AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
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At no point have I said 'accidents happen' Pitts. I am saying statistics lie and that emotion clouds reality. This accident is a tragic loss of life and I hope that we all can learn from it to avoid repitition. Pandering to FB, basing the public opinion on hearsay from a relative of a passenger, and picking and choosing which stats to look at are the issues I am completely sick of.
When an oil rig catches fire, explodes, leaks crude, or kills people do we shut them all down? Or all semi-subs? No, it's ridiculous. I trust that the men and women working on the vessels I land on, spend time on, and race to when I am needed are professional enough to do their best to provide a safe environment for me.
I do the same for them!
As for the grounding....good sense for the PR guys. Limited adverse effect if not necessary. But if a 332/225 has an incident removed from the previous by every magnitude possible, no connection whatsoever, the damage to the type and the operator will be insurmountable. Risk assessment says pander to the mob.
Operationally, given the paucity of information, the groundings are unjustified. The history of the type does not support it nor do the stats. I believe that if there was a design flaw that had come to light there would not be a single individual trying to hide it. We would all know.
We are where we are because too many people have traded in their brains for paperwork, their balls for PR and longevity, and our CEO's have no connection to their industries.
When an oil rig catches fire, explodes, leaks crude, or kills people do we shut them all down? Or all semi-subs? No, it's ridiculous. I trust that the men and women working on the vessels I land on, spend time on, and race to when I am needed are professional enough to do their best to provide a safe environment for me.
I do the same for them!
As for the grounding....good sense for the PR guys. Limited adverse effect if not necessary. But if a 332/225 has an incident removed from the previous by every magnitude possible, no connection whatsoever, the damage to the type and the operator will be insurmountable. Risk assessment says pander to the mob.
Operationally, given the paucity of information, the groundings are unjustified. The history of the type does not support it nor do the stats. I believe that if there was a design flaw that had come to light there would not be a single individual trying to hide it. We would all know.
We are where we are because too many people have traded in their brains for paperwork, their balls for PR and longevity, and our CEO's have no connection to their industries.
Given;
This is not going to be revealed in an hour-long tour by a company's PR department, so what is needed is a task force of experienced (maybe retired?) helicopter industry professionals who can go into each company and work alongside the personnel there, in all operations and maintenance departments, to establish which aspects of one company's culture enable it to operate the same machine as its competitors, but with less incidents.
Each visit would need to last weeks, if not months, to give time for a range of incidents to be observed and see how they are managed, as well as giving sufficient time for the 'being watched' feeling to go and the true style of operations to be observed.
Such an exercise would need the cooperation of all the operators, and assurances that the sole objective is to bring industry standards up to the level of the best.
- the current lack of confidence in the Super Puma variants by those who travel to work in them,
- the potential loss of revenue to UK PLC and the rig operators from a sudden reduction in available helicopters,
- the evident difference in accident/incident rates between the various North Sea helicopter operators,
This is not going to be revealed in an hour-long tour by a company's PR department, so what is needed is a task force of experienced (maybe retired?) helicopter industry professionals who can go into each company and work alongside the personnel there, in all operations and maintenance departments, to establish which aspects of one company's culture enable it to operate the same machine as its competitors, but with less incidents.
Each visit would need to last weeks, if not months, to give time for a range of incidents to be observed and see how they are managed, as well as giving sufficient time for the 'being watched' feeling to go and the true style of operations to be observed.
Such an exercise would need the cooperation of all the operators, and assurances that the sole objective is to bring industry standards up to the level of the best.
Last edited by Mechta; 27th Aug 2013 at 12:45.
Gentlemen (and Ladies),
I awoke to find five new pages to this thread from when I left it late last night.
It took a full cup of coffee to read through the new posts and consider what I had read.
In a previous post I warned that there would be shoulder dropping, finger pointing, spinning, etc....before this issue or issues had been resolved.
I was right....it started while I was sound asleep, safely snug in my bed.
Air Wave in post 440 hit the Nail squarely on the Head.....every damn one of you posting here need to go back and read that post again.
He stated words to the effect...."Every accident gets investigated and recommendations are made." His point being, as I understood it....is the "System" never gets investigated.
That is the crux of the problem.....the entire system needs investigating and the System needs fixing. It is the System that is causing the problems that manifest themselves in the form of Incidents, Ditchings, and Crashes.
A direct example of what I am talking about.....the Bristow 76 that had the Lightning Struck Rotor Blade re-installed on a different Aircraft.
HC refuses to accept, admit, or confront the Bristow Management Decision to re-use that Blade after it had been involved in a Lightning Strike on a different aircraft.
Get him to list the damage done to the aircraft that was struck by Lightning and pass judgement on the Management Decision, which would have required the Engineers agreeing to it.
That Blade should never have been put back into service.
He is correct there was a manufacturing defect in the blade that upon being struck by Lightning.....led to the blade failure. The defect would not otherwise have harmed the integrity of the blade EXCEPT for the Lightning Strike.
The System failed in that case and good Men died as direct result.
Ask HC what the Bristow Policy is now on re-using parts from aircraft that are struck by Lightning.
Folks, Drop the Shields!
Go back and look at every single accident, at every single incident, and re-consider all the causes of the problems. That is what is needed....not protecting your turf, shifting blame, spinning the truth.
The Truth is the UK North Sea Helicopter operation has problems that need to directly addressed.
The Accident rate in the GOM are DOWN.....even the US HEMS Industry Accident Rates are DOWN. They had to go down as they damn sure could not go up very much. Key.....The American Helicopter Industry and the FAA did something. Kicking and Screaming....they did something but they finally admitted there was a problem and then set out to improve the situation.
That is where you are today.....and kicking and screaming you are going to have to do something about it.
Nick Lappos in a Safety Seminar I attended.....said "The harder you have to argue you have no problem.....the bigger your problem really is."
So ya'll keep on arguing about how big your problem is.
I awoke to find five new pages to this thread from when I left it late last night.
It took a full cup of coffee to read through the new posts and consider what I had read.
In a previous post I warned that there would be shoulder dropping, finger pointing, spinning, etc....before this issue or issues had been resolved.
I was right....it started while I was sound asleep, safely snug in my bed.
Air Wave in post 440 hit the Nail squarely on the Head.....every damn one of you posting here need to go back and read that post again.
Reasurances that you'll investigate specific incidents mean nothing, you already do that and it doesn't actually make any difference.
(in the overall picture)
Too many and too often is the problem.
(in the overall picture)
Too many and too often is the problem.
That is the crux of the problem.....the entire system needs investigating and the System needs fixing. It is the System that is causing the problems that manifest themselves in the form of Incidents, Ditchings, and Crashes.
A direct example of what I am talking about.....the Bristow 76 that had the Lightning Struck Rotor Blade re-installed on a different Aircraft.
HC refuses to accept, admit, or confront the Bristow Management Decision to re-use that Blade after it had been involved in a Lightning Strike on a different aircraft.
Get him to list the damage done to the aircraft that was struck by Lightning and pass judgement on the Management Decision, which would have required the Engineers agreeing to it.
That Blade should never have been put back into service.
He is correct there was a manufacturing defect in the blade that upon being struck by Lightning.....led to the blade failure. The defect would not otherwise have harmed the integrity of the blade EXCEPT for the Lightning Strike.
The System failed in that case and good Men died as direct result.
Ask HC what the Bristow Policy is now on re-using parts from aircraft that are struck by Lightning.
Folks, Drop the Shields!
Go back and look at every single accident, at every single incident, and re-consider all the causes of the problems. That is what is needed....not protecting your turf, shifting blame, spinning the truth.
The Truth is the UK North Sea Helicopter operation has problems that need to directly addressed.
The Accident rate in the GOM are DOWN.....even the US HEMS Industry Accident Rates are DOWN. They had to go down as they damn sure could not go up very much. Key.....The American Helicopter Industry and the FAA did something. Kicking and Screaming....they did something but they finally admitted there was a problem and then set out to improve the situation.
That is where you are today.....and kicking and screaming you are going to have to do something about it.
Nick Lappos in a Safety Seminar I attended.....said "The harder you have to argue you have no problem.....the bigger your problem really is."
So ya'll keep on arguing about how big your problem is.
Last edited by SASless; 27th Aug 2013 at 13:13.
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Senior Pilot & GF:My apologies if my post was viewed as insulting those who have contributed to this thread this was not the case. I guess I am as frustrated as others in that accusations are being made about the abilities and competence of UK aviation professionals by individuals who do not work in the aviation industry they merely use it. GF you are entirely correct that the lives of the passengers are in our hands and, agreed, we always welcome questions from those passengers who come forward from the cabin and this will/should continue. To start down the line of UK aviation standards versus Norwegian aviation standards is drifting off the events of what happened last Friday and is nonsense. Why does the UK have more incidents than Norway is exactly the same as HC stated in why CHC & Bond have had more than Bristow...that being luck.My opinion.
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Mechta, yours is a sound idea.
But do you know one of the most effective ways this could be accomplished?
Well let me tell you first of all how it could be stifled. If you leave it to the operators to sort it out among themselves it will never happen because there will be suspicions as to allegiances and agenda.
If you give it to the authority they will draw-up some fabulous list of requirements any such task force would need to possess and in the process most likely circumvent those who could realistically offer the most (ie. the retired jocks and spanners you suggest).
One of the areas in which you might therefore find the most support, is from the bears themselves. A North Sea Helicopter Operations Task Force comprised of retired pilots and engineers, supported in their mission by offshore workers and paid for by Oilco Plc.
I encourage to pursue what you have proposed.
But do you know one of the most effective ways this could be accomplished?
Well let me tell you first of all how it could be stifled. If you leave it to the operators to sort it out among themselves it will never happen because there will be suspicions as to allegiances and agenda.
If you give it to the authority they will draw-up some fabulous list of requirements any such task force would need to possess and in the process most likely circumvent those who could realistically offer the most (ie. the retired jocks and spanners you suggest).
One of the areas in which you might therefore find the most support, is from the bears themselves. A North Sea Helicopter Operations Task Force comprised of retired pilots and engineers, supported in their mission by offshore workers and paid for by Oilco Plc.
I encourage to pursue what you have proposed.
"Luck" is made....not inherited.
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I apologise myself however if my support (earlier in the thread) for a comparison between British and Norwegian operations was in any way unhelpful. I can only plead ignorance together with an initial alarm at the statistics being touted. The situation is still far from clear though and it would seem that some recommendations from the Sintef report may be applicable as well as other general operational procedures from Norway but, none of this is as yet confirmed.
We've had something similar this morning with another set of statistics being touted telling us that GOM ops are safer than NS ops and which comes as a surprise because within the industry NS operators use their NS ops as a sort of professional benchmark. Again, as with the 'Norwegian scenario' the facts are too sparse for us to draw any substantive interpretations let alone conclusions.
Hence my support for Mechta's proposal which I think is a sound idea.
SAS, I don't know too much about the 76 blade, it is a type I have never flown and the event occured on a base I have never operated from. However I believe that the manufacturer's recommendations were followed to the letter. You could argue that Bristow should have known better than Sikorsky about how to deal with damaged parts, but I think that is unrealistic. In accordance with the MM, the part was returned to the Sikorsky facility, who had full knowledge about the nature of the damage, they as the experts in the field, did what they considered necessary to return the part to service. What you are saying is something along the lines of "anytime a helicopter develops a defect, it should be thrown away and a new one put into service. Everytime a component reaches its overhaul life, it should be thrown away and not overhauled." Not terribly practical.
Yes, with hindsight everyone now realises the potential danger of those actions, but before the event, everybody (operator, manufacturer, regulator) though they were doing the right thing and not cutting any corners.
The true cause of that accident was the latent manufacturing defect in the blade. As witnessed by the fact that all the AAIB's recommendations were aimed at the manufacturer, none at the operator.
Yes, with hindsight everyone now realises the potential danger of those actions, but before the event, everybody (operator, manufacturer, regulator) though they were doing the right thing and not cutting any corners.
The true cause of that accident was the latent manufacturing defect in the blade. As witnessed by the fact that all the AAIB's recommendations were aimed at the manufacturer, none at the operator.
Last edited by HeliComparator; 27th Aug 2013 at 13:31.
At no point have I said 'accidents happen' Pitts. I am saying statistics lie and that emotion clouds reality. This accident is a tragic loss of life and I hope that we all can learn from it to avoid repitition. Pandering to FB, basing the public opinion on hearsay from a relative of a passenger, and picking and choosing which stats to look at are the issues I am completely sick of.
When an oil rig catches fire, explodes, leaks crude, or kills people do we shut them all down? Or all semi-subs? No, it's ridiculous. I trust that the men and women working on the vessels I land on, spend time on, and race to when I am needed are professional enough to do their best to provide a safe environment for me.
I do the same for them!
As for the grounding....good sense for the PR guys. Limited adverse effect if not necessary. But if a 332/225 has an incident removed from the previous by every magnitude possible, no connection whatsoever, the damage to the type and the operator will be insurmountable. Risk assessment says pander to the mob.
Operationally, given the paucity of information, the groundings are unjustified. The history of the type does not support it nor do the stats. I believe that if there was a design flaw that had come to light there would not be a single individual trying to hide it. We would all know.
We are where we are because too many people have traded in their brains for paperwork, their balls for PR and longevity, and our CEO's have no connection to their industries.
When an oil rig catches fire, explodes, leaks crude, or kills people do we shut them all down? Or all semi-subs? No, it's ridiculous. I trust that the men and women working on the vessels I land on, spend time on, and race to when I am needed are professional enough to do their best to provide a safe environment for me.
I do the same for them!
As for the grounding....good sense for the PR guys. Limited adverse effect if not necessary. But if a 332/225 has an incident removed from the previous by every magnitude possible, no connection whatsoever, the damage to the type and the operator will be insurmountable. Risk assessment says pander to the mob.
Operationally, given the paucity of information, the groundings are unjustified. The history of the type does not support it nor do the stats. I believe that if there was a design flaw that had come to light there would not be a single individual trying to hide it. We would all know.
We are where we are because too many people have traded in their brains for paperwork, their balls for PR and longevity, and our CEO's have no connection to their industries.
I hear the view over the groundings but I'm not sure what message it sends had they not occurred, even if there are willing passengers to fly in them today in any event? I don't know. One can suggest its irrational but the one who pays the piper calls the tune...
I don't agree with the last paragraph. I don't think the stockholders of Bristow (keep the piper and his tune in the front of the mind) give two fecks about Bill Chiles ability to fly a helicopter. They care that the business is tightly run with increasing margins and revenues, end of.
The same will be true for the stockholders at EADS, however it does seem that the man now at the helm of Eurocopter is in fact a professional pilot but I don't expect much to change, do you?
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I enjoy reading the posts that SASless makes. He has a great talent for aiming at right spot - but a completely warped love of the Chinook!
On this thread he has posted the quote
I've read all of the accident investigations of the UK crashes and they make sad reading - failed procedures, failed processes, engineering or design errors. Their cumulative effect has got us here. Most of the non-pilot contributions have been trying to point this out.
Airwave I think sums up the passenger view quite well. If the 332s have to be scarificed to shake things up, tough! It is not fair and I for one would be happy to go offshore tomorrow in one - I do not believe (perhaps until the AAIB preliminary bulletin!) that there is a type specific fault. But things have to change.
What I do believe is there is no active safety management and nothing pro-active within the system (EASA, CAA, Helicopter companies, O&G companies) which will eliminate the sources of potential accidents and so reduce the real accident rate. Plugging the holes which have appeared in the bucket is not working.
Anold Palmer is reputed to have said "the more I practice, the luckier I get". In the majority of cases luck is practice. I'm right behind Mechta.
On this thread he has posted the quote
Nick Lappos in a Safety Seminar I attended.....said "The harder you have to argue you have no problem.....the bigger your problem really is."
Airwave I think sums up the passenger view quite well. If the 332s have to be scarificed to shake things up, tough! It is not fair and I for one would be happy to go offshore tomorrow in one - I do not believe (perhaps until the AAIB preliminary bulletin!) that there is a type specific fault. But things have to change.
What I do believe is there is no active safety management and nothing pro-active within the system (EASA, CAA, Helicopter companies, O&G companies) which will eliminate the sources of potential accidents and so reduce the real accident rate. Plugging the holes which have appeared in the bucket is not working.
Anold Palmer is reputed to have said "the more I practice, the luckier I get". In the majority of cases luck is practice. I'm right behind Mechta.
Grenville,
Thanks for your reply. Yes, I am well aware that both the industry and the authorities would be able to mess up such a proposal before it even starts. Getting the customers/users (oil companies/'bears' unions) to apply the pressure sounds like a good idea.
In the short term, how about another appoach? A confidential survey, or confidential interviews with all personnel who have worked for more than one North Sea helicopter operator? It is bound to identify examples of how similar incidents were handled in different ways.
My concern is that the further away from the spanners/cyclic stick/ops room one goes, the more the true 'modus operandi' is distorted and the detail missed. Only by being right where the decisions are made, can a true feel for the way a helicopter is operated be made.
Thanks for your reply. Yes, I am well aware that both the industry and the authorities would be able to mess up such a proposal before it even starts. Getting the customers/users (oil companies/'bears' unions) to apply the pressure sounds like a good idea.
In the short term, how about another appoach? A confidential survey, or confidential interviews with all personnel who have worked for more than one North Sea helicopter operator? It is bound to identify examples of how similar incidents were handled in different ways.
My concern is that the further away from the spanners/cyclic stick/ops room one goes, the more the true 'modus operandi' is distorted and the detail missed. Only by being right where the decisions are made, can a true feel for the way a helicopter is operated be made.
HC,
Read the accident report and the incident report for the Lightning strike.
All the gearboxes, tail rotor blades, and several other components were scrapped.
Yet....they wanted to re-use this blade?
As I have said.....the "System" has some flaws in it.
Gasax,
We all have our favorite sweetheart don't we.....in helicopters mine is the Chinook and I am quite glad to admit it. She never let me down and always got me home even if she did give me some white hairs in the process....but then the majority of my time in them was in "A" Models....early "A" Models with all the teething problems that incurred....and in a place where the locals were very hostile NIMBY's.
Read the accident report and the incident report for the Lightning strike.
All the gearboxes, tail rotor blades, and several other components were scrapped.
Yet....they wanted to re-use this blade?
As I have said.....the "System" has some flaws in it.
Gasax,
We all have our favorite sweetheart don't we.....in helicopters mine is the Chinook and I am quite glad to admit it. She never let me down and always got me home even if she did give me some white hairs in the process....but then the majority of my time in them was in "A" Models....early "A" Models with all the teething problems that incurred....and in a place where the locals were very hostile NIMBY's.
Last edited by SASless; 27th Aug 2013 at 13:38.
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Thanks for replying airwave. I would like to continue this debate a little more. I will add my own highlights to your post:
Airwave45
I could take some exception to this statement. Do you really think that the only safety efforts made in the helicopter aviation community are in response to crashes?
I know that as a check and training pilot over more than a decade I have seen different. Take a CFIT accident for instance. After the accident there is a flurry of blame, dissection of the crew, operator, CAA, etc. Then highly publicized changes are made. You see the reactiveness of the system most of us dislike (and I personally despise) because that is all anyone on the outside sees.
On a daily basis we are on the line watching how procedures are being flown, suggesting changes, assessing the effectiveness of training, makes changes to curriculums, monitoring flight checks for trends, etc. No one outside our sphere sees this proactive work because there was no accident to put it on FB.
That doesn't mean the work wasn't happening.
Not so long ago I was receiving an update during a monthly safety meeting (hate the name) and at that time CHC's accident rate was equivalent to a first tier airline. Despite a much harsher and volatile operating environment. I don't recall the particular metric being used but the point is that those of us at the coal face have faith in the system because the real system is us, not the PR machines of the manufacturer, authority, and employer.
I have seen the same daily input into maintenance procedures, reporting of trends, and assessment of data on the engineering side.
There are weak operators out there yes, and weak individuals, but not a majority.
You agree that stats are easily manipulated, then you say...
It's not big, it's not clever, and it could kill a type (225**) that has brought many advances to the business of moving people offshore. The net positive effect is zero. Blunt instruments don't make for effective surgical tools, they just force a patient into surgery.
This is akin to having a man complain that he is in pain but it's not serious enough to get looked at. You whip out a sledge hammer and break his leg and say "now he'll see you". He asks you why you did that: now his leg is broken and his shoulder still hurts.
**I don't fly the 225, nor do I particularly want to. A VFR 212 would be a dream.
Airwave45
P and A,
Very well put together post.
There is a view from the front of the bus that every effort will be made to understand root cause for each incident, I believe you as an industry do that exceptionally well.
It's a very reactive way to address safety issues though.
Very well put together post.
There is a view from the front of the bus that every effort will be made to understand root cause for each incident, I believe you as an industry do that exceptionally well.
It's a very reactive way to address safety issues though.
I know that as a check and training pilot over more than a decade I have seen different. Take a CFIT accident for instance. After the accident there is a flurry of blame, dissection of the crew, operator, CAA, etc. Then highly publicized changes are made. You see the reactiveness of the system most of us dislike (and I personally despise) because that is all anyone on the outside sees.
On a daily basis we are on the line watching how procedures are being flown, suggesting changes, assessing the effectiveness of training, makes changes to curriculums, monitoring flight checks for trends, etc. No one outside our sphere sees this proactive work because there was no accident to put it on FB.
That doesn't mean the work wasn't happening.
Not so long ago I was receiving an update during a monthly safety meeting (hate the name) and at that time CHC's accident rate was equivalent to a first tier airline. Despite a much harsher and volatile operating environment. I don't recall the particular metric being used but the point is that those of us at the coal face have faith in the system because the real system is us, not the PR machines of the manufacturer, authority, and employer.
I have seen the same daily input into maintenance procedures, reporting of trends, and assessment of data on the engineering side.
There are weak operators out there yes, and weak individuals, but not a majority.
The Norwegian approach seems to be significantly more proactive.
As for comparing stats, you can get them to say anything as you pointed out, the 777 may have crashed every other month over the last two but despite flying into a wall at close to your Vne, it still only killed one person.
(terrible tragedy with the emergency services, for all concerned)
It's a tank.
As for comparing stats, you can get them to say anything as you pointed out, the 777 may have crashed every other month over the last two but despite flying into a wall at close to your Vne, it still only killed one person.
(terrible tragedy with the emergency services, for all concerned)
It's a tank.
Data mining the stats GoM vs NS is possible as Take off and landing data is there. But it's pretty obvious that N Sea ops are only, at best, almost as good as GoM. (but you would be stretching things to say as good as)
Given the differences in machinery, that should not be so.
Look at the difference between the East and West of the N Sea and a blind man in a dark room could see that something is not right.
I'm with you in that I don't think any specific aircraft is responsible for this.
Given the percieved difficulty by the pilots / mechs on here to pinpoint why we are not as good as the Norwegians, I'll happily see the SP sacrificed to the press as that will shake the business up sufficiently to make us find out what is going on.
It's not big and it's not clever, but it will make change happen.
Given the differences in machinery, that should not be so.
Look at the difference between the East and West of the N Sea and a blind man in a dark room could see that something is not right.
I'm with you in that I don't think any specific aircraft is responsible for this.
Given the percieved difficulty by the pilots / mechs on here to pinpoint why we are not as good as the Norwegians, I'll happily see the SP sacrificed to the press as that will shake the business up sufficiently to make us find out what is going on.
It's not big and it's not clever, but it will make change happen.
This is akin to having a man complain that he is in pain but it's not serious enough to get looked at. You whip out a sledge hammer and break his leg and say "now he'll see you". He asks you why you did that: now his leg is broken and his shoulder still hurts.
**I don't fly the 225, nor do I particularly want to. A VFR 212 would be a dream.
The AAIB report on the S76 that had the Lightning Strike.
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...pdf_501501.pdf
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...pdf_501501.pdf
Last edited by SASless; 27th Aug 2013 at 13:49.
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I don't agree with the last paragraph. I don't think the stockholders of Bristow (keep the piper and his tune in the front of the mind) give two fecks about Bill Chiles ability to fly a helicopter. They care that the business is tightly run with increasing margins and revenues, end of.
The same will be true for the stockholders at EADS, however it does seem that the man now at the helm of Eurocopter is in fact a professional pilot but I don't expect much to change, do you?
The same will be true for the stockholders at EADS, however it does seem that the man now at the helm of Eurocopter is in fact a professional pilot but I don't expect much to change, do you?
to add:
A CEO demonstrates to his subordinates what is most valued in a company, effectively creating its culture. In the last year, my employer has sent me dozens of emails regarding fiscal and financial reporting policies, revenue generation strategies, auditing standards, corporate restructurings, senior appointment responsibility reassignments, and the list goes on and on and on and on and on.......
I have not received a single email announcing new (or lost) operations or contracts, I have never seen an email above the base level that refers to a customer at all, and the only mention of a helicopter at all is when one goes in the water.
Last edited by pilot and apprentice; 27th Aug 2013 at 14:00.
P&A - maybe although my own view when you talk to the guys at Bristow management on the telephone I think safety is very high on their priority and Bill Chiles seems a stand up bloke.