Hi Triadic,

Lot's of METARs and SPECIs earlier in the thread but unless I'm losing it completely (which is possible), I can't see any TAFs.

UTR.

You guys are all just jealous because the pilot was formerly Cleo batchelor of the year :)

Ha i thought it was every pilots dream to be Cleo batchelor of the year :}:D

Ah XXX, no he wasn't.

He was/is in the Top 50 finalists. If you hang around the right bars with the right people you'd probably get a look in too.

Why would you declare a mercy flight and plan to YSNF when you have NWWW 400nm away, and in the scheme of things bugger all out of the way for a flight to Melbourne. why not just plan via there where you have alternates close by in the first place?

If pelair stopped going there due to failing ramp checks as someone has said in an earlier post, maybe they should have fixed the things they were getting pinged on instead of not using NWWW (if it is true that is) and if it was fuel policies they were getting in trouble for then maybe NWWW had the right idea getting up them!

I know nothing about them not using NWWW for this purpose other than what I have read in here, and just for info.

It will be interesting to see what comes out of the CVR if they find them and recover them.

Swiss cheese effect at play here.

WW24 Ditching Checklist:

-Trim for best glide?

-Gear up?

-Awesome photo ready to send to the news?


http://www.abc.net.au/reslib/200911/r472603_2370875.jpg

Capt. K, yes I do realise it was at night.
I should have added that a 'dropping low then popping up' attempt was maybe because the Captain was resigned to the fact that he couldn't get in, couldn't go anywhere else, and this was his only other option prior to ditching.

Like I said in my earlier post, a bit speculative but the no mayday, few lifejackets and no raft thing gets the cogs working.


tio540, what are WW1142's, are they the Pel Westwinds???
Wonder if the people pulled from the water would be getting back onto one of those things? Plenty out there say "I'm not flying with them again" in relation to other operators for much more trivial reasons!

And they were not the least bit interesting.....:E


"I call it feeding the chooks."

RAMROD2:
"I agree aussie027. It was not "normal circumstances"

Another "pilot" prepared to bust the MDA??????:ugh:

There are NO CIRCUMSTANCES, in any civilian flying opsor non-tactical military operationsworth busting the MDA or DA for.

These are not the "old and bold" days of the past when "herioc" pilots died regularly testing the system to see what worked and what didn't.

The tested and proven system is in place and PROHIBITS flight below the MDA/DA, etc in IMC, at all times..... for good reason.

Some parts of the aviation system will need updating as time passes but the proof about the dangers involved with IFR flight below the MDA is proven.

Operated to NLK out of LHI for many years in turbo props. two occasions spring to mind when heading out there. Both times, divert times to noumea and LHI were within minutes of each other. Ended up holding off the island past the noumea time and comfortably headed back to LHI. We only got to NLK on these occasions because loads were light and we could carry the fuel. Otherwise PNR return. Some times we wouldn't even bother leaving LHI.

Approaches are useless out there as the problem is fog and you could quite reasonably sit in a hold just off the island on a beautiful blue sky day staring at a mound of white fluffy stuff completely covering it. waiting for a hole or your divert time.

Often our PNR would be just short of the island and we could asses the conditions visually usually prior to top of drop, aswell as having the friendly ATO guy talking to us on the way in.

Bare in mind, alternate fuel was not always required, only in the past 10 years or so.

Would often hear the AN F28s and ANZ 737s turning back at there PNRs.

The weather at NLK can change very quickly and anyone with any experience out there can see it coming well in advance from trends on the actual reports.

I think the question of why this aircraft ended up in the water is a valid one.

The other question? Will this affect PAs current and near future Aero Med contracts?

I disagree. I believe you can go below the minima (MDA, DA/DH) in IMC during an emergency. :ok:

Tiger35

What a useless comment !

Anyone who's flown IFR for more than ten minutes understands what you're saying and MUST plan to never have to do it....but in this case the pilot painted himself into a corner.
What was he going to do ????? Stay up there ????

Do you have some marvelous tool to keep a Westwind in the air sans fuel ??

If you were in his position, what would you have done ??

Please don't say you wouldn't be in that position, because that's not what it's about, we assume that as a responsible IFR pilot you wouldn't be.

I think more than anything lots of us just have lots of questions ! Another thing with NLK is because the coastline is so rugged barely any boats are left in the water and have to be launched.(especially most ocean capable one anyway) By the sounds of it wasn't even discussed with the manager?

Again surely ditching procedures would have made everyone pop on a vest before impact, and where was the raft ?

One would hope that both the crew and pel-air had read and used all of these recommendations which date back 9 or so years ago now, I remember being told about reading of the mistakes of others to learn from the mistakes of others because you won't live long enough to make them all yourself.

Another thing mentioned in the past was that Auckland was always a prefered diversion port rather than Noumea due to higher landing fees or costs, that along with Pel-airs rumoured problems with authorites there may have influenced decisions.

RECOMMENDATION : R20000040

SUBJECT - RELIABILITY OF NORFOLK ISLAND FORECASTS

SAFETY DEFICIENCY

The meteorological forecasts for Norfolk Island are not sufficiently reliable on some occasions to prevent pilots having to carry out unplanned diversions or holding.

FACTUAL INFORMATION

Related Occurrences

During the period 1 January 1998 to 31 March 1999, occurrences involving unforecast or rapidly changing conditions at Norfolk Island reported to the Bureau included the following:


199801482

A British Aerospace 146 (BAe146) aircraft was conducting a regular public transport (RPT) passenger service from Sydney to Norfolk Island. The terminal area forecast (TAF) for Norfolk Island indicated that cloud cover would be 3 octas with a cloud base of 2,000 ft. Approaching Norfolk Island, the crew found that the area was completely overcast. After conducting an instrument approach, they determined that the cloud base was 600 ft, which was less than the alternate minima. Fuel for diversion to an alternate airfield was not carried on the flight because the forecast had not indicated any requirement.


199802796

Before a Piper Navajo Chieftain aircraft departed for an RPT passenger service from Lord Howe Island to Norfolk Island, the TAF for Norfolk Island did not require the carriage of additional fuel for holding or for diversion to an alternate airfield. Subsequently, the TAF was amended to require 30 minutes holding and then 60 minutes of holding. The pilot later advised that he became aware of the deteriorating weather at his destination only after he had passed the planned point of no return (PNR). However, the aircraft was carrying sufficient fuel to allow it to hold at Norfolk Island for 60 minutes. When the aircraft arrived in the Norfolk Island circuit area, the pilot assessed the conditions as unsuitable to land due to low cloud and rainshowers. After approximately 45 minutes of holding, the weather conditions improved sufficiently for the pilot to make a visual approach and landing.


199804317

A BAe146 aircraft was conducting an RPT passenger service from Brisbane to Norfolk Island. When the crew were planning the flight, the Norfolk Island TAF included a steady wind of 10 kt and thunderstorm conditions for periods of up to 60 minutes. Approximately 30 minutes after the aircraft departed, the TAF was amended to indicate a mean wind speed of 20 kt with gusts to 35 kt. As the aircraft approached its destination, the Unicom operator reported the wind as 36 kt with gusts to 45 kt. The crew attempted two approaches to runway 04 but conducted a go-around on each occasion because of mechanical turbulence and windshear. The pilot in command then elected to divert the aircraft to Auckland. The wind gusts at Norfolk Island did not decrease below 20 kt for a further 3 hours.


199900604

While flight planning for an RPT passenger service from Lord Howe Island to Norfolk Island, the pilot of a Piper Navajo Chieftain found that the TAF required the carriage of fuel sufficient for a diversion to an alternate aerodrome. As the aircraft was unable to carry sufficient fuel for the flight to Norfolk Island and then to an alternate aerodrome, the flight was postponed. Later in the day, the forecast was amended to require the carriage of 60 minutes of holding fuel and the flight departed carrying the additional fuel. Approximately 20 minutes after the aircraft departed Lord Howe Island and more than one hour before it reached its point of no return (PNR), the TAF was amended again to require the carriage of alternate fuel. The pilot did not request or receive this amended forecast and so continued the flight.

Following the flight's arrival overhead Norfolk Island, the pilot conducted a number of instrument approaches but was unable to land the aircraft due to the poor visibility. After being advised of further deteriorations in conditions, the pilot made an approach below the landing minima and landed in foggy conditions with a visibility of 800m. Subsequent investigation determined that the actual conditions at Norfolk Island were continuously below alternate minima for the period from 2.5 hours before the aircraft departed from Lord Howe Island until 6 hours after the aircraft landed.


Meteorological information

The Norfolk Island Meteorological Observing Office, which is staffed by four observers, normally operates every day from 0400 until 2400 Norfolk Island time. When one or more observers are on leave, the hours are reduced to 0700 until 2400 daily. Hourly surface observations by the observers, or by an automatic weather station when the office is unmanned, are transmitted to the Sydney Forecasting Office where they are used as the basis for the production and amendment of TAFs and other forecasts.

Weather conditions are assessed by instrument measurements, for example, wind strength, temperature and rainfall, or by visual observation when observers are on duty, for example, cloud cover and visibility. There is no weather-watch radar to allow the detection and tracking of showers, thunderstorms and frontal systems in the vicinity of the island. The wind-finding radar on Norfolk Island is used to track weather balloons to determine upper level winds six-hourly when observers are on duty. It cannot detect thunderstorms or rainshowers.

Pilots in the Norfolk Island area can contact the Met Office staff on a discrete frequency for information about the current weather conditions.

The reliability of meteorological forecasts is a factor in determining the fuel requirements. As forecasts cannot be 100% reliable, some additional fuel must be carried to cover deviations from forecast conditions.

A delay of one hour or more can exist between a change occurring in the weather conditions and advice of that change reaching a pilot. The change has to be detected by the observer or automatic weather station and the information passed to the Forecasting Office. After some analysis of the new information in conjunction with information from other sources, the forecaster may decide to amend the forecast. The new forecast is then issued to Airservices Australia and disseminated to the Air Traffic Services (ATS) staff who are in radio contact with the pilot. It is then the pilot's responsibility to request the latest forecast from ATS.


Alternate minima

Alternate minima are a set of cloud base and visibility conditions which are published for each airfield that has a published instrument approach procedure. The alternate minima are based on the minimum descent altitude and minimum visibility of each of the available instrument approaches. When the forecast or actual conditions at an airfield decrease below the alternate minima, aircraft flying to that airfield must either carry fuel for flight to an alternate airfield or fuel to allow the aircraft to remain airborne until the weather improves sufficiently for a safe landing to be conducted.

A pilot flying an aircraft that arrives at a destination without alternate or holding fuel and then finds that the weather is below landing and alternate minima is potentially in a hazardous situation. The options available are:

1. to hold until the weather improves; however, the fuel may be exhausted before the conditions improve sufficiently to enable a safe landing to be made;

2. to ditch or force-land the aircraft away from the aerodrome in a area of improved weather conditions, if one exists; or

3. attempt to land in poor weather conditions.

All of these options have an unacceptable level of risk for public transport operations. (my bolding)


The alternate minima for Norfolk Island are:

1. cloud base at or above 1,069 ft above mean sea level (AMSL) and visibility greater than 4.4 km for category A and B aircraft; and

2. cloud base at or above 1,169 ft AMSL and visibility greater than 6 km for category C aircraft.

The available alternate aerodromes for Norfolk Island are La Tontouta in Noumea (431 NM to the north), Lord Howe Island (484 NM to the south-west) and Auckland NZ (690 NM to the south-east). Lord Howe Island may not be suitable for many aircraft due to its short runway. Flight from Norfolk Island to an alternate aerodrome requires a large amount of fuel, which may not be carried unless required by forecast conditions or by regulations.


Australian regulations

Prior to 1991, the then Civil Aviation Authority published specific requirements for flights to island destinations. For example, flights to Lord Howe Island were required to carry fuel for flight to an alternate aerodrome on the mainland Australia, and flights to Norfolk Island and Cocos Island, where no alternate aerodromes were available, were required to carry a minimum of 2 hours of holding fuel.

In 1991, Civil Aviation Regulation (CAR) 234 was enacted. This regulation provided that an aircraft would not commence a flight unless the pilot in command and the operator had taken reasonable steps to ensure that the aircraft was carrying sufficient fuel and oil to enable the proposed flight to be undertaken in safety. The regulation did not specify the method for determining what was sufficient fuel in any particular case. Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 234-1(0) dated March 1991, provided guidelines which set out one method that could be used to calculate fuel requirements that would satisfy CAR 234. CAAP 234-1 did not contain any special considerations or requirements when planning a flight to an island destination.

In August 1999, Civil Aviation Order 82.0 was amended to require all charter passenger-carrying flights to Norfolk Island and other remote islands to carry fuel for the flight to their destination and to an alternate aerodrome. The alternate aerodrome must not be located on a remote island. This requirement to carry additional fuel does not apply to regular public transport flights to a remote island.


European Joint Aviation Regulation

The European Joint Aviation Regulation (Operations) 8.1.7.2 states: "at the planning stage, not all factors which could have an influence on the fuel used to the destination aerodrome can be foreseen. Consequently, contingency fuel is carried to compensate for ... deviations from forecast meteorological conditions."


Traffic levels

In February 2000, approximately 11 regular public transport aircraft land at Norfolk Island every week, including Boeing 737 and Fokker F100 aircraft. An additional 20 instrument flight rules and 12 visual flight rules flights are made to the island every week by a variety of business and general aviation aircraft.


ANALYSIS

Reports to the Bureau, including those detailed in the factual information section above, indicate that the actual weather conditions at Norfolk Island have not been reliably forecast on a number of occasions. Current regulations do not require pilots of regular public transport aircraft to carry fuel reserves other than those dictated by the forecast weather conditions. The safety consequences of an unforecast deterioration in the weather at an isolated aerodrome like Norfolk Island may be serious.

The present level of reliability of meteorological forecasts and the current regulatory requirements are not providing an adequate level of safety for passenger-carrying services to Norfolk Island.


SAFETY ACTION

As a result of these occurrences, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority has commenced a project to review the fuel requirements for flights to remote islands.


Output Text: The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation) recommends that the Bureau of Meteorology should review the methods used and resources allocated to forecasting at Norfolk Island with a view to making the forecasts more reliable.


Response from: Bureau Of Meteorology
Date Received: 27 April 2000
Response Status: Closed - Accepted
Response Text: In response to your letter of 25 February 2000 relating to Air Safety Recommendation 20000040 and the reliability of meteorological forecasts for Norfolk Island, the Bureau of Meteorology has explored a number of possible ways to increase the reliability of forecasts for flights to the Island.

There are several factors which determine the accuracy and reliability of the forecasts. The first is the quality and timeliness of the baseline observational data from Norfolk Island itself. The second is the information base (including both conventional surface observational data and information from meteorological satellites and other sources) in the larger Eastern Australia-Southwest Pacific region. The third is the overall scientific capability of the Bureau's forecast models and systems and, in particular, their skill in forecasting the behaviour of the highly localised influences which can impact on conditions on Norfolk Island. And the fourth relates to the speed and responsiveness with which critical information on changing weather conditions (forecast or observed) can be conveyed to those who need it for immediate decision making.

As you are aware, the Bureau commits significant resources to maintaining its observing program at Norfolk Island. While the primary purpose of those observations is to support the overall large-scale monitoring and modelling of meteorological conditions in the Western Pacific, and the operation of the observing station is funded by the Bureau on that basis, it is staffed by highly trained observers with long experience in support of aviation. As far as is possible with available staff numbers, the observers are rostered to cover arrivals of regular flights and rosters are adjusted to cover the arrival of notified delayed flights.

The Norfolk Island Terminal Aerodrome Forecast (TAF) is produced by experienced professional meteorologists located in the Bureau's New South Wales Regional Forecasting Centre in Sydney. The terminal forecast provides predictions of wind, visibility, cloud amount and base height and weather routinely every six hours. Weather conditions are continuously monitored and the terminal forecast is amended as necessary in line with air safety requirements. The forecasters have full access to all the Bureau's synoptic meteorological data for the region and guidance material from both Australian and overseas prediction models. As part of the forecasting process, they continuously monitor all available information from the region including the observational data from Norfolk Island itself. When consideration of the latest observational data in the context of the overall meteorological situations suggests the need to modify the terminal forecast, amendments are issued as quickly as possible.

Despite the best efforts of the Bureau's observing and forecasting staff, it is clear that it is not always possible to get vital information to the right place as quickly as it is needed and the inherent scientific complexity of weather forecasting means that occasional serious forecast errors will continue to be unavoidable. That said, the Bureau has carefully reviewed the Norfolk Island situation in order to find ways of improving the accuracy and reliability of its forecasts for aviation through a range of short and longer-term means.

As part of its strategic research effort in forecast improvement, the Bureau of Meteorology Research Centre is undertaking a number of projects aimed at increasing scientific knowledge specifically applied to the provision of aviation weather services. Research projects are focussed on the detection and prediction of fog and low cloud and are based on extensive research into the science of numerical weather prediction. However, with the current level of scientific knowledge, the terminal forecasts for Norfolk Island cannot be expected to be reliable 100 percent of the time. Based on figures available for the period January 1998 to March 2000 (some 12 000 forecast hours), the Bureau's TAF verification system shows that for category A and B aircraft when conditions were forecast to be above the minima, the probability of encountering adverse weather conditions at Norfolk Island airport was 0.6%.

As part of its investigations, the Bureau has considered the installation of a weather watch radar facility at Norfolk Island with remote access in the NSW Regional Forecast Centre. Although routine radar coverage would enable the early detection of precipitation in the vicinity of the Island, investigations suggest that the impact of the radar images in improving forecast accuracy would be on the time-scale of one to two hours. This time frame is outside the point of no return for current aircraft servicing the route. It was concluded that the installation of a weather watch radar would be relatively expensive and would only partially address the forecast deficiencies identified in Air Safety Recommendation R20000040. The Bureau will however keep this option under review.

To increase the responsiveness of the terminal forecasts to changes in conditions at Norfolk Island, the Bureau has issued instructions to observing staff to ensure forecasters at the Sydney RFC are notified directly by telephone of any discrepancies between the current forecast and actual conditions. This arrangement will increase the responsiveness of the system particularly during periods of fluctuating conditions. In addition the Bureau has provided the aerodrome manager with access to a display of the latest observations to ensure the most up to date information is relayed to aircraft.

The Bureau is actively participating in the review of fuel requirements for flights to remote islands being undertaken by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.

I regret the delay in replying to your letter but the Bureau has felt it important to look carefully at all aspects of the Norfolk Island forecast situation and consider the full range of possibilities for forecast improvement within the resources available to us. We will continue to work on forecast improvement for Norfolk Island as resources permit.

There is a lot of talk of mercy flights on here, a Mercy flight ( I am fairly sure ) does not allow you to launch to a destination without enough fuel, this ould have to come under the heading of " wreckless " :ok:

A very good point also, how " critically ill " was the patient, since they were able to bob up and down in ther ocean for over an hour and still survive ?

All those who think this guy " done good ", is a " hero " etc, could you please let me know who you fly for, I want to make sure none of my family or friends ever fly with your outfit :ouch:

BTW Tiger 35, you may be alarmed to know that I would sooner bust an MDA by 100' ( with some 5-700 ' terrain clearance ) or a DA ( with 200' terrain clearance, and precise tracking ) than ditch in the water at night.
I fly for a large HK based carrier, just incase you want to avoid me ;)
( not saying that a 100' MDA bust would have got this guy in )

Wreckless?
 

.... given that the aircraft is now a wreck on the floor of the Pacific ocean, there's nothing Wreckless about it.

Reckless, perhaps. :rolleyes:

To my thinking, seems to have been a pretty casual approach to fuel and flight planning for this flight operating as it did at night to a remote, rarely visited stop for an ad-hoc charter. Operated day and night RPT, and day and sometimes night ad-hoc charter to a few destinations in the southern Pacific in all weathers (sometimes cyclones), but the companies involved had thorough policies of requireing depress. and single engine CP's and PNR's calculated before flight at the planning stage, and updated as we went along with the latest weather received in flight. Pre-GPS days we had Omega in some aircraft, listened to the Volmet, kept in touch with the Company Operations 24 hours on H.F., sometimes carried 2 hours Island Reserve, talked to the agent from 100 miles out or earlier if in range on VHF for the latest weather before descent. Off-track alternates had to provide the latest weather for ETOPS or we were required to turn back. (sometimes Wallis was a little tardy). Tonga sometimes got fog at the times we went there. What to do in an 'Unlikely Event" was also reinforced during annual training in the pool with jacket and raft inflation practice.
Training for it made sure it didn't happen. Smaller companies standards were not up to that, but were appropriate for where and when they went, if commonsense and self preservation were applied.
Complacency and "she'll be right" didn't get a lookin then..

Just read on Face-Tube.

Identity withheld to protect the guilty. :E

DD

Not being familiar with Medivac policy, but why go to the expense of a private medivac for a walk-on patient who is well enough to be able to tread water for 40 minutes. Why not put them on the next scheduled flight back to Australia?

Thank goodness no fatalities!
So many questions being asked.
Considering the crew are still with us, Im sure the ATSB will relish the opportunity to seek the answers.
In regards to CASA.......:ugh:

DD, I feel your pain..

Were the patient intubated, had fractures or was a spinal she would have been very unlikely to survive a ditching.

So how much fuel did they arrive with to shoot 3 approaches and ditch? You're not putting down in the water unless you're about to flame out..

and 2x pilots but no mayday, no CTAF/unicom broadcast "i'm ditching Xnm N/S/E/W of xyz", no "hey crew, get those jackets out and make sure that raft is ready to go" ??!

It doesn't add up, much like the fuel figure I imagine..

Haven't read the whole seven pages, so apologies if I'm not the first to say it, but in my experience, it's uncanny how often a pilot whose skill and daring are trumpheted in the press (along with that grossly overused 'hero' word) immediately after the incident, when the evidence is compiled and the final report tabled, turns out to be anything but.

Call me an old fart, but in my opinion, a professional pilot doesn't commit to an island destination, especially at night, unless the weather is gin clear.

The boss is backing up his pilot. Some may see that as admirable. Cynics might think that he's doing so while trembling at the thought of the litigation that is almost certainly heading his company's way when the final report comes out, to say nothing of what recommendations the regulator might come up with.

Having said all that, successfully dictching a jet at night in open water without killing or even injuring anyone on board was probably a better effort than many of us, if we were honest with ourselves, would expect we'd be able to do ourselves. I'm very glad I never found myself in such a position.

Australia's capt Sully.. good grief...
 

quotes in todays SMH from Christopher Newns of Concept Aviation Supplies who has been flying small planes since 1973.(apparently)


"It's unlike the Hudson River [ditching], which was done in good visual conditions, by a very experienced pilot and co-pilot, and they would have had training exercises in a simulator"

Two main differences..they had no engines... and fuel.

"Whether the weather was bad at the time of departure, I don't know, but as they approached Norfolk Island, the weather suddenly turned to custard."

If TAF's had been obtained on the way, you would know that the weather was bad...

"The better option was to have a controlled landing into water rather than an uncontrolled crash at the airfield."

Or divert before you ever get to that situation...

"Regardless of any bad decisions made in getting to that point, in the end he made a decision and got the aircraft down safely."

Regardless?

The great australian media.........

Fantastic job!!!

Could a Westwind have carried 6 POB and sufficient fuel to fly anywhere else other than Samoa - NFK? :hmm:

I had a funny feeling the thread/story would accelerate faster than a locomotive.
There are a lot of valid questions being asked here and no doubt some will be answered by the officials (CASA)some day.
But for now I'd like to add some answers in the mean time.

The life raft is often placed in the 'boot' of these small jets as there is no room within the main seating area, besides such an item needs to be stowed well & truly for a ditching, hence it was not accessed due the rapid nature of the A/'C sinking, better to get out with life jackets only than to go down with the hull whilst stuck inside trying to retrieve the bulky raft amongst amongst all the med equipment & believe me at times the plane of full of it!


Mercy flights under extraordinary circumstances can be conducted from at the flight planning stage where there are no other options at hand & it's a life threatening situation, obviously SOP need to be followed for this with any Co.This will be determined am sure whether this applied in this case.

One thing that I have not read here but may have missed is COMMERCIAL PRESSURE. It happens in ALL sectors of aviation. These tasks represent big money & we ALL live by money alone! It would be nice to make all flights perfectly safe but we don't live in a perfect world now do we? Airliners to ultralights crash & will continue to do so, that's the very nature of aviation, it's all about risks, calculated risks. Am not saying that the hapless pilot was under any commercial pressure other than to complete the mission & to stay alive when it went sour or even PelAir where making anybody do anything they didn't want to but now after the event perhaps we can all learn from it. Humans have only ever learnt from making mistakes, I have, we all have in life.
I think under the extreme duress this crew where facing when a ditching was imminent they did a good job but also remember everyone what was going thru their minds as they knew they was running out of fuel must have been terrifying!.
Can you perform yr duties flawlessly under that level of stress when perhaps training wasn't as good as at airline level? And even then that guarantees zip!

As for the Wx forecasts etc? Well half the flights planned to such places wouldn't even leave the ground if they where going strictly by the book without some human interpretation, humans make decisions & sometimes not good ones whether that applies here we or not we shall see.
My most steepest learning curve & most challenging times was when I was doing OS MediVacs, this is an area that few experience.

More to come am sure but lets be objective hey?

Wmk2

Read this gushing testimonial from someone called Christopher Newns of Concept aviation supplies.

Norfolk Island crash pilot an instant celebrity | Stuff.co.nz

Just wondering out aloud while awaiting the ATSB report. A lot has been said about this being an intention ditching, but might it not be an unfortunate outcome of an attempted duck under, there being no mayday or comms referring to an intentional ditching. Or even a replay of the King Air at Coffs with a worse outcome .Gear position might be an immediate give away.

Anybody else think there is something "Tom Cruise-ish" about his photo? Not a twin? Maybe why he got the Cleo gig.

If this guy gets Max Markson to represent his interests and to make hundreds of thousands of dollars in endorsements because he put innocent people at risk like this, then it is time for me to shuffle off to another line of work.

I am EXTREMELY disappointed this pilot was NAMED in the Pel-Air press release. Leaving aside the opinions of the pilot's actions and decisions what gives the company the right to name him? When did this become OK? :ugh:

Maybe he was jumping up on his seat when this happened.............

Tiger35 - you, sir are an idiot. Last time I checked you're fine under normal circumstances to fly under DA. It's a DECISION altitude. You start your go around there (if required). I'm with Hongkongfooey. He's had a shocker to get into that position, but once he's there, it's time to trust the old navaids a little bit more than the rules and tolerences might allow, and take a speculator closer to the runway.

Old mate was very very lucky, and probably doesn't deserve the kudo's. He porked it big time getting in the situation he found himself in. If I were him, I'd be crawling under a rock and hoping people forgot about me as soon as possible, otherwise future employers might remember him for this....

Tiger 35 - Have to disagree, im not one who condones breaking rules, in particulars minimas, however to throw down a blanket response such as yours is a big call. Never ever break minimums? If you were caught in a situation and had to choose between a cat III landing in an approved a/c at a non approved airport or ditching would you still not break the cat I DA? Hypothetical and not apllicable to NLK but clearly a situation where breaking the minima is the safer option.

In saying this, have had exp at NLK in the past and it is not a place i would be willing to bust the minimas in blind hope. Each threshold has a steep hill/cliff immediately before it and at the minima the approach spits you out at quite a large angle to the runway requiring a fairly sharp and immediate turn onto RWY HDG (this is often exagerated by unfavourable and strong crosswinds. Any mistakes in the rate of turn or your calculations of the 3 degree profile would be disastorous at best .

As far as trying to duck under and climb up to the threshold...that is definately placing you life (and your PAX's) in the lap of the gods. The elev is about 370', ducking under would involve scud running under cloud at 200', at night, towards a steep cliff with no hope of seeing the RWY lights from your position below the cliffs. If it was this or ditching...id take the water.

As far as places to push your luck, NLK would be one of the worst around.

Fantastic that everone survived and congrats to the careflight crew.

Tom Cruise is not cross-eyed.

What, his flying or his modeling? Exactly which one is his day job?

In the bad old days, when men were men and barmaids ate their young, it was usual and legal to go out to NLK without an alternate if the weather forecast allowed. We always calculated a PNR to either return to the mainland or divert. By PNR we had to be reasonably assured by the latest weather observations at the island that we had a very good chance of landing. PNR was typically about top of descent. Even so, sometimes it went wrong in the last 30 minutes and, having committed to continue past PNR, we were forced to either land by busting minimums or to divert with less than legal reserves. Those of us that went there often enough probably did one or the other or both at some stage. What we did know was NOT to persist with multiple approaches until a ditching became imminent. Better to miss and go somewhere inconvenient even if it meant arriving with only 20 minutes fuel. Fuel could always be stretched by shutting an engine down in the cruise and relighting it on final (done that).
After a few good frights and close calls, CASA saw the light and the rules changed to always require a suitable alternate for so-called remote islands. The two hours 'island reserve' mentioned elsewhere here no longer became a choice. In any case, two hours would get most aeroplanes to either Auckland or Noumea.
So, either the rules have been broken or there was an un-detected fuel leak. For the 'hero' status of the pilot to remain intact, I hope for his sake that it was the latter.

Horatio, Touche' ;) however I defy you to find the " wreck " :eek:

I was told ( by a guy who's had a GFPT for 15 years ) that the nearest suitable is 1.5 hrs away, so thats 1 approach and then :mad: off to Noumea, sounds fairly simple, maybe I missed something :confused:

Will be interesting to see if the toothless Tiger, called CASA, bow to media pressure and let this guy ( and Pelair ) off the hook, and not ban him for life like they should.
The comparisons being drawn between this and the Hudson river are :yuk: at best, one guy was faced with the sudden loss of all thrust with absolutely no warning, the other deliberately ran out of fuel after several hours of flight, please explain to me the similarities ( OK, other than both A/C ending up in the drink )

24 hour media cycle
 

Channel 7 news Melbourne is currently asking why they ran out of fuel and has made the link to the Air Ambulance contract in Victoria. No mention of last nights story funnily enough nor any comment from PelAir!

Loved the expert opinion from the bloke from the pilot shop. Apparently the shiela that makes the sandwiches at the BK cafe wasn't available for comment to the media:}

Channel 10 in Brisbane just ran a story and Jim Davis was interviewed and stated that the flight had the correct fuel loaded. So the next question is was it a mercy flight ? If it was reading the rules of a Mercy flight, did it really qualify? If it did would the patients partner be considered essential? AIP ENR 81.1.6 d. limit the operating crew and other persons carried in the aircraft to the minimum number required to conduct the flight. If not a mercy flight does Pel have a dispo for not carrying of an alternate for NLK?

Norfolk Is news website states as well as Channel 9 who said that the PIC advised that the flight was low on fuel arriving at NLK due to heavier than expected headwinds from APW...The questions keep on coming !

I wouldn't worry too much about the media calling him a hero.
I n 3 days when newspaper sales drop, they will then turn their focus on calling him evil.
The first media organisation to do that will be the one who doesn't get the exclusive.
Then it will be a week of A Current Idiot Vs Today a hero Tonight a villian slagging off at each other.
And it doesn't matter which one you are. The media only care about selling the advertising.