Helicopter - v - crane LONDON
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SASless: Folks remember this.....Ass, Tin, Ticket....in that order.
Quite right SASless. Also this:
METAR..... TAF...... FLY or NO FLY or FLY LATER.....in that order.
By the look at the TAF´s in the area, FLY LATER would have been my obvious choice.
Quite right SASless. Also this:
METAR..... TAF...... FLY or NO FLY or FLY LATER.....in that order.
By the look at the TAF´s in the area, FLY LATER would have been my obvious choice.
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Just what are the consequences for a precautionary landing in London or a 300ft agl scud run due weather?
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It seems permission below 500ft requires a Bond film or Olympic Opening ceromony sized budget/project.
From a non pilots perspective it seems perverse that a particular flight regime can be flow with the right paperwork yet same regime is not the highest priority when fate lady luck and human error conspire against the pilot.
You need to prove to the authorities - not just the CAA sometimes - that the flying can be performed in a safe and proper manner. The permission and assistance of these authorities are essential beforehand and have enabled us to fly through Tower Bridge on two seperate occasions, landings in Central London and countless other sorties at 250' or lower over congested areas including London.
As has been said already on the threads here, in deteriorating weather a precautionary landing in a park and the subsequent enquiry would be a better bet. Sure, questions would be asked but they'd be very much more palatable than the ones that are being asked right now.
Last edited by TRC; 22nd Jan 2013 at 08:48.
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Will the draft AAIB report have a conclusion like this...
Here is a filleted AAIB summary into a recent A109 fatal accident , that was inconclusive. It will be familiar reading to certain diligent rotorheads. My concern is that, inspite of the Herculean efforts of the AAIB, we will get another summary in similar terms in twelve months time.
"The accident occurred when the helicopter flew at a near constant height, heading and groundspeed into XXXX. No technical fault was identified in the examination of the wreckage, but given the extreme disruption of the airframe and flying controls, a full inspection was not possible and therefore a technical fault cannot be completely ruled out. The helicopter impacted the terrain some 100 ft below the summit height of XXXX ft.
Without clearer evidence of the pilot’s actions or intentions, no conclusive causal factors for the accident could be established. However, as possible contributory factors, it is likely that the upper slopes of the ridge were obscured by cloud and some combination of visual or distracting factors led the pilot to consider that he was clear of terrain. Whilst there was no evidence of any pre-existing condition or disease, subtle pilot incapacitation could not be ruled out."
"The accident occurred when the helicopter flew at a near constant height, heading and groundspeed into XXXX. No technical fault was identified in the examination of the wreckage, but given the extreme disruption of the airframe and flying controls, a full inspection was not possible and therefore a technical fault cannot be completely ruled out. The helicopter impacted the terrain some 100 ft below the summit height of XXXX ft.
Without clearer evidence of the pilot’s actions or intentions, no conclusive causal factors for the accident could be established. However, as possible contributory factors, it is likely that the upper slopes of the ridge were obscured by cloud and some combination of visual or distracting factors led the pilot to consider that he was clear of terrain. Whilst there was no evidence of any pre-existing condition or disease, subtle pilot incapacitation could not be ruled out."
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For what it's worth here's a section of Google maps with a convenient 500ft scaler bottom left....500 ft radiuses dotted round the St Georges Wharf point tower(594ft high), 152 Grosvenor Rd opposite which is perhaps 150 ft high and the Millbank tower shown as 360 ft high(other sources 390ft). Much of 'south bank' (actually east there)between the Albert Embankment and the river is built up , guessing average 150ft? but I haven't attempted to dot that side
Is there any instrumentation on the tallest towers in London to transmit accurately visibility 'at the top' to ATC/the flying community?
Is there any instrumentation on the tallest towers in London to transmit accurately visibility 'at the top' to ATC/the flying community?
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THOSE WHO DO NOT WISH TO READ SPECULATIVE POSTS - TURN AWAY NOW.
I shall don my Deerstalker and suck on my Calabash once again - to the consternation of Double Bogey and others I am sure.
My supposition is based exclusively on comments made on this and the thread on Rumours and News.
The following is believed to be applicable:
* The weather at St. George Tower at around 7:30am was apparently clear but 30 mins later at 8:00am low level (presumably stratus) had moved in and obscured the top of the building.
* The pilot may have had no means of checking the "actual" weather at Elstree prior to his departure.
* The accident occurred at the point where the pilot was meant to contact Battersea (his diversion destination).
One scenario for that ill-fated Wednesday morning less than a week ago is as follows:
The pilot, a 12,000 hour well known, much admired and by all counts capable professional was tasked to collect a celebrity restaurateur from Elstree last Wednesday morning. The weather at Redhill may have been "passable" but he may have had no way of knowing the actual weather at Elstree.
He wants to perform his tasked mission (good for him and good for the business he is freelancing for). If he has any hesitation about the weather he has at least decided to go have a "look see".
According to the reports in London, at 7:30am the weather was "clear" but 30 mins later that had changed. The pilot no doubt ran into this changing weather on his northward track to Elstree.
Having been stumped by the weather ahead of him he elects to divert to his nearest alternate, Battersea.
Presumably he speaks with the control he was under and advises them of he intentions and makes the left turn.
At this point we are led to understand that there is visibility but that this exists under a fairly low cloud base.
Now this is where the supposition kicks in - there have been posts suggesting that the pilot will have maintained as much height as possible in order to avoid busting low flying rules and noise issues.
I personally think it is naive to imagine that the pilot "should have" automatically descended below the legally permissible minimums as here's why:
This whole saga unfolds from the time the pilot makes his left turn towards Battersea having abandoned hope of tracking north to Elstree due weather. During this westbound journey the flight, quite literally, falls to pieces and, barring mechanical failure, we must look at a pilot induced scenario to explain this.
Those arguing that he should have descended below the legally permissible minimums are assuming that the pilot recognised that he was facing a critical predicament, one which warranted immediate and urgent attention and we absolutely do not know if this is what was going through the pilot's head. But, to me it seems unlikely because had the pilot believed that his deteriorating visibility placed him in imminent life-threatening danger he probably would have busted the rules and taken remedial (even dramatic) action to place him and the helicopter in a situation where the reducing/reduced visibility no longer posed such great risk.
Far more likely (as has been suggested already) is that the pilot, though probably concerned about the deterioration of visibility, believed that "this too shall pass" and which then allows us to assume that his only remaining challenge was that of getting the helicopter to Battersea where he could lick the shallow wounds of having launched the flight but failed to collect (on time) his VIP passenger.
The commercial consideration to make the flight, not only from a revenue perspective for the company he was freelancing for but also in cultivating a good reputation on behalf of this company with their client (for being able to perform the flight) - should not be discounted.
Of even greater relevance is this - what did Pete Barnes have with his experience and at his age that was of worth? The answer is simple and it is the same as for any pilot - reputation.
He's just made a left turn and with that he has sacrificed RotorMotion's ability to turn up on time as promised for their VIP passenger. Some pilots will find this very easy to do while others will feel challenged to satisfy - its a fairly personal approach and without knowing the man's character I can't comment authoritatively.
Assuming however that he felt at least some element of disappointment about being unable to push through to Elstree we now find him heading towards his diversion destination. He's over the city, not just any city, but the City of London. Restrictions, regulations and peering/judgemental eyes are everywhere.
It is unlikely at this point that he is thinking to himself "this weather is seriously dangerous - I need to take drastic measures to make sure this doesn't deteriorate into something I cannot control".
So, he maintains the maximum height he can, basically hugging the cloud base as he gropes for Battersea. His likely thoughts are "this weather is a pig, I hope it improves a little, Battersea should be coming up any minute now".
Descending to an abnormally low height is not on his mind. He's already had to abort his on time arrival at Elstree and he knows the VIP is going to have to wait at the airport. He is not now going to bust the regulations and set in motion the fall out of an incident report in which he could incriminate himself and which may perhaps reflect badly on the company he is freelancing for. No, that's out of the question because it would mean a snowballing of his original decision to launch from Redhill. He's imagining the report "He launched from Redhill in generally poor visibility, the weather en-route became progressively worse, he diverted to the London Heliport and in attempting to reach his destination was forced to fly within just 200 feet (or whatever) of the built-up area along the banks of the Thames."
In his head he's thinking "no way", "there's no way this morning is going to turn into a total disaster - let me push on to Battersea, wait it out and see if we can still move the client from Elstree".
So, he skims the cloudbase remaining as high as he can in order to stay as legal as he can as best as he can. Things will work out, he will push through, Battersea is about to appear.
At this point we need to recognise another "subcontial" element in this scenario which may, or may not, have been a factor.
Helicopter pilots familiar with London know that there is a gathering of tall buildings in the Docklands area. Its impressed into the mindset and the knowledge is there.
The St. George tower, still being completed, is not instinctively something that most pilots may think of such as "Vauxhall Bridge, oh yes, I must watch out for that huge building" - the building is known to be lower than those at Canary Wharf (although with the crane was actually the same height at the tallest of the East London buildings).
So, we have a potential situation where the threat of the St. George Tower may not be as well recognised as those which exist in the east.
Stuck to the cloud base and aiming towards Battersea he receives the QSY to Battersea. It has been said in a previous post that when the AAIB connect power to G-CRST's radios they will immediately know whether he was changing frequency at the time of impact. Presumably if the read-out indicates a frequency between the one he was on and the Battersea frequency (or any unknown frequency) one might make the assumption that he was changing frequency at the time of impact.
If the Battersea frequency was already dialled in then the only two remaining scenarios are 1) that the Tower and its crane appeared just after the frequency change leaving him little or no time to out-manoeuvre the obstruction or 2) had the frequency change been completed some 15 seconds or more beforehand or if he was yet to change frequency - his hugging of the bottom of the cloud base was taking him in and out of VMC and which meant that the impact with the crane happened largely in IMC or significantly reduced visibility.
The moment of impact must have been horrendous with one of the first emotional responses being "no way, not me" to "oh my God, this is really happening".
They say your life flashes before you at such times and I can well believe it. When death is imminent you wonder, almost immediately, about ever seeing your children again, about your spouse and there is still a sense of unbelief that what has happened has in fact happened.
The moment from the blade strike to the capsule impacting the road must have been pure hell and though lasting just a handful of seconds must have felt like an eternity.
I narrate these things for one reason - and is for a reason which has already been given in this and other weather related threads, that if even one person is stirred by this accident and it causes them to shy away from marginal VMC - then it has served its purpose.
Now, all this I have written is conjecture on a massive scale (I know that) but, its my supposition for now pending any further information.
I could be totally wrong [hopefully] but until further notice all the warnings across the whole forum about not flying in poor visibility are sound advice and worth holding onto.
I shall don my Deerstalker and suck on my Calabash once again - to the consternation of Double Bogey and others I am sure.
My supposition is based exclusively on comments made on this and the thread on Rumours and News.
The following is believed to be applicable:
* The weather at St. George Tower at around 7:30am was apparently clear but 30 mins later at 8:00am low level (presumably stratus) had moved in and obscured the top of the building.
* The pilot may have had no means of checking the "actual" weather at Elstree prior to his departure.
* The accident occurred at the point where the pilot was meant to contact Battersea (his diversion destination).
One scenario for that ill-fated Wednesday morning less than a week ago is as follows:
The pilot, a 12,000 hour well known, much admired and by all counts capable professional was tasked to collect a celebrity restaurateur from Elstree last Wednesday morning. The weather at Redhill may have been "passable" but he may have had no way of knowing the actual weather at Elstree.
He wants to perform his tasked mission (good for him and good for the business he is freelancing for). If he has any hesitation about the weather he has at least decided to go have a "look see".
According to the reports in London, at 7:30am the weather was "clear" but 30 mins later that had changed. The pilot no doubt ran into this changing weather on his northward track to Elstree.
Having been stumped by the weather ahead of him he elects to divert to his nearest alternate, Battersea.
Presumably he speaks with the control he was under and advises them of he intentions and makes the left turn.
At this point we are led to understand that there is visibility but that this exists under a fairly low cloud base.
Now this is where the supposition kicks in - there have been posts suggesting that the pilot will have maintained as much height as possible in order to avoid busting low flying rules and noise issues.
I personally think it is naive to imagine that the pilot "should have" automatically descended below the legally permissible minimums as here's why:
This whole saga unfolds from the time the pilot makes his left turn towards Battersea having abandoned hope of tracking north to Elstree due weather. During this westbound journey the flight, quite literally, falls to pieces and, barring mechanical failure, we must look at a pilot induced scenario to explain this.
Those arguing that he should have descended below the legally permissible minimums are assuming that the pilot recognised that he was facing a critical predicament, one which warranted immediate and urgent attention and we absolutely do not know if this is what was going through the pilot's head. But, to me it seems unlikely because had the pilot believed that his deteriorating visibility placed him in imminent life-threatening danger he probably would have busted the rules and taken remedial (even dramatic) action to place him and the helicopter in a situation where the reducing/reduced visibility no longer posed such great risk.
Far more likely (as has been suggested already) is that the pilot, though probably concerned about the deterioration of visibility, believed that "this too shall pass" and which then allows us to assume that his only remaining challenge was that of getting the helicopter to Battersea where he could lick the shallow wounds of having launched the flight but failed to collect (on time) his VIP passenger.
The commercial consideration to make the flight, not only from a revenue perspective for the company he was freelancing for but also in cultivating a good reputation on behalf of this company with their client (for being able to perform the flight) - should not be discounted.
Of even greater relevance is this - what did Pete Barnes have with his experience and at his age that was of worth? The answer is simple and it is the same as for any pilot - reputation.
He's just made a left turn and with that he has sacrificed RotorMotion's ability to turn up on time as promised for their VIP passenger. Some pilots will find this very easy to do while others will feel challenged to satisfy - its a fairly personal approach and without knowing the man's character I can't comment authoritatively.
Assuming however that he felt at least some element of disappointment about being unable to push through to Elstree we now find him heading towards his diversion destination. He's over the city, not just any city, but the City of London. Restrictions, regulations and peering/judgemental eyes are everywhere.
It is unlikely at this point that he is thinking to himself "this weather is seriously dangerous - I need to take drastic measures to make sure this doesn't deteriorate into something I cannot control".
So, he maintains the maximum height he can, basically hugging the cloud base as he gropes for Battersea. His likely thoughts are "this weather is a pig, I hope it improves a little, Battersea should be coming up any minute now".
Descending to an abnormally low height is not on his mind. He's already had to abort his on time arrival at Elstree and he knows the VIP is going to have to wait at the airport. He is not now going to bust the regulations and set in motion the fall out of an incident report in which he could incriminate himself and which may perhaps reflect badly on the company he is freelancing for. No, that's out of the question because it would mean a snowballing of his original decision to launch from Redhill. He's imagining the report "He launched from Redhill in generally poor visibility, the weather en-route became progressively worse, he diverted to the London Heliport and in attempting to reach his destination was forced to fly within just 200 feet (or whatever) of the built-up area along the banks of the Thames."
In his head he's thinking "no way", "there's no way this morning is going to turn into a total disaster - let me push on to Battersea, wait it out and see if we can still move the client from Elstree".
So, he skims the cloudbase remaining as high as he can in order to stay as legal as he can as best as he can. Things will work out, he will push through, Battersea is about to appear.
At this point we need to recognise another "subcontial" element in this scenario which may, or may not, have been a factor.
Helicopter pilots familiar with London know that there is a gathering of tall buildings in the Docklands area. Its impressed into the mindset and the knowledge is there.
The St. George tower, still being completed, is not instinctively something that most pilots may think of such as "Vauxhall Bridge, oh yes, I must watch out for that huge building" - the building is known to be lower than those at Canary Wharf (although with the crane was actually the same height at the tallest of the East London buildings).
So, we have a potential situation where the threat of the St. George Tower may not be as well recognised as those which exist in the east.
Stuck to the cloud base and aiming towards Battersea he receives the QSY to Battersea. It has been said in a previous post that when the AAIB connect power to G-CRST's radios they will immediately know whether he was changing frequency at the time of impact. Presumably if the read-out indicates a frequency between the one he was on and the Battersea frequency (or any unknown frequency) one might make the assumption that he was changing frequency at the time of impact.
If the Battersea frequency was already dialled in then the only two remaining scenarios are 1) that the Tower and its crane appeared just after the frequency change leaving him little or no time to out-manoeuvre the obstruction or 2) had the frequency change been completed some 15 seconds or more beforehand or if he was yet to change frequency - his hugging of the bottom of the cloud base was taking him in and out of VMC and which meant that the impact with the crane happened largely in IMC or significantly reduced visibility.
The moment of impact must have been horrendous with one of the first emotional responses being "no way, not me" to "oh my God, this is really happening".
They say your life flashes before you at such times and I can well believe it. When death is imminent you wonder, almost immediately, about ever seeing your children again, about your spouse and there is still a sense of unbelief that what has happened has in fact happened.
The moment from the blade strike to the capsule impacting the road must have been pure hell and though lasting just a handful of seconds must have felt like an eternity.
I narrate these things for one reason - and is for a reason which has already been given in this and other weather related threads, that if even one person is stirred by this accident and it causes them to shy away from marginal VMC - then it has served its purpose.
Now, all this I have written is conjecture on a massive scale (I know that) but, its my supposition for now pending any further information.
I could be totally wrong [hopefully] but until further notice all the warnings across the whole forum about not flying in poor visibility are sound advice and worth holding onto.
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Grenville Fortescue - You have the credentials to become the next 'expert' for the BBC.
I took 5 minutes to read your work ... and came away with .... nothing new.
I took 5 minutes to read your work ... and came away with .... nothing new.
Ass, Tin, Ticket. I dont see rulebook in that equation.
Bit of a short plank are you?
MJB: "Just what are the consequences for a precautionary landing in London or a 300ft agl scud run due weather?"
There is nothing to stop you landing anywhere in an emergency. Even EG R160 states "helicopters should remain able to alight clear.." - that doesn't mean that you can't land in, say, Battersea Park in an emergency. Nil vis would surely qualify.
And with regard to your take on the 500ft rule and filming. The area that mostly gets filmed in London is east of Vauxhall Bridge - in the City Class D. The rules (off route) here are the 1000ft rule - exemptions to this down to 750ft are possible.
(This 1000ft rule is easily breached if you go off-route - The Shard in particular casts its spell as far as about 4 blocks north of the river on the opposite bank to where the building is located.)
Only west of VB is the 1000ft rule exempted because it's Class A airspace, and the 500ft rule applies.
Let's also (in the case of G-CRST) not forget EG R157. Unless you've got an advance clearance (Enhanced Non Standard Flight number) for a specific purpose, you cannot route due north from Vauxhall Bridge beneath 1500ft, due to EG R157. It is unlikely that G-CRST would have an ENSF for a transit. Was 1500ft available that morning at that time?
So, to get north, you need to position west to Battersea to avoid 157.
There is nothing to stop you landing anywhere in an emergency. Even EG R160 states "helicopters should remain able to alight clear.." - that doesn't mean that you can't land in, say, Battersea Park in an emergency. Nil vis would surely qualify.
And with regard to your take on the 500ft rule and filming. The area that mostly gets filmed in London is east of Vauxhall Bridge - in the City Class D. The rules (off route) here are the 1000ft rule - exemptions to this down to 750ft are possible.
(This 1000ft rule is easily breached if you go off-route - The Shard in particular casts its spell as far as about 4 blocks north of the river on the opposite bank to where the building is located.)
Only west of VB is the 1000ft rule exempted because it's Class A airspace, and the 500ft rule applies.
Let's also (in the case of G-CRST) not forget EG R157. Unless you've got an advance clearance (Enhanced Non Standard Flight number) for a specific purpose, you cannot route due north from Vauxhall Bridge beneath 1500ft, due to EG R157. It is unlikely that G-CRST would have an ENSF for a transit. Was 1500ft available that morning at that time?
So, to get north, you need to position west to Battersea to avoid 157.
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Swiss Cheese
Your 'filleted AAIB summary' is from the report of the A109 crash in the Mourne Mountains in 2010.
Sometimes, after a thorough investigation and careful consideration of the available evidence, the AAIB is unable to establish conclusive causal factors for an accident.
When that is the position, the AAIB is IMHO absolutely right to say so - and, if appropriate, list possible contributory factors from which pilots may learn.
It may be disappointing for lawyers but it is far better they do that than assume pilot error when the pilots concerned are not alive to defend themselves - damaging their reputations and with potential dire consequences (legal, financial and emotional) for their grieving families.
In 2007 you posted:
You were talking about American firms at the time but that's why lawyers (of the ambulance chaser variety) around the globe do it.
Can we assume then that you as an aviation lawyer disapprove of lawyer James Healy-Pratt's PR stunts in the days after this accident. His firm's website now boasts that he provided commentary on the crash and discussed the causes in the Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, Daily Telegraph and Guardian (with links) and even includes a link to a video of him being interviewed on Sky.
A gem from someone who describes himself as an "air safety expert"
-
He said he would happily have flown "as co-pilot" with Pete Barnes based upon his reputation.
Co-pilot??
The man has only recently got his PPL(H) on an EC120!
Disapprove of his PR stunts?
Or too close to home?
(Edit)
I've just noticed you ended a post last year with your email address.
It was jhp@xxxxxxxxlaw
Maybe there are two aviation lawyers with the initials JHP.
Here is a filleted AAIB summary into a recent A109 fatal accident , that was inconclusive. It will be familiar reading to certain diligent rotorheads. My concern is that, inspite of the Herculean efforts of the AAIB, we will get another summary in similar terms in twelve months time.
Sometimes, after a thorough investigation and careful consideration of the available evidence, the AAIB is unable to establish conclusive causal factors for an accident.
When that is the position, the AAIB is IMHO absolutely right to say so - and, if appropriate, list possible contributory factors from which pilots may learn.
It may be disappointing for lawyers but it is far better they do that than assume pilot error when the pilots concerned are not alive to defend themselves - damaging their reputations and with potential dire consequences (legal, financial and emotional) for their grieving families.
In 2007 you posted:
The real aviation lawyers around the globe tend to hold back and wait to be asked by the families or referral lawyers to get involved.
Firms that launch PR stunts days after accidents happen are usually doing it for self-serving reasons.
Firms that launch PR stunts days after accidents happen are usually doing it for self-serving reasons.
Can we assume then that you as an aviation lawyer disapprove of lawyer James Healy-Pratt's PR stunts in the days after this accident. His firm's website now boasts that he provided commentary on the crash and discussed the causes in the Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, Daily Telegraph and Guardian (with links) and even includes a link to a video of him being interviewed on Sky.
A gem from someone who describes himself as an "air safety expert"
-He said he would happily have flown "as co-pilot" with Pete Barnes based upon his reputation.
Co-pilot??
The man has only recently got his PPL(H) on an EC120!
Disapprove of his PR stunts?
Or too close to home?
(Edit)
I've just noticed you ended a post last year with your email address.
It was jhp@xxxxxxxxlaw
Maybe there are two aviation lawyers with the initials JHP.
Wow, you're good, Heliport.
This biography sounds familiar:
About Swiss Cheese
Licence Type (eg CPL. Pilots only) PPL (H)
Current a/c Type (eg B737. Pilots only) EC-120
Location Gatwick
Interests Helicopters & Vintage Jets
Occupation Aviation Lawyer for Families and Pilots
And clicking on "Visit Swiss Cheese's homepage!" takes you to: Aviation & Travel, Clinical Negligence, Commercial Litigation, Competition Litigation, Divorce (www.stewartslaw.c0m)
This biography sounds familiar:
About Swiss Cheese
Licence Type (eg CPL. Pilots only) PPL (H)
Current a/c Type (eg B737. Pilots only) EC-120
Location Gatwick
Interests Helicopters & Vintage Jets
Occupation Aviation Lawyer for Families and Pilots
And clicking on "Visit Swiss Cheese's homepage!" takes you to: Aviation & Travel, Clinical Negligence, Commercial Litigation, Competition Litigation, Divorce (www.stewartslaw.c0m)
Swiss cheese
I can't believe or more importantly understand your assumptions, am merely a bystander with zero experience but!!!!
Last edited by nomorehelosforme; 22nd Jan 2013 at 19:35.
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Swiss Cheese if you are indeed James Healy-Pratt then it was mentioned earlier on in this thread (the post now removed I think) that you apparently sued someone for a piece of flying you observed and that the case resulted in no prosecution towards the pilot.
If this is true (and if it is not then my apologies) my question is, why would you do something like this? The helicopter community (worldwide) is still fairly close and often behaves like a brotherhood and this doesn't come across as very brotherly to me?
Moreover, if safety was your concern - did you speak with the pilot personally in the first instance and discuss this matter with him in order to understand a little more about what he may have been doing and why?
If this is true (and if it is not then my apologies) my question is, why would you do something like this? The helicopter community (worldwide) is still fairly close and often behaves like a brotherhood and this doesn't come across as very brotherly to me?
Moreover, if safety was your concern - did you speak with the pilot personally in the first instance and discuss this matter with him in order to understand a little more about what he may have been doing and why?
Re Heliport.
Wrong!
He is very, very, good!
Crossing foils with Heliport generally results in the sound of hot air whooshing from one's tush.
I have the puncture scars to prove it!
Wow, you're good, Heliport.
He is very, very, good!
Crossing foils with Heliport generally results in the sound of hot air whooshing from one's tush.
I have the puncture scars to prove it!
Last edited by SASless; 22nd Jan 2013 at 20:16.
JHP did his PPL at Redhill and has also flown an EC120 from there. I'm sure there will be a warm welcome for him when he returns for his LPC.
My post 223 still exists. Heliport, our thanks for a fascinating bit of detective work.
If I was an aviation lawyer, would I file a spurious flying report against an aircraft, just to test the robustness of the CAA's reporting system?
No - JHP (PPL) did not contact the operator, owner or pilot. He simply filed a complaint direct with the CAA - which he knew would have to be investigated. His evidence was shoddy, his witness statements amateurish and inaccurate.
My post 223 still exists. Heliport, our thanks for a fascinating bit of detective work.
If I was an aviation lawyer, would I file a spurious flying report against an aircraft, just to test the robustness of the CAA's reporting system?
No - JHP (PPL) did not contact the operator, owner or pilot. He simply filed a complaint direct with the CAA - which he knew would have to be investigated. His evidence was shoddy, his witness statements amateurish and inaccurate.
.....and he is as popular as a "Dog Dropping" in a Punch Bowl now!
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Two or more sides to every story . . . .
Some interesting opinions expressed by Heliport, JimBall and SND, most of which are off the mark in terms of content and accuracy. By all means PM me, without being so anonymous.
The relevant issue here is the potential for an inconclusive AAIB report, which will not help the families. Fault in the legal sense (civil or criminal) is something very different. Here, Section 76 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982 removes the need for proof of fault. Please go and read it (again).
Heliport commented that -
"It may be disappointing for lawyers but it is far better they do that than assume pilot error when the pilots concerned are not alive to defend themselves - damaging their reputations and with potential dire consequences (legal, financial and emotional) for their grieving families."
Since pilots are insured under aviation liability insurance policies, their reputations are defended where necessary or expedient by those insurers. We all know that insurance companies are profit based and have their own interests. Are you suggesting that grieving families of non-pilots deserve different treatment?
Twenty + years of involvement in air accidents from both sides of the fence, have left me with the distinct impression that the families of the pilots in such cases are least well looked after. An inconclusive accident report simply amplifies that position.
The relevant issue here is the potential for an inconclusive AAIB report, which will not help the families. Fault in the legal sense (civil or criminal) is something very different. Here, Section 76 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982 removes the need for proof of fault. Please go and read it (again).
Heliport commented that -
"It may be disappointing for lawyers but it is far better they do that than assume pilot error when the pilots concerned are not alive to defend themselves - damaging their reputations and with potential dire consequences (legal, financial and emotional) for their grieving families."
Since pilots are insured under aviation liability insurance policies, their reputations are defended where necessary or expedient by those insurers. We all know that insurance companies are profit based and have their own interests. Are you suggesting that grieving families of non-pilots deserve different treatment?
Twenty + years of involvement in air accidents from both sides of the fence, have left me with the distinct impression that the families of the pilots in such cases are least well looked after. An inconclusive accident report simply amplifies that position.
Last edited by Swiss Cheese; 23rd Jan 2013 at 09:43.
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AAIB special bulletin released today: http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...3%20G-CRST.pdf
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