Pilots and Parachutes. (Merged)
Join Date: Dec 2008
Location: San Diego, CA, USA
Posts: 115
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A good example if improper use are the majority of the Cirrus CAPS deployments...strongly suggesting that pilots have placed themselves in dangerous positions because of the equipment on board. The parachute then becomes a panic button, and is subsequently used under conditions when they ought not. A pilot that elects to fly in weather and loses control deploys a parachute or exits the airplane...he has pushed the "panic button." Unfortunately, he's also elected to make a parachute descent under conditions when one should never make a parachute jump...the parachute has lulled him into making two very bad decisions, either of which could easily be fatal, to say nothing of having abandoned an airplane over a populace which had no choice in his decision making process.
Unfortunately, your logic is backwards.
Over 75% of all fatal accidents in general aviation are attributed to a pilot-related cause. That's the concern that I recommend we address, not the specious argument that the presence of the parachute is the cause or even a factor.
Fortunately, 12 pilots who have gotten into bad situations are alive because of the Cirrus parachute, also 15 additional passengers.
By my reckoning, about half of the Cirrus fatal accidents could have been survivable if the Cirrus parachute had been deployed. That's about 25 of 44 fatal accidents, double the number of Cirrus parachute deployments!
A Cirrus pilot who pulls the CAPS handle to deploy the parachute knows he is in a bad situation. He doesn't need you to remind him. Yet he has acted to use a last-option safety device for himself and any passengers on board.
Cheers
Rick
Join Date: Dec 2008
Location: San Diego, CA, USA
Posts: 115
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
At the least generous 5/14 hardly qualifies as "nearly every". With a little generousity not even half fall into this category.
Unless the readers of the this thread would like a rebuttal for your lengthy list, which I am happy to provide, let me respond to one or two selected examples.
1. October 2002, Texas: detached aileron Preflighting airplanes prevents needing to use panic button parachutes, and prevents ailerons from detaching in flight. Note that taken from that NTSB report, the following Cirrus statement is identified: The CAPS deployment is expected to result in the destruction of the airframe, and possible severe injury or death to the occupants.
4. September 2004, California: loss of control in high-altitude climb above clouds, 2 uninjured Again, a situation that the pilot should never have been in; one flies beyond one's capabilities, one uses the panic button...one has unnecessarily gone where one shouldn't have been and used what didn't need to be used...when the airplane could simply have been flown to a landing. Again, we're not even talking about a broken airpalne here...just a pilot who elected to deploy a parachute on a perfectly good airplane. This brain surgeon-rocket scientist flew into a Level 5 thunderstorm...not really the best place to fly, shows poor judgement, and certainly a very poor place to deploy a parachute canopy.
He and his wife confirm that they were flying in clear air. You claim he could have simply avoided the thunderstorms and flown to a landing. But he experienced the airplane doing something to him that placed him upside down, spiraling down into the cloud layer below, entering IMC without a horizon or reliable instruments to recover from that unusual attitude.
Yes, there were convective thunderstorms miles away. But the area where they had this incident was actively searched by other pilots sent there by ATC to try to locate the airplane. No thunderstorms in the vincinity at the time of the incident.
Seems the NTSB investigator got a bit rushed in his investigation of a non-fatal accident. And you rushed up the ladder of inference. By the way, the outcome was sufficiently successful that none of the glass ornaments nor bottles of wine or olive oil were broken -- and the airplane flew again!
9. August 2006, Indiana: ...in fact it wasn't the CG which caused the crash, but the deployment of the CAPS system, and a pilot who couldn't handle the airplane. Chalk it up once again to the same majority of the incidents...pilot error, unnecessary use, and a system that took the pilot to places he wasn't capable of going and to a place where he never should have been.
How about a 5-turn spin before deployment causing the crash? Without deploying the parachute, the impact would have been much less survivable.
You have presented an astounding amount of interpretation and judgment about these accidents. Then you conclude that almost all of the Cirrus parachute deployments were improper.
By my reckoning, 27 people survived really bad situations because 12 pilots deployed the parachute. And we are still working on that 75% of accidents attributed to pilot actions.
Cheers
Rick
Join Date: Dec 2008
Location: San Diego, CA, USA
Posts: 115
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I also dont think many pilots continue into IMC when not qualified to do so because they have a chute.
Most pilots were very inexperienced, several hundred hours.
For the record, over half of the Cirrus pilots who deployed the parachute had more than 800 hours of total time. That's several years of flying experience for more general aviation pilots.
Cheers
Rick
Join Date: Dec 2008
Location: San Diego, CA, USA
Posts: 115
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
... a year or so ago a guy deployed his chute over water when his engine failed, he broke his back on impact as the landing gear wasn't able to do what it was designed to do. The guy had the chance to glide to a nearby beach and carry out a forced landing yet thought hmm I'll deploy my chute without even considering landing the aircraft, ...
"Had the chance"? Maybe, but a pretty slim one. Radar returns show that he was in a rapid descent and accelerating. The last radar return was at 1600 feet at 190 knots descending about 3,000 fpm.
"Yet thought hmm I'll deploy my chute without even considering landing the aircraft"? This Cirrus pilot has written extensively about his thought process. Yes, he decided to deploy without considering to land. As he describes his situation, he lost consciousness for a while then awoke to discover that he was in a high-speed dive. He recovered beyond Vne but was not fully in control as he noticed that his right leg was numb and non-responsive. He immediately pulled the CAPS handle to deploy the parachute.
At least SNS3Guppy considers this a "possibly valid use." Tough critic.
Cheers
Rick
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: USA
Posts: 3,218
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hmmm... So what experience level would satisfy you?
Hours don't mean a lot, but judgment and experience surely does. Hours don't equate to experience.
Flying into thunderstorms and ice and encountering the situations that many of these pilots did...shows poor airmanship and very poor judgement.
For the record, over half of the Cirrus pilots who deployed the parachute had more than 800 hours of total time. That's several years of flying experience for more general aviation pilots.
Many of those identified the incidents and mishaps had only a few hours in type. An 800 hour pilot with 15 hours of cirrus time is a 15 hour cirrus pilot...not an 800 hour pilot. Start combining minimal instrument experience, minimal weather experience, minimal time in type, and very poor judgement, you have a rash of pilots who flew well beyond their own capabilities and that of the airplane, who lost control as a result in most cases, and fell back not on the aerodynamic capabilities of flying a perfectly good airplane...but deploying a parachute.
For those who've never had a parachute canopy collapse in winds and turbulence, an understanding of exactly why deploying a parachute in a thunderstorm is a bad idea...may not sink in. There really isn't any worse place to do so...the pilots who put themselves in that position not only made severely stupid blunders from the outset, but perpetuated and compounded that chain of thought when they elected to deploy parachutes at night or in storms, or both.
SNS3Guppy, as shown here, it was your interpretations and judgments that suggest otherwise.
Improper use of the parachute? The cause was the failure of the mechanic to safety wire the aileron hinge nut. The plane was preflighted. The potential problem was not observed. The problem happened in flight. What is improper? Saving oneself? Or not being perfect?
Do you know that a mechanic can approve an aircraft for return to service, but doesn't ever return the aircraft to service? The pilot does that when he or she flies it. The pilot who does so takes full responsibility for the airworthy condition of the aircraft...and unlike the mechanic who merely signs for it, the pilot places his or her life on the line. How much more reason does one need to perform a very thorough inspection and get it right? Perfection? No. Simply doing one's job as PIC is enough...and that didn't get done.
You are on a roll. CAPS caused the crash? Unnecessary?
August 2006, Indiana: parachute deployed three miles from departure end of runway, aircraft landed in retention pond, parachute was deployed by a passenger because the pilot had fainted, pilot fatality, 3 passengers injured
The pilot, while having over 2,500 hours total time, had only 31 hours of actual experience. While total time is often taken to be significant, the duration over which that time is spread is more significant. A man with 31 hours of instrument time in the last week, for example, is likely to be far more proficient than a man with 31 hours of instrument time spread over the past 31 years.
The Wikipedia article states that the parachute was deployed because the pilot fainted, which was NOT the case. The pilot requested his son in law to deploy the parachute, and did not faint. It's important to note that the pilot didn't lose capacity to fly, and the airplane wasn't unflyable; he flew it to four thousand feet under control. Furthermore, a test airplane was loaded identially and flown to determine it's in-flight characteristics, and it flew acceptably. Bottom line is that it was a flyable, controllable airplane which was mismanaged and ultimately became a non-flyable airplane with the introduction of the parachute deployment.
In fact, the report specifically states:
Furthermore, the study indicated that the extra 300 pounds over the certified maximum takeoff weight reduced the available rate-of-climb at 4,000 feet by about 260 ft/min. Consequently, the combination of the excess weight, uncoordinated flight, and use of the air conditioner reduced the available rate-of-climb by about 500 ft/min from the numbers published in the POH. Nonetheless, the airplane still had adequate climb performance, and even at the accident flight conditions should have been able to maintain a steady-state rate-of-climb of about 900 ft/min at 4,000 feet and 105 KIAS. Reducing the airspeed below the best rate-of-climb speed put the airplane "behind the power curve", decreasing the rate-of-climb further to about 500 ft/min, the rate-of-climb present when the airplane stalled.
Ouch! Beyond his capabilities? The pilot is a retired university professor with thousands of hours of flight instruction, including aerobatic instruction, has been instructing in Cirrus airplanes since 2001, and is alive! He is one of my instructors, and I have interviewed him extensively for a safety issue of the Cirrus Pilot magazine (sent to all members of the Cirrus Owners and Pilots Association).
He and his wife confirm that they were flying in clear air. You claim he could have simply avoided the thunderstorms and flown to a landing. But he experienced the airplane doing something to him that placed him upside down, spiraling down into the cloud layer below, entering IMC without a horizon or reliable instruments to recover from that unusual attitude.
Yes, there were convective thunderstorms miles away. But the area where they had this incident was actively searched by other pilots sent there by ATC to try to locate the airplane. No thunderstorms in the vincinity at the time of the incident.
He and his wife confirm that they were flying in clear air. You claim he could have simply avoided the thunderstorms and flown to a landing. But he experienced the airplane doing something to him that placed him upside down, spiraling down into the cloud layer below, entering IMC without a horizon or reliable instruments to recover from that unusual attitude.
Yes, there were convective thunderstorms miles away. But the area where they had this incident was actively searched by other pilots sent there by ATC to try to locate the airplane. No thunderstorms in the vincinity at the time of the incident.
The recollections of the pilot aren't necessarily relevant. The previous incident in Indiana, in which the aircraft was stalled, was researched, thoroughly tested and a finding made that the 93 decibel stall warning was going off for over a minute! Never the less, the eye-whitnesses, the ones who were there, didn't recall ever even hearing it...those on scene often do the worst job of recalling, and recall incorrectly for a number of reasons. From the record, we do have the following regarding the California incident:
A Convective SIGMET (49W) was issued at 1555, and was valid at the time of the accident. It indicated a severe line of thunderstorms 30 miles wide moving from 300 degrees at 15 knots, with tops to 27,000 feet. The SIGMET also noted the possibility of 1-inch hail and wind gusts up to 50 knots.
The official report...
During climbing flight at 16,000 feet, the single engine airplane encountered the outer boundaries of severe convective weather; the airplane departed controlled flight, the pilot deployed the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS), and the airplane was substantially damaged during the parachute landing in a walnut grove. The pilot did receive a standard weather briefing, checked radar, and satellite imagery prior to departing on the 600-mile cross-country flight. Throughout the flight the pilot recognized cloud build-ups and steered west to avoid the weather. About an hour into the flight he climbed from 13,500 to 16,000 in an attempt to stay clear of clouds; the autopilot was in heading mode and the vertical speed knob was set to maintain 100 knot climb. About this time radar depicted the airplane descending 1,100 feet in 23 seconds then climbing 1,300 feet in 14 seconds. The pilot heard a "whirring" noise in his headset, prompting him to disconnect the autopilot. The nose pitched up and the left wing dropped. It was at this time that the pilot transmitted that he was out of control and he deployed the CAPS. The airplane then descended by parachute to a landing in a walnut orchard. The radar track of the airplane combined with the weather surveillance radar imagery depicted the airplane encountering a level 5 (intense) area of convective activity moments prior to the final descent (CAPS deployment). Radar derived cloud tops indicated that the tops of the thunderstorms in the accident area were between 15,000 and 20,000 feet. Convective SIGMETs 44W and 47W, had been issued during the hour before departure, and warned of thunderstorms in the vicinity of the pilots' planned route of flight. SIGMET 49W, which covered the area in which the airplane was flying, was issued approximately 10 minutes prior to the airplane departing controlled flight. Examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of a preimpact malfunction or failure of the control system, autopilot, or power plant.
AIRCRAFT 1 CAUSE REPORT
The pilot's decision to continue flight into adverse weather and the subsequent encounter with the outer boundaries of a level 5 thunderstorm, which resulted in his loss of control of the airplane.
The pilot's decision to continue flight into adverse weather and the subsequent encounter with the outer boundaries of a level 5 thunderstorm, which resulted in his loss of control of the airplane.
You may call this an overzealous investigator, but this wasn't a cursory investigation, and there's more data to be had than that of the pilot's own statements. He asserts he was well clear of weather, no weather nearby, as you say, and as others suggest when they came looking for him (weather moves, of course), but radar tracks and tapes show otherwise. Furthermore, if there was no weather around him...why did he deploy the parachute when he found he was about to enter "a cloud layer?" One can't have it both ways...his own admission that he was about to enter the clouds, the fact that radar placed both him, and his airplane, and the weather occupying the same space...bears out the fact that he was where he shouldn't have been.
That trinkets on board weren't damaged is really quite irrelevant. Every bit as much as one wouldn't walk down the street with cavalier abandon, point a gun at someone's head, pull the trigger, and then when it fails to go off, state "it's okay. It apparently wasn't loaded." Simply because nobody got hurt, you see, doesn't make it okay, and no, the ends do not justify the means. A series of bad decisions took place culminating with the pilot losing control of his airplane and resorting to the panic button...in an intact airplane perfectly capable of being flown.
Furthermore, this individual claims over two thousand hours of flight time and a thousand of that as instrument time. Even professional instrument pilots (myself included) average approximately 10% instrument time out of our total flying time...but this guy has nearly half of his on instruments. Admirable for him one might suppose, but what that tells me is that his time is more than likely falsified. I've even flown weather research, in which it's all instrument, and it's all intentionally flown inside thunderstorms...and I wouldn't lay claim to having such a large percentage of my own experience as instrument.
As most of his claims appear rather dubious, what we see is an older gentleman who's veracity is in question who simply flew beyond his capabilities, exercised very poor judgement, and ultimately lost control...and was very lucky that he didn't kill himself, his passenger, or anyone on the ground in the process.
Join Date: May 2001
Location: UK
Posts: 4,631
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hours don't mean a lot, but judgment and experience surely does.
and
800 hours is still 800 hours...no matter who's doing the flying.
and
800 hours is still 800 hours...no matter who's doing the flying.
Yes, 800 hours is a very low time pilot
Moreover, realistically for most GA pilots 800 hours IS a high time pilot.
An 800 hour pilot with 15 hours of cirrus time is a 15 hour cirrus pilot...not an 800 hour pilot.
The Cirrus is a reasonable quick, easy to fly, non complex aircraft. It is a simple aircraft, but performs well compared with most light singles. The only aspect that causes low time pilots problems is that it is significantly quicker and more slippery than most GA singles. Someone transferring from a Mooney with glass with 800 hours is as good as makes no difference an 800 hours Cirrus pilot after 20 hours in the aircraft.
I do wish you wouldnt keep referring to the chute as the "panic button". It makes me think you have never seen a Cirrus.
The chute is there as a means of giving the pilot a second chance when things go wrong. Many pilots kill themselves making forced landings - the outcome is by no means assured. Many pilots in aircraft without chutes get themselves into the same situation as Cirrus pilots. The evidence suggests that in the early days Cirrus pilots suffered a high accident rate than expected, but that is almost certainly no longer the case. Personally I think the reason was far more to do with the aircraft being relatively easy to fly and attractive to a new breed of more wealthy pilots but some of these pilots had not accumulated the experience to take on a high performance light single. This has rightly been addressed.
SNS3Guppy - you appear to be obsessed with the Cirrus and its chute. I dont understand why. Do you have something against chutes other than having convinced yourself a pilot with a chute lets go of the normal rules about blundering into weather?
Join Date: Dec 2008
Location: San Diego, CA, USA
Posts: 115
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Wow! A treatise almost 2,500 words long. Frankly, I'm not sure what to make of it all.
Is your point that if you push the panic button (your phrase), then instead you should be dead?
Is your point that the Cirrus innovation to certify an aircraft with a whole airframe parachute is bad enough to warrant action, perhaps to remove it (no more panic button)?
Is your point that pilots of Cirrus aircraft are unworthy, improper, inexperienced, and therefore should not be flying?
Is your point that pilots who are stupid enough (your phrase) should not be flying? If so, do you have a test for that?
I'm simply unsure what has you so exercised.
Pilots make mistakes. Pilots make poor judgments. Pilots kill perfectly good airplanes.
So, if a pilot makes a series of mistakes or poor judgments, what is your remedy?
Cheers
Rick
p.s. I hope you have an answer that can help all the pilots of general aviation airplanes, because even without the parachute, 75% of all GA fatal accidents have pilot causes.
Is your point that if you push the panic button (your phrase), then instead you should be dead?
Is your point that the Cirrus innovation to certify an aircraft with a whole airframe parachute is bad enough to warrant action, perhaps to remove it (no more panic button)?
Is your point that pilots of Cirrus aircraft are unworthy, improper, inexperienced, and therefore should not be flying?
Is your point that pilots who are stupid enough (your phrase) should not be flying? If so, do you have a test for that?
I'm simply unsure what has you so exercised.
Pilots make mistakes. Pilots make poor judgments. Pilots kill perfectly good airplanes.
So, if a pilot makes a series of mistakes or poor judgments, what is your remedy?
Cheers
Rick
p.s. I hope you have an answer that can help all the pilots of general aviation airplanes, because even without the parachute, 75% of all GA fatal accidents have pilot causes.
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: USA
Posts: 3,218
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Moreover, realistically for most GA pilots 800 hours IS a high time pilot.
Hours mean a lot.
SNS3Guppy - you appear to be obsessed with the Cirrus and its chute. I dont understand why. Do you have something against chutes other than having convinced yourself a pilot with a chute lets go of the normal rules about blundering into weather?
Do I have something against "chutes?" As I'm one of few in this thread with considerable parachute experience....I think not. More to the point, I strongly advocate the use of parachutes, as well as a thorough knowledge of them, and have repeatedly stressed proper education and training in their use if one does in fact intend to have them available for use. Read the thread.
Cirrus, of course, relies heavily on the parachute as a marketing gimmick to entice inexperienced pilots with more money than training to buy. They market an airplane that feels like a nice car inside. They market it with sleek lines, and sell it as a safe airplane, largely predicated on the parachute. The very fact that Cirrus sells airplanes with the parachute system as a major attraction makes it very much fair game for criticism, and the statistics bear this criticism out.
I do wish you wouldnt keep referring to the chute as the "panic button". It makes me think you have never seen a Cirrus.
How many of those pilots, of course, had ever bee under a round canopy, could appreciate the vertical descent rate, or the pendulous motion which often accompanies a round canopy during descent...and which can signficantly increase the injuries and damage by contributing to the impact forces? How many of those pilots simply blasted off with the parachute at their disposal, never having used a canopy in their life?
Many pilots kill themselves making forced landings - the outcome is by no means assured.
Is your point that pilots of Cirrus aircraft are unworthy, improper, inexperienced, and therefore should not be flying?
Is your point that pilots who are stupid enough (your phrase) should not be flying? If so, do you have a test for that?
Is your point that the Cirrus innovation to certify an aircraft with a whole airframe parachute is bad enough to warrant action, perhaps to remove it (no more panic button)?
Conversely, a pilot who can afford an airplane has little safeguards in this respect. A pilot who flies his sailplane or aerobatic airplane straps on a canopy not even knowing the color of the parachute or what it should look like when inflated over his head, not knowing how to steer it or even if it can be steered, not knowing how to safely land in water, in trees, downwind, or to do a proper PLF (parachute landing fall). Excuses run the gamut from "I don't slam my head against the airplane to know how to use my helmet so I don't need to have any training or experience with my parachute to properly use it," to "the odds are very low I'll ever have to use it, so why bother learning?" Dangerous mentalities. We certainly can't apply this line of thinking to an airplane...we study constantly to prepare for an emergency by learning and rhearsing maneuvers we may never need in daily life...never the less, we need to know them. We perform stalls, we perform rejected takeoffs, no-flap approaches, etc...we learn everything about the airplane, even if we may never need to apply that knowledge. To fail to prepare in this way would be very poor airmanship.
A parachute canopy is an aircraft. It's relative wind comes from below, but then so does the airflow through a gyroplane or helicopter in autorotation. It may not be powered, but neither is a sailplane. It moves through the atmosphere, it's proper operation may save your life, it's improper operation may kill you. Learning it is every bit as important as learning your airplane. when you strap a parachute to your back, you're just put on a complete aircraft system.
A pilot who straps on both a parachute and an airplane has a duty and obligation to know both, thoroughly.
Another point of this thread, along with pilots and parachutes, is whether pilots need parachutes...and generally this is not the case. Further, a little knowledge is a dangerous thing, and the panic button, along with the indiscriminate wearing and use, of parachutes, is indeed a dangerous thing.
Wow! A treatise almost 2,500 words long.
Last edited by SNS3Guppy; 14th Dec 2008 at 16:16.
Join Date: Dec 2008
Location: San Diego, CA, USA
Posts: 115
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The very fact that Cirrus sells airplanes with the parachute system as a major attraction makes it very much fair game for criticism, and the statistics bear this criticism out.
Cheers
Rick
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: USA
Posts: 3,218
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The best selling handguns in the US have always been the cheapest and the worst...why? Because they're cheap. It's a legitimate example, because a handgun is a device intended to save one's life. Never the less, the uninformed buyer and user often selects based on irrational criteria; price is one such example. Point is that simply because something sells well, means very little.
The same may be said of the Cirrus. Is it the best, the worst, or just another aircraft? It could be any of those things, but the numbers sold are irrelevant.
I used to fly the most produced airplane ever built. When I flew it, there were five remaining in the world, and now there are four. Does making the most, or selling the most make it the best or serve as any particular recommendation for the type design? No.
If one experiences a mishap but doesn't die, does this mean it's a safe design? We've cited a number of Cirrus mishaps, most of which weren't fatal...yet very easily could have been for the occupants as well as those on the ground. Several of these incidents were owing to the parachute itself, as previously identified. Simply because someone doesn't die...means very little. One would hardly entertain a prospective pilot for a professional position who's chief qualificationis "Well, I did it before, and I didn't die."
The parachute for the Cirrus is a gimmick. It lures pilots into doing stupid things in the misguided hope of having an "out." Even an ejection seat lures young military pilots into doing stupid things they might not do without the seat, and anti-icing and de-icing equipment lures pilots into the ice...where they wouldn't go without that equipment, shouldn't be with the equipment, but somehow feel justified because of the magic words "known ice."
The parachute assembly on the Cirrus should be considered much like a handgun with one round left. You'll probably get hurt very badly, likely die, but if you've got no choices left, then it's better than nothing. Such events should be reserved for situations such as a wing which is no longer attached to the airplane, not for times when one elects to undertake a foolish and risky flight beyond one's own capabilities and that of the airplane. It's a dubious emergency device, not a hail-mary, and not a get-out-of-jail-free card. It should not be relied upon to work, and one should NEVER predicate a purchase of the aircraft, or undertake a flight, because the CAPS is on board.
When the manufacturer specifically stipulates that the use of the CAPS should be expected to cause significant airframe damage and very likely severe injury or death, this is a telling thing, and shouldn't be lightly disregarded. Remember, that's not the counsel of a critic, but the one selling the aircraft. Too bad such counsel is buried behind slick advertising and a snappy interior and avionics suite that more resembles a rental car than an airplane.
The same may be said of the Cirrus. Is it the best, the worst, or just another aircraft? It could be any of those things, but the numbers sold are irrelevant.
I used to fly the most produced airplane ever built. When I flew it, there were five remaining in the world, and now there are four. Does making the most, or selling the most make it the best or serve as any particular recommendation for the type design? No.
If one experiences a mishap but doesn't die, does this mean it's a safe design? We've cited a number of Cirrus mishaps, most of which weren't fatal...yet very easily could have been for the occupants as well as those on the ground. Several of these incidents were owing to the parachute itself, as previously identified. Simply because someone doesn't die...means very little. One would hardly entertain a prospective pilot for a professional position who's chief qualificationis "Well, I did it before, and I didn't die."
The parachute for the Cirrus is a gimmick. It lures pilots into doing stupid things in the misguided hope of having an "out." Even an ejection seat lures young military pilots into doing stupid things they might not do without the seat, and anti-icing and de-icing equipment lures pilots into the ice...where they wouldn't go without that equipment, shouldn't be with the equipment, but somehow feel justified because of the magic words "known ice."
The parachute assembly on the Cirrus should be considered much like a handgun with one round left. You'll probably get hurt very badly, likely die, but if you've got no choices left, then it's better than nothing. Such events should be reserved for situations such as a wing which is no longer attached to the airplane, not for times when one elects to undertake a foolish and risky flight beyond one's own capabilities and that of the airplane. It's a dubious emergency device, not a hail-mary, and not a get-out-of-jail-free card. It should not be relied upon to work, and one should NEVER predicate a purchase of the aircraft, or undertake a flight, because the CAPS is on board.
When the manufacturer specifically stipulates that the use of the CAPS should be expected to cause significant airframe damage and very likely severe injury or death, this is a telling thing, and shouldn't be lightly disregarded. Remember, that's not the counsel of a critic, but the one selling the aircraft. Too bad such counsel is buried behind slick advertising and a snappy interior and avionics suite that more resembles a rental car than an airplane.
A little less conversation,
a little more aviation...
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: Bracknell, UK
Posts: 696
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by SNS3Guppy
Dangerous mentalities
As for airframe parachutes - I'll pass, thanks - as you say, the statistics on those are distinctly uninspiring.
Join Date: Dec 2008
Location: San Diego, CA, USA
Posts: 115
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Breathtaking!
Amazing. Simply amazing.
SNS3Guppy, you have produced more words, connected more illogical reasons, and adduced more outcomes than anyone that I have ever encountered!
Yet, I'm left wondering if you believe it possible that innovation in personal air transportation will keep it available and thriving. You seem to have an answer to everything -- except how to ensure that it continues.
My hope is that you spewed so many words that few will indulge in reading them.
Cheers
Rick
SNS3Guppy, you have produced more words, connected more illogical reasons, and adduced more outcomes than anyone that I have ever encountered!
Yet, I'm left wondering if you believe it possible that innovation in personal air transportation will keep it available and thriving. You seem to have an answer to everything -- except how to ensure that it continues.
My hope is that you spewed so many words that few will indulge in reading them.
Cheers
Rick
Join Date: Oct 2007
Location: England
Posts: 102
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
SNS3Guppy - the most mass-produced aircraft you flew and four (flying?) left - was that the B17, or what?
I can go along with:
"if you've got no choices left, then it's better than nothing. Such events should be reserved for situations such as a wing which is no longer attached to the airplane,"
Fine- a second-chance (not gauranteed) at surviving what would otherwise appear to the pilot (for whatever reason) to be, or is, a life-threatening situation.So, most people I guess would have common ground thus far?
Now then what about....
IF someone has undertaken a foolish and risky flight beyond one's own capabilities and that of the airplane.
1) Well did they REALLY do that BECAUSE they had the chute? Somehow you are quite certain that is consistently the case, but I can't see how you can assert that other than as a personal interpretation and opinion. Your experience leads you to draw such conslusions but we dont know what that experience is it is - making it hard to follow your thinking as you reverse-engineer from effect to cause. Would like to know more 'history' please.
2) Consider how many pilots without airframe parachutes have flown themselves into the same circumstances and been killed. They flew into those circumstances and they DIDN'T have a parachute? Now just how DUMB/IMPERFECT is that!? Pilots have been getting themselves into big trouble one way or another - with or without a chute. Sadly, they will keep doing so. We can probably all agree on that too, but WHY do they (we) do that? Beacuse they are not like SN3Guppy seems to be the answer. Just HOW did you get to be many multi-thousand hours experence knowing how many many threads should show beyond a nut? If only we could all be like that - but I guess you have military/professional flying behind you that got you to that skygod (for light GA) level? The rest of us don't and won't get that benefit and we are going to keep missing things like a safety-wire having been put in wrong. Maybe if you write a book for us that would be a better alternative to a chute? Seriously. Why not?
You seem to be applying the expectations/standard of whatever aviation world you come from to light GA. I wish more of us could reach those heady heights. The chute isnt a cop out not to try to do so, but it is a last chance (possibly) which might save life when we fail to attain them. Mistakes are going to keep happening, not BECAUSE of the chute, but because of pilot error - and that includes if a pilot allows his judgement to be inappropriately influenced by the equipment aboard.
For me, the chute is a acknowledgement of an unpleasant realities - pilots make mistakes and aviation can be very unmerciful - and offers a last ditch possibility of survival.
Here is the dividing line - you think so lowly of pilots that you feel more of them will kill themselves BECAUSE they have a chute, than those who will be saved that got into difficulty for the same old reasons pilots have, do and will. I don't share that view of the pilot community as a whole. There might be the odd nutter out there I agree. All the more reason to have a chute in case I come across one mid-air I guess. In fact if they all have as much poor judgement as you suggest perhaps I'd be fool to fly without one!
I can go along with:
"if you've got no choices left, then it's better than nothing. Such events should be reserved for situations such as a wing which is no longer attached to the airplane,"
Fine- a second-chance (not gauranteed) at surviving what would otherwise appear to the pilot (for whatever reason) to be, or is, a life-threatening situation.So, most people I guess would have common ground thus far?
Now then what about....
IF someone has undertaken a foolish and risky flight beyond one's own capabilities and that of the airplane.
1) Well did they REALLY do that BECAUSE they had the chute? Somehow you are quite certain that is consistently the case, but I can't see how you can assert that other than as a personal interpretation and opinion. Your experience leads you to draw such conslusions but we dont know what that experience is it is - making it hard to follow your thinking as you reverse-engineer from effect to cause. Would like to know more 'history' please.
2) Consider how many pilots without airframe parachutes have flown themselves into the same circumstances and been killed. They flew into those circumstances and they DIDN'T have a parachute? Now just how DUMB/IMPERFECT is that!? Pilots have been getting themselves into big trouble one way or another - with or without a chute. Sadly, they will keep doing so. We can probably all agree on that too, but WHY do they (we) do that? Beacuse they are not like SN3Guppy seems to be the answer. Just HOW did you get to be many multi-thousand hours experence knowing how many many threads should show beyond a nut? If only we could all be like that - but I guess you have military/professional flying behind you that got you to that skygod (for light GA) level? The rest of us don't and won't get that benefit and we are going to keep missing things like a safety-wire having been put in wrong. Maybe if you write a book for us that would be a better alternative to a chute? Seriously. Why not?
You seem to be applying the expectations/standard of whatever aviation world you come from to light GA. I wish more of us could reach those heady heights. The chute isnt a cop out not to try to do so, but it is a last chance (possibly) which might save life when we fail to attain them. Mistakes are going to keep happening, not BECAUSE of the chute, but because of pilot error - and that includes if a pilot allows his judgement to be inappropriately influenced by the equipment aboard.
For me, the chute is a acknowledgement of an unpleasant realities - pilots make mistakes and aviation can be very unmerciful - and offers a last ditch possibility of survival.
Here is the dividing line - you think so lowly of pilots that you feel more of them will kill themselves BECAUSE they have a chute, than those who will be saved that got into difficulty for the same old reasons pilots have, do and will. I don't share that view of the pilot community as a whole. There might be the odd nutter out there I agree. All the more reason to have a chute in case I come across one mid-air I guess. In fact if they all have as much poor judgement as you suggest perhaps I'd be fool to fly without one!
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: USA
Posts: 3,218
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
SNS3Guppy - the most mass-produced aircraft you flew and four (flying?) left - was that the B17, or what?
Just HOW did you get to be many multi-thousand hours experence knowing how many many threads should show beyond a nut? If only we could all be like that - but I guess you have military/professional flying behind you that got you to that skygod (for light GA) level? The rest of us don't and won't get that benefit and we are going to keep missing things like a safety-wire having been put in wrong. Maybe if you write a book for us that would be a better alternative to a chute? Seriously. Why not?
Write a book? Ample texts are already in production on the subject. A standard in the US which has applicability nearly everywhere is called AC43.13; Acceptable Methods, Techniques, & Practices--Aircraft Inspection and Repair. It comes in two parts; AC43.13 2B, and 1A.
You can find the first part here:
AC 43.13-1B CHG 1 [Large AC. This includes Change 1.] Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and Practices - Aircraft Inspection and Repair
The circular as follows has been cancelled, but still provides good guidance:
AC 43.13-2A [Large AC] Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and Practices - Aircraft Alterations
Most instructors don't insist their students learn this material, largely because the instructors don't know it...another area in which the heritage of inexperience fails both the teacher and student. Again, however, I ask how you can preflight your airplane if you don't know what you're seeing?
Here is the dividing line - you think so lowly of pilots that you feel more of them will kill themselves BECAUSE they have a chute, than those who will be saved that got into difficulty for the same old reasons pilots have, do and will.
We don't guess at fuel reserves. We calculate them. We don't guess at weight, nor balance. We calculate them, and know. We don't guess at ETA's; we calculate the time enroute and apply the known performance of the airplane to come up with detailed correct technically-based answers. We don't guess we can land the airplane; we know we can. And certainly we don't guess we might figure out how to handle the parachute on the way down.
It's laughable, really. Pilots seek out an instructor and obtain a checkout when moving from a Cessna 150 to a 152, or when learning a new radio system or display...even the smallest nuances are taken seriously with the airplane. The parachute, however, a compact, inflatable aircraft in a little bag on one's back...is simply taken in complete ignorance and a rough approximation of faith. Do you approach a new airplane by refusing to learn performance numbers, emergency procedures, normal procedures, or refuse to get a checkout? Of course not. But many here balk at the idea of getting proper instruction regarding a parachute.
The problem here? You don't take the parachute seriously. You should. Treat it as though your life depends on it, because it very well may. Improper use of the parachute, something as simple as not performing a pincheck, riser routing, or protecting the system handles, can kill you or create a dire emergency even though there was nothing else amiss in your world. Take the parachute seriously. It's a serious piece of equipment.
Join Date: May 2001
Location: UK
Posts: 4,631
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Aircraft fall out of the sky because the engine stops, they structurally fail, they enter a spin from which the pilot cannot recover, they pick up enough ice or encounter the most severe weather. All these situations are life threatening. It is a fine degree of judgement when to throw in the towel.
If the engine stops you have one course - land. With any luck the outcome should be good - unless of course it is night, there is a low base, or the terrain is rugged. In those circumstances the chances of success are less favourable. Pilots aren’t taught to recover from spins these days. Spins aren’t a problem - unless it is your first - which is more than likely these days. Pushing on or retreating from ice and severe weather is a calculated risk. If things have got that bad you need a little luck however much of a sky God you believe yourself to be.
Pilots make mistakes - the number of hours they have or the amount of experience they have makes them no more or less immune, with any luck with experience they just make fewer mistakes. However, we all have to cut our teeth. Pilots aren’t born sky Gods. This means they are more susceptible to making mistakes during their early years. No one said flying is without risk. No one said in single pilot “sport” flying you would be wrapped in cotton wool.
To be blunt SN3Guppy that is the real issue with your posts - your hours and commercial experience long belie any understanding of real world flying for the average private pilot. As I indicated earlier private pilots flying for pleasure make mistakes, they make errors of judgement. They may well manage to get themselves into a spin from which they are unable and unprepared to attempt a recovery, they demonstrably make the mistake time and time again of entering IMC when not qualified to do so, and they take on weather beyond their and their aircrafts ability.
As but one example you wax lyrical about pre-flight checks. However, you appear blind to the pre-flight check most pilots undertake. In that you make the worst of assumptions - the vast majority of GA pilots do not complete an adequate pre flight check.
It is a bit like climbing - you could climb with a rope, or you could chose to free climb. Most opt for the rope, not because they expect to fall, not because they intentionally embark on a pitch knowing it to be beyond their ability, but because they don’t want to pay for their mistakes with their lives.
The chute gives them a second chance - that is it - it is not that complicated. It is no more a gimmick than a rope. It is no more a gimmick that a second engine which wasn’t put there to give you more performance, but to give you a second chance when the first engine fails.
If the engine stops you have one course - land. With any luck the outcome should be good - unless of course it is night, there is a low base, or the terrain is rugged. In those circumstances the chances of success are less favourable. Pilots aren’t taught to recover from spins these days. Spins aren’t a problem - unless it is your first - which is more than likely these days. Pushing on or retreating from ice and severe weather is a calculated risk. If things have got that bad you need a little luck however much of a sky God you believe yourself to be.
Pilots make mistakes - the number of hours they have or the amount of experience they have makes them no more or less immune, with any luck with experience they just make fewer mistakes. However, we all have to cut our teeth. Pilots aren’t born sky Gods. This means they are more susceptible to making mistakes during their early years. No one said flying is without risk. No one said in single pilot “sport” flying you would be wrapped in cotton wool.
To be blunt SN3Guppy that is the real issue with your posts - your hours and commercial experience long belie any understanding of real world flying for the average private pilot. As I indicated earlier private pilots flying for pleasure make mistakes, they make errors of judgement. They may well manage to get themselves into a spin from which they are unable and unprepared to attempt a recovery, they demonstrably make the mistake time and time again of entering IMC when not qualified to do so, and they take on weather beyond their and their aircrafts ability.
As but one example you wax lyrical about pre-flight checks. However, you appear blind to the pre-flight check most pilots undertake. In that you make the worst of assumptions - the vast majority of GA pilots do not complete an adequate pre flight check.
It is a bit like climbing - you could climb with a rope, or you could chose to free climb. Most opt for the rope, not because they expect to fall, not because they intentionally embark on a pitch knowing it to be beyond their ability, but because they don’t want to pay for their mistakes with their lives.
The chute gives them a second chance - that is it - it is not that complicated. It is no more a gimmick than a rope. It is no more a gimmick that a second engine which wasn’t put there to give you more performance, but to give you a second chance when the first engine fails.
Last edited by Fuji Abound; 14th Dec 2008 at 22:34.
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: USA
Posts: 3,218
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Pilots aren’t born sky Gods.
As I indicated earlier private pilots flying for pleasure make mistakes, they make errors of judgement.
Yes, people make errors in judgment. In aviation the penalty is often one's life, or that of others. As stated before...this is aviation. We don't guess, we don't gamble.
As an instructor, I don't believe it's appropriate to humor a pilot who whines "You can't expect us to know this fancy-schmancy stuff! You can't expect us to know we shouldn't fly a light, single engine piston powered airplane into a level five thunderstorm! You can't expect us to know not to fly it into severe icing. I'm a private pilot, and by gum, I'll fly my airplane over the mountains at night in convective weather if I want to!" Why, yes, you will...and you may pay the price for it, too. But don't ever try to cop the excuse that it was all a mistake.
I once asked a pilot who flew for our medical operation why he didn't file IFR. He told me it was his personal preference, and nobody was going to tell him what to do. A few days later a friend of his was killed in a helicopter at night on the same route he usually flew on emergency runs; right into the top of a mountain in the dark. This pilot found his friend...and the wreckage, still smoking. A week later, he still wasn't flying IFR altitudes...he was still doing exactly what the dead pilot did...because nobody was going to tell him what to do.
I'm reminded somewhat of the two ships approaching in the night. The ships captain saw the lights ahead, and ordered the message sent "Turn right ten degrees."
Came the reply, "you turn right twenty degrees."
The ship's captain replied "I am a ships captain, turn right ten degrees."
Came the reply, "I am an ensign. Turn right twenty degrees."
The ship's captain ordered the message sent, "I am a battleship. Alter your course right by ten degrees."
Came the reply, "I am a light house. Turn right, twenty degrees. NOW!"
The ship's captain turned.
Yes, you can be proud to not live by basic tenets of safety, and justify it by arguing that you have a right to make mistakes...just like a man standing in the middle of a highway has the right of way as a pedestrian. He may be a dead pedestrian with a right of way...but by all that's holy, he will have his right of way...even if it kills him.
These are not "skygod" concepts. These are basic, necessary precepts and steps to keep you out of the dirt and rocks, and form a basic standard which if upheld, will save your life, and if ignored, may seal your fate such that nothing can save you.
Who takes ultimate responsibility for the safe outcome of the flight, and pays the ultimate price for failure to do so? That would be you; the pilot in command. Be the PIC, don't make excuses. Measure twice, cut once; don't guess. KNOW.
Join Date: May 2001
Location: UK
Posts: 4,631
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
There is no such thing.
However, electing to fly an airplane into ice isn't a mistake.
I know many pilots that fly into icing conditions. They make an assessment about the aircrafts ability to climb into clear air on top without picking up too much ice. They havent made a mistake, they have made a risk assessment. I know many pilots that fly at night in singles. They also would claim they have made a risk assessment. Flying into icing conditions in a Cirrus is illegal - flying at night is legal. More often than not if you have made the correct assessment about the rate of accumulation of ice, the length of time the aircraft will be in icing conditions, and the ability of the "anti-ice" to cope you will do pretty well, however if the engine quits at night chances are the outcome will not be good. Your example is for that reason a poor one.
I'm reminded somewhat of the two ships approaching in the night.
Join Date: Oct 2007
Location: England
Posts: 102
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
These are your words SN3Guppy, I believe in response to Fuji's comment that you must have a very jaundiced view of your fellow pilots: "Give a pilot an inch, often as not, he will take a mile...and yes, I do have a VERY low opinion of pilots in general. I have long maintained that 90% of the pilots out there aren't worth their weight in dirty salt...and based on global experience in nearly every facet of aviation out there so far, I'm still convinced this is true."
Strong views indeed, which it would seem reasonable to assume naturally inform your own judgements on other pilots motivations and actions, and whether BRS systems are a net saver or loser of lives. That is all I wanted to get to understand better really when I read you comments about the majority of CAPS pulls.
I am not arguing against better training, or that mistakes are to be simply accepted or shrugged off.
Thanks for the pointers to the additional reading materials - I am looking forward to reading and learning from them.
I got to tour round an airworthy Privateer in 1998 - an amazing aircraft as you say - made a big impression.
Strong views indeed, which it would seem reasonable to assume naturally inform your own judgements on other pilots motivations and actions, and whether BRS systems are a net saver or loser of lives. That is all I wanted to get to understand better really when I read you comments about the majority of CAPS pulls.
I am not arguing against better training, or that mistakes are to be simply accepted or shrugged off.
Thanks for the pointers to the additional reading materials - I am looking forward to reading and learning from them.
I got to tour round an airworthy Privateer in 1998 - an amazing aircraft as you say - made a big impression.
Join Date: Oct 2007
Location: England
Posts: 102
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Ft Wainwright, Fairbanks, Alaska. PB4Y along with a C-97G.
A typcial U.S. GA friendly welcome and tour of the aircraft with a crew member. They hadn't flown a mission for a while but were expecting to next day - July 4th 1998 - apparently the celebration fireworks usually managed to set something on fire!
A typcial U.S. GA friendly welcome and tour of the aircraft with a crew member. They hadn't flown a mission for a while but were expecting to next day - July 4th 1998 - apparently the celebration fireworks usually managed to set something on fire!