Hmmm... So what experience level would satisfy you?
Whatever it takes to not be stupid enough to fly a light single at night over the mountains in British Colombia, into a level 5 thunderstorm and then deploy a parachute...or fly into severe icing...or do all the stupid things that lead to deploying the panic button.
Hours don't mean a lot, but judgment and experience surely does. Hours don't equate to experience.
Flying into thunderstorms and ice and encountering the situations that many of these pilots did...shows poor airmanship and very poor judgement.
For the record, over half of the Cirrus pilots who deployed the parachute had more than 800 hours of total time. That's several years of flying experience for more general aviation pilots.
800 hours is still 800 hours...no matter who's doing the flying. The total time is really quite irrelevant, however. Yes, 800 hours is a very low time pilot...barely enough to qualify flying a VFR single engine charter in the US. Look at their instrument times, however, and you'll see a lot of 30 hour instrument pilots. An 800 hour pilot with 30 hours total instrument experience is a 30 hour pilot when it comes to flying instruments...not an 800 hour pilot.
Many of those identified the incidents and mishaps had only a few hours in type. An 800 hour pilot with 15 hours of cirrus time is a 15 hour cirrus pilot...not an 800 hour pilot. Start combining minimal instrument experience, minimal weather experience, minimal time in type, and very poor judgement, you have a rash of pilots who flew well beyond their own capabilities and that of the airplane, who lost control as a result in most cases, and fell back not on the aerodynamic capabilities of flying a perfectly good airplane...but deploying a parachute.
For those who've never had a parachute canopy collapse in winds and turbulence, an understanding of exactly why deploying a parachute in a thunderstorm is a bad idea...may not sink in. There really isn't any worse place to do so...the pilots who put themselves in that position not only made severely stupid blunders from the outset, but perpetuated and compounded that chain of thought when they elected to deploy parachutes at night or in storms, or both.
SNS3Guppy, as shown here, it was your interpretations and judgments that suggest otherwise.
No, the record speaks for it's self. It's a virtual wall of shame that highlights foolishness and stupidity, and a tribute to luck. Little more...but it does show a remarkable consistency in the nature of those involved, and their actions...which as I stated before, are the vast majority.
Improper use of the parachute? The cause was the failure of the mechanic to safety wire the aileron hinge nut. The plane was preflighted. The potential problem was not observed. The problem happened in flight. What is improper? Saving oneself? Or not being perfect?
Perfection is irrelevant. An airplane coming out of maintenance deserves a close inspection. I see things missed all the time that should have been caught; this should also have been caught. But as you're dragging perfection into it, perhaps you can answer...you preflight airplanes, do you not? Do YOU know what to look for? Do you know how many threads must extend beyond a nut, and whether a metallock nut or a fiberlock is the right choice? Or do you simply look, see something and move on? Do you know how to identify the a proper safety wire job vs. an improper one? Most pilots don't...they assume that what they see is correct, gloss over it, don't know the mechanical standards which they're supposed to be inspecting and approving.
Do you know that a mechanic can approve an aircraft for return to service, but doesn't ever return the aircraft to service? The pilot does that when he or she flies it. The pilot who does so takes full responsibility for the airworthy condition of the aircraft...and unlike the mechanic who merely signs for it, the pilot places his or her life on the line. How much more reason does one need to perform a very thorough inspection and get it right? Perfection? No. Simply doing one's job as PIC is enough...and that didn't get done.
You are on a roll. CAPS caused the crash? Unnecessary?
Yes, CAPS caused the crash, and yes, it's use was unnecessary. You refer to the crash in Indiana. You also state that you're the person who placed the Wikipedia entries (several of which are grossly inaccurate and do not reflect the accident reports). Specifically, Wikipedia states regarding this particular mishap:
August 2006, Indiana: parachute deployed three miles from departure end of runway, aircraft landed in retention pond, parachute was deployed by a passenger because the pilot had fainted, pilot fatality, 3 passengers injured
The pilot improperly loaded the airplane, stalled, and spun the airplane. The pilot had no idea what was wrong, but was unable to control the airplane. The pilot reported engine trouble when there was none. The actual CG was within limits, although the baggage compartment limits were well exceeded, as was the aircraft gross weight. The aircraft was a flyable airplane...it didn't cease to be flyable until the pilot lost control, and it was no longer flyable when the parachute was deployed, destroying any possibility of landing the aircraft...a perfectly flyable, intact airplane which, while overgross and improperly loaded, was within the aerodynamic CG.
The pilot, while having over 2,500 hours total time, had only 31 hours of actual experience. While total time is often taken to be significant, the duration over which that time is spread is more significant. A man with 31 hours of instrument time in the last week, for example, is likely to be far more proficient than a man with 31 hours of instrument time spread over the past 31 years.
The Wikipedia article states that the parachute was deployed because the pilot fainted, which was NOT the case. The pilot requested his son in law to deploy the parachute, and did not faint. It's important to note that the pilot didn't lose capacity to fly, and the airplane wasn't unflyable; he flew it to four thousand feet under control. Furthermore, a test airplane was loaded identially and flown to determine it's in-flight characteristics, and it flew acceptably. Bottom line is that it was a flyable, controllable airplane which was mismanaged and ultimately became a non-flyable airplane with the introduction of the parachute deployment.
In fact, the report specifically states:
Furthermore, the study indicated that the extra 300 pounds over the certified maximum takeoff weight reduced the available rate-of-climb at 4,000 feet by about 260 ft/min. Consequently, the combination of the excess weight, uncoordinated flight, and use of the air conditioner reduced the available rate-of-climb by about 500 ft/min from the numbers published in the POH. Nonetheless, the airplane still had adequate climb performance, and even at the accident flight conditions should have been able to maintain a steady-state rate-of-climb of about 900 ft/min at 4,000 feet and 105 KIAS. Reducing the airspeed below the best rate-of-climb speed put the airplane "behind the power curve", decreasing the rate-of-climb further to about 500 ft/min, the rate-of-climb present when the airplane stalled.
Unwise, inexperienced pilot flies airplane beyond his and the airplane's capability (was he enticed by the prospect of a free save with the panic button?), deploys the panic button, and is killed by the blunt force trauma resulting from a steep, 70 degree nose down impact under canopy. The chief mechanism of injury...the steep nose down impact, wrought on by a canopy system that didn't function properly and level the airplane to a safer 10 degree nose down status, prior to impact...deploying the parachute from a botched and improperly conducted flight sealed his own fate.
Ouch! Beyond his capabilities? The pilot is a retired university professor with thousands of hours of flight instruction, including aerobatic instruction, has been instructing in Cirrus airplanes since 2001, and is alive! He is one of my instructors, and I have interviewed him extensively for a safety issue of the Cirrus Pilot magazine (sent to all members of the Cirrus Owners and Pilots Association).
He and his wife confirm that they were flying in clear air. You claim he could have simply avoided the thunderstorms and flown to a landing. But he experienced the airplane doing something to him that placed him upside down, spiraling down into the cloud layer below, entering IMC without a horizon or reliable instruments to recover from that unusual attitude.
Yes, there were convective thunderstorms miles away. But the area where they had this incident was actively searched by other pilots sent there by ATC to try to locate the airplane. No thunderstorms in the vincinity at the time of the incident.
Yes, beyond his capabilities...he lost control, after all. He experienced "the airplane doing something to him?" Yes, he certainly did...the airplane flying him, instead of him flying the airplane. This is bad.
The recollections of the pilot aren't necessarily relevant. The previous incident in Indiana, in which the aircraft was stalled, was researched, thoroughly tested and a finding made that the 93 decibel stall warning was going off for over a minute! Never the less, the eye-whitnesses, the ones who were there, didn't recall ever even hearing it...those on scene often do the worst job of recalling, and recall incorrectly for a number of reasons. From the record, we do have the following regarding the California incident:
A Convective SIGMET (49W) was issued at 1555, and was valid at the time of the accident. It indicated a severe line of thunderstorms 30 miles wide moving from 300 degrees at 15 knots, with tops to 27,000 feet. The SIGMET also noted the possibility of 1-inch hail and wind gusts up to 50 knots.
The "professor" might or might not be aware, but these aren't considered good conditions in which to be undertaking flight in a light airplane. A full test of the aircraft systems, instruments, and autopilot revealed NO PROBLEMS...fully functional. A ghost problem that couldn't be found or duplicated...or a pilot who lost control? Yes, it was beyond his capabilities, else he wouldn't have lost control.
The official report...
During climbing flight at 16,000 feet, the single engine airplane encountered the outer boundaries of severe convective weather; the airplane departed controlled flight, the pilot deployed the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS), and the airplane was substantially damaged during the parachute landing in a walnut grove. The pilot did receive a standard weather briefing, checked radar, and satellite imagery prior to departing on the 600-mile cross-country flight. Throughout the flight the pilot recognized cloud build-ups and steered west to avoid the weather. About an hour into the flight he climbed from 13,500 to 16,000 in an attempt to stay clear of clouds; the autopilot was in heading mode and the vertical speed knob was set to maintain 100 knot climb. About this time radar depicted the airplane descending 1,100 feet in 23 seconds then climbing 1,300 feet in 14 seconds. The pilot heard a "whirring" noise in his headset, prompting him to disconnect the autopilot. The nose pitched up and the left wing dropped. It was at this time that the pilot transmitted that he was out of control and he deployed the CAPS. The airplane then descended by parachute to a landing in a walnut orchard. The radar track of the airplane combined with the weather surveillance radar imagery depicted the airplane encountering a level 5 (intense) area of convective activity moments prior to the final descent (CAPS deployment). Radar derived cloud tops indicated that the tops of the thunderstorms in the accident area were between 15,000 and 20,000 feet. Convective SIGMETs 44W and 47W, had been issued during the hour before departure, and warned of thunderstorms in the vicinity of the pilots' planned route of flight. SIGMET 49W, which covered the area in which the airplane was flying, was issued approximately 10 minutes prior to the airplane departing controlled flight. Examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of a preimpact malfunction or failure of the control system, autopilot, or power plant.
And the final statement:
AIRCRAFT 1 CAUSE REPORT
The pilot's decision to continue flight into adverse weather and the subsequent encounter with the outer boundaries of a level 5 thunderstorm, which resulted in his loss of control of the airplane.
Readers may reference the report and view for themselves:
https://extranet.nasdac.faa.gov/pls/...ALSE&NARR_VAR=
You may call this an overzealous investigator, but this wasn't a cursory investigation, and there's more data to be had than that of the pilot's own statements. He asserts he was well clear of weather, no weather nearby, as you say, and as others suggest when they came looking for him (weather
moves, of course), but radar tracks and tapes show otherwise. Furthermore, if there was no weather around him...why did he deploy the parachute when he found he was about to enter "a cloud layer?" One can't have it both ways...his own admission that he was about to enter the clouds, the fact that radar placed both him, and his airplane, and the weather occupying the same space...bears out the fact that he was where he shouldn't have been.
That trinkets on board weren't damaged is really quite irrelevant. Every bit as much as one wouldn't walk down the street with cavalier abandon, point a gun at someone's head, pull the trigger, and then when it fails to go off, state "
it's okay. It apparently wasn't loaded." Simply because nobody got hurt, you see, doesn't make it okay, and no, the ends do not justify the means. A series of bad decisions took place culminating with the pilot losing control of his airplane and resorting to the panic button...in an intact airplane perfectly capable of being flown.
Furthermore, this individual claims over two thousand hours of flight time and a thousand of that as instrument time. Even professional instrument pilots (myself included) average approximately 10% instrument time out of our total flying time...but this guy has nearly half of his on instruments. Admirable for him one might suppose, but what that tells me is that his time is more than likely falsified. I've even flown weather research, in which it's all instrument, and it's all intentionally flown inside thunderstorms...and I wouldn't lay claim to having such a large percentage of my own experience as instrument.
As most of his claims appear rather dubious, what we see is an older gentleman who's veracity is in question who simply flew beyond his capabilities, exercised very poor judgement, and ultimately lost control...and was very lucky that he didn't kill himself, his passenger, or anyone on the ground in the process.