I'd like to thank Mel Effluent for posting that link - a very interesting and sad report. I was up all night reading it.
I'm curious for those who do a lot of twin engine flying how much emphasis an operator like Cougar puts on autorotative descents during initial and recurrent training? My initial assumption when I first heard about the accident was that the MRG had seized, but reading the report it sounds like it was flying right until impact.
Besides the yaw from the TR failure, what kind of control issues would a pilot be encountering on a S92 that would compromise the execution of the autorotation? Would the aircraft still be experiencing yaw kicks after the collective was all the way down? Does that still couple into pitch with the Sikorsky (canted) TR design once you are in autorotation? (I wouldn't think so).
Finally, that far offshore, how hard is it to judge height above the water for a proper flare initiation? (I'm sure you could use a RADALT but in good VFR I would think most of us would judge the flare visually).
I was also under the assumption that a gearbox would give you lots of warning before it finally let go - noise, vibration, etc. This report seems to indicate that isn't always the case.
Paul