Helicopter crash off the coast of Newfoundland - 18 aboard, March 2009
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I'd like to thank Mel Effluent for posting that link - a very interesting and sad report. I was up all night reading it.
I'm curious for those who do a lot of twin engine flying how much emphasis an operator like Cougar puts on autorotative descents during initial and recurrent training? My initial assumption when I first heard about the accident was that the MRG had seized, but reading the report it sounds like it was flying right until impact.
Besides the yaw from the TR failure, what kind of control issues would a pilot be encountering on a S92 that would compromise the execution of the autorotation? Would the aircraft still be experiencing yaw kicks after the collective was all the way down? Does that still couple into pitch with the Sikorsky (canted) TR design once you are in autorotation? (I wouldn't think so).
Finally, that far offshore, how hard is it to judge height above the water for a proper flare initiation? (I'm sure you could use a RADALT but in good VFR I would think most of us would judge the flare visually).
I was also under the assumption that a gearbox would give you lots of warning before it finally let go - noise, vibration, etc. This report seems to indicate that isn't always the case.
Paul
I'm curious for those who do a lot of twin engine flying how much emphasis an operator like Cougar puts on autorotative descents during initial and recurrent training? My initial assumption when I first heard about the accident was that the MRG had seized, but reading the report it sounds like it was flying right until impact.
Besides the yaw from the TR failure, what kind of control issues would a pilot be encountering on a S92 that would compromise the execution of the autorotation? Would the aircraft still be experiencing yaw kicks after the collective was all the way down? Does that still couple into pitch with the Sikorsky (canted) TR design once you are in autorotation? (I wouldn't think so).
Finally, that far offshore, how hard is it to judge height above the water for a proper flare initiation? (I'm sure you could use a RADALT but in good VFR I would think most of us would judge the flare visually).
I was also under the assumption that a gearbox would give you lots of warning before it finally let go - noise, vibration, etc. This report seems to indicate that isn't always the case.
Paul
I was also under the assumption that a gearbox would give you lots of warning before it finally let go - noise, vibration, etc. This report seems to indicate that isn't always the case.
This may only be remotely comparable to a helicopter gearbox failure - then again, i don't believe there are many people who have experienced one of those and lived to tell about it.
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Yes EH101 plus the US military have reuired a 30 minute capability for years (early 70s?) so there are more military helicopters that are capable.
In fact AS332L managed 28 minutes before failure back in the early 90s and EC225 50 minutes (with the emergency cooling system that EC installed to protect crew and passenegrs).
The S-92 gearbox has performance stuck in the 1970s along with the 76, 365/155 and other helicopters of that era.
In fact AS332L managed 28 minutes before failure back in the early 90s and EC225 50 minutes (with the emergency cooling system that EC installed to protect crew and passenegrs).
The S-92 gearbox has performance stuck in the 1970s along with the 76, 365/155 and other helicopters of that era.
Industry Insider,
The EC-155 had 25 minutes. It's stated in the RFM, I stated it in this thread and, strangely enough, the TSB state it in their report!
The EC-155 had 25 minutes. It's stated in the RFM, I stated it in this thread and, strangely enough, the TSB state it in their report!
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From section 1.18.5.5 of the TSB report
So even though TC identified the issue IMO they accepted a rather poor solution. They should have insisted on an automatic cooler bypass and looked more at the temperature readings in the event of total MRGB loss as witnessed during the total oil loss test on 06 August 2002. Were the FAA in attendance at that test? What exactly did TC witness in the level 2, nothing, just a paper review at SAC? Why did TC not review the concerns that the JAA had raised?
The JAA are stated in the report to have referred to the Blackhawk's track record but just how similar are the S92 and Blackhawk MRGBs to draw conclusions from this comparison? Did the Blackhawk MRGB have steel or titanium oil filter housing studs and/or the high filter changeout issues? How does the Blackhawk MRGB achieve 30-minute run-dry capability?
IMO each aircraft type should be reviewed and approved on its own merits with no "follow-through" credit assumed from previous/similar designs. This for me was a fundamental error by the FAA and TC.
History has shown how this type of design approval can have serious consequences e.g. Bristow 56C G-TIGK lightening strike back in Jan '95 when flying out to Brae "A" highlighting issue via change of tail rotor to composite carbon fibre and aluminium reinforcement edging. I worked with one of the PAX after that successful A/R and he told me first-hand how lucky they were and the skill the pilots showed to save their lives.
Looks like 15+ years later we're still making the same mistakes in this industry. This needs to change.
Safe flying
Max
TC produced a concern paper which stated that 5 seconds was insufficient for the pilot to engage the MGB oil bypass switch. Requiring the pilot to action a system of this type in such a short time was considered unusual, and TC stated its belief that this function should be automated. Sikorsky's response was to explain that 5 seconds represented the worst-case scenario. TC did not agree with Sikorsky's position. In an effort to mitigate risk, TC requested that Sikorsky provide additional guidance that would help the pilot determine whether the switch was selected quickly enough to trap sufficient oil, and to monitor the health of the transmission in bypass mode. In response, Sikorsky revised the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) to identify the range of MGB oil temperature and pressure indications pilots should expect to see after the bypass switch had been activated. Sikorsky also identified symptoms which would warrant a "land immediately" situation. TC accepted the RFM revision and on 07 February 2005, the S-92A helicopter was granted a TC type certificate based on a validation of the FAA approval.
The JAA are stated in the report to have referred to the Blackhawk's track record but just how similar are the S92 and Blackhawk MRGBs to draw conclusions from this comparison? Did the Blackhawk MRGB have steel or titanium oil filter housing studs and/or the high filter changeout issues? How does the Blackhawk MRGB achieve 30-minute run-dry capability?
IMO each aircraft type should be reviewed and approved on its own merits with no "follow-through" credit assumed from previous/similar designs. This for me was a fundamental error by the FAA and TC.
History has shown how this type of design approval can have serious consequences e.g. Bristow 56C G-TIGK lightening strike back in Jan '95 when flying out to Brae "A" highlighting issue via change of tail rotor to composite carbon fibre and aluminium reinforcement edging. I worked with one of the PAX after that successful A/R and he told me first-hand how lucky they were and the skill the pilots showed to save their lives.
Looks like 15+ years later we're still making the same mistakes in this industry. This needs to change.
Safe flying
Max
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Max
The FAA certified the Sikorsky design. The FAA usually witness major tests.
JAA and TC were separately validating the FAA certification. They could both only talk to the FAA (and Sikorsky through the FAA).
I can only guess that the H-60 Blackhawk experience was offered up via FAA to justify their certification. Actually I do believe good-prior experience can be used to justify a design. However it has to be relavent (the fatal BV234 accident off the Shetlands in 1984 is a case of an aircraft changing operating environment and suffering) and bad-prior experience on other types needs to be considered too!
What is odd is that Sikorsky's experience with Titanium studs is not from the H-60, but the H-53 according to the TSB (note the E model, which suggests the material may have been dropped on subsequent H-53s) and in an installation with a robust cluster of 6 studs, not just the 3 Sikorsky introduced for the S-92:
The first opportunity to question the Blackhawk heritage was not Broome, but the Norsk incident in May 2005. I say that because the vespel splines that failed were said to be an H-60 feature that had never been a problem on the H-60. Certainly it was questioned here: http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/163...perations.html
The FAA certified the Sikorsky design. The FAA usually witness major tests.
JAA and TC were separately validating the FAA certification. They could both only talk to the FAA (and Sikorsky through the FAA).
I can only guess that the H-60 Blackhawk experience was offered up via FAA to justify their certification. Actually I do believe good-prior experience can be used to justify a design. However it has to be relavent (the fatal BV234 accident off the Shetlands in 1984 is a case of an aircraft changing operating environment and suffering) and bad-prior experience on other types needs to be considered too!
What is odd is that Sikorsky's experience with Titanium studs is not from the H-60, but the H-53 according to the TSB (note the E model, which suggests the material may have been dropped on subsequent H-53s) and in an installation with a robust cluster of 6 studs, not just the 3 Sikorsky introduced for the S-92:
Sikorsky selected the titanium alloy stud because these had been used successfully on other Sikorsky products, such as the CH-53E Sea Stallion which utilizes six titanium studs to attach the oil filter bowl to the MGB.
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212man
Thanks for explain the EC155 capability again. Having seen the comments on past kidnaps in Nigeria I'm sure having 25 minutes tested would be more reassuring that just 11 when flying over the delta.
It does go to show that some OEMs have been able to take an earlier design build it into an bigger airframe and still expand the loss of lube resilience.
All
It is well worth reading the http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/163...perations.html thread (as mentioned by TSB in their report) for the period between the catestrophic MGB test in early August 2002 (done the conventional way with just residual oil) and the December 2002 FAA certification (with the bypass added). There is a hint of the schedule pressure there.
Thanks for explain the EC155 capability again. Having seen the comments on past kidnaps in Nigeria I'm sure having 25 minutes tested would be more reassuring that just 11 when flying over the delta.
It does go to show that some OEMs have been able to take an earlier design build it into an bigger airframe and still expand the loss of lube resilience.
All
It is well worth reading the http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/163...perations.html thread (as mentioned by TSB in their report) for the period between the catestrophic MGB test in early August 2002 (done the conventional way with just residual oil) and the December 2002 FAA certification (with the bypass added). There is a hint of the schedule pressure there.
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Squib66
You got me going back over old posts from the main S92 thread. Here's some extracts that caught my eye:
IMO the S92 vibrates worse than any helo I've flew in over 20 years. Linked to MRGB mounting feet cracks, accelerated fatigue of titanium studs?
Note the highlighted wording, doesn't say run-dry but does refer to the UH-60 which apparently does have 30-minute run dry time capability. This statement was the one issued by SAC post-FAA certification approval.
Perhaps in hindsight too fast considering some of the base errors we now unfortunately know about.
Is not one of the "regular" mil-spec rules 30-minute run-dry time? The Canadian military certainly won't accept the CH-148 without this.
I'm assuming reference to the simulated oil cooler leak and bypass switch mode. No mention of what happens when the MRGB is run dry though...
JAA didn't like the work-around the 30-minute run-dry time requirement, so why was this not looked into more detail e.g. closer analysis of MRGB temperature? IMO nobody appears to have looked at the 11 minute data, instead looked at the 3-hour data. Was it made available to JAA via the FAA?
Well then why did the MRGB temperature gauge get missed off that list?
Comment posted after the Norsk Hydro vespel spline failure. So where is the secondary MRGB temperature sensor? Why not have 2 temperature sensors, one on the feed to the MRGB and one on the return line, that way you have dual-redundancy and also can monitor delta-T for an additional condition-based monitoring tool?
All the above quotes were from the same person, namely the S92 program director. As I read it there is a very strong bias here towards not only the S92 but a big push to get this A/C into production and fleets. I wonder why...and what will change now?
Simple, IMO the S92 design errors will have to be fixed or the A/C will be grounded for civilian use and a suitable replacement such as the EC225 procured by the oil companies. That means acceptable vibration levels, noise levels, robust and proven MRGB.
Safe flying
Max
You got me going back over old posts from the main S92 thread. Here's some extracts that caught my eye:
The S-92 has 4 main rotor blades (last time I counted) and will have them for the next decade, anyway. The vibration is very nice, thank you, with levels that are better than the President's S-61, thanks to the 4 (that's four) main rotor blades, and also the very good computer driven vibration absorber system that we use.
Breaking new ground for medium-weight helicopters, the S-92 provides unprecedented levels of safety and reliability. It is the only aircraft in its class certified to the latest specifications for flaw tolerance, bird strike capability and turbine burst protection. In addition to its civil helicopter capabilities, the rotor system and dynamic components are designed to meet the UH-60 BLACK HAWK ballistic tolerance requirements and all gearboxes are capable of running 30 minutes after loss of oil. Corrosion protection meets or exceeds current maritime standards
It was the fastest, cleanest certification anyone at Sikorsky can remember. The first certification data flight was made last December, the FAA got on board in September, and we were done with all flights exactly one year later, Dec 12. The data was all processed in real time, so the FAA was ready to sign on Dec 17 (Wright Brothers day!) so they did. Not a bad data point in the thousands taken.
The "regular" Sikorsky military design rules were also met, including ballistics and object strikes, since we intend to use the whole drive train (engines, transmissions, rotors and blades) on the most advanced version of the Black Hawk in a few years. The gearboxes bolt right into the Hawk family.
FYI, you also get a main transmission that ran 3 hours after a massive oil leak, damage tolerant rotor and structural components, full bird strike protection (controls and drive shaft covers that are nearly ballistic so birds don't cave them in at Vne), and tolerance of engine burst events. {You also get ballistic tolerance, based on the H-60 design requirements, but one hopes this is not necessary in the oil patch!}
With the S-92, we applied for a certification basis in the FUTURE to capture the draft regulations. This meant that we reached ahead to capture those safety aspects.
Similarly, the S-92 is the only large helicopter to apply for JAR certification, and will shortly work with the JAR test community to get that done.
Similarly, the S-92 is the only large helicopter to apply for JAR certification, and will shortly work with the JAR test community to get that done.
Your comments are quite valid if one carries the old philosophy of needing to have the pilot stay as a gauge-tender, with one eye on the limit and the other on the rest of the world, but we designed the system to free you of that workload
The oil system of the S-92 is virtually identical to the Black Hawk, and probably the 225. It is dual in every way, as are the indications. The pilots in this emergency landed with an aircraft that could have been flown for hunderds of hours, yet you have purposely posted inuendo that ditching was imminent, that fleets are grounded, and that the sky is falling, and now you need to see the oil system so you can pronounce the S-92 still born.
All the above quotes were from the same person, namely the S92 program director. As I read it there is a very strong bias here towards not only the S92 but a big push to get this A/C into production and fleets. I wonder why...and what will change now?
Simple, IMO the S92 design errors will have to be fixed or the A/C will be grounded for civilian use and a suitable replacement such as the EC225 procured by the oil companies. That means acceptable vibration levels, noise levels, robust and proven MRGB.
Safe flying
Max
Supplemental air
but why not simply require Supplemental Air Devices for all over water flights and prevent folks having to solely rely upon a single breath to escape from a submerged aircraft?
We were unable to have a practice with any ancillary air because according to the instructor the admin and H&S paperwork makes it onerous and also due to the number of people they teach that their would likely be a medical issue sooner or later. Shark website states that "Air Pocket Plus has been designed to minimize the risk of cerebral arterial gas embolism which results from any system which introduces supplementary gas" So perhaps this is what the training organisations worried about?
Looking far forward, what is needed is a more user friendly face mask for passengers something that can be easily donned or better yet, is comfortable enough to worn for the entire flight. All of the spare air and rebreathers don't use a mask but a mouthpiece, it is quite difficult to think about not breathing through your nose, especially if suffering cold shock. A nose clip avoids involuntary water inhalation, this they are uncomfortable to wear for the entire flight and unlikely to be deployed by a novice in an emergency in my view.
Anyway, helmets should be a priority followed by spare air?
Thinking high tech, for passengers, how about a one piece sealed helmet that, on contact with water switches from environmental air to (1 minute) of bottled air housed in the helmet? Would need some new technology to create a seal at the neck or otherwise the helmet could be incorporated into the design of the immersion suit.
Although an immersion suite protects most parts of the body it offers zero protection for the airway.
Mickjoebill
Where did SAC claim a 30 minute run dry capability for the 92? Have I missed it somehow?
[QUOTE]dynamic components are designed to meet the UH-60 BLACK HAWK ballistic tolerance requirements and all gearboxes are capable of running 30 minutes after loss of oil.[/QUOTE]
It did. Did SAC hide the results of another test that failed? Did the FAA ignore that failure if it in fact occurred? Who stamped "OK" on the Test? SAC or the FAA?
Nothing about "Run Dry" said.
How many certification authorities in fact certified the S-92? How many refused to certifiy the S-92?
Why is it the focus is only on SAC?
That is not where the finger should be pointing unless SAC and the FAA for sure are married at the hip! Are they?
[QUOTE]dynamic components are designed to meet the UH-60 BLACK HAWK ballistic tolerance requirements and all gearboxes are capable of running 30 minutes after loss of oil.[/QUOTE]
you also get a main transmission that ran 3 hours after a massive oil leak,
Nothing about "Run Dry" said.
How many certification authorities in fact certified the S-92? How many refused to certifiy the S-92?
Why is it the focus is only on SAC?
That is not where the finger should be pointing unless SAC and the FAA for sure are married at the hip! Are they?
Last edited by SASless; 14th Feb 2011 at 03:22.
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Sultan,
You bring up a good point with regards to taking a closer look at the effects the tail rotor drive failure had. The TSB report notes that the data recorder showed an indication of rotor brake engagement just a few seconds before the data acquisition ended. And I believe the rotor brake is located where the tail rotor drive exits the MRGB housing. The investigators seemed to think that excessive motion of the tail rotor gear shaft as it failed may have affected the rotor brake.
The investigation clearly showed that the tail rotor drive gear failed structurally. Under a loss of lube event, this should not be unexpected for a couple reasons.
First, the tail rotor drive gear was likely a spiral bevel gear. Spiral bevel gear meshes generate lots of heat and thus are prone to scoring. A loss of oil cooling to this spiral bevel mesh would quickly result in contact scoring, overheating, loss of mechanical strength in the gear teeth, and finally structural failure of the gear teeth.
Second, the tail rotor driven gear was supported by a tapered roller bearing set. Once again, tapered roller bearings tend to generate lots of friction heat where the roller big ends rub against the race shoulder. A loss of oil cooling to this area would quickly result in overheating of the rollers and race, loss of mechanical strength, and finally structural failure. These problems would be made worse if the tail rotor drive was subjected to high torque loads in addition to the loss of oil flow.
Just one more interesting aspect in the chain of events that caused this tragedy.
You bring up a good point with regards to taking a closer look at the effects the tail rotor drive failure had. The TSB report notes that the data recorder showed an indication of rotor brake engagement just a few seconds before the data acquisition ended. And I believe the rotor brake is located where the tail rotor drive exits the MRGB housing. The investigators seemed to think that excessive motion of the tail rotor gear shaft as it failed may have affected the rotor brake.
The investigation clearly showed that the tail rotor drive gear failed structurally. Under a loss of lube event, this should not be unexpected for a couple reasons.
First, the tail rotor drive gear was likely a spiral bevel gear. Spiral bevel gear meshes generate lots of heat and thus are prone to scoring. A loss of oil cooling to this spiral bevel mesh would quickly result in contact scoring, overheating, loss of mechanical strength in the gear teeth, and finally structural failure of the gear teeth.
Second, the tail rotor driven gear was supported by a tapered roller bearing set. Once again, tapered roller bearings tend to generate lots of friction heat where the roller big ends rub against the race shoulder. A loss of oil cooling to this area would quickly result in overheating of the rollers and race, loss of mechanical strength, and finally structural failure. These problems would be made worse if the tail rotor drive was subjected to high torque loads in addition to the loss of oil flow.
Just one more interesting aspect in the chain of events that caused this tragedy.
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HUET Provider Observations
Hi Mickjoebill
Speaking as the chairman of the Asia Pacific Training Providers Advisory Group, a body made up of leading HUET providers in the region that train to the international OPITO standard; can I reinforce that training providers, like aviation companies, are subject to many regulations and their associated audit process – simply put, we train to the standard or loose accreditation.
However, twice yearly TPAG’s meet to discuss ways of improving offshore safety training, and as of last year this now includes a global safety conference involving our regional counterparts from the other OPITO regions: Middle East Africa, Europe and The Americas.
At the global conference held in Abu Dhabi last November, where sixty training provider representatives were in attendance, the MEA and AP TPAG’s submitted a proposal to increase HUET training standards to include cross-cabin escapes as an option when individuals requested “more realistic” training (current drills and trainee contact-time do not permit additional [non-OPITO] exercises being undertaken in a standard training day). This proposal was rejected with the rationale that change must be generated by oil companies.
Although frustrating for training providers, we; like aviators, are obliged to operate within the confines of documented standards. Notwithstanding this point, many providers can tailor HUET to individual client requirements if the client chooses not to undertake an internationally recognised course.
An example of this was HUET training provided to the Red Bull Air Race pilots prior to the last Perth race where an aircraft ended up in the Swan River inverted and the pilot made a successful escape using an emergency air supply. In this instance a Shark product would have been impractical due to the high ‘G’ associated with racing, so an appropriate solution was identified and a training course developed.
Of course another option to generate change would be for aviation companies to lobby oil companies, but how do you think that would work out?
PS: should any aviation representative wish get a better understanding of how international HUET standards evolve, please don’t hesitate to contact me.
Speaking as the chairman of the Asia Pacific Training Providers Advisory Group, a body made up of leading HUET providers in the region that train to the international OPITO standard; can I reinforce that training providers, like aviation companies, are subject to many regulations and their associated audit process – simply put, we train to the standard or loose accreditation.
However, twice yearly TPAG’s meet to discuss ways of improving offshore safety training, and as of last year this now includes a global safety conference involving our regional counterparts from the other OPITO regions: Middle East Africa, Europe and The Americas.
At the global conference held in Abu Dhabi last November, where sixty training provider representatives were in attendance, the MEA and AP TPAG’s submitted a proposal to increase HUET training standards to include cross-cabin escapes as an option when individuals requested “more realistic” training (current drills and trainee contact-time do not permit additional [non-OPITO] exercises being undertaken in a standard training day). This proposal was rejected with the rationale that change must be generated by oil companies.
Although frustrating for training providers, we; like aviators, are obliged to operate within the confines of documented standards. Notwithstanding this point, many providers can tailor HUET to individual client requirements if the client chooses not to undertake an internationally recognised course.
An example of this was HUET training provided to the Red Bull Air Race pilots prior to the last Perth race where an aircraft ended up in the Swan River inverted and the pilot made a successful escape using an emergency air supply. In this instance a Shark product would have been impractical due to the high ‘G’ associated with racing, so an appropriate solution was identified and a training course developed.
Of course another option to generate change would be for aviation companies to lobby oil companies, but how do you think that would work out?
PS: should any aviation representative wish get a better understanding of how international HUET standards evolve, please don’t hesitate to contact me.
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Mickjoebill
As I'm originally from the UK I did offshore refreshers just when the Shark rebreather came out, we had to do the "dry" test first then used the "boil-in-the-bag" rebreather in a similar fashion to the HUEBA training we get over here in Canada i.e. face down in the water, then at a lower level < 1 metre albeit in the HUEBA training you're in a flight seat and turned upside down (you have to be able to deploy the HUEBA in a capsize situation).
I remember the extra effort required even after 8 years since my last UK refresher at NUTEC Aberdeen just in the pool to use the Shark rebreather even just under 1 metre of water pressure. Since 1 meter = 1/10th of an atmosphere I wouldn't want to try a fight against 10 metres = 30 feet which is what they reckon the depth was at when 2 survivors escaped but only one miraculously survived without HUEBA/rebreather pocket.
I recall the rebreather using your own breath only. I just wonder how effective they would be with cold water shock, also at such depths. Perhaps the small air cylinder is a relatively new thing or my memory is getting dusty.
I have done two HUEBA training courses now, one just after they were finally brought in after 491 (they were in the works for over 6 years) and again just last year during my BST-R (Canadian survival course refresher). The secret is to use the face mask which we strap to our arm, the nose clips IMO are a waste of time. Another reason for the face mask is to see where you're going better and if there are any fuel leaks, which happened in 491, to prevent damage to your eyes.
The military have been using HUEBAs for many years and they have saved many lives. Their requirement was based on hostile territory flying over sea and a higher risk of ditching. The civilian industry requirement is more to do with the extended flight times in relatively hostile territory (sea state, icing conditions, lightening strike potential etc.) and more lately due to the S92A lack of MRGB run-dry capability, which IMO deems it unsuitable for Cat A classification.
The key is reducing the risk of ditching to as long as reasonably practicable (ALARP), but in the event that this happens I'm glad we have the HUEBAs now. Hopefully after the TSB report recommendations these will be adopted by all helo ops, not just those in the Grand Banks.
There is a fine line between realistic training and increased risk to trainees. If a more stringent medical was put in place perhaps we could introduce cold-water shock awareness, deployment of HUEBA in the HUET, and a general increase in fitness level required for offshore certification. Sadly though our aging oil and gas workers (including myself) would experience a high failure rate, costing the oil companies a huge amount of money to train up new blood. IMO this is probably the main reason why this will never go ahead.
It is up to the individual to decide if he/she is willing to take the inherent risks associated with our industry based on their own self-management of health and fitness. Things are improving albeit slowly and it unfortunately takes tragedies such as 491 to make them happen. That's just the way big oil works.
There is a much more detailed thread on this tragedy, perhaps the moderators will merge the two of these.
Safe flying
Max
As I'm originally from the UK I did offshore refreshers just when the Shark rebreather came out, we had to do the "dry" test first then used the "boil-in-the-bag" rebreather in a similar fashion to the HUEBA training we get over here in Canada i.e. face down in the water, then at a lower level < 1 metre albeit in the HUEBA training you're in a flight seat and turned upside down (you have to be able to deploy the HUEBA in a capsize situation).
I remember the extra effort required even after 8 years since my last UK refresher at NUTEC Aberdeen just in the pool to use the Shark rebreather even just under 1 metre of water pressure. Since 1 meter = 1/10th of an atmosphere I wouldn't want to try a fight against 10 metres = 30 feet which is what they reckon the depth was at when 2 survivors escaped but only one miraculously survived without HUEBA/rebreather pocket.
I recall the rebreather using your own breath only. I just wonder how effective they would be with cold water shock, also at such depths. Perhaps the small air cylinder is a relatively new thing or my memory is getting dusty.
I have done two HUEBA training courses now, one just after they were finally brought in after 491 (they were in the works for over 6 years) and again just last year during my BST-R (Canadian survival course refresher). The secret is to use the face mask which we strap to our arm, the nose clips IMO are a waste of time. Another reason for the face mask is to see where you're going better and if there are any fuel leaks, which happened in 491, to prevent damage to your eyes.
The military have been using HUEBAs for many years and they have saved many lives. Their requirement was based on hostile territory flying over sea and a higher risk of ditching. The civilian industry requirement is more to do with the extended flight times in relatively hostile territory (sea state, icing conditions, lightening strike potential etc.) and more lately due to the S92A lack of MRGB run-dry capability, which IMO deems it unsuitable for Cat A classification.
The key is reducing the risk of ditching to as long as reasonably practicable (ALARP), but in the event that this happens I'm glad we have the HUEBAs now. Hopefully after the TSB report recommendations these will be adopted by all helo ops, not just those in the Grand Banks.
There is a fine line between realistic training and increased risk to trainees. If a more stringent medical was put in place perhaps we could introduce cold-water shock awareness, deployment of HUEBA in the HUET, and a general increase in fitness level required for offshore certification. Sadly though our aging oil and gas workers (including myself) would experience a high failure rate, costing the oil companies a huge amount of money to train up new blood. IMO this is probably the main reason why this will never go ahead.
It is up to the individual to decide if he/she is willing to take the inherent risks associated with our industry based on their own self-management of health and fitness. Things are improving albeit slowly and it unfortunately takes tragedies such as 491 to make them happen. That's just the way big oil works.
There is a much more detailed thread on this tragedy, perhaps the moderators will merge the two of these.
Safe flying
Max
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Recently in the news, looks like not all Cougar S92s are currently upgraded to SS6 EFS.
No flights over rough seas - Business - The Telegram
Safe flying
Max
No flights over rough seas - Business - The Telegram
Safe flying
Max
Brian,
My guess is 2003 judging by the date on the brochure (very hard to read for these old eyes so might actually be different).
What I did notice is at the Top of the thing they do say "Run Dry" but at the bottom of the thing they say "30 minute Run after Oil Loss and 140% Torque application".
The important question is did they make the "Run Dry" claim in their Technical Data/Certification Data/RFM/Checklist/Training Material?
My guess is 2003 judging by the date on the brochure (very hard to read for these old eyes so might actually be different).
What I did notice is at the Top of the thing they do say "Run Dry" but at the bottom of the thing they say "30 minute Run after Oil Loss and 140% Torque application".
The important question is did they make the "Run Dry" claim in their Technical Data/Certification Data/RFM/Checklist/Training Material?
According to the report there is NO indication that the crew thought they had 30 min dry run.
The other thing I noticed, and I actually teach this to PPL/CPL is "Bucket speed" and the Co-pilot mentioned this (using L/D Max instead), but the Captain was not familiar.
Perhaps this also shows some lack of systems knowledge on a broader spectrum (not just for this crew, but for most of us), showing the need to reduce power and slow down, in case of an emergency? Counter intuitive as well.
Anyways, I am by no stretch of the imagination any sort of expert on this, so I will shut up now.
Cheers
H.
The other thing I noticed, and I actually teach this to PPL/CPL is "Bucket speed" and the Co-pilot mentioned this (using L/D Max instead), but the Captain was not familiar.
Perhaps this also shows some lack of systems knowledge on a broader spectrum (not just for this crew, but for most of us), showing the need to reduce power and slow down, in case of an emergency? Counter intuitive as well.
Anyways, I am by no stretch of the imagination any sort of expert on this, so I will shut up now.
Cheers
H.
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Brian
I think 2003 also like SASless. But TSB do mention such terms were being used well after delivery to Cougar too.
SASless
Your point about the FAA is noted but it is the job of the applicant (Sikorsky) to show compliance (i.e state they have complied with the rule and how) and then for the FAA to verify that.
Where the FAA may well be at serious fault is in the re-interpretation of the rule after the failure in August 2002.
As that resulted in a means of compliance that differed from all former (and since!) loss of lube tests I believe that should have been recorded as an Equivalent Safety Finding on the TC Data Sheet and at least it would have been visible and rightly open to challenge.
The fact they did the first test the usual way does rather indicate that Sikorsky (and FAA) understood what should have been done but fudged it with the bypass system in a panic when the failure occured. The apparently lengthy debate the JAA had seems to have been, at least, in part due to that re-interpretation.
Winnie
The crew had a right to expect (even if they didn't understand FAR29) a gearbox that could run for 30 minutes after any credible type of oil loss because that is the requirement in the latest FARs which Sikorsky were happy to trumpet they complied with.
Sikorsky and FAA should have had a wake up call after Broome which showed that there were failures that were not extremely remote that the bypass system could not cope with.
I wonder if they need a better system knowledge.
I think 2003 also like SASless. But TSB do mention such terms were being used well after delivery to Cougar too.
SASless
Your point about the FAA is noted but it is the job of the applicant (Sikorsky) to show compliance (i.e state they have complied with the rule and how) and then for the FAA to verify that.
Where the FAA may well be at serious fault is in the re-interpretation of the rule after the failure in August 2002.
As that resulted in a means of compliance that differed from all former (and since!) loss of lube tests I believe that should have been recorded as an Equivalent Safety Finding on the TC Data Sheet and at least it would have been visible and rightly open to challenge.
The fact they did the first test the usual way does rather indicate that Sikorsky (and FAA) understood what should have been done but fudged it with the bypass system in a panic when the failure occured. The apparently lengthy debate the JAA had seems to have been, at least, in part due to that re-interpretation.
Winnie
The crew had a right to expect (even if they didn't understand FAR29) a gearbox that could run for 30 minutes after any credible type of oil loss because that is the requirement in the latest FARs which Sikorsky were happy to trumpet they complied with.
Sikorsky and FAA should have had a wake up call after Broome which showed that there were failures that were not extremely remote that the bypass system could not cope with.
I wonder if they need a better system knowledge.