AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
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MT raises a good point. How was the SP certified for overwater flights if the escape windows can be blocked by the sliding door? Isn't the rule only one seat away from an escape window? Of course if you can reach the open door all well and good, but if not you are trapped.
Here's to S-92 style airstair doors.
Here's to S-92 style airstair doors.
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Sliding door question
It's been a while since I've been in a SP (circa. 2006 as we switched type to the S92) but I recall the pax safety brief stating that the main cabin doors would normally be jettisoned by the crew, however in the event that they were manually operated they would block the windows. This was only meant to be done during a non-capsize situation as we would be going into the life rafts .
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"...the full use of automatics is a godsend to reduce the fatigue encountered in a long days helicopter flying." Interesting comment, Wirbelsturm.
A significant number of our pilots are frequently close to the FTL limits (the limits are of course regarded as a target by the commercial department) and there are regular complaints about being fatigued. I wonder how many pilots come to work on their 5th day thinking that the automation will help them get through the 7 hours of flying and that 3rd ILS following the 4 ARAs? Another hole in the cheese is lining up as mistakes in setting up the AP are creeping in, even for those experienced on type! Would you have turned up for work if you knew you had to fly it all manually?
I agree with those who advocate more training, as opposed to testing, combined with manual flying. The latter has served me well on more than one occasion.
A significant number of our pilots are frequently close to the FTL limits (the limits are of course regarded as a target by the commercial department) and there are regular complaints about being fatigued. I wonder how many pilots come to work on their 5th day thinking that the automation will help them get through the 7 hours of flying and that 3rd ILS following the 4 ARAs? Another hole in the cheese is lining up as mistakes in setting up the AP are creeping in, even for those experienced on type! Would you have turned up for work if you knew you had to fly it all manually?
I agree with those who advocate more training, as opposed to testing, combined with manual flying. The latter has served me well on more than one occasion.
Albert - correct on the bug settings for cruise but now 100 for precision approach and 200 for non-precision.
I think the big difference is that we (unlike the SH Force) never fly through a bug, we react and not just 'cancel to land'. That way the audio remains an exception rather than the norm and crews are far more likely to react to it even in a high pressure situation.
I think the big difference is that we (unlike the SH Force) never fly through a bug, we react and not just 'cancel to land'. That way the audio remains an exception rather than the norm and crews are far more likely to react to it even in a high pressure situation.
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Still here reading every post with interest. Even if I am not getting in the back presently, my friends, colleagues and some family regularly do. Forgive not quoting, I am going to refer to post numbers and posters. Please correct me if any of my assumptions are wrong.
The pilots involved in this incident. We do not know the full reason or reasons for this accident yet, so let's not presume they are guilty of anything until all the facts are known, we cannot make any judgements until we have the full facts, but we can learn lessons, which I think everyone is doing on this thread on the forum.
victor papa - post 1484 page 75. Please keep fighting to try and implement the improvements you and your colleagues have discovered - keep fighting against the stupidity. I fully agree with Senior Pilots post 1493 on the same page. Perhaps you could remind them there are 4 grieving families, a seriously injured pilot and some others who are very lucky to have walked away from this one.
26500lbs - post 1572 page 79. You have quoted one of the many excellent posts by Double Bogey advocating flying fully coupled which I assume is fully automatic with the flying pilot monitoring. What you said here is that you have seen for a long time in the simulator, that pilots can fly fully manually no problem, and fully auto no problem, but problems arise when mixing the two, when stress and distraction are present. I also assume that getting low in poor visibility make those two factors appear. This may be as close as it gets to hitting the nail on the head.
HeliComparitor post 1574 page 79. Sterile Cockpit - if this is a rule when the 2 crew don't talk to each other I find this quite worrying, but I guess there is a good reason for it? I would have assumed professional crews knew when to keep quiet and when to talk? Would be interested in what the RAF guys think of this? And the NS pilots.
26500lbs Post 1579, page 79. We have hired co pilots with low hrs due to pilot shortages, I understand this, on the rigs its the same. Another poster above your post also suggests that training to become licensed does not cover the complex automation on the modern large helicopters we use - a worry. Although this is surely easily addressed? I can also see how routine and tedium on long flights in cruise is a worry, and complacency but don't have any answers to this.
I do however have a question. Is the culture in the cockpit such that an inexperienced co pilot has the confidence (I would say duty) to question a Snr captain if he thought he was observing bad practice, or to make a suggestion on how to do something better. I would like to think that even if he asked something stupid, this would be seen as an opportunity for the captain to pass on knowledge and experience?
Crab post 1588 page 80 - agree we must make sure training is sufficient and adequate no matter the cost, but also guard against overtraining - training for trainings sake and generating a new industry. Also you should be able to fail training - often does not happen now as this reflects badly on the training provider. The Norwegian training model posted earlier looks good.
I may be an old cynic, but I don't think a House of Commons select committee or Scottish Parliament ministers will help us learn the lessons and make the required improvements, but hopefully I am wrong.
I like the work being done by the HSSG, although maybe for some of the workforce they are perceived as being too close to the oil companies, even although the unions are represented there.
Hummingfrog, post 1549, page 78. The suggestion all 3 Aberdeen companies need some sort of meeting. I think you need some sort of work group which meets on a regular basis, reviews incidents, near misses and feedback from the crews and the sim instructors, and makes recommendations on procedures, automation etc and shares the learning's. If this could be done under HSSG then even better. Most important things - open minds or as you guys say shields down thinking.
Keep up the excellent debate and exchange of views here.
Sorry for the long post. One other thing, don't shut the curtain so often, it seemed to me to happen more often recently. Some of the non sleeping pax like to watch you guys at work.
The pilots involved in this incident. We do not know the full reason or reasons for this accident yet, so let's not presume they are guilty of anything until all the facts are known, we cannot make any judgements until we have the full facts, but we can learn lessons, which I think everyone is doing on this thread on the forum.
victor papa - post 1484 page 75. Please keep fighting to try and implement the improvements you and your colleagues have discovered - keep fighting against the stupidity. I fully agree with Senior Pilots post 1493 on the same page. Perhaps you could remind them there are 4 grieving families, a seriously injured pilot and some others who are very lucky to have walked away from this one.
26500lbs - post 1572 page 79. You have quoted one of the many excellent posts by Double Bogey advocating flying fully coupled which I assume is fully automatic with the flying pilot monitoring. What you said here is that you have seen for a long time in the simulator, that pilots can fly fully manually no problem, and fully auto no problem, but problems arise when mixing the two, when stress and distraction are present. I also assume that getting low in poor visibility make those two factors appear. This may be as close as it gets to hitting the nail on the head.
HeliComparitor post 1574 page 79. Sterile Cockpit - if this is a rule when the 2 crew don't talk to each other I find this quite worrying, but I guess there is a good reason for it? I would have assumed professional crews knew when to keep quiet and when to talk? Would be interested in what the RAF guys think of this? And the NS pilots.
26500lbs Post 1579, page 79. We have hired co pilots with low hrs due to pilot shortages, I understand this, on the rigs its the same. Another poster above your post also suggests that training to become licensed does not cover the complex automation on the modern large helicopters we use - a worry. Although this is surely easily addressed? I can also see how routine and tedium on long flights in cruise is a worry, and complacency but don't have any answers to this.
I do however have a question. Is the culture in the cockpit such that an inexperienced co pilot has the confidence (I would say duty) to question a Snr captain if he thought he was observing bad practice, or to make a suggestion on how to do something better. I would like to think that even if he asked something stupid, this would be seen as an opportunity for the captain to pass on knowledge and experience?
Crab post 1588 page 80 - agree we must make sure training is sufficient and adequate no matter the cost, but also guard against overtraining - training for trainings sake and generating a new industry. Also you should be able to fail training - often does not happen now as this reflects badly on the training provider. The Norwegian training model posted earlier looks good.
I may be an old cynic, but I don't think a House of Commons select committee or Scottish Parliament ministers will help us learn the lessons and make the required improvements, but hopefully I am wrong.
I like the work being done by the HSSG, although maybe for some of the workforce they are perceived as being too close to the oil companies, even although the unions are represented there.
Hummingfrog, post 1549, page 78. The suggestion all 3 Aberdeen companies need some sort of meeting. I think you need some sort of work group which meets on a regular basis, reviews incidents, near misses and feedback from the crews and the sim instructors, and makes recommendations on procedures, automation etc and shares the learning's. If this could be done under HSSG then even better. Most important things - open minds or as you guys say shields down thinking.
Keep up the excellent debate and exchange of views here.
Sorry for the long post. One other thing, don't shut the curtain so often, it seemed to me to happen more often recently. Some of the non sleeping pax like to watch you guys at work.
Sterile cockpit
Thelearner
I would love to be able to tell you that "sterile cockpit" is the cleaning regime whereby all the dropped pilot food, gunge and ship's rat droppings are meticulously cleaned up from the cockpit at the end of every flight. Sadly its not so.
It refers to a "no chit-chat" policy whereby talk in the cockpit is limited solely to stuff required to get the job done safely and efficiently. In other words, no chat about "wot I did last night", the state of Ronnie on Eastenders etc.
Clearly its a good policy when all concentration has to be given to the job in hand during critical phases of flight, but if you extend it too long, it will inevitably not be adhered to.
Not only that, but a part of working closely with another pilot requires you to understand what makes them tick, in order to optimise the way you interact with them, in order to function optimally together. "Idle chit chat" is in fact very beneficial in this respect since it allows you to get a handle on your colleague, especially if you don't know them well. With a newish copilot and a senior captain, it helps to break down barriers and make the copilot regard the capt as being human! So it is a very important part of the job. Granted there is a time for this, and a time not to be doing this, but it shouldn't be dismissed as irrelevant.
I would love to be able to tell you that "sterile cockpit" is the cleaning regime whereby all the dropped pilot food, gunge and ship's rat droppings are meticulously cleaned up from the cockpit at the end of every flight. Sadly its not so.
It refers to a "no chit-chat" policy whereby talk in the cockpit is limited solely to stuff required to get the job done safely and efficiently. In other words, no chat about "wot I did last night", the state of Ronnie on Eastenders etc.
Clearly its a good policy when all concentration has to be given to the job in hand during critical phases of flight, but if you extend it too long, it will inevitably not be adhered to.
Not only that, but a part of working closely with another pilot requires you to understand what makes them tick, in order to optimise the way you interact with them, in order to function optimally together. "Idle chit chat" is in fact very beneficial in this respect since it allows you to get a handle on your colleague, especially if you don't know them well. With a newish copilot and a senior captain, it helps to break down barriers and make the copilot regard the capt as being human! So it is a very important part of the job. Granted there is a time for this, and a time not to be doing this, but it shouldn't be dismissed as irrelevant.
Last edited by HeliComparator; 11th Sep 2013 at 21:10.
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HC, thanks for clearing that up for me. Makes perfect sense now.
I may be wrong, but in military, and possibly civilian SAR, are you much more likely to be flying with the same crew all the time compared to commercial NS ops? In FW going by TV documentary's which I watch too much of, often the crew have little experience of each other?
I may be wrong, but in military, and possibly civilian SAR, are you much more likely to be flying with the same crew all the time compared to commercial NS ops? In FW going by TV documentary's which I watch too much of, often the crew have little experience of each other?
HC, thanks for clearing that up for me. Makes perfect sense now.
I may be wrong, but in military, and possibly civilian SAR, are you much more likely to be flying with the same crew all the time compared to commercial NS ops? In FW going by TV documentary's which I watch too much of, often the crew have little experience of each other?
I may be wrong, but in military, and possibly civilian SAR, are you much more likely to be flying with the same crew all the time compared to commercial NS ops? In FW going by TV documentary's which I watch too much of, often the crew have little experience of each other?
That said, some of the oil and gas bases are not that big, and due to the rosters (in Bristow anyway, where rosters tend to be very predictable) you often are rostered to fly with a relatively small cadre of pilots. That does of course mean that once in a while you fly with someone new, because they have worked a day off for someone else etc.
But a big part of the job is getting on with your fellow pilot for 8 hours or so, when he might be someone who otherwise you would really not wish to spend any time at all. That's why we have to do courses on the subject -aka CRM!
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IFR Piggy, that was a quality rant!!
Thanks, all compliments are welcome! If you re-read my post I was asking for an AAIB definition to "non-technical" with a particular interest in aircraft serviceability state, and not as you inferred; demanding an end to all speculation on this accident. Do I get to keep the wooden spoon?
Al-bert
I believe you touched very briefly on the same point but then spun off in a direction of self praise aboard the band wagon of "pilots these days don't have adequate handling skills".....no doubt, I'm still wrong about that and the willy waving and await further correction. By the way I might be a pig but Dad's a horse!
Monitoring an aircraft flown by the other or "third" pilot and handling skills are two distinctly different elements to our daily routine and I don't believe handling skills are the most pertinent factor with this accident......bugger I've said it again.
I agree with all that have made the points that will aid effective monitoring; Reducing checklist items, amending SOPs to time the use of checks during less critical phases or "holding the checks" when necessary, strict adherence to sterile cockpit procedures, etc But also the aircraft we fly could be modified to help improve monitoring by alerting the pilots to an undesired flight configuration.
26500 wrote and Crab quoted
I don't accept that at all. My company pays for 2 simulator sessions per pilot per year. Just how many do you need? Each sim trip overseas (there are none here) is followed by equal time off.
Training is far more limited due to the nature of budgets and how much the customer is willing to pay. There is always a competitor who will try and do it cheaper, driving competition and stretching budgets ever further. My point is that we have what we have and have to work with that and within some of the constraints we have upon us
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industry insider
I hope you're being ironic
Those that mentioned the door blocking the windows - this was mentioned earlier in this thread with reference to the Bond ETAP ditching where passengers slid open the door in the normal manner, thus blocking two of the windows.
I hope you're being ironic
Those that mentioned the door blocking the windows - this was mentioned earlier in this thread with reference to the Bond ETAP ditching where passengers slid open the door in the normal manner, thus blocking two of the windows.
II
Are these training sessions or "checking sessions" where OPCs/LPCs have to be completed?
The Sim sessions that I had were a mixture and because we used company TREs always had some training value tacked onto the end of the "checking session". Does this happen with 3rd party trainers?
HF
My company pays for 2 simulator sessions per pilot per year
The Sim sessions that I had were a mixture and because we used company TREs always had some training value tacked onto the end of the "checking session". Does this happen with 3rd party trainers?
HF
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Approach Minimums
Hi Guys,
How did the crew do this approach legally when the minimums were 300 feet and the reported ceiling was 200 feet?
Would they have just shot it anyway and hoped to see some sort of the runway environment from the MAP at MDA even though they would have been 100' into the clouds? Would they crank up the lights on a day like this in Sumburgh?
I'm curious if they intentionally descended below approach minimums after levelling off because they were still in cloud or just descended straight through MDA into the water in one go?
How did the crew do this approach legally when the minimums were 300 feet and the reported ceiling was 200 feet?
Would they have just shot it anyway and hoped to see some sort of the runway environment from the MAP at MDA even though they would have been 100' into the clouds? Would they crank up the lights on a day like this in Sumburgh?
I'm curious if they intentionally descended below approach minimums after levelling off because they were still in cloud or just descended straight through MDA into the water in one go?
Are these training sessions or "checking sessions" where OPCs/LPCs have to be completed?
The Sim sessions that I had were a mixture and because we used company TREs always had some training value tacked onto the end of the "checking session". Does this happen with 3rd party trainers?
The Sim sessions that I had were a mixture and because we used company TREs always had some training value tacked onto the end of the "checking session". Does this happen with 3rd party trainers?
By Session I have to assume an hour and a half as the handling pilot and then the same amount of time as the non-handling pilot for a total of three hours per session.
Please explain to me why a TRE/IRE would do training AFTER the Check Ride?
Would not training be far more beneficial if it were done as part of a regular syllabus and be combined with Classroom and System trainers....then carry on in the Sim and apply what was learned or refreshed during the other training?
Guys.....just reading the Questions tells me there is a huge problem in what is going on.
Sort of a blunt answer but my Butt is hurting from 900 miles of Harley riding and perhaps i am a bit grouchy tonight.....really....two whole Sim sessions in a Year....and probably focused upon doing some required Checks and damn little in the way of useful training.
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Article in The Scotsman, nice to know about the S92's run dry capability. 
Shetland helicopter crash: Warning over Sikorsky S-92 - The Scotsman
Shetland helicopter crash: Warning over Sikorsky S-92 - The Scotsman
The S-92 was applauded by federal aviation authorities in the US for its safety, including a “run-dry” feature which allows it to go for 30 minutes after running out of fuel.
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Hello again, I would like to put forward a few more remarks from the back seats if I may, of particular concern to me is the apparently barely discussed side doors.
I posted on here a while ago and have been home for a while so my recent helicopter ride experience is some time on a 332L1 yesterday (and then a while last night catching up on this thread). Coincidental to some recent comments I recall wondering as I sat there whether the emergency release on the doors functions when the doors are open and I am a bit disturbed to find they don't.
My theory is that this makes these doors very dangerous simply due to human nature. In the event of a sudden violent ditching, all the folk on board will probably have just one thought on their minds and that is to get out. The 6 persons in the middle row will have the doors and the safest and easiest way for them to leave in a hurry is through the doors and opening the doors will give the largest and therefore easiest gap. In a panic would there be any thought to the training video about these doors obscuring the front windows?
My point is that due to human nature, this will probably be the first choice as it is a well observed method for doing this (i.e. a normal sliding forward opening) - which will condem those in front row. I would suspect in a panic situation the emergency door release would be less likely to be used to to its difficult location in the row forward! This is hard to reach by those next to the door and in panic those in the front row will be trying the windows and not worrying about a door that they are not using. In the event that the door is slid open then they will be unable to release it.
My point discussed before about cramped conditions strongly applies to the front row of seats now I have travelled in them again. My favorite spot is the centre forward facing seat so I can watch the instruments (those I can see anyway - cant quite see VSI) and looking yesterday, I don't see any way that the 6 seats crammed in there could be safe in an evacuation. There was only 4 averaged sized people there yesterday and it would still have been a struggle. I noticed the window closest to me was of the small type and I would have been hard pressed to use it and there was an empty seat between me and it meaning that 2 folk should have been using 1 small window! I would question if window size vs a north sea person in full modern survival gear including air pocket has ever been tested.
There is obviously also the issue of comfort. The 4 people yesterday staggered the seats to give each other leg room but 6 people in these seats leaves 4 people jammed together very closely. Maybe it would be wise to video people disembarking from arriving helicopters and those flights where a percentage of the passengers are staggering in pain to the terminal due to cramp be looked at.
Following that question I would like to ask if anyone knows who defines the capacity of 19 people on these flights and what are the specifications? Does it have anything to do with escapability? From a non technical point of view I doubt it, therefore raising the question is the basic capacity rating procedure wrong? Having looked again yesterday sadly I would suspect most of the casualties in the recent tragic accident may have been in this section of the cabin.
In summary I would like to know what others think of the doors. Would it be wise to have the emergency release next to or on the door itself and clearly labelled that it must be used in emergency? Could it be redesigned to work when open or partially open as well (I realise this would be difficult)? Can anyone define the capacity rating procedure?
I posted on here a while ago and have been home for a while so my recent helicopter ride experience is some time on a 332L1 yesterday (and then a while last night catching up on this thread). Coincidental to some recent comments I recall wondering as I sat there whether the emergency release on the doors functions when the doors are open and I am a bit disturbed to find they don't.
My theory is that this makes these doors very dangerous simply due to human nature. In the event of a sudden violent ditching, all the folk on board will probably have just one thought on their minds and that is to get out. The 6 persons in the middle row will have the doors and the safest and easiest way for them to leave in a hurry is through the doors and opening the doors will give the largest and therefore easiest gap. In a panic would there be any thought to the training video about these doors obscuring the front windows?
My point is that due to human nature, this will probably be the first choice as it is a well observed method for doing this (i.e. a normal sliding forward opening) - which will condem those in front row. I would suspect in a panic situation the emergency door release would be less likely to be used to to its difficult location in the row forward! This is hard to reach by those next to the door and in panic those in the front row will be trying the windows and not worrying about a door that they are not using. In the event that the door is slid open then they will be unable to release it.
My point discussed before about cramped conditions strongly applies to the front row of seats now I have travelled in them again. My favorite spot is the centre forward facing seat so I can watch the instruments (those I can see anyway - cant quite see VSI) and looking yesterday, I don't see any way that the 6 seats crammed in there could be safe in an evacuation. There was only 4 averaged sized people there yesterday and it would still have been a struggle. I noticed the window closest to me was of the small type and I would have been hard pressed to use it and there was an empty seat between me and it meaning that 2 folk should have been using 1 small window! I would question if window size vs a north sea person in full modern survival gear including air pocket has ever been tested.
There is obviously also the issue of comfort. The 4 people yesterday staggered the seats to give each other leg room but 6 people in these seats leaves 4 people jammed together very closely. Maybe it would be wise to video people disembarking from arriving helicopters and those flights where a percentage of the passengers are staggering in pain to the terminal due to cramp be looked at.
Following that question I would like to ask if anyone knows who defines the capacity of 19 people on these flights and what are the specifications? Does it have anything to do with escapability? From a non technical point of view I doubt it, therefore raising the question is the basic capacity rating procedure wrong? Having looked again yesterday sadly I would suspect most of the casualties in the recent tragic accident may have been in this section of the cabin.
In summary I would like to know what others think of the doors. Would it be wise to have the emergency release next to or on the door itself and clearly labelled that it must be used in emergency? Could it be redesigned to work when open or partially open as well (I realise this would be difficult)? Can anyone define the capacity rating procedure?