Attitude Hold is your friend.
In instances like this where corporate / private pilots are hired in / employed; do they (the pilots) require liability insurance to protect their estates?
An excellent suggestion from a previous poster about owners doing CRM (related) courses. It should be compulsory for the owners of all private a /c to complete (successfully) a CRM module.
[And I don't just mean owner/drivers either.]
RiP guys.
An excellent suggestion from a previous poster about owners doing CRM (related) courses. It should be compulsory for the owners of all private a /c to complete (successfully) a CRM module.
[And I don't just mean owner/drivers either.]
RiP guys.