Helicopter crash off the coast of Newfoundland - 18 aboard, March 2009
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As FH1100 correctly explains, the S-92 accident was down to a design choice to preserve design schedule:
To final announce such a u-change here to add emergency lube (as should have been done in late 2002 even if it meant a delay to the certification) could be seen as tantamount to agreeing that the decisions made behind closed doors in the fall of 2002 were negligent.
On another thread SASless wrote
That is a trait that is often shared by individuals & companies too. Yet product safety starts with management behaviour.
However, considering the unique acknowledgement in the TSB report of a certain Sikorsky Manager's postings on a certain 'social network' site on the S-92 loss of lube, and considering all the court cases are now over, perhaps we can see a frank admission on the very same site.
Though at least the Canadian DND are continuing to insist that Sikorsky's MHP has a full 30-minute capability, as per the requirements the S-92 failed to achieve.
SAC managed to convince the FAA guy (whose name we don't need to mention because everyone already knows who signed-off on it) that the ONLY possible source of a leak of transmission oil would be the lines leading to the oil cooler. Filter won't/can't leak...driveshaft inputs can't leak...the mast seal can't leak...the list goes on!
And the (unnamed) FAA guy said, "Yup, I agree!" But if they were using the S-92 design to justify that "extremely remote" crap, they had no historical base to draw from. If they (SAC) were using an industry-wide base for loss of transmission oil, they STILL were not on solid ground, because such things happen more than extremely remotely. (Admittedly they don't happen often, but "extremely remote" is a defined term.) SAC took the awkward wording of section 29.927(c)(1) and used it to their financial advantage.
So no, the S-92 does not IN FACT meet the requirements of FAR part-29 when it comes to the transmission. I would venture to say that there is no helicopter in existence that would qualify under that "extremely remote" clause. Why do we care? Because when you design an aircraft that's going to take LOTS of people out over some very inhospitable parts of the earth, then you are - and should be - held to a higher standard.
We know now that the S-92 transmission cannot withstand a complete loss of oil. Sikorsky admitted that their testing showed (and Cougar proved in the field) that you get "about" ten minutes of run time with no oil. This is undisputed. What's truly disturbing to me is that so few people seem to care.
And the (unnamed) FAA guy said, "Yup, I agree!" But if they were using the S-92 design to justify that "extremely remote" crap, they had no historical base to draw from. If they (SAC) were using an industry-wide base for loss of transmission oil, they STILL were not on solid ground, because such things happen more than extremely remotely. (Admittedly they don't happen often, but "extremely remote" is a defined term.) SAC took the awkward wording of section 29.927(c)(1) and used it to their financial advantage.
So no, the S-92 does not IN FACT meet the requirements of FAR part-29 when it comes to the transmission. I would venture to say that there is no helicopter in existence that would qualify under that "extremely remote" clause. Why do we care? Because when you design an aircraft that's going to take LOTS of people out over some very inhospitable parts of the earth, then you are - and should be - held to a higher standard.
We know now that the S-92 transmission cannot withstand a complete loss of oil. Sikorsky admitted that their testing showed (and Cougar proved in the field) that you get "about" ten minutes of run time with no oil. This is undisputed. What's truly disturbing to me is that so few people seem to care.
On another thread SASless wrote
Government never wants to admit a mistake....even when it is patently clear to everyone involved.
However, considering the unique acknowledgement in the TSB report of a certain Sikorsky Manager's postings on a certain 'social network' site on the S-92 loss of lube, and considering all the court cases are now over, perhaps we can see a frank admission on the very same site.
Though at least the Canadian DND are continuing to insist that Sikorsky's MHP has a full 30-minute capability, as per the requirements the S-92 failed to achieve.
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Cougar SAR-ready at St. Johns
Great news that there has been an upgrade in SAR capability!
No mention of the S-92 autohover being aproved for use in Canada yet. Can anyone confirm the current status?
Great news that there has been an upgrade in SAR capability!
No mention of the S-92 autohover being aproved for use in Canada yet. Can anyone confirm the current status?
Yes it is - see here (near the end):
List of Approved Special Conditions - Airworthiness - Transport Canada
it was approved shortly after the FAA did - about 4 years after EASA
List of Approved Special Conditions - Airworthiness - Transport Canada
it was approved shortly after the FAA did - about 4 years after EASA
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212man
The link you posted is to the agreed extra certification conditions the equipment needs to meet.
But is it actually certified in Canada yet?
I agree 4 years seems amazing.
The link you posted is to the agreed extra certification conditions the equipment needs to meet.
But is it actually certified in Canada yet?
I agree 4 years seems amazing.
Energy clients seek to lift of ban on Canadian offshore night flights
Cool response from some to extending offshore flying day - Regional - The Gander Beacon
An agreement between the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (CNLOPB) and the oil companies operating offshore restricted flights to daylight hours after the crash of Cougar Flight 491.
On Tuesday, representatives for the offshore operators — specifically Suncor, Husky Energy and the Hibernia Management and Development Corp. (HMDC) — pointed to the advances in helicopter safety since the crash, including increased pilot training, machine upgrades and the creation of a dedicated search and rescue service.
The company representatives then said they would seek a change in the ban on night flights, and make a formal filing with the CNLOPB in near future.
The request comes following consultations with offshore workers, they said.
It would not be a full removal of the ban on night flights, but would allow for flights to land at night, just after dusk.
It amounts to about an extra hour and a half of flying time each day.
“This really is an attempt by the oil operators to get a full return to night flights,” said a less-than-impressed Lana Payne, Atlantic director for Unifor.
The union represents workers on the Terra Nova FPSO and the Hibernia oil platform.
Payne acknowledged some workers at both sites may be OK with extending the flying day — as has been indicated by representatives for the employer companies — but Unifor is not supporting any change to the status quo, she said.
On Tuesday, representatives for the offshore operators — specifically Suncor, Husky Energy and the Hibernia Management and Development Corp. (HMDC) — pointed to the advances in helicopter safety since the crash, including increased pilot training, machine upgrades and the creation of a dedicated search and rescue service.
The company representatives then said they would seek a change in the ban on night flights, and make a formal filing with the CNLOPB in near future.
The request comes following consultations with offshore workers, they said.
It would not be a full removal of the ban on night flights, but would allow for flights to land at night, just after dusk.
It amounts to about an extra hour and a half of flying time each day.
“This really is an attempt by the oil operators to get a full return to night flights,” said a less-than-impressed Lana Payne, Atlantic director for Unifor.
The union represents workers on the Terra Nova FPSO and the Hibernia oil platform.
Payne acknowledged some workers at both sites may be OK with extending the flying day — as has been indicated by representatives for the employer companies — but Unifor is not supporting any change to the status quo, she said.
New rules focus on dangers of flights to offshore drilling sites
The Hidernia oil-drilling platform 315 kilometres off the coast of Newfoundland
Nearly five years after a helicopter crash killed 17 people en route to the White Rose and Hibernia oilfields off the coast of Newfoundland, new aviation safety regulations are in the works to prevent similar tragedies in the future.
The proposed amendments to the Canadian Aviation Regulations would require emergency floatation systems and breathing apparatus for over water flights involved in offshore operations.
They would also prevent flights in weather where sea conditions at the destination exceed the measures for safe “ditching” of the vessel, except in emergency situations. Additionally, the proposals, laid out in the Canada Gazette quarterly index, would amend a requirement that crew members wear passenger transportation suits – survival suits – when flying over water with a temperature less than 10 C.
Crew members instead would be able to wear specialized suits tailored to their duties as the passenger suits can interfere with their ability to manipulate controls and “increases the likelihood of thermal exhaustion.”
The proposals take into account several recommendations made by the Transportation Safety Board in 2011 after its investigation of the 2009 Cougar Helicopters crash that left 17 people dead and raised concerns about aviation safety in Canada.
The accident’s lone survivor, Robert Decker, as well as family members of the victims have been critical of Canada’s aviation safety protocol and its slow response to outdated regulations.
Some of the recommendations are already in place, but mandated by the industry rather than government.
Petroleum boards overseeing offshore activity in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia require helicopter operators bidding on contracts to supply emergency floatation systems, which keep the helicopter frame from sinking, and emergency underwater breathing apparatus for each passenger. But with interest in offshore drilling expected in Canada’s arctic and Northern B.C., the proposed changes would be mandatory across the country.
“The safety of passengers and crews of Canadian offshore operations flights cannot be left to reactive contractual obligations,” says the gazette.
The regulations would apply to offshore drilling flights, sea-pilot transfer flights and search and rescue. Failure to comply would be met with a fine of $3,000 for individuals and $15,000 for corporations.
New aviation safety rules focus on dangers of flights to offshore drilling sites
The Hidernia oil-drilling platform 315 kilometres off the coast of Newfoundland
Nearly five years after a helicopter crash killed 17 people en route to the White Rose and Hibernia oilfields off the coast of Newfoundland, new aviation safety regulations are in the works to prevent similar tragedies in the future.
The proposed amendments to the Canadian Aviation Regulations would require emergency floatation systems and breathing apparatus for over water flights involved in offshore operations.
They would also prevent flights in weather where sea conditions at the destination exceed the measures for safe “ditching” of the vessel, except in emergency situations. Additionally, the proposals, laid out in the Canada Gazette quarterly index, would amend a requirement that crew members wear passenger transportation suits – survival suits – when flying over water with a temperature less than 10 C.
Crew members instead would be able to wear specialized suits tailored to their duties as the passenger suits can interfere with their ability to manipulate controls and “increases the likelihood of thermal exhaustion.”
The proposals take into account several recommendations made by the Transportation Safety Board in 2011 after its investigation of the 2009 Cougar Helicopters crash that left 17 people dead and raised concerns about aviation safety in Canada.
The accident’s lone survivor, Robert Decker, as well as family members of the victims have been critical of Canada’s aviation safety protocol and its slow response to outdated regulations.
Some of the recommendations are already in place, but mandated by the industry rather than government.
Petroleum boards overseeing offshore activity in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia require helicopter operators bidding on contracts to supply emergency floatation systems, which keep the helicopter frame from sinking, and emergency underwater breathing apparatus for each passenger. But with interest in offshore drilling expected in Canada’s arctic and Northern B.C., the proposed changes would be mandatory across the country.
“The safety of passengers and crews of Canadian offshore operations flights cannot be left to reactive contractual obligations,” says the gazette.
The regulations would apply to offshore drilling flights, sea-pilot transfer flights and search and rescue. Failure to comply would be met with a fine of $3,000 for individuals and $15,000 for corporations.
Tcabot113 Riff Raff
Things inside of a transmission are rarely without all lube even if jets are clogged due to misting of all of the oil flowing around. I attended an AHS meeting where Bell Helicopter showed a HUMS trace from a 412 where the tail rotor output quill of the main transmission had restricted lube to the bearings due to "cork" in the oil port (not known until inspected). The vibration of the quill was monitored for one year before the decision was made to overhaul it where the cork was found. The bearings had sufficient damage to cause vibration alerts, but no chip indications.
So are you saying there was a 12 month knowledge with the HUMS regarding unexplained vibration on quill
Things inside of a transmission are rarely without all lube even if jets are clogged due to misting of all of the oil flowing around. I attended an AHS meeting where Bell Helicopter showed a HUMS trace from a 412 where the tail rotor output quill of the main transmission had restricted lube to the bearings due to "cork" in the oil port (not known until inspected). The vibration of the quill was monitored for one year before the decision was made to overhaul it where the cork was found. The bearings had sufficient damage to cause vibration alerts, but no chip indications.
So are you saying there was a 12 month knowledge with the HUMS regarding unexplained vibration on quill
500e
Your analysis is completely wrong. The point they were making was a properly designed quill with robust bearings can survive extended operations with reduced/no lubrication. It took one year before the take action level was reached, not that it is flying one year above the highest alert level. Anyone familiar with HUMS knows extremely minor damage can light off lower alerts that have no impact on safety and even the highest are set with significant margin.
The point is Sikorsky screwed up and choose a tail rotor output quill bearing configuration which fails in 12 minutes after loss of lube. This resulted in gears moving and chewing themselves to pieces. The pathetic part was that the failure on the 92 was exactly what was seen in the failed oil out demonstrations. It was loss of tail rotor drive that caused the crash, there was no loss of rotor drive.
Another post showed that Bell presented an AHS paper where the Bell 429 main transmission, in a realistic loss of lube test, ran four hours after the main oil volume was lost in a similar way as the 429. These tests were conducted a minimum continue flight torque up to Max cont power. Bell knows how to design transmissions.
The Sultan
Your analysis is completely wrong. The point they were making was a properly designed quill with robust bearings can survive extended operations with reduced/no lubrication. It took one year before the take action level was reached, not that it is flying one year above the highest alert level. Anyone familiar with HUMS knows extremely minor damage can light off lower alerts that have no impact on safety and even the highest are set with significant margin.
The point is Sikorsky screwed up and choose a tail rotor output quill bearing configuration which fails in 12 minutes after loss of lube. This resulted in gears moving and chewing themselves to pieces. The pathetic part was that the failure on the 92 was exactly what was seen in the failed oil out demonstrations. It was loss of tail rotor drive that caused the crash, there was no loss of rotor drive.
Another post showed that Bell presented an AHS paper where the Bell 429 main transmission, in a realistic loss of lube test, ran four hours after the main oil volume was lost in a similar way as the 429. These tests were conducted a minimum continue flight torque up to Max cont power. Bell knows how to design transmissions.
The Sultan
"It took one year before the take action level was reached, not that it is flying one year above the highest alert level. Anyone familiar with HUMS knows extremely minor damage can light off lower alerts that have no impact on safety and even the highest are set with significant margin".
I thought HUMS was a trend forecast, so if there is a trend that is monitored getting closer to failure mode over a relativity short period, perhaps ?.
I did not think it had been above safe level for a year if it had surely that would would be irresponsible at least
I do appreciate there has to be a level that is to low to warrant action but as the trend was progressing in hind sight a look may have been a good idea.
I thought HUMS was a trend forecast, so if there is a trend that is monitored getting closer to failure mode over a relativity short period, perhaps ?.
I did not think it had been above safe level for a year if it had surely that would would be irresponsible at least
I do appreciate there has to be a level that is to low to warrant action but as the trend was progressing in hind sight a look may have been a good idea.
500
When removed the bearings were completely serviceable but showing the initial signs of minor surface damage. No spalling occurred, no chips generated, etc. Same can not be said off Canada.
Savoia
Sorry the last 429 should have been the 92.
The Sultan
When removed the bearings were completely serviceable but showing the initial signs of minor surface damage. No spalling occurred, no chips generated, etc. Same can not be said off Canada.
Savoia
Sorry the last 429 should have been the 92.
The Sultan
Bob, it gets down to an issue of trust. To wit: Do you trust your aircraft to get you to Point B? Most helicopter pilots don’t. Either consciously or sub-consciously, many helicopter pilots have a nagging feeling of dread that a catastrophic failure of some sort will occur which will require them to be on the ground RIGHTFRIGGIN’ NOW! And so they fly low, as SASless notes. They don’t want to be “way up there” when Something Bad happens.
I’m no Sigmund Freud, but I think I know why. Most helicopter pilots are pretty untrustworthy people. There, I said it. And it’s true. If you’ve met many of them you can vouch for this on your own. You can’t trust a helicopter pilot to tell you the time of day, unfortunately. Some will vehemently pretend to deny this, but again, stick around this industry for a while and you’ll see what I mean.
Hand and hand with this personality “quirk” is the fact that most helicopter pilots don’t trust anything or anybody. This lack of trust explains why so many helicopter pilots are fearful, paranoid atheists. (Want to know how paranoid a helicopter pilot is? Just ask him about politics - then stand back!)
Helicopter pilots feel that they are absolutely in charge of their own destiny, and giving up even one small iota of that control is totally unacceptable and abhorrent. Helicopter pilots don’t trust the maintenance guys and they certainly don’t trust their machines, heavens no! Thus, that helpless feeling of being up high in a helicopter when the poop hits the fan is utterly intolerable; too much for them to bear.
They’ll rationalize it. They’ll worry, “What if you get a chip light?” Or, “What if you lose all your transmission oil?” Or, “What if the engine catches on fire?” Or, "What if the rotor blades fly off?" Because in their mind (either the front or back of their mind), every time they fly all of those things are imminent. They’ll tell you, “Oh, the scenery is so much better down low!” But that’s just a mask to hide their real fear. And yes, it’s fear.
Like you, I fly airplanes too. When I’m flying along up high in a single-engine airplane I sometimes wonder to myself, “Gee, what if the engine caught on fire? How fast could I get ‘er down before my feet burned off?” The answer to that could be troubling. But then I ask myself, “...And how likely is that to happen?” The answer is: Not very. So I relax and have myself a sandwich.
There are a number of emergencies that might cause a typical helicopter pilot to want to be on the ground pretty quickly. There’s always the dreaded chip-light (“LAND IMMEDIATELY!!!) that makes a lot of pilots panic. There are also a lot of spinny things (bearings and linkages and such) in our aircraft that can come askew. But aside from in-flight fire, the worst-case scenario is probably a total loss of transmission oil. Yikes! Does that ever happen??
Well…yeah. In 2009 this actually did happen to the crew of a Sikorsky S-92 that was cruising along eastbound off the coast of Canada at 9,000 feet. The crew reversed course, descended to 800 feet and headed toward land. They erroneously thought (due to their knowledge of aircraft certification regulations) that they had at least 30 minutes of “run-dry” capability in their transmission. That’s what the rules call for. But there is a loophole (isn’t there always?).
What they didn’t know, but what Sikorsky did know (but didn’t tell anyone) is that with no trans juice at all the S-92 transmission would last about nine minutes before it did its impersonation of a hand grenade. And, wouldn’t you know it, about nine minutes after the transmission pressure went to zero in that S-92 off the Canadian coast, the transmission came apart. The pilots lost control and the helicopter crashed into the sea. Of the 18 people on board, only one survived.
So the typical helicopter pilot would point excitedly to this event and say, “See?! I told ya so! Bad **** happens!”
The fact is, stuff like that RARELY happens. And even if the S-92 had been up at 10,000 feet when the transmission lost all its oil, the crew still could have initiated a 1500 fpm descent and landed safely if they actually followed the emergency procedures set out in their RFM (although in the case referenced above they did not). But don’t tell that to a paranoid helicopter pilot who’s so worried about getting an engine chip light that he feels uncomfortable and squirms when he gets above 1,000 feet.
Like a few of the guys on this board, I’ve been flying for a living for over 30 years and I’ve got a logbook full of hours, mostly in single-engine helicopters. And me, I fly high. It’s cooler up there, often smoother, and sometimes you can find a ripping tailwind. Plus, I like the view from altitude. If I were that distrustful of my equipment…if I were that paranoid…that afraid of Something Bad happening to my helicopter, I just could not fly it at all - not at any altitude! But see, I also have faith. Faith in the designers, faith in the builders, and faith in the maintainers. Without that faith, I doubt I could even climb into one of these crazy contraptions in the first place.
If the pilot with whom you are ferrying that helicopter is a “typical”helicopter pilot, I’ll bet that you’ll likely spend the whole trip dogging along down at 1,000’ agl. Or less. If that happens, you’ll know some other things about him too...perhaps things that you'd rather not know.
I’m no Sigmund Freud, but I think I know why. Most helicopter pilots are pretty untrustworthy people. There, I said it. And it’s true. If you’ve met many of them you can vouch for this on your own. You can’t trust a helicopter pilot to tell you the time of day, unfortunately. Some will vehemently pretend to deny this, but again, stick around this industry for a while and you’ll see what I mean.
Hand and hand with this personality “quirk” is the fact that most helicopter pilots don’t trust anything or anybody. This lack of trust explains why so many helicopter pilots are fearful, paranoid atheists. (Want to know how paranoid a helicopter pilot is? Just ask him about politics - then stand back!)
Helicopter pilots feel that they are absolutely in charge of their own destiny, and giving up even one small iota of that control is totally unacceptable and abhorrent. Helicopter pilots don’t trust the maintenance guys and they certainly don’t trust their machines, heavens no! Thus, that helpless feeling of being up high in a helicopter when the poop hits the fan is utterly intolerable; too much for them to bear.
They’ll rationalize it. They’ll worry, “What if you get a chip light?” Or, “What if you lose all your transmission oil?” Or, “What if the engine catches on fire?” Or, "What if the rotor blades fly off?" Because in their mind (either the front or back of their mind), every time they fly all of those things are imminent. They’ll tell you, “Oh, the scenery is so much better down low!” But that’s just a mask to hide their real fear. And yes, it’s fear.
Like you, I fly airplanes too. When I’m flying along up high in a single-engine airplane I sometimes wonder to myself, “Gee, what if the engine caught on fire? How fast could I get ‘er down before my feet burned off?” The answer to that could be troubling. But then I ask myself, “...And how likely is that to happen?” The answer is: Not very. So I relax and have myself a sandwich.
There are a number of emergencies that might cause a typical helicopter pilot to want to be on the ground pretty quickly. There’s always the dreaded chip-light (“LAND IMMEDIATELY!!!) that makes a lot of pilots panic. There are also a lot of spinny things (bearings and linkages and such) in our aircraft that can come askew. But aside from in-flight fire, the worst-case scenario is probably a total loss of transmission oil. Yikes! Does that ever happen??
Well…yeah. In 2009 this actually did happen to the crew of a Sikorsky S-92 that was cruising along eastbound off the coast of Canada at 9,000 feet. The crew reversed course, descended to 800 feet and headed toward land. They erroneously thought (due to their knowledge of aircraft certification regulations) that they had at least 30 minutes of “run-dry” capability in their transmission. That’s what the rules call for. But there is a loophole (isn’t there always?).
What they didn’t know, but what Sikorsky did know (but didn’t tell anyone) is that with no trans juice at all the S-92 transmission would last about nine minutes before it did its impersonation of a hand grenade. And, wouldn’t you know it, about nine minutes after the transmission pressure went to zero in that S-92 off the Canadian coast, the transmission came apart. The pilots lost control and the helicopter crashed into the sea. Of the 18 people on board, only one survived.
So the typical helicopter pilot would point excitedly to this event and say, “See?! I told ya so! Bad **** happens!”
The fact is, stuff like that RARELY happens. And even if the S-92 had been up at 10,000 feet when the transmission lost all its oil, the crew still could have initiated a 1500 fpm descent and landed safely if they actually followed the emergency procedures set out in their RFM (although in the case referenced above they did not). But don’t tell that to a paranoid helicopter pilot who’s so worried about getting an engine chip light that he feels uncomfortable and squirms when he gets above 1,000 feet.
Like a few of the guys on this board, I’ve been flying for a living for over 30 years and I’ve got a logbook full of hours, mostly in single-engine helicopters. And me, I fly high. It’s cooler up there, often smoother, and sometimes you can find a ripping tailwind. Plus, I like the view from altitude. If I were that distrustful of my equipment…if I were that paranoid…that afraid of Something Bad happening to my helicopter, I just could not fly it at all - not at any altitude! But see, I also have faith. Faith in the designers, faith in the builders, and faith in the maintainers. Without that faith, I doubt I could even climb into one of these crazy contraptions in the first place.
If the pilot with whom you are ferrying that helicopter is a “typical”helicopter pilot, I’ll bet that you’ll likely spend the whole trip dogging along down at 1,000’ agl. Or less. If that happens, you’ll know some other things about him too...perhaps things that you'd rather not know.
You can’t trust a helicopter pilot to tell you the time of day,
Sad you have to prove your own point.
Mr. Santa not leave you anything in yer stocking last night or something?
Tis the Season to be of Good Cheer.....try it....you will find it much more enjoyable just as ol' Scrooge hisself did!
This has been put to bed by the Canadian TSB.....read the report of their review of that situation.
You do need to quit talking Bollocks FH!
Well…yeah. In 2009 this actually did happen to the crew of a Sikorsky S-92 that was cruising along eastbound off the coast of Canada at 9,000 feet. The crew reversed course, descended to 800 feet and headed toward land. They erroneously thought (due to their knowledge of aircraft certification regulations) that they had at least 30 minutes of “run-dry” capability in their transmission. That’s what the rules call for. But there is a loophole (isn’t there always?).
I have read the report, SAS, and it did nothing of the sort. You ought to shut yer...how do they say it in your country?...gob.
1. Trans ran dry.
2. Pilots believed that they had "30-minute run-dry" capability as per FAR Part 29.
3. Sikorsky knew it would only last 9 minutes (or so) with no oil at all.
4. Transmission (tail rotor drive) came apart 9 minutes into emergency.
5. Pilots screwed up emergency landing.
6. Everybody died except one pax.
Perhaps you'd like to counter my post with some, you know, FACTS? That is, if it wouldn't trouble you too much. I know that you mostly like to just post innuendo, half-baked opinions and fond remembrances of back when you used to be a pilot some time ago (as opposed to us who still are active pilots), but you're not THAT out of it, are you?
Happy Xmas.
1. Trans ran dry.
2. Pilots believed that they had "30-minute run-dry" capability as per FAR Part 29.
3. Sikorsky knew it would only last 9 minutes (or so) with no oil at all.
4. Transmission (tail rotor drive) came apart 9 minutes into emergency.
5. Pilots screwed up emergency landing.
6. Everybody died except one pax.
Perhaps you'd like to counter my post with some, you know, FACTS? That is, if it wouldn't trouble you too much. I know that you mostly like to just post innuendo, half-baked opinions and fond remembrances of back when you used to be a pilot some time ago (as opposed to us who still are active pilots), but you're not THAT out of it, are you?
Happy Xmas.
FH......FFS Man....how far is Destin from Pensacola?
FYI....we just went through this discussion a few weeks ago. During that I posted quotes from the TSB Report here at Rotorheads.
I suggest you do a search....catch up on what was posted, what was argued, and how it turned out.
It is all there for you to read....and I care not to go through that again just for your education....and I am sure the rest of the folks here do not want to have to go through it again either.
You are altogether too rude....plainly do not have the facts....and border on being quite offensive in the tone and sentiment of your posts....especially when there is absolutely no call for it.
I know you.....know your background....and had some respect for you in the workplace but here at Rotorheads your manner greatly harms what respect I had for you back then.
The TSB Report does not support your comments re the reasons for the Ditching or the Times you cite along with several other glaring differences.
You have been called out by others, one right after another, and you persist in your crass ways.
Why?
FYI....we just went through this discussion a few weeks ago. During that I posted quotes from the TSB Report here at Rotorheads.
I suggest you do a search....catch up on what was posted, what was argued, and how it turned out.
It is all there for you to read....and I care not to go through that again just for your education....and I am sure the rest of the folks here do not want to have to go through it again either.
You are altogether too rude....plainly do not have the facts....and border on being quite offensive in the tone and sentiment of your posts....especially when there is absolutely no call for it.
I know you.....know your background....and had some respect for you in the workplace but here at Rotorheads your manner greatly harms what respect I had for you back then.
The TSB Report does not support your comments re the reasons for the Ditching or the Times you cite along with several other glaring differences.
You have been called out by others, one right after another, and you persist in your crass ways.
Why?
SAS, I'm not sure if you try to be obtuse and argumentative or if it just comes naturally to you. Either way, your posts are tiresome.
But okay SAS, you're right: I'm such an idiot. I absolutely got it wrong. It wasn't nine minutes from loss of transmission oil to transmission failure - it was eleven minutes. And it wasn't nine minutes that the CHI crew got after they noticed a low transmission gearbox pressure to the time their gearbox failed, it was ten minutes. Silly, silly me. Mea culpa, mea culpa, you dick.
Look, I'll play your silly game and make it easy on you. Which one of the following statements is not true?
1. Trans ran dry.
(True/False)
2. Pilots believed that they had "30-minute run-dry" capability as per FAR Part 29.
(True/False)
3. Sikorsky knew it would only last (edited) 11 minutes with no oil at all.
(True/False)
4. Transmission (tail rotor drive) came apart (edited) 10 minutes into the emergency.
(True/False
5. Pilots screwed up emergency landing.
(True/False)
6. Everybody died except one pax.
(True/False)
Here is the synopsis from the Transport Canada report on the accident:
Bob Denny, here is the link to the Transport Canada TSB report:
Transportation Safety Board of Canada - Aviation Investigation Report A09A0016
To save time, I bid you to please refer to Section 1.18.5 S-92A MGB Certification.
There you'll read about how FAR 29.927(c)(1) calls for a helicopter transmission to run for 30 minutes after the loss of lubricating oil.
Sikorsky drained all the oil out of an S-92 gearbox and it ran for eleven minutes until it came apart.
But wait! Like I said, there's a loophole. The FAA permits manufacturers to forego that "30-minute run-dry capability" (as it's informally known in the industry) if such incidences of total loss of oil are "extremely remote." And while extremely-remote is not specifically defined in the 29.927(c)(1) it is generally considered to be one in 10 to the seventh power to 10 to the ninth power. Gee, that's pretty remote!
In Section 1.18.5 of the TSB report you'll read about how Sikorsky convinced the FAA that the only real failure of the trans would be the lines going to and from the transmission oil cooler. Yes, yes, sounds good. Never mind the external oil filter (oh, those never leak!) or the seals on things like accesssory drives (e.g. the generator) or the tail rotor drive shaft or the seals on the two input drive shafts from the engines. Nope, none of those would never leak either!
So Sikorsky simply came up with a means of bypassing the transmission oil cooler. Once the pilots got the "Low Trans G/B Press" caption they had five seconds to activate the emergency bypass, or all of the transmission oil might have been lost. Problem solved! With the cooler isolated and "some" oil lost, the trans oil temp would probably climb up into the red, but hey, at least you'd have some oil circulating around! The trans can run for a long time with hot oil. It just can't run for 30-minutes with no oil.
Handshakes were made and all agreed that no transmission would fail in that way in 10 to the seventh power of flight time. Bing- certified! Aren't their faces red now! Well...no...but they ought to be.
And so that's what happened. A big sun gear in the transmission failed. The drive to the tail rotor disintegrated - like hot melted plastic. While the transmission did not explode or sieze, it was definitely coming apart and would not have lasted much longer with all that molten metal flinging around inside it. But it didn't matter. Flight tests showed that the S-92 was incapable of level flight after a tail rotor failure. (TSB Section 1.18.1.4) Either way, that ship was going down.
In this case, the PF screwed up the auto and pretty much leveled and cushioned at 90 feet or so. Oops! It was a long way to fall.
SASless may tell you I've got things wrong with my description of this accident, but he won't provide a reference. I do not have it wrong. He is mistaken. But he's old (and possibly senile) and apparently not a pilot anymore, so his opinions cannot be confidently relied upon.
In any case, the peculiar CHS S-92 accident should not deter you from flying up an altitude higher than 500' agl. Me? I agree with guys like Shawn Coyle. And if he says to fly high, that should be good enough for the rest of us too.
But okay SAS, you're right: I'm such an idiot. I absolutely got it wrong. It wasn't nine minutes from loss of transmission oil to transmission failure - it was eleven minutes. And it wasn't nine minutes that the CHI crew got after they noticed a low transmission gearbox pressure to the time their gearbox failed, it was ten minutes. Silly, silly me. Mea culpa, mea culpa, you dick.
Look, I'll play your silly game and make it easy on you. Which one of the following statements is not true?
1. Trans ran dry.
(True/False)
2. Pilots believed that they had "30-minute run-dry" capability as per FAR Part 29.
(True/False)
3. Sikorsky knew it would only last (edited) 11 minutes with no oil at all.
(True/False)
4. Transmission (tail rotor drive) came apart (edited) 10 minutes into the emergency.
(True/False
5. Pilots screwed up emergency landing.
(True/False)
6. Everybody died except one pax.
(True/False)
Here is the synopsis from the Transport Canada report on the accident:
On 12 March 2009, at 0917 Newfoundland and Labrador daylight time, a Cougar Helicopters' Sikorsky S-92A (registration C-GZCH, serial number 920048), operated as Cougar 91 (CHI91), departed St. John's International Airport, Newfoundland and Labrador, with 16 passengers and 2 flight crew, to the Hibernia oil production platform.
At approximately 0945, 13 minutes after levelling off at a flight-planned altitude of 9000 feet above sea level (asl), a main gearbox oil pressure warning light illuminated. The helicopter was about 54 nautical miles from the St. John's International Airport. The flight crew declared an emergency, began a descent, and diverted back towards St. John's. The crew descended to, and levelled off at, 800 feet asl on a heading of 293° Magnetic with an airspeed of 133 knots.
At 0955, approximately 35 nautical miles from St. John's, the crew reported that they were ditching. Less than 1 minute later, the helicopter struck the water in a slight right-bank, nose-high attitude, with low speed and a high rate of descent. The fuselage was severely compromised and sank quickly in 169 metres of water. One passenger survived with serious injuries and was rescued approximately 1 hour and 20 minutes after the accident. The other 17 occupants of the helicopter died of drowning. There were no signals detected from either the emergency locator transmitter or the personal locator beacons worn by the occupants of the helicopter.
At approximately 0945, 13 minutes after levelling off at a flight-planned altitude of 9000 feet above sea level (asl), a main gearbox oil pressure warning light illuminated. The helicopter was about 54 nautical miles from the St. John's International Airport. The flight crew declared an emergency, began a descent, and diverted back towards St. John's. The crew descended to, and levelled off at, 800 feet asl on a heading of 293° Magnetic with an airspeed of 133 knots.
At 0955, approximately 35 nautical miles from St. John's, the crew reported that they were ditching. Less than 1 minute later, the helicopter struck the water in a slight right-bank, nose-high attitude, with low speed and a high rate of descent. The fuselage was severely compromised and sank quickly in 169 metres of water. One passenger survived with serious injuries and was rescued approximately 1 hour and 20 minutes after the accident. The other 17 occupants of the helicopter died of drowning. There were no signals detected from either the emergency locator transmitter or the personal locator beacons worn by the occupants of the helicopter.
Bob Denny, here is the link to the Transport Canada TSB report:
Transportation Safety Board of Canada - Aviation Investigation Report A09A0016
To save time, I bid you to please refer to Section 1.18.5 S-92A MGB Certification.
There you'll read about how FAR 29.927(c)(1) calls for a helicopter transmission to run for 30 minutes after the loss of lubricating oil.
Sikorsky drained all the oil out of an S-92 gearbox and it ran for eleven minutes until it came apart.
But wait! Like I said, there's a loophole. The FAA permits manufacturers to forego that "30-minute run-dry capability" (as it's informally known in the industry) if such incidences of total loss of oil are "extremely remote." And while extremely-remote is not specifically defined in the 29.927(c)(1) it is generally considered to be one in 10 to the seventh power to 10 to the ninth power. Gee, that's pretty remote!
In Section 1.18.5 of the TSB report you'll read about how Sikorsky convinced the FAA that the only real failure of the trans would be the lines going to and from the transmission oil cooler. Yes, yes, sounds good. Never mind the external oil filter (oh, those never leak!) or the seals on things like accesssory drives (e.g. the generator) or the tail rotor drive shaft or the seals on the two input drive shafts from the engines. Nope, none of those would never leak either!
So Sikorsky simply came up with a means of bypassing the transmission oil cooler. Once the pilots got the "Low Trans G/B Press" caption they had five seconds to activate the emergency bypass, or all of the transmission oil might have been lost. Problem solved! With the cooler isolated and "some" oil lost, the trans oil temp would probably climb up into the red, but hey, at least you'd have some oil circulating around! The trans can run for a long time with hot oil. It just can't run for 30-minutes with no oil.
Handshakes were made and all agreed that no transmission would fail in that way in 10 to the seventh power of flight time. Bing- certified! Aren't their faces red now! Well...no...but they ought to be.
And so that's what happened. A big sun gear in the transmission failed. The drive to the tail rotor disintegrated - like hot melted plastic. While the transmission did not explode or sieze, it was definitely coming apart and would not have lasted much longer with all that molten metal flinging around inside it. But it didn't matter. Flight tests showed that the S-92 was incapable of level flight after a tail rotor failure. (TSB Section 1.18.1.4) Either way, that ship was going down.
In this case, the PF screwed up the auto and pretty much leveled and cushioned at 90 feet or so. Oops! It was a long way to fall.
SASless may tell you I've got things wrong with my description of this accident, but he won't provide a reference. I do not have it wrong. He is mistaken. But he's old (and possibly senile) and apparently not a pilot anymore, so his opinions cannot be confidently relied upon.
In any case, the peculiar CHS S-92 accident should not deter you from flying up an altitude higher than 500' agl. Me? I agree with guys like Shawn Coyle. And if he says to fly high, that should be good enough for the rest of us too.
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FH
Interesting, presumably factually accurate post FH, and a good read as usual, thanks.
SAS - have to say that FH does seem to have responded very pertinently, and I for one would like to hear which of his facts you believe are wrong - and do not have the time or inclination to trawl through old info on the S92 accident. FH duly presented a summary - could you do the same please?
High or low? Bit of both for me on a trip of this length. High if I've got a good tailwind, am bored of sightseeing and want to make some smooth progress, but low if not and the view's good!
Interesting, presumably factually accurate post FH, and a good read as usual, thanks.
SAS - have to say that FH does seem to have responded very pertinently, and I for one would like to hear which of his facts you believe are wrong - and do not have the time or inclination to trawl through old info on the S92 accident. FH duly presented a summary - could you do the same please?
High or low? Bit of both for me on a trip of this length. High if I've got a good tailwind, am bored of sightseeing and want to make some smooth progress, but low if not and the view's good!
Superificially and cherry picked only that which tends to support his argument.
Now go back into the Report....Read what is there.....all of it....and check back with us.
Read up on the entire sequence of events where Sikorsky, the Operators including Cougar, and the Authorities worked towards resolving the Oil Filter problem.
There is specific mention to a Senior Cougar Manager and several Cougar Pilots attending a popular, well know internet media site where that issue had been argued, discussed, debated, and talked about for several years.
Also read what they describe as being the cause of the Crash.....and you will see they make no mention of the Run Dry Issue. It all comes down to the Captain made several bad decisions beginning with an improper diagnosis of the problem, followed by failing to comply with Company SOP's for Emergency Descents, and failing to comply with the Company Checklist instruction to Ditch the Aircraft despite the Co-Pilot telling him that on at least three occasions. They go into great detail about bad engineering practices at Cougar re the Oil Filter Studs and Self Locking Nuts, along with other issues that led to the tragedy.
But....they do not say anywhere the Crew made any decision based upon the 30 Minute notion. They do go to lengths to dispel that idea as being part of the decisions the Crew made. There is no other way to read the Report's findings.
If you have not read the TSB report.....word for word....you are not adequately sourced to discuss this.
As I have told FH....he is late to the Party.....must be that Infamous American site ran him off and now he is back here thinking he can carry on in the same manner as is acceptable there but not here.
Now go back into the Report....Read what is there.....all of it....and check back with us.
Read up on the entire sequence of events where Sikorsky, the Operators including Cougar, and the Authorities worked towards resolving the Oil Filter problem.
There is specific mention to a Senior Cougar Manager and several Cougar Pilots attending a popular, well know internet media site where that issue had been argued, discussed, debated, and talked about for several years.
Also read what they describe as being the cause of the Crash.....and you will see they make no mention of the Run Dry Issue. It all comes down to the Captain made several bad decisions beginning with an improper diagnosis of the problem, followed by failing to comply with Company SOP's for Emergency Descents, and failing to comply with the Company Checklist instruction to Ditch the Aircraft despite the Co-Pilot telling him that on at least three occasions. They go into great detail about bad engineering practices at Cougar re the Oil Filter Studs and Self Locking Nuts, along with other issues that led to the tragedy.
But....they do not say anywhere the Crew made any decision based upon the 30 Minute notion. They do go to lengths to dispel that idea as being part of the decisions the Crew made. There is no other way to read the Report's findings.
If you have not read the TSB report.....word for word....you are not adequately sourced to discuss this.
As I have told FH....he is late to the Party.....must be that Infamous American site ran him off and now he is back here thinking he can carry on in the same manner as is acceptable there but not here.
Last edited by SASless; 26th Dec 2013 at 12:47.