Pilots and Parachutes. (Merged)
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The siren call of illogical reasoning
I think Guppy talks a lot of sense.
The problem is that he takes a known effect, a parachute pull, works backwards to deduce that the pilot was at fault, then concludes that the parachute made them do it.
But that's looking at only 14 parachute activiations. With 75% of all fatal accidents being attributed to pilot causes, you would expect 10 of those 14 to be dumb pilot mistakes. No surprise, right?
But if there are 4,000 Cirrus airplanes and say, maybe 6,000 Cirrus pilots, what about those other 5,986 pilots with a parachute who did not get into a situation where the parachute made them do it?
If SNS3Guppy made so much sense, then would you not expect a much greater effect?
And if you think that Cirrus airplanes are flown by pilots with much less experience, like the argument made by SNS3Guppy, then consider that every one of those 6,000 Cirrus pilots starts out with zero hours of time-in-type. They all didn't fall out of the sky.
So what about the other fatal Cirrus crashes? There have been 42 other crashes with fatalities and no parachute activation (there were two previously mentioned parachute pulls that resulted in a fatality). Given that we know the flying time of the fleet, we can calculate the rate of the number of fatal accidents per 100,000 hours of flying time, just like the FAA and NTSB does for the general aviation fleet.
If SNS3Guppy were making sense, then one would expect these Cirrus pilots to be lulled into making stupid decisions, showing their lack of expertise, and killing themselves at a prodigious rate to prove him right! They don't.
When you take out the multiengine turboprop and turbojet numbers from the data, you get 1.86 fatal accidents per 100,000 hours in the GA fleet. The Cirrus numbers, depending how you aggregate their relatively small and perhaps statistically insignificant number of fatal accidents, are 1.70 for the past 12 months and 1.57 for the past 36 months. Not so prodigious.
So, it's a dramatic theatrical trick to take the 14 known parachute activations and deduce that the parachute is the problem, or Cirrus pilots are a problem.
His logic is backwards. Even if he sounds good.
Cheers
Rick
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I know many pilots that fly into icing conditions. They make an assessment about the aircrafts ability to climb into clear air on top without picking up too much ice. They havent made a mistake, they have made a risk assessment. I know many pilots that fly at night in singles. They also would claim they have made a risk assessment. Flying into icing conditions in a Cirrus is illegal - flying at night is legal. More often than not if you have made the correct assessment about the rate of accumulation of ice, the length of time the aircraft will be in icing conditions, and the ability of the "anti-ice" to cope you will do pretty well, however if the engine quits at night chances are the outcome will not be good. Your example is for that reason a poor one.
Justification is the narcotic of the soul. Many are addicts.
When someone tells you they know it's a risk, but it's a calculated risk...they've just made an excuse. Boiled down, it may best be paraphrased as "Yes, I know it's dangerous and stupid, but I'm going to do it anyway." It's "calculated" after all. Once it's been "calculated" and becomes a "calculated risk," then it's okay. This is called justification, more plainly described as an excuse. Don't make excuses.
I can tell you about ice, but your words suggest you won't hear it...after all, it's calculated, it's probably okay. I can tell you about experiencing rapid ice buildups in light airplanes (twins) that left me coming down in the mountains, I can tell you about aileron snatch and control problems that developed in large four engine piston airplanes...I can tell you about seeing 3" of ice buildupon the airplane so rapidly it couldn't be shed...all in places where no icing was anticipated, or very light trace icing...and all in cases where it built in less than 60 seconds. A case where the airplane lost 50 knots of airspeed immediately, went through best climb to best angle and then nearly to minimum controllable before settling there in a sustained descent. You don't want to hear that. You take calculated risks, that ignore that, apparently. It's what you don't "calculate" that can kill you.
Flying the airplane into ice is illegal you say...but flying over the mountains at night isn't...so that's okay. It's okay so long as it's not illegal, then? Justification, excuses, calculation, assessment. Even in Russian Roulette, one can calculate and assess the possibility of going at least five times before one pulls the trigger and shoots one's self in the head. This really doesn't make it the right thing to do. In aviation we don't play odds. We calculate, we know, we plan...we don't guess, and we don't take risks because we think the odds favor us.
You can let experience teach you this the hard way, or you can listen to others who have the experience to help you avoid having to learn the hard way. You would seem to be one who prefers to find out the hard way. I don't recommend it.
So, it's a dramatic theatrical trick to take the 14 known parachute activations and deduce that the parachute is the problem, or Cirrus pilots are a problem.
The vast majority of the cirrus parachute activations involved stupid pilot error; I said it before, I was dismissed, and proved I was right based on the stats. That's all. Don't try to carry the example to places it was never intended to go. When we speak of the few cirrus examples involving activations...thats 100% of the set in discussion...the discussion doesn't carry beyond those people, where the cirrus is concerned. If you are emotionally invested in the airplane or fly one yourself, deal with it. Be safe, don't crash...but my comments have nothing to do with you. These pertain the pilots and parachutes, and you're going a little (actually a lot) far afield.
Ft Wainwright, Fairbanks, Alaska. PB4Y along with a C-97G.
A typcial U.S. GA friendly welcome and tour of the aircraft with a crew member. They hadn't flown a mission for a while but were expecting to next day - July 4th 1998 - apparently the celebration fireworks usually managed to set something on fire!
A typcial U.S. GA friendly welcome and tour of the aircraft with a crew member. They hadn't flown a mission for a while but were expecting to next day - July 4th 1998 - apparently the celebration fireworks usually managed to set something on fire!
Hopefully you survived the mosquitos in Ft. Wainwright.
Did the airplanes have their nose-art at the time? That turned into quite a saga.
I'm glad they treated you well. I always made sure that visitors got the full tour of the airplane, so long as we weren't about to launch on a fire. I hosted a lot of WWII veterans, many of whom cried when they got in the airplane. I had some follow me, or their sons drive them around to follow us, just so they could have a look. They would bring scrapbooks, and shoe boxes with pictures medals, mementos. They never cried because they missed the airplane, but for the friends of their youth who didn't get to come home.
One old man climbed into the left seat and stared pensively out the window. He finally said that the ground was a lot farther down than he remembered it. Then he allowed that the last time he climbed out of a B24 it was in Holland, and the airplane had been buried nearly up to the cockpit in mud as he crashed in soft earth; he climbed out the cockpit side window and the ground was only a couple of feet below the window.
Another old man flew P47's. He recalled flying up alongside a severely shot-up B24 over Germany. It clearly wasn't going to make it back to England, so he lead it over Switzerland. The nav station was shot out and the side of the airplane missing. One vertical stab detached and wildly spinning on the remains of the control cables, and one aileron separated. As he turned, the B24 followed him. He lead them back again, and then left them, hoping they got out okay. It was the most poignant memory for him of the B24.
A Canadian came to me one day to show me pictures of explosions behind his airplane as they bombed and torpedoed german U boats, shots taken out of the tail turret. I took him into the tail turret, where he hadn't been in many, many years.
I spent a lot of time researching the airplane. When I got typed in it, the flight manuals were old xerox copies. I got my own set of originals, and still have them. I really loved that airplane. The wings came off the one I got typed in, a few years ago, and the fleet was grounded. They've since been auctioned off. I'd love to fly one again one day, but doubt I ever will.
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To take the discussion back to pilot parachutes, there is some evidence from gliding statistics that possession of a parachute does not lead pilots into taking risks that they would otherwise not have undertaken.
For at least the last ten years the vast majority of flights in single seater gliders in the UK have been made with a parachute. The mid-air collision rate (which is the main risk which parachutes mitigate) seems not to have increased - there are no fully worked-out statistics, but there is a good reporting system and any major increase would have been noticed.
Personal parachutes are certainly not perceived by glider pilots as as panic buttons for when flights go wrong - if anything there is a reluctance to use them even where it would be appropriate. There are several reports of pilots landing a glider with known airframe damage, at least one of which led to a fatal accident when the damage beceme catastrophic while manoeuvring to land. I regularly hear discussions which conclude that the pilot would continue to fly the aircraft if it seemed controllable.
I can see that an airfame parachute might change a pilot's attitude to risk taking, but the fact that it might is not the same as proof that it did. That proof could only come from two sources: (a) higher accident rates for the aircraft type compared to non-parachute equipped aircraft, or (b) higher rates of a particular type of accident (in which possession of a parachute might be expected to reduce the risk of death). If there are no such increases, that is proof that pilot psychology has not been affected in this way by possession of an airframe parachute.
The training question for personal parachutes is not a single question but two different issues. Training in the care and checking of the equipment and planning for its use is obviously sensible, and I see no arguments against it and plenty for. Training in its actual use is more problematic. I'm a moderately active cross-country glider pilot, and the risk that I will ever have to use my parachute before I'm forced by age to give up flying is very small. I balance that against the known risk of injury in training via actual parachute jumps, the known risk to me of injury if I make a jump without training (the expected outcome is severe bruising with the possibility of minor fractures) and my distaste for the whole idea of parachuting if I'm not forced into it. Thus I wear a parachute, know how to check and maintain it, have planned for how I'd use it, but hope never to have to and will not jump voluntarily.
Even if my personal calculations are wrong, I see no argument that I'm better off not wearing a parachute if I refuse to take jump training.
For at least the last ten years the vast majority of flights in single seater gliders in the UK have been made with a parachute. The mid-air collision rate (which is the main risk which parachutes mitigate) seems not to have increased - there are no fully worked-out statistics, but there is a good reporting system and any major increase would have been noticed.
Personal parachutes are certainly not perceived by glider pilots as as panic buttons for when flights go wrong - if anything there is a reluctance to use them even where it would be appropriate. There are several reports of pilots landing a glider with known airframe damage, at least one of which led to a fatal accident when the damage beceme catastrophic while manoeuvring to land. I regularly hear discussions which conclude that the pilot would continue to fly the aircraft if it seemed controllable.
I can see that an airfame parachute might change a pilot's attitude to risk taking, but the fact that it might is not the same as proof that it did. That proof could only come from two sources: (a) higher accident rates for the aircraft type compared to non-parachute equipped aircraft, or (b) higher rates of a particular type of accident (in which possession of a parachute might be expected to reduce the risk of death). If there are no such increases, that is proof that pilot psychology has not been affected in this way by possession of an airframe parachute.
The training question for personal parachutes is not a single question but two different issues. Training in the care and checking of the equipment and planning for its use is obviously sensible, and I see no arguments against it and plenty for. Training in its actual use is more problematic. I'm a moderately active cross-country glider pilot, and the risk that I will ever have to use my parachute before I'm forced by age to give up flying is very small. I balance that against the known risk of injury in training via actual parachute jumps, the known risk to me of injury if I make a jump without training (the expected outcome is severe bruising with the possibility of minor fractures) and my distaste for the whole idea of parachuting if I'm not forced into it. Thus I wear a parachute, know how to check and maintain it, have planned for how I'd use it, but hope never to have to and will not jump voluntarily.
Even if my personal calculations are wrong, I see no argument that I'm better off not wearing a parachute if I refuse to take jump training.
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Quite agree
given the choice of sitting on a parachute or sitting on a seat cushion in a glider, I'll take the parachute. It would improve one's chances quite significantly in the event of losing a wing or similar.
(c.f. K21 struck by lighting some years back, 2 successful bailouts, the Calif breakup even more years back, 2 successful bailouts, mid air at Sutton Bank, only one unfortunately got out, but he survived)
And I've seen quite enough "one jump wonders" bending themselves at our site not to want to do any parachute training. If I'm going to break a leg/hit a barn/tree/powerline I'll take my chance if I ever have to use the chute for real, thanks all the same.
PS I believe the RAF stopped practising 1 engined landings in Mosquitoes because they were killing more people in practices than they were losing with real engine failures. Similar logic I guess. And GA spin training?
given the choice of sitting on a parachute or sitting on a seat cushion in a glider, I'll take the parachute. It would improve one's chances quite significantly in the event of losing a wing or similar.
(c.f. K21 struck by lighting some years back, 2 successful bailouts, the Calif breakup even more years back, 2 successful bailouts, mid air at Sutton Bank, only one unfortunately got out, but he survived)
And I've seen quite enough "one jump wonders" bending themselves at our site not to want to do any parachute training. If I'm going to break a leg/hit a barn/tree/powerline I'll take my chance if I ever have to use the chute for real, thanks all the same.
PS I believe the RAF stopped practising 1 engined landings in Mosquitoes because they were killing more people in practices than they were losing with real engine failures. Similar logic I guess. And GA spin training?
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Flying the airplane into ice is illegal you say...but flying over the mountains at night isn't...so that's okay. It's okay so long as it's not illegal, then?
On this occasion you do seem to have lost the plot.
I never said flying over mountains at night was ok. I simply pointed out it was legal - two very different matters. In fact the very point I was making is that it is illegal to fly in icing conditions which may, in some instances, be a great deal safer than flying over mountains at night in a single - or for that matter flying any where at night in a single.
The whole essence of flying is risk management. There is no such thing as a safe flight. What matters is where you draw the line. Some pilots are far more risk adverse than others. However, there are many pilots who will point out that they are prepared to accept the risk of an engine failure in a single at night. They point out that there are many more risky elements in every day life that most of us accept. To every person that smokes there is a greater risk smoking will kill you than flying at night. To everyone that drives if you only fly a few hours at night statistically you are more likely to be killed driving your car. To everyone that is obese (a majority of Americans apparently) you are more likely to die from weight related conditions. For these reasons I do not accept your argument -flying is a study in risk assessment like a great many things we do in life.
To your specific point I would far rather be involved with some one who has calculated the risk. At least if their calculations are accurate they have demonstrated a proper understanding of the factors involved and what actions they will take to mitigate the risk. Find me a surgeon who will guarantee the success of a procedure. A good surgeon understands the risks involved with each procedure he conducts but he knows full well a percentage of patients will die. In many cases the condition is in itself not life threatening, but the patient and the surgeon, knowing the risks agree to the procedure. One patient may accept a 5% chance he will die, another may not. Neither is right - each has hopefully made an informed decision - he has made a risk assessment.
Flying is just another study in risk assessment.
When I collect my aircraft (any aircraft) from its annual there is a whole gamit of things I do I wouldnt normally. For one, I loiter in the overhead for rather a long time. Many of my friends think I am mad. Personally I have recorded maybe a dozen hours in singles at night - I dont enjoy the added risk, and for that reason nearly all my night hours involve two engines. I use to fly across 80 miles of sea in the winter in a single without a second thought. Now days I would only do so in a twin unless I really had no alternative. There lies the issue: what happens if you have no alternative - you can only afford to fly a single, you have to be at a meeting and there is 80 miles of winter ocean between you and the meeting. Do you not go? Do you take a raft? Do you take a raft and jackets? Do you wear a dry suite? Do you fly as high as possible to minimise time over the sea? Do you take a hand held ELT. In reality the risk of an engine failure in the first place is very small. However, should it happen the risk of you dieing from hypothermia is very large. Jackets are of little value, but better than nothing. Some will say a liferaft is the answer, others there is no substitute for a dry suite. You will stand the best chance of survival with all three. Statistically the higher you go the better, but the reduction in the risk is tiny. Of course if you want to carry commercial passengers none of the risks are acceptable, so you bolt on an extra engine.
I worry about you because if you believe you can get in an aircraft an eliminate the risk then most certainly you have never flown - which I do not believe. In fact it is the very failure to assess the risk that leads so often to accidents. There was an accident recently involving two very experienced commercial pilots. They found themselves in a spot of weather and decided to divert without a proper assessment of their diversion. They chose not to assess the risk. Not only did they end up accepting a tail wind but a wet runway that in combination was too short. They killed themselves and their passengers - and took with them all 20,000 odd hours of experience. All your hours of experience and mine count for nothing the moment you forget to assess the risk of what you are about to do - we dont assess the risk to justify our actions, we assess the risk because we know it is inherant to some degree in what we are about to do and by identifying the risk we best establish whether we have taken adequate measures to mitigate the risk to an acceptable level.
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Round or Square
This is a bit parallel to the main arguments raging here at the moment, but relevant to an earlier post and I believe the merged nature of this thread, so here goes:
Need an emergency parachute for an aerobat, not a parachutist - what are the arguments for round / square and where to get training for care and potential use in UK?
PS on the BRS / Cirrus thing, my view is there are always likely to be people (not just pilots) who believe safety device X makes them relatively immune to certain threats (e.g. believing ABS / Stability systems help cars defy the laws of physics), but that doesn't negate their value for those of us who make good judgements and still end up in the brown stuff, where safety device X has any reasonable chance of saving our bacon.
Need an emergency parachute for an aerobat, not a parachutist - what are the arguments for round / square and where to get training for care and potential use in UK?
PS on the BRS / Cirrus thing, my view is there are always likely to be people (not just pilots) who believe safety device X makes them relatively immune to certain threats (e.g. believing ABS / Stability systems help cars defy the laws of physics), but that doesn't negate their value for those of us who make good judgements and still end up in the brown stuff, where safety device X has any reasonable chance of saving our bacon.
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I don't. You're asking the wrong question.
You stated that the "risk" of an engine failure is small. It's not. It's a big risk, and perhaps until you have one, or several, then it's an academic one.
You have the same "chance" every time; the engine will either run, or it won't. Better put, it will run properly, or it won't. My last event resulted in a forced landing on the side of a mountain with an engine that was fully responsive to the power lever, and a propeller that wasn't. No oil. While the engine ran fine, it did me no good...so perhaps it's better to say either the engine will work for you, or it won't.
I don't care about five hundred hours, or five thousand, or dividing failures into those hours. I've gone for years without failures, and then had multiple failures in a year or a season, in multiple aircraft for multiple operators. There's really never been anything "average" about them.
The attitude of assuming it's a "small risk" is a dangerous one. I used to think it was a small thing too. After you've made forced landings off field, after you've dealt with some of the things that can go wrong, truly wrong, with an airplane or airframe, then you'll come to appreciate the fallacy of that concept; it's not a small risk, at all. It's very real.
Fly over the freezing water to get to that meeting if you like, but it's not a "small risk." That same flight could be made over the shore, perhaps...taking longer to get where you're going, but with options in the event of a power loss. You could take that flight out in the middle of the night through the mountains and possible weather, or wait until morning so you have options. Me? I wait for morning. I follow the shore line. I stay over roads. Risk elimination is all about identifying risks and eliminating them by avoiding what causes them, or providing a way out, options, so it's no longer a risk.
Accepting risk is to embrace hazard, to marry chance, and to lie with a question. It has no place in aviation, particularly not in private aviation.
You stated that the "risk" of an engine failure is small. It's not. It's a big risk, and perhaps until you have one, or several, then it's an academic one.
You have the same "chance" every time; the engine will either run, or it won't. Better put, it will run properly, or it won't. My last event resulted in a forced landing on the side of a mountain with an engine that was fully responsive to the power lever, and a propeller that wasn't. No oil. While the engine ran fine, it did me no good...so perhaps it's better to say either the engine will work for you, or it won't.
I don't care about five hundred hours, or five thousand, or dividing failures into those hours. I've gone for years without failures, and then had multiple failures in a year or a season, in multiple aircraft for multiple operators. There's really never been anything "average" about them.
The attitude of assuming it's a "small risk" is a dangerous one. I used to think it was a small thing too. After you've made forced landings off field, after you've dealt with some of the things that can go wrong, truly wrong, with an airplane or airframe, then you'll come to appreciate the fallacy of that concept; it's not a small risk, at all. It's very real.
Fly over the freezing water to get to that meeting if you like, but it's not a "small risk." That same flight could be made over the shore, perhaps...taking longer to get where you're going, but with options in the event of a power loss. You could take that flight out in the middle of the night through the mountains and possible weather, or wait until morning so you have options. Me? I wait for morning. I follow the shore line. I stay over roads. Risk elimination is all about identifying risks and eliminating them by avoiding what causes them, or providing a way out, options, so it's no longer a risk.
Accepting risk is to embrace hazard, to marry chance, and to lie with a question. It has no place in aviation, particularly not in private aviation.
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Accepting risk is to embrace hazard, to marry chance, and to lie with a question. It has no place in aviation, particularly not in private aviation.
BTW, how have you personally elminated risk from the flying you do in a typical GA single?
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I believe that's already been provided, by example.
This is long, but it's important.
Eliminating risk: refuse a flight. Preflight and find problems before getting in the air. Reject a takeoff. Wait for better weather. Choose routing to avoid hazards. Keep landing sites available in the event of power loss. Avoid single engine IMC operations. Use longer runways. There are many ways to find and eliminate risk. One must always be asking what it is that one doesn't know yet, and accounting for it.
When I approach a ridge on a fire, for example, I approach at an angle. I approach with an exit planned such that if I'm unable to jettison the load, the aircraft can still escape. Everything is made downhill; water flows downhill, and so do I. I know I can't outclimb the mountain; it outclimbs me. Therefore, I don't try.
When I fly cross country, I know it's much harder to run out of fuel if I don't burn off the bottom half of the tank. This doesn't mean one must keep a half tank on board, but it does mean that there's no law against carrying more than the bare minimum fuel reserve. Reserves aren't there to be used as part of regular planning and operation. Never the less, pilots annually continue to run out of fuel. A four and a half hour flight with five hours of fuel is asking for trouble. Make it a four and a half hour flight with six hours of fuel, or seven...now you're talking about eliminating on possible "risk."
Got known ice? Dandy. Is there some law which says you have to go sucking around in the ice to see how well it works? Of course not. Ever have hot props or boots fail you in the ice? Ever have ice come off your props and put holes in the side of the airplane? Ever have ice build fast enough it interfered with the aerodynamic handling of the airplane? I sure have, and it's for that reason that I strongly suggest one learn from other's experiences rather than insisting on experiencing it first hand. Got known ice? Good for you. Avoid ice that's known, so you don't have to see how well it works. Now you're eliminating risk.
Wearing a parachute? Can you recognize a pilot chute in tow? A horseshoe malfunction? A lineover? A mae west? An end cell closure? Can you stop a spin with a released brake line? What about broken lines? Collapsing a canopy? Getting stable in freefall? Do you know what a canopy out of the pack in an airplane can do or how dangerous it is? Ever performed a PLF? Do you know what to do when you land in water? In a tree? To avoid powerlines? How to collapse the parachute in wind? Release the parachute? Any idea what happens if your leg straps aren't TIGHT when you open that canopy?
Of course...we're told it's a "small risk," and therefore you don't need to know it.
Of course.
Perhaps you do.
Can you imagine never being taught to land in a crosswind. It's a small risk. Probably never need to be able to do that. All the winds here are out of the south...all the runways north/south...don't worry about the crosswinds. Don't worry about draining the fuel sumps...probably never any water in the fuel. Small risk, right? Why get to know your equipment...probably never have any problems, right?
Many Cessna 200 owners and pilots aren't aware of the kidney sumps that are below the fuselage, just below where the wing strut attaches to the airframe (or would attach, in the case of most 210's that lack struts, of course). Many don't even know there are drains there, or the significance of those tanks...perfectly happy and content to not know their aircraft fuel system. The problem is that this system can cause what's known as Fuel Flow Fluctuation. Problem is that the same line which feeds that tank from the wing also serves as a vapor return line, and it's the same tank to which hot bypass fuel from the fuel pump is sent.
The real problem is that the hot fuel under the right conditions can cause a vapor lock in the fuel feed line from the tank, causing the engine to sputter and die. The problem is that the Cessna manual dictates turning on the boost pump, switching tanks, then adjusting the mixture...and the real problem is that doing this without taking the time to know the system can prevent you from restoring power...because turning on the boost pump only makes the problem worse by returning even more hot fuel to that same kidney sump/header tank. Go figure. Many general aviation pilots who fly these airplanes don't know it.
You see, knowing your equipment and your systems is very, very important. Every bit as much with the parachute as it is with your airplane. To not learn your airplane is unthinkable...yet still goes on. Little wonder, then, that pilots are dismissive about learning their parachute system. Take it seriously.
I can't count the number of fatality reports I've read with jumpers who died tugging on a piece of their harness instead of an operating handle. Jumpers who were seen frantically pulling on what they thought was a toggle, D-ring, or other control to open their parachute, but instead had grasped a part of the harness webbing...and they fought with it all the way to impact, and to their death.
I think about that every time I jump. I consciously think about that and reach for, and touch every part of the harness, over and over. I want the very last thing that ran through my mind, before an emergency, to be the one thing that will save me.
About five years ago I'd had a modification done by a rigger to a parachute system, moving the pilot chute pocket from a ROL (rear of leg) position to a BOC (bottom of container) position; a safety upgrade which all new systems now use. I tested the system repeatedly on the ground to ensure that the pilot chute would extract comfortably from the sleeve when it came time to pull, and it did.
I rode to 18,000' in a Caravan, and got out. I did a 2-way freefall with someone else down to 4,500', then broke away. I did several turns, a backloop, a roll, and reached to pull. I grasped the toggle on the pilot chute, and pulled, and it was stuck fast. At this point I was below my usual pull atitude of 3,000', passing 2,500', and stable at terminal velocity. I tried a second time and it didn't work. I tried arching my hips one way for leverage while pulling the other, and immediately found myself on my back, with my chest mount altimeter showing through 2,000'. At this point, 10-12 seconds to impact.
I knew that when not in a stable face-to-earth position, the altimeter wouldn't read correctly...I could be lower. The audible alert altimeter in my helmet was a steady loud whine in my ear and my wrist altimeter agreed. I arched hard, pushing my arms and legs out and behind me, my chest up, and quickly flipped over, now turning head down as I righted myself. I noted I was directly above the ramp in front of the main drop zone hangar, and I got ground rush. This is when everything that was small and far away suddenly blossoms and gets detailed; if you get ground rush you're very low, and I was.
At that moment I had the car-crash experience, when everything slows down, and things became very crystal clear. I remembered all the reports of other jumpers going in, bouncing, dying, with a useless handle or the harness in their hand, and thought to myself "you're that guy." I knew that any further hesitation, any further effort to extract that canopy would result in my death. This was perfectly clear, obvious, no question. I knew I had to let go of that handle and open a reserve. The thought briefly flashed through my mind, verifying that I did indeed have a total malfunction and nothing to cut away, and in that moment I released the handle, used both hands, and pulled the reserve D-ring. The reserve parachute, a bright pink square ram-air parachute came off my back under spring tension, and opened hard and fast.
I had time to check the canopy, release the brakes, and I hit the ground.
I'm not telling you these things to give you a hard time. It's usually far better to learn from other people's experiences than from your own; especially when your own may kill you.
Some years ago following a major fire fatality, a discussion came up regarding the actions of the deceased. When the burnover started and they began running for their safety zone, some made it, some didn't. The ones who made it dropped their packs, their chainsaws, and their gear, and ran for their lives. The ones who didn't were found burned beyond recognition in the 2,000 degree heat, with what was left of their tools melted into their charred bodies. It seem so simple, then...drop the tools and run.
One member of the discussion had been a firefighter for 20 years on the line. He was faced with a similiar problem. He knew the score. As the fire exploded behind him, he caught up with a member of his team running, and the member was being slowed down because he was still carrying his saw...a heavy chainsaw full of gasoline. The experienced firefighter screamed at him to drop it, then slapped him hard and took the saw out of the young man's hands. They ran and made it; they arrived at the safe zone. They lived.
When the experienced firefighter look down at his own hands, he found that he held the saw he'd taken from the junior man. His instinct and training had kicked in...the saw is a lifeline, and he'd clutched it as he ran...just as he'd told the others not to do. He couldn't believe it. That was twelve years or so ago now, I think. Probably not the first time, probably not the last. But it wasn't in an airplane, you say, and what does that have to do with parachutes and flying and risk? Everything.
Human nature. In an emergency, we revert to two things; what we know, and our training. We can't revert to what we don't know, save for instinct, and we train the proper response so we don't follow instinct into an early grave.
We can go through life thinking "it's a small risk, so I won't bother," but it's improper, unprofessional, and inappropriate in aviation. But we're private pilots, we don't have to act professionally...I've heard it before. Not so. Professionalism isn't about making money at what you do; it's state of mind. it's the ability to say no, it's the ability to never perform at the minimum level, it's the drive and desire to seek training, seek a higher level of operation, and to maintain a high standard. Simply believing "it's a small risk" won't cut it, and it's no more appropriate for a private pilot than it is for an ATP.
I've worked a lot of jobs to support my flying habit. One of them was as an armed guard, servicing ATM's (teller machines). I carried over two hundred thousand dollars in cash, in a canvas bag, while approaching the machine. As you can imagine, this would be tempting to nearly anyone. In training, on the range, we practiced with heavy canvas bags, carried in the shooting hand. Or one in both hands. When a buzzer sounded, we had to be able to complete the shooting drill accurately without danger to ourselves or targets representing bystanders, while protecting our lives.
You might be shocked at the number of people who failed to drop the money. First step, drop the money. It's no longer a priority. Empty one's hands, abandon what you knew a half a second ago, because your world has now changed. It's a new landscape. Drop the money. Draw. Front sight on target, trigger pressure, fire again. But what did people do? They struggled, went into sensory overload, tried to transfer the bag to the other hand before drawing the weapon to save their life...very bad.
The saying goes that you fight as you train, and it's equally true that you fly as you train. Before I fly, I always rehearse my way out of the harness or seat belt, out of the cockpit, and out of the airplane. I want to be able to do it eyes closed, in the dark, under water, on fire, whatever. I want to be blindfold familiar with the cockpit so I could find anything on command without having to feel for it...intimately knowing the airplane. Same with a parachute. Know every inch of it, inside and out. Know what it looks like open and closed, and what to do. People buy firearms to protect themselves and then die in a gunfight when they don't know how to release the safety under stress. The same can be said for opening a parachute, clearing a fuel flow fluctuation malfunction, or handling an aircraft fire.
I sat in the back of an airliner recently, going home from a 17 day trip on the road. I was in uniform, and the passenger next to me looke surprised when I withdrew the passenger safety briefing card from the seatback in front of me, and began to read it. "But, aren't you a pilot?" He asked. Why, yes. "Why do you need to read that?"
I explained that no matter who we are, or our background, it's important to read that information every single time, and listen to the briefing by the flight attendant. As I glanced around me, I saw what I usually see...nobody reading the cards, nobody watching the flight attendant. The man seated next to me scoffed..."I really don't need anyone to tell me how to undo my seatbelt."
I explained to him that in an emergency, when the airplane is full of smoke and upside down and he's hanging from that belt, when it's dark and there's a lot of yelling and screaming, the one thing he wants running through is mind is the last thing he did, the last thought he had...and that was practicing locating and undoing that buckle. You may find this silly...but as a firefighter I've been inside enough vehicles with crash victims...cars and aircraft, to know that many people can't even fire out where they are, or who they are, or how to release their seatbelt, for that matter. When the chips are down, you really want to be trained in your system...and that includes a parachute.
I've spent most of my adult life, and a good share of my teenage life too, training for and engaged in emergency situations in flight and on the ground. Often as a fucntion of my employment. I sincerely hope that there are those who are able to learn from others who've been through those situations, rather than having to go out and prove it for themselves. This is just as applicable to wearing an emergency parachute as it is to preflighting an airplane or outrunning a fire on the ground. All involve aspects of human nature under stress, or potentially under stress, and all involve an inherent need to get it right, every time, with potentially dire consequences if one fails to do so. A preflight may not be a stressful experience, but dealing with the aftermath of what's missed most certainly can be, to say nothing of the stress one's relatives and friends may feel after the fact. For everyone's sake, think safety first; find the risk, eliminate it.
Eliminate it with thorough training proficiency, and an attitude toward safety. Never think "it's a little risk." It's not. If it's risk, it's worth taking seriously.
This is long, but it's important.
Eliminating risk: refuse a flight. Preflight and find problems before getting in the air. Reject a takeoff. Wait for better weather. Choose routing to avoid hazards. Keep landing sites available in the event of power loss. Avoid single engine IMC operations. Use longer runways. There are many ways to find and eliminate risk. One must always be asking what it is that one doesn't know yet, and accounting for it.
When I approach a ridge on a fire, for example, I approach at an angle. I approach with an exit planned such that if I'm unable to jettison the load, the aircraft can still escape. Everything is made downhill; water flows downhill, and so do I. I know I can't outclimb the mountain; it outclimbs me. Therefore, I don't try.
When I fly cross country, I know it's much harder to run out of fuel if I don't burn off the bottom half of the tank. This doesn't mean one must keep a half tank on board, but it does mean that there's no law against carrying more than the bare minimum fuel reserve. Reserves aren't there to be used as part of regular planning and operation. Never the less, pilots annually continue to run out of fuel. A four and a half hour flight with five hours of fuel is asking for trouble. Make it a four and a half hour flight with six hours of fuel, or seven...now you're talking about eliminating on possible "risk."
Got known ice? Dandy. Is there some law which says you have to go sucking around in the ice to see how well it works? Of course not. Ever have hot props or boots fail you in the ice? Ever have ice come off your props and put holes in the side of the airplane? Ever have ice build fast enough it interfered with the aerodynamic handling of the airplane? I sure have, and it's for that reason that I strongly suggest one learn from other's experiences rather than insisting on experiencing it first hand. Got known ice? Good for you. Avoid ice that's known, so you don't have to see how well it works. Now you're eliminating risk.
Wearing a parachute? Can you recognize a pilot chute in tow? A horseshoe malfunction? A lineover? A mae west? An end cell closure? Can you stop a spin with a released brake line? What about broken lines? Collapsing a canopy? Getting stable in freefall? Do you know what a canopy out of the pack in an airplane can do or how dangerous it is? Ever performed a PLF? Do you know what to do when you land in water? In a tree? To avoid powerlines? How to collapse the parachute in wind? Release the parachute? Any idea what happens if your leg straps aren't TIGHT when you open that canopy?
Of course...we're told it's a "small risk," and therefore you don't need to know it.
Of course.
Perhaps you do.
Can you imagine never being taught to land in a crosswind. It's a small risk. Probably never need to be able to do that. All the winds here are out of the south...all the runways north/south...don't worry about the crosswinds. Don't worry about draining the fuel sumps...probably never any water in the fuel. Small risk, right? Why get to know your equipment...probably never have any problems, right?
Many Cessna 200 owners and pilots aren't aware of the kidney sumps that are below the fuselage, just below where the wing strut attaches to the airframe (or would attach, in the case of most 210's that lack struts, of course). Many don't even know there are drains there, or the significance of those tanks...perfectly happy and content to not know their aircraft fuel system. The problem is that this system can cause what's known as Fuel Flow Fluctuation. Problem is that the same line which feeds that tank from the wing also serves as a vapor return line, and it's the same tank to which hot bypass fuel from the fuel pump is sent.
The real problem is that the hot fuel under the right conditions can cause a vapor lock in the fuel feed line from the tank, causing the engine to sputter and die. The problem is that the Cessna manual dictates turning on the boost pump, switching tanks, then adjusting the mixture...and the real problem is that doing this without taking the time to know the system can prevent you from restoring power...because turning on the boost pump only makes the problem worse by returning even more hot fuel to that same kidney sump/header tank. Go figure. Many general aviation pilots who fly these airplanes don't know it.
You see, knowing your equipment and your systems is very, very important. Every bit as much with the parachute as it is with your airplane. To not learn your airplane is unthinkable...yet still goes on. Little wonder, then, that pilots are dismissive about learning their parachute system. Take it seriously.
I can't count the number of fatality reports I've read with jumpers who died tugging on a piece of their harness instead of an operating handle. Jumpers who were seen frantically pulling on what they thought was a toggle, D-ring, or other control to open their parachute, but instead had grasped a part of the harness webbing...and they fought with it all the way to impact, and to their death.
I think about that every time I jump. I consciously think about that and reach for, and touch every part of the harness, over and over. I want the very last thing that ran through my mind, before an emergency, to be the one thing that will save me.
About five years ago I'd had a modification done by a rigger to a parachute system, moving the pilot chute pocket from a ROL (rear of leg) position to a BOC (bottom of container) position; a safety upgrade which all new systems now use. I tested the system repeatedly on the ground to ensure that the pilot chute would extract comfortably from the sleeve when it came time to pull, and it did.
I rode to 18,000' in a Caravan, and got out. I did a 2-way freefall with someone else down to 4,500', then broke away. I did several turns, a backloop, a roll, and reached to pull. I grasped the toggle on the pilot chute, and pulled, and it was stuck fast. At this point I was below my usual pull atitude of 3,000', passing 2,500', and stable at terminal velocity. I tried a second time and it didn't work. I tried arching my hips one way for leverage while pulling the other, and immediately found myself on my back, with my chest mount altimeter showing through 2,000'. At this point, 10-12 seconds to impact.
I knew that when not in a stable face-to-earth position, the altimeter wouldn't read correctly...I could be lower. The audible alert altimeter in my helmet was a steady loud whine in my ear and my wrist altimeter agreed. I arched hard, pushing my arms and legs out and behind me, my chest up, and quickly flipped over, now turning head down as I righted myself. I noted I was directly above the ramp in front of the main drop zone hangar, and I got ground rush. This is when everything that was small and far away suddenly blossoms and gets detailed; if you get ground rush you're very low, and I was.
At that moment I had the car-crash experience, when everything slows down, and things became very crystal clear. I remembered all the reports of other jumpers going in, bouncing, dying, with a useless handle or the harness in their hand, and thought to myself "you're that guy." I knew that any further hesitation, any further effort to extract that canopy would result in my death. This was perfectly clear, obvious, no question. I knew I had to let go of that handle and open a reserve. The thought briefly flashed through my mind, verifying that I did indeed have a total malfunction and nothing to cut away, and in that moment I released the handle, used both hands, and pulled the reserve D-ring. The reserve parachute, a bright pink square ram-air parachute came off my back under spring tension, and opened hard and fast.
I had time to check the canopy, release the brakes, and I hit the ground.
I'm not telling you these things to give you a hard time. It's usually far better to learn from other people's experiences than from your own; especially when your own may kill you.
Some years ago following a major fire fatality, a discussion came up regarding the actions of the deceased. When the burnover started and they began running for their safety zone, some made it, some didn't. The ones who made it dropped their packs, their chainsaws, and their gear, and ran for their lives. The ones who didn't were found burned beyond recognition in the 2,000 degree heat, with what was left of their tools melted into their charred bodies. It seem so simple, then...drop the tools and run.
One member of the discussion had been a firefighter for 20 years on the line. He was faced with a similiar problem. He knew the score. As the fire exploded behind him, he caught up with a member of his team running, and the member was being slowed down because he was still carrying his saw...a heavy chainsaw full of gasoline. The experienced firefighter screamed at him to drop it, then slapped him hard and took the saw out of the young man's hands. They ran and made it; they arrived at the safe zone. They lived.
When the experienced firefighter look down at his own hands, he found that he held the saw he'd taken from the junior man. His instinct and training had kicked in...the saw is a lifeline, and he'd clutched it as he ran...just as he'd told the others not to do. He couldn't believe it. That was twelve years or so ago now, I think. Probably not the first time, probably not the last. But it wasn't in an airplane, you say, and what does that have to do with parachutes and flying and risk? Everything.
Human nature. In an emergency, we revert to two things; what we know, and our training. We can't revert to what we don't know, save for instinct, and we train the proper response so we don't follow instinct into an early grave.
We can go through life thinking "it's a small risk, so I won't bother," but it's improper, unprofessional, and inappropriate in aviation. But we're private pilots, we don't have to act professionally...I've heard it before. Not so. Professionalism isn't about making money at what you do; it's state of mind. it's the ability to say no, it's the ability to never perform at the minimum level, it's the drive and desire to seek training, seek a higher level of operation, and to maintain a high standard. Simply believing "it's a small risk" won't cut it, and it's no more appropriate for a private pilot than it is for an ATP.
I've worked a lot of jobs to support my flying habit. One of them was as an armed guard, servicing ATM's (teller machines). I carried over two hundred thousand dollars in cash, in a canvas bag, while approaching the machine. As you can imagine, this would be tempting to nearly anyone. In training, on the range, we practiced with heavy canvas bags, carried in the shooting hand. Or one in both hands. When a buzzer sounded, we had to be able to complete the shooting drill accurately without danger to ourselves or targets representing bystanders, while protecting our lives.
You might be shocked at the number of people who failed to drop the money. First step, drop the money. It's no longer a priority. Empty one's hands, abandon what you knew a half a second ago, because your world has now changed. It's a new landscape. Drop the money. Draw. Front sight on target, trigger pressure, fire again. But what did people do? They struggled, went into sensory overload, tried to transfer the bag to the other hand before drawing the weapon to save their life...very bad.
The saying goes that you fight as you train, and it's equally true that you fly as you train. Before I fly, I always rehearse my way out of the harness or seat belt, out of the cockpit, and out of the airplane. I want to be able to do it eyes closed, in the dark, under water, on fire, whatever. I want to be blindfold familiar with the cockpit so I could find anything on command without having to feel for it...intimately knowing the airplane. Same with a parachute. Know every inch of it, inside and out. Know what it looks like open and closed, and what to do. People buy firearms to protect themselves and then die in a gunfight when they don't know how to release the safety under stress. The same can be said for opening a parachute, clearing a fuel flow fluctuation malfunction, or handling an aircraft fire.
I sat in the back of an airliner recently, going home from a 17 day trip on the road. I was in uniform, and the passenger next to me looke surprised when I withdrew the passenger safety briefing card from the seatback in front of me, and began to read it. "But, aren't you a pilot?" He asked. Why, yes. "Why do you need to read that?"
I explained that no matter who we are, or our background, it's important to read that information every single time, and listen to the briefing by the flight attendant. As I glanced around me, I saw what I usually see...nobody reading the cards, nobody watching the flight attendant. The man seated next to me scoffed..."I really don't need anyone to tell me how to undo my seatbelt."
I explained to him that in an emergency, when the airplane is full of smoke and upside down and he's hanging from that belt, when it's dark and there's a lot of yelling and screaming, the one thing he wants running through is mind is the last thing he did, the last thought he had...and that was practicing locating and undoing that buckle. You may find this silly...but as a firefighter I've been inside enough vehicles with crash victims...cars and aircraft, to know that many people can't even fire out where they are, or who they are, or how to release their seatbelt, for that matter. When the chips are down, you really want to be trained in your system...and that includes a parachute.
I've spent most of my adult life, and a good share of my teenage life too, training for and engaged in emergency situations in flight and on the ground. Often as a fucntion of my employment. I sincerely hope that there are those who are able to learn from others who've been through those situations, rather than having to go out and prove it for themselves. This is just as applicable to wearing an emergency parachute as it is to preflighting an airplane or outrunning a fire on the ground. All involve aspects of human nature under stress, or potentially under stress, and all involve an inherent need to get it right, every time, with potentially dire consequences if one fails to do so. A preflight may not be a stressful experience, but dealing with the aftermath of what's missed most certainly can be, to say nothing of the stress one's relatives and friends may feel after the fact. For everyone's sake, think safety first; find the risk, eliminate it.
Eliminate it with thorough training proficiency, and an attitude toward safety. Never think "it's a little risk." It's not. If it's risk, it's worth taking seriously.
Emergency Bail-out -- Parts I and II
Free Flightthis year carried two articles on emergency bailout:
Soaring Association of Canada - Downloads | 2000's | free flight
Well worth reading every Spring if not more often.
The difficult thing to practice in many gliders is getting out after getting rid of the canopy and unstrapping.
The recumbent position and instrument binnacle don't help -- also, the fact that we normally treat the glider with great delicacy getting in and out.
I've been telling myself to use the tow release toggle to pull myself up; even put my feet on the instrument binnacle if that's what's needed to get out.
Yes, many pilots will attempt to land a damaged glider if it's still controllable (i.e. can fly at approach speed and behave properly with spoilers) and a long field into wind is available.
Soaring Association of Canada - Downloads | 2000's | free flight
Well worth reading every Spring if not more often.
The difficult thing to practice in many gliders is getting out after getting rid of the canopy and unstrapping.
The recumbent position and instrument binnacle don't help -- also, the fact that we normally treat the glider with great delicacy getting in and out.
I've been telling myself to use the tow release toggle to pull myself up; even put my feet on the instrument binnacle if that's what's needed to get out.
Yes, many pilots will attempt to land a damaged glider if it's still controllable (i.e. can fly at approach speed and behave properly with spoilers) and a long field into wind is available.
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This is long, but it's important.
Unfortunately it is very unimportant for the sake of this discussion.
Please forgive me but from my point of view (and I genuinely dont mean to come across as conceited) you have trotted out the usual patter about minimising risk which should be bread and butter to any seasoned pilot. To the wider audience it may be of interest - I hope so.
You havent eliminate risk at all - you have taken some sensible precautions to reduce the risk in certain aspects of the flight all of which are pretty self evident to most experienced pilots.
Avoid single engine IMC operations.
My guess is that if you fly through an overcast at 4,000 feet to be clear on top at 5,000 feet you have not increased the risk at all. Any competant instrument pilot should manage to maintain control through the undercast into VMC at 4,000 and perform as good a forced landing as if the cloud had not been there.
As I tried to explain earlier it would have been interesting to discuss how we assess risk - does the excercise become an unreasonable risk if the cloudbase is at 3,000 feet, or 2,000 feet, or 1,000 feet .. .. .. but your bland assertion is just nonesense and contributes nothing to the debate we were having.
I am afraid your last post just comes across as naive.
Clearly you are not naive when it comes to flying, but you would seem obsessed with broadly dogmatic mantra which may go down well with students but deals with the issues we having been discussing in such a broad brush manner that it does not advance the debate.
Sorry, we are going to have to just disagree on this one.
I enjoyed the debate, however, thanks.
PS I am glad that at least I have convinced you the extra engine is not there for performance.
Last edited by Fuji Abound; 16th Dec 2008 at 21:32.
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There is a difference between forthright and your post.
If you thought I was insulting you, you would be wrong.
It is just that your argument does not stack up.
As I said, you havent eliminated risk at all, you have simply trotted out a few of the usual precautions any mature pilot should take.
You have also chosen to ignore my comments about each flight being an excercise in risk assessment followed by an excercise in risk management. I dont as much mind if you disagree with my view, but I do mind that you have not tackled the debate in a constructive way, simply dismissing my assertion that you must elimanate risk without demonstrably explaining how you achieve that.
What worries me is you seem closed to any other position than your own, but arent prepared to justify the view you hold.
I still believe it is almost impossible to eliminate risk in flying a light single if only because as you point out if you fly for long enough the engine will eventually fail on you - it could happen much earlier than you think. Height, visibility, terrain and regular practise are your friends, but even then do not guarantee success every time. Most pilot's erode their friendship with each to some degree otherwise you would severly restrict your flying - rightly or wrongly that is the simple reality. Hence we should debate what degree of erosion is warranted.
Doubtless we may have the debate on another occasion and perhaps with an open mind make more progress. Sorry it did not prove possible on this occasion.
If you thought I was insulting you, you would be wrong.
It is just that your argument does not stack up.
As I said, you havent eliminated risk at all, you have simply trotted out a few of the usual precautions any mature pilot should take.
You have also chosen to ignore my comments about each flight being an excercise in risk assessment followed by an excercise in risk management. I dont as much mind if you disagree with my view, but I do mind that you have not tackled the debate in a constructive way, simply dismissing my assertion that you must elimanate risk without demonstrably explaining how you achieve that.
What worries me is you seem closed to any other position than your own, but arent prepared to justify the view you hold.
I still believe it is almost impossible to eliminate risk in flying a light single if only because as you point out if you fly for long enough the engine will eventually fail on you - it could happen much earlier than you think. Height, visibility, terrain and regular practise are your friends, but even then do not guarantee success every time. Most pilot's erode their friendship with each to some degree otherwise you would severly restrict your flying - rightly or wrongly that is the simple reality. Hence we should debate what degree of erosion is warranted.
Doubtless we may have the debate on another occasion and perhaps with an open mind make more progress. Sorry it did not prove possible on this occasion.
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....This thread does seem rather hard to follow...Broadly I would agree with Fuji over risk; flying light aircraft will always be risky...although as I think back to a thread on flying and danger last year I remember of course that risk is a relative word and relies on some sort of common consensus of meaning to be used in an absolute sense.
On the subject of parachutes and training though I think it is worth doing a parachute jump if you're a pilot who flies with one. I've done one solo jump and while it's not something I enjoyed enough to spend money on a regular basis it was good to know what actually jumping was like and I now would have less apprehension about using a parachute in anger and therefore feel safer wearing one. To those worrying about the likelihood of injuring themselves modern parachutes are very reliable - of the eight of us or so that jumped in our group no one received any injuries or any sort.
As for the Cirrus parachutes I don't really believe they induce a moral hazard effect - plenty of pilots kill themselves by getting into situations they can't handle without needing or having a parachute to lure them. On a personal level though I actually don't really care either way - the fact that others may have abused a safety feature doesn't make me any more likely to - I would trust myself not be any less conservative with decision making because I had BRS and therefore it can only add to my safety. At the end of the day I know I'd rather have it.
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"flying light aircraft will always be risky"
Not encouraging words for someone like myself who is about to start training, but I have to admit that I have come to a similar conclusion by speaking with various people.
Many of the posts that I have submitted so far might indicate that I'm simply "scared" of flying .. maybe it's a bit of that, and maybe it's also that I would like to know that my safety is in my own hands. Before people start, I KNOW that it's always better to be prepared for the worst ... but would also hate to think that every flight could end up in a big drama, sort of takes the fun out of it. Then again, it's my love for aeroplanes and flying that still makes me want to do it.
S
Not sure how accurate any of the below is but in case anyone is interested/can comment:
General Aviation Safety
"flying light aircraft will always be risky"
Not encouraging words for someone like myself who is about to start training, but I have to admit that I have come to a similar conclusion by speaking with various people.
Many of the posts that I have submitted so far might indicate that I'm simply "scared" of flying .. maybe it's a bit of that, and maybe it's also that I would like to know that my safety is in my own hands. Before people start, I KNOW that it's always better to be prepared for the worst ... but would also hate to think that every flight could end up in a big drama, sort of takes the fun out of it. Then again, it's my love for aeroplanes and flying that still makes me want to do it.
S
Not sure how accurate any of the below is but in case anyone is interested/can comment:
General Aviation Safety
Fly Conventional Gear
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Not encouraging words for someone like myself who is about to start training, but I have to admit that I have come to a similar conclusion by speaking with various people.
I posted on your thread about car vs. plane engines that I would have more faith in a modern and well maintained aero engine than in a car one....so it's not all bad. Your slight fear may well actually have given you a head start in terms of safety while flying; certainly I didn't really consider the issue of crashing before learning to fly so it's good that you're thinking about it. You really won't be able to make a judgement as to what you feel comfortable doing until you've been flying a little while though.
Simply and well put.
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Not encouraging words for someone like myself who is about to start training, but I have to admit that I have come to a similar conclusion by speaking with various people.
The two most significant types are controlled flight into terrain and loss of control.
Ignoring the fatalities connected with flying into mountainous terrain (a type of flying which requires its own skill set) almost all CFIT is associated (not surprisingly) with poor visibility or IMC.
The vast majority of loss of control fatalities are associated with loss of control at low level (often in the circuit in and around base leg and final) and to a much lesser extent, en route weather.
Not surprisingly it takes a hard impact with the ground to kill you, which is why these scenarios are almost always fatal.
From that we can conclude that if you stay away from poor visibility, or ensure you skill set enables you to safely operate in IMC, and you maintain control in the circuit at all cost, you will have eliminated the most common reasons for loss of life.
Accidents which are almost completely outside the control of the pilot are fortunately few and far between and, in any event, often not fatal. Often there is very little a pilot could have done to prevent an engine failure, but the number of engines that fail other than as a result of running out of fuel or evidently poor operating procedures and maintenance are relatively few. In my view any operator should ensure that he always uses a maintenance shop with a proven reputation. Oil analysis is inexpensive and also in my view should always be undertaken as it is a great indicator of impending problems. Low compressions, delaying replacement of vital parts and running engines on condition or close to their service life are also operating procedures which in my view are false economy and increase the chances of an in flight failure. Never the less there is always a risk the best maintained engine can fail at the most unexpected of times for reasons that could not have been detected. However, there is every reason to expect a forced landing will be successful. The chances of success can of course be significantly improved by never putting yourself in a position where the landing becomes a significant lottery - poor terrain, night, water etc, or you have little time for setting up the landing (you are asking for trouble if you give yourself less than 1,000 feet through an undercast). As I indicated earlier, each persons assessment of the level of risk they are prepared to accept in terms of this (and other) scenarios is a matter for them. I know some pilots who regularly fly singles at night. Statistically, if you follow all of the precautions I have mentioned, the chances of a calamitous engine failure are remote - you may be prepared to accept that level of risk, the chances of a successful forced landing at night are clearly rather less than during the day, but there are many success stories. A good friend of mine landed in total darkness, went through a hedge, over a ditch, and a tree took off his starboard wing, but he got out the aircraft without so much as a scratch. It is however a lottery - he might have ploughed head on into the side of a barn and the wall collapse on the aircraft. For that reason, as I said earlier, you cant eliminate risk completely other than by only ever flying in perfect conditions and even then, as just one example, it is a “brave” pilot who can guarantee he is never going to suffer a mid air outside CAS using only the mark 1 eyeball and the other techniques available to reduce the risk of a collision. In my time I have been “involved” with three mid airs which I would consider were uncomfortably close. On one occasion I wasn’t the flying crew - whether I would have seen the aircraft if I had been looking I don’t know to this day. In the second I was receiving a RIS in IMC as was the other aircraft. Prima facia it was ATCs “fault”. In the third I simply never saw the threat until he had passed just beneath me. I often ask if I should have done, but I was taking all the precautions I normally do at the time, both aircraft were fast twins, and I suspect we both just did pick up each other in our scan until it was too late.
So in short, you can make flying a great deal safer than you might imagine, and you can eliminate a significant element of the risk involved, although at least in part only to the extent of being very selective about your operating conditions. However, even then you cannot totally eliminate the risk involved.