Sometimes you could see daylight when inflated.

Probably dumb question, will there be any attempt to raise it?

Or dive it?

The FDR and CVR must surely be on the top of the list.

Sorry to burst your bubble Tempo, but as a person that lives here on Norfolk Island who watched all 3 missed approaches and listened to all the coms, and pretty well everything else, most people are right on the money with what has happened.

How about a bit more of a plug for the real hero's, being the Norfolk people who risked their lives by putting a fishing boat in the water a night with crap wx. Lucky for local knowledge! Just imagine if the pilot did communicate earlier knowing the circumstances and ask for a bit of "local" knowledge from some of seasoned aviators on island, he might have got in through the gap on 04.

Very serious
 

Below is direct from CAO...

remote island

Civil Aviation Order 82.0

5
(b) the minimum amount of fuel that would, if the failure of an engine or a
loss of pressurisation were to occur during the flight, enable the
aeroplane:
(i) to fly to its destination aerodrome or to its alternate aerodrome for the
flight; and
(ii) to fly for 15 minutes at holding speed at 1 500 feet above that
aerodrome under standard temperature conditions; and

(iii) to land at that aerodrome.

I doubt if there was a dispensation approval, but one never knows about "mates rates".

Well it's almost certain especially as he was working for Pelair, the worst payers in Australian GA!

Metro FOs elsewhere earn more than a Pelair skipper, I'd hate to see what a Westwind wage would be :=

Ladies and Gents,


3A Conditions for passenger-carrying charter operations to remote
Islands

3A.1

Each certificate authorising charter operations for the carriage of passengers is
subject to the condition that an aeroplane operated under the certificate is to
carry passengers on a flight to a remote island only if:

(a) the aeroplane has more than 1 engine; and

(b) the total amount of fuel carried by the aeroplane at the start of the flight is
not less than the minimum safe fuel for the aeroplane for that flight; and

(c) the alternate aerodrome for the aeroplane for that flight is not an aerodrome located on a remote island.

Has anyone missed something here (hint: read the title)


OK if you missed it the key words are passenger-carrying charter operations


This flight was a medivac or air ambulance, therefore Aerial Work.
Check the CASA website for Pel-Air AOC and you will find that they are approved for Aerial Work- Ambulance Functions- ISRAEL 1124 1124A.


CAO 82 simply does not apply here, with regard to remote islands


Like Keg and others have said, get off of their case, they and their pax are alive, and looks like Capt James and F/O Culpit did an amazing job.

Let the investigation run its proper course. If the crew Pel-Air or CASA or others are subsequently found culpable, then let due process follow, but

It is insulting that those without facts, just hype, media spin, bar room speculation and “knows someone who knows someone” can have such positive conclusions as to what definitely caused this accident.

BTW if you are “knows someone who knows someone” you have a duty to be discussing it with either CASA or ATSB, certainly not here

If the Charter rule does not apply as it was an Aerialwork operation, then I expect CASA might do what they did for the said departure without lights at LST - operating in a reckless manner or somesuch! just have to wait and see I guess. (the LST case goes back to court later this month - what is that 6 or so years after the event!!) The system (what system?) is beyond help.

Marauder, how much simpler aviation would be if we could just selectively use the bits of legislation and regulations that suit us on the day. You simply cannot read only bits of CAO 82 but in its entirety. You will find that the paragraph you've selected is complementary to the rest of the Order. The heading for paragraph 2.3 is: "The minimum safe fuel for an aeroplane undertaking a flight to a remote island is:" Don't see that it differentiates between types of operations but is all encompassing. Anyway, by your own words, it was an aerial work operation and therefore the charter paragraph you selected effectively invalidates your own argument .

CAO 82 most DEFINITELY applies.


As to RAMROD's comment and also that of Norfolk Hawk - a bit of communication from the aircraft as to their plight might have resulted in the suggestion they ditch closer to the harbour and in an area where boats were waiting (or at least could get to quickly) rather than in an area unknown to potential searchers and rescuers who found them mainly because of luck which overcame the inadequate planning.

Maurader
Think you may be wrong there in your statement.

CAO 82 applies to Air Operators’ Certificates authorising aerial work operations, charter operations and regular public transport operations and sets out conditions to which such certificates are subject for the purposes of paragraph 28BA (1) (b) of the Act.

AND then

2.4 For the purposes of subparagraph 2.3 (b), the amounts of fuel are:

(a) the minimum amount of fuel that will, whatever the weather conditions, enable the aeroplane to fly, with all its engines operating, to the remote island and then from the remote island to the aerodrome that is, for that flight, the alternate aerodrome for the aircraft, together with any reserve fuel requirements for the aircraft;

and etc etc

Your 3A is just a further restriction to that above which applies to pax carrying CHT operations, that being the alternate cant be another remote island and cant be a single engine aircraft.

So it appears that you still need a alternate even for AWK travel to a remote island.

edit (Zanzibar, you beat me by mere minutes)

Marauder, I'll take your word for it at the moment, but beg to differ. Please explain why CAO 82.0.2.3 does not apply, as far as I can see it applies to aerial work, charter and RPT. This part defines what is regarded as "minimum safe fuel", where as 3A.1 elaborates a little further by directing that charter must have more than one engine and the alternate may not itself be a remote island. It directs that the flight may "not carry less than the minimum safe fuel".

As said before, the "minimum safe fuel" is determined by 82.0.2.3. Stand to be corrected.

Edit and I'm dragging the chain in response.

Thanks Brian, but i think the genie is out of the bottle.

Regarding selective use of regs, of course you can, CASA have been doing for years.

Sorry guys slight thread drift but...

Does anyone have the legal definition of a "Remote Island" ? (obviously the ones stated in CAO 82, but how is it defined) Very relevant when it comes to looking at alternates out there. (IE why is Noumea etc not remote and able to be used as an alternate?).

SRU

I don't think you would be able to second guess the CAO Interpretation. I would say the reason the three islands are named in the CAO is to rule out any confusion on the definition of "remote island"

Marauder, according to your public profile, "Location:ere today, gone tommorrow
Occupation:Redneck" ;does not indicate if you are a pilot. If you are in fact a pilot, would you operate a flight to a remote island without an alternate with sufficient fuel?:confused:

Brian, here is the guts of it, but I am as guilty as those I am accusing, selective posting and quoting ( to save bandwidth and sore fingers), but read and re read the whole lot and you will find that it applies to pax charter only, not legitimate Aerial Work

3A Conditions for passenger-carrying charter operations to remote
islands. etc etc etc

Yeh its a loophole, but at the end of the day, it is all that counts

Marauder,

You are right about 3A not applying to AWK operations but you seem to conveniently not apply 2.4 which does.

Both 2.4 ad 3A require an alternate for remote island operations (unless there is a approved ops manual that provides differently).

Sorry, cant see your loophole at all.

It's interesting sitting here watching everyone giving there expert opinions with the benefit of hindsight and without the operational pressures the crew were under at the time.

Regardless of what we may think or how we think we may have done things different from an operational and planning point of view, I think Dom deserves some praise and credit for making what has to be one of the most difficult command decisions any aircraft would ever want to have to make.

I wonder how many of you, put in the same situation, would have had the courage to make the ultimate command decision and ditch the aircraft.

I think there would be some of you who would have continued the approach below minimas and tried to land (with probably disastrous results), and probably a similar number of you who would have flown the aircraft until it simply ran out of fuel, because you wouldn't have had the courage to make the command decision that this crew did.


Should we not be learning and reflecting more on Command Decision making (more so, some of our own) as opposed to critizising the crew.

mattgitau
I can see that you are a supporter of the pilot in question, and that is not necessarily a bad thing, however, whilst you say the pilot made a difficult command decision, why didnt he make the decision to warn the passengers of an impending ditching.I would have thought that it would be the minimum that should occur if the ditching was planned.

mattgitau

How about you go and practice your goal kicking instead of sitting on pprune...that one you missed against Scotland was an absolute shocker!

(sorry for the thread drift!)

Where is the command decision in a ditching due to fuel exhaustion? The only decision is to attempt to land on land or water, that is life preservation not command decision making.

The last command decision was to carry out a missed approach and not divert or proceed beyond a PNR in qustionable wx conditions.

VH-NGA= Norfolk Go Around........
Hope the pax in the back can get over this one. Out there delivering a service second to none putting there lives in the hande of the guys and girls in the pointy end. Learn from it and move on...:ok:

I think he saw the fame 'ole Sully received and thought he would have a go himself...

On a more serious note however this is not an example of a hero, but rather and example of 'poor aimanship' IMO and should be used and treated as an example of such.

Because the correct decisions WEREN'T made earlier...the last action wasn't a decision...It was inevitable. Just a matter of time.

In any case,the facts indicate that the "water landing" was inadvertent anyway.

Zeebee,

And what 'facts' are you referring to? Those reported on Today Tonight or ACA? Or those from Pprune or Crickey??

You seem to know the facts so why dont you share them.

1. Three people ended up in the water without life jackets
2. The Airport Manager who launched to rescue them stated that he didn't know when the aircraft hit the water, or where it was when he launched the boat to find them (first hand radio interview)
3. The husband in the back stated that there was no advanced warning of the aircraft hitting the water. (First hand radio interview)
4. No Mayday was either received or acknowledged (multiple sources).

:hmm:

If there was any "decision" to ditch, and it wasn't just a case of striking the water while low and slow, stooging around looking for a hole in the weather, it was the worst "planned" ditching in history! :hmm:

Sounds like the airport Manager was the real hero out of all of this! Where was the FO when all these bad decisions where being made...

I'm not an atorney but wouldn't section 2 of CAO 82.0 simply set out the 'interpretation' in so far as the CAO is concerned - a little like definitions and therefore only regulatory when applied to conditions. After all it does specify 'Interpretation" in the heading. The conditions for Charter are as stated under 3A headed "Conditions for passenger ...". There is a gulf between the term 'interpretation' and 'condition' in my opinion.

Obviously RPT would be specified in a more formal and specific document appended to the AOC or your operations manual. Same may be applicable to airwork, also referenced to the operations manual.

I would imagine that any regulator would cover his butt by requiring a charter operator to also deal with fuel issues under the operations manual but rely on 3A as a safety net pending operational surveillance and development of such manual.

Surely the operator and the managing or chief pilot would have an obligation to oversee any such operation and perhaps intervene if the mission is running outside the gambit of probability.

Little bit premature to hang the crew without fully considering the procedures they were attempting to comply with. You guys are hip shooters.

Two things,

1. They did a good job of ditching at the end ( intentional or not : all survived)

2. How did they get into that situation?

In today's "regulated sterile environment How does one learn? " Airman ship is a change in attitude brought about by Experience" .

Unfortunately the system now caters for the lowest common denominator. and as such "learning" or thinking outside the "box" is discouraged.

What ever happened to common sense and self preservation.

Norfolk Hawk Can you shed some light on how events unfolded that night? I've heard reference to 3 approaches, but I've also seen a mention of 6 - can you confirm? Were comms difficult that night?

No doubt about it, putting the SAR boat through 3m waves through the gap in the reef is no mean feet in itself and should be recognised. As always though, it's the humble volunteers that save the day who go unrecognised by the media.

Get Real People - accidents are not accidental!!
 

The Westwind 1124A is a 2200nm aircraft. It ditched after a 1440nm sector................why..............well I can assure you the good people at ATSB will get to to the bottom of this one (if they are properly funded)

Why did this happen to this jet and never before to other aircraft going to Norfolk Island or Christmas Island or Cocos Island or for matter of fact any other bloody place on the planet!!!!!

Globally, EMS aircraft, both FW and RW are experiencing many tragic accidents..........WHY?????

Was this a classic CFIT, was this poor judgement and decision making by the crew or was this poor safety oversight by the company or was this faulty weather reporting.......... or all the the above??

There is no such thing as an "accident"

Let us encourage the Federal Government to fund the investigation properly and eventually read a report that will educate people in the aviation industry and even others.

No proper investigation results in no proper findings!!!

We all know that accidents....expose huge deficiencies in what was considered a perfectly normal operation. Thats what the investigators are there for.................

Everybody, including the crew should be thankfull that all survived.

let the TRUTH prevail

mattgitau - Aren't you missing the point here? The guy PUT himself, his aircraft and his pax, IN this position of needing to ditch, because of poor planning and a gung-ho atttitude. He never had a mechanical failure, the aircraft was airworthy at all times, as I understand, until the minute it hit the water.
IMO, he looks like Tom Cruise, and he thought he was playing Tom Cruise - but with pax aboard.
He's a BOLD pilot - and bold pilots make good fighter pilots, but don't often make good civvy pilots. His responsibility as a civvy pilot with pax, at all times, is to ensure that he takes no risks. He took a risk and lost. Luckily, it was only a jet he lost; next time, it might be a jet + pax.

There are two ways for them to "all survive" :

1. A good ditching
2. being very lucky.

:rolleyes:

Checkboard,

Agree, but what can we LEARN from this ? God forbid it happening to us, what then?

:confused:

PS not talking about the act of ditching. r m p past point 2:cool:

A good ditching does always have an element of luck doesn't it? The fact that they all are alive is a great thing and the Cpt has obviously done a great job getting the aircraft on the water in one piece. The odds were significantly stacked against him. Night, poor wx, significant swell, maybe aircraft type too.

However lets hope at the end of this enquiry that the fuel regulations especially with regard to remote island opeartions are made far clearer!
Instigation of proper ditching training, not the fluffy box ticking crap that gets passed as training.

Great work to the locals who responded quickly at fetched them from the sea!!

I too have flown the Westwind, and done the leg from Apia to Norfolk, I have also done Apia to Noumea when the weather was bad.

The way I look at it weather the ditching was well done or good luck it is irrelevant, its like judging an entire flight on the landing.

lets look at the decision making.

1. choice of aerodrome - - on a day with alternate requirements on YSNF, and none on NWWW why use YSNF which has a VOR, and NDB or RNAV which none of the westwind crews are trained for (unless things have changed), instead of NWWW which has an ILS, VOR, NDB and no alternate requirements for the sake of an extra 100nm (not to mention air traffic control services and closer alternates)

2. Fuel - - I have seen on here reports of not taking full fuel, and have heard the same rumors from some friends linked to this. Why would you not take full fuel? we always used full fuel for flights in the pacific unless there was an operational reason not to.

3. Pre-flight briefing - - once again I have seen on here a report the CREW departed without weather or notams, and have heard from my friends they had difficulty getting weather and notams, no one can confirm whether they did or didnt have it but there is doubt over whether they had it, if this is true, Poor Command decision making, and lets not forget the FO who keeps being left out of this, They are a crew she should have also ensured they had everything before departing (this point may not be relevant if they did get weather and notams, being Apia he had better have signed for it or there is no record and ATSB will probably assume he didn't have it, and the met guys in Apia will say no signature he didn't get it to keep the spot light off them)

4. Situational Awareness during the flight - - The CREW either didnt get Metars on the way to YSNF, or didn't act on them - Why would any captain continue to a remote airfield that is showing metars with OVC cloud below the lowest Approach minimum if they knew they wouldnt have the fuel to miss out and divert?

5. As you go charts - - as mentioned by an earlier post pelair us to have as you go graphs which we always ran for flights in the pacific, or to other destinations with PNR, CP's and PSD's - - obviously one of these wasnt being done or the CREW would have noticed that the winds were stronger than forecast (as is being reported in the media now) and would have know a good estimate of how much fuel they would have on arrival as opposed to how much they needed, and would have given a good idea for a diversion.
( I have been in the same situation where winds have been substantially stronger than forecast and I diverted instead of swimming, and the weather wasnt below approach minimum, only alternate min but I still diverted to my alternate, but then again I am not a hero either)

6. the most worrying part of all, the ditching -- -- -- How the hell do you ditch an aircraft on purpose without first MAKING A MAYDAY CALL so search and rescue are launched before you hit the water, briefing the passengers, preparing the cabin (ie securing loose objects, fastening seatbelts for an impact and ensuring the rafts are in a position that is secure and will allow easy deployment) ensuring the passengers are wearing life jackets and know how and when to inflate them.

As with most people I am hearing all this info second hand but if any of the above points are true, I would not want to get in an aircraft with either of these pilots in control.

I am glad I am not a hero, I prefer being a Captain, or even a Crew member for that matter.

Luck???? Depends on the pilots skill and experience. If these are sadly lacking, then yes, luck plays a big part.
I would have thought that a Westwind fuselage would probably be the best one could have for ditching. I mean to say there is just a fairly round and smooth single hull to put onto the water. It is not impaired by, wings, engines, undercarriage. To me it would be the (near) perfect platform to conduct a "water landing".

YSNF Approaches
 

VH-NGA did 3 approaches to YSNF last Wednesday night.
2 x 11 VOR/DME approaches each followed by a Missed Approach,
then a 29 VOR/DME approach followed by a Missed Approach
After that nothing further was heard - No Mayday, No Pan.

Local news articles can be found at Norfolk Online

Can someone with some time on Westwinds so some sums for me?

Would it be safe to assume, that the aircraft had divert capability (to Noumea?) at or around TOPD, if not a bit later?

How much fuel would that involve? (I'd be guessing, a quite substantial amount, as in a couple of hours endurance?)

Would three approaches and misssed approaches burn that much fuel and his final fixed reserve? (I'd be guessing - no.)

So how much fuel would you be guessing was still in the tanks when the captain decided (that's IF he decided!!!) to put it down in the water?

Can anyone tell me what time passsed between the third missed approach and the time the aircraft alighted on the water?




If the information beginning to come to light now is accurate, (no pre-ditching briefing for the pax, life jackets not worn, no Mayday call or even a request for the boat to launch etc), I'd be guessing that we're looking at a very, VERY lucky outcome to what might have been an unmitigated disaster, and, amazing as it might seem to some, that the ditching might have been almost as much of a surprise to the pilots as it was to the passengers!!!

What did someone say earlier in the thread? Something along the lines that it's uncanny how often when the media hails a pilot as a hero immediately after the event, the final report brings out something very, very different?

For everyone's sake, I hope I'm really, really wrong in harbouring these suspicions.