The Truckie

There’s actually nothing illegal about using ones contacts from past employment to help your current employer get contracts. What I find abhorrent though is certain ex pollies that have got plum jobs after their political life simply because they helped a mate in business win a government tender for an airport or highway network. Natural monopolies that should never be in the hands of private enterprise.

Another unanswered question that I am sure someone will be able to answer, comes from another Norfolk resident aviator that lives right next to the VOR at the threshold of 04, hearing and sighting all 3 missed approaches, but when the 3rd and final missed approach went overhead it sounded completely different, it sounded like a "turboprop".

FYI this information was given to the appropriate people during the situation.

Sighting? :hmm:

Not unusual, tinnie, as I'm sure you know. Nor for the crew to see the ground and runway during the missed approach. Slant viz is very different to vertical viz.

Can someone answer my earlier question? Did he start out with alternate capability, or had he planned with no alternate capability?

One comment, where the poster said the fuel state was below fixed reserves when it alighted, would make me think he departed ,not carrying alternate fuel (or a TOPD PNR).

Surely three approaches and missed approaches would not have used up 2+ hours of fuel at cruising rates? (Which I would expect he'd have needed to be carrying Noumea as an alternate or as a TOPD PNR.)

Truckie,

He is not the CEO. He is in fact the non executice Chairman and would have nothing to do with the day to day running of Pelair.

He is also non executive deputy chairman of Rex.

It would seem that all he has done is stand up for some staff in the absence of the full information. A hanging offence it would seem.

As if his friends in high places are going to be labour government people.

Logical disconnect
 

With respect Brian Abraham - there's a logical disconnect between the two assertions you make in 2 & 4. If indeed it was a CFIT as you claim to know, how can you purport to know how much fuel was carried with respect to the regulations? The logical consequence of your assertion that it was a CFIT, ie. they are still maneuvering, should be that they were STILL busy attempting approaches into Norfolk, possibly because they maintained an expectation that the weather might improve or, - in fact even STILL had NWWW as an alternate up their sleeve. The last option is highly unlikely I know, but as pilots we tend to be too quick to wash our hands off one of our colleagues after they've achieved that undesirable disconnect between number of Takeoffs and number of landing in our logbook. I realise this is a rumour network but all of the self pronounced aviation experts posting here, helps set a public perception of the nature of character, skill and experience (and in this case - bugger me dead, even the LOOKS) of the aviator in question. For us to hang anyone out to dry before KNOWING the facts involved are as despicable as the press desire to make heroes out of anyone of us after we have done nothing but what would be expected of us in a difficult situation. I have done some flying out to Norfolk myself and echo the sentimens regarding the bravery of the First Response team launching a boat across the reef at night time. Without a shadow of a doubt - THEY are the true heroes in this case and I shall rescind my Aussie citizenship unless they are receiving a well-deserved medal and honour on next Australia day.:ok:

I reckon it is time for a lot of posters on this forum to take a deep breath and let the REAL experts get on with their investigations into the chain of causation that led to the situation where 6 people managed to swim away from the aircraft that night.
Cheers all

If this is the assumed case, then the conclusions you could assume for the accident was an attempt to get visual by letting down over the water or ducking under the minima (CFIT) rather than a planned and controlled ditching.

Think about it, why would you ditch if you still had alternate fuel on board?

I note with interest that the "Checklist" posted from the Flight Safety Foundation that there is no reference for the flight crew to don life jackets either before or after ditching.

BoeingBender I don't see any disconnect at all.

After three approaches one would have thought that things are unlikely to get much better.
If you've been to NF then you will probably know that the reducing temperature will only worsen the situation in the short term therefore the chances of the fog lifting are very unlikely.
Yes it has happened, but would you bet yours and other's life on it ? I wouldn't.

So, if he had the fuel to head off elsewhere then that would have been the time to do it, NOT hang around until you get to fly a submarine.

Surely a decision to ditch would have (given the enormity of the decision) at least been preceded by the MAYDAY call and an approx position of where they planned to deposit the A/C.

All of the factors indicate that the splashdown WAS premature or at the very least unplanned.

Remember, this guy wasn't alone up there...The FO could well have organised all of those things we associate with a planned ditching maneuver.

I could certainly be wrong (have been in the past, many times and sincerely hope I am now) but these realities are hard to walk away from.

Not I, perhaps you missed my
and
My understanding from posts elsewhere on the site is that Danny set up the board as a substitute for the "happy hour" hangar flying that people might otherwise indulge. Should any not be comfortable with that I guess they can remove themselves and drink at the other end of the bar. Then again I don't know what subjects you restrain yourself to when hangar flying. :p

The site's going to be a pretty empty place if we were all to take a deep breath whenever unfortunate events take place, though a deep breath is preferable before going under water.

Some info that just came to hand from another source

As an expat Norfolk Islander I can confirm there is no ILS available on Norfolk. The only aids are ADF and VOR. The GPS that was installed a number of years ago has not been commissioned. The weather during the 12 hours before the ditching was low ceilings that tended to roll in as fog every few hours. At the time of the ditching it was very heavy rain with fairly solid mist just above the cliff tops. Using the available aids there is no way that the strip could have been sighted in such conditions. The alternates are New Caledonia and Kaitaia in New Zealand both around an hour's flying time away. The local gossip at this stage is that the pilot held too long hoping for a break, and that the ditching was dead stick after just departing the end of RWY 22. If he had lost the engines while over land the ending would have been considerably worse as the airstrip is pretty much the only flat piece of land on Norfolk, the rest is very undulating and covered in Norfolk Island pines, a very substantial tree.

After radio contact was lost - there was no Mayday call - one of the local fire safety officers went out to the cliff top on the western side of the island and spotted 3 little lights bobbing in the ocean. There were only 3 life jackets being used for the 6 survivors. The accident report will make for interesting reading and there are sure to be lessons that can be learned not withstanding the amazing survival and rescue of all onboard.

Deadstick after all perhaps? In which case kudos for a good job in pulling it off if that be the case.

Has the Westwind got a ditching/water landing checklist in the QRH?

Should someone here be able to put me in touch with Dom, I'd
be v grateful. (Dear mod, it is to his potential advantage.)

PM only, any info.

Could we drop the debate as to whether or not we should be discussing this accident? :confused:
If you don't wish to be involved in the discussion, then don't.

Some posters have probably jumped to some dodgy conclusions,
at the end of the day though, if something happened out there that night that could happen to me with even the most careful planning, I want to know.
If the crew was at fault, if the the aircraft let them down, if the SOPs were lacking, I want to know.
If the weather forecasting, the regulations, fatigue or some other unknown factor was crucial, I want to know.

There is always something to learn from every discussion, every crash comic, every investigation report.
Keep up the questions and suggestions everybody, there is some good collective grey matter here. :ok:

or a gig doing ferries for C&H ;)

"NOTE TO ALL JOURNOS"
The vast majority of posts on this subject have been made utilising exactly what most of us detest. Unreliable second, third or imaginary information sourced through hack reporters, unqualified apparent witnesses or overly active imaginations!
NONE of them have spoken to the flight crew.
NONE of them have spoken to the company/ies concerned.
NONE of them were on the aircraft.
Comments such as that espoused by Brian, Zeebee Wiley and others above summarise what this forum is all about.
Not a forum for "professional" pilots but rather a virtual open back laundry window where the little old women who sit peeling potatoes on the sidelines of this industry can shout across the rickety back fence discussing the other neighbours personal and work life for all to hear with little or scant regard for facts or indeed for the effect on the unfortunate neighbours life or the life of his or hers loved ones as a result of their drool filled utterings.
The analogy that Brian has used is at best non sensical and at its worst a call to arms for every enthusiastic moronic wannabe to further tarnish Doms reputation. Most "professional" pilots will back me up on this!
As for Brian, Zeebee, Wiley and the part time crew...listen up.
Just so that we're clear you slack jawed idiots....this NOT a bar. It is an online forum veiwable from virtually any part of the world open to all.....including the journos you and other "professional" pilots all have no time for.
For the last few days I've been fielding questions and enquiries from media friends and aquaintances as to the circumstances behind this incident. My standard reply is....."I don't know all the facts, so I can't give an informed opinion" It's amazing how many of them have quoted "facts" and "unnamed sources" that seem to closely parallel the drivel that is served up on this website. Wake up to yourselves and have some consideration for somebody elses career.......morons!:=:*:ugh:

Brian

If it was TRULY a deadstick, then I think the the pilot did a good job in keeping the aircraft in a flying attitude until it hit something.
I don't think he would have had a clue where the water was in the conditions, and given that he was flying into a black hole, it would have been so easy to have allowed the aircraft to roll off the straight and level.

This accident has given me a new thing to be thankful for....I'm SO glad it wasn't me !!

GADRIVR Et al,

For crying out loud.. if you didnt want to read this you wouldn't have logged on. The mere fact you read the thread and then deride the posters for commenting is the most hypocrital thing... get lost if you dont want to know...

The title of this one isnt "Official ATSB Report" so why are you here?


On thread topic. John Sharp was the opposition minister during another successful ditching and I believe he was very vocal on the standards of the industry at the time.


Dog

GADRIVR, not having a go but can you be absolutely certain that nobody here has talked to people that were actually in NLK and involved that very night, even though it might be 2nd or 3rd hand information?

Granted most people's posts are, for lack of a better word, 'uninformed', there is the reasonable possibility that others are not.


However... Any word on FDR/CVR (does the WW carry them?) and aircraft recovery? How deep is the water?
If the seas are as rough around NLK as some posters mention, then I'd imagine recovery would be quite difficult.

FDR / CVR Recovery?

If they can find them that is....the clock is ticking...once immersed in water and the contact is activated isn't there a 60 day (max...) time limit before the sonar stops...(just remembering the metro into Botany Bay....)

:confused:

GADRIVR, listen up. Just so that we're clear you slack jawed idiot, I'm playing a bit part, in a very small way off forum, to helping Dominic out in this, to him, stressful time. I've walked in his shoes so don't for one minute attempt to lecture me. moron.

I can't speak for Wiley but I know for a fact that ZEEBEE has had a long, and I might say, distinguished career in things aeronautical. An old women peeling potatoes he ain't.

PS Please do check what the "R" in PPrune stands for. moron (merely added for emphasis, but I'll wake up hating myself in the morning)

Yes it does, red hatching around the sides, tab 14.


DITCHING

PREPARATION

1. Communications ............................................................ .....MAYDAY
2. Transponder ............................................................ ........CODE 7700
3. Passengers ...........................................BRIEFED AND PREPARED
4. Cabin baggage ............................................................ .... SECURED
5. CABIN LIGHTS switch ........................................... BELTS/NO SMK
6. EMERG L T switch ............................................................ ........ ARM
7. Cabin altitude controller ................................... SET FOR DESCENT
8. Fuel DUMP pushbuttons ................................................... PUSH ON
(boosted dump required)

APPROACH

1. Cabin pressurization .................. MONITOR DEPRESSURIZATION
2. Landing gear lever ...................... UP; WARNING HORN CB - PULL
3. FLAPS lever ............................................................ .................... 40°
4. AIRSPEED bug and ADA indicator ........................ SET FOR VREF
(Figure 5-48)
5. Heading ........................................... PARALLEL TO MAIN SWELL

BEFORE TOUCHING WATER

1. Radar altimeter .................................................. SET FOR 50 FEET
2. Altitude ......................... NOSE UP; 10° deck angle when DH light
comes on (GO AROUND mode)
3. Thrust levers ............................................................ ......... CUT-OFF
4. FUEL SHUTOFF switches ................................................... CLOSE
5. BATTERY MASTER SWITCH .................................................. OFF

AFTER DITCHING

1. Pilot DV window .............................. OPEN to depressurize cabin
(alter removing loose articles
from window and console areas)
2. Emergency escape windows and door ................................ OPEN
WHICHEVER IS ABOVE WATER LEVEL
3. life Rafts ........................................... TIE static line to anchoring
point and prepare for deployment
4. LAUNCH AND BOARD LIFE RAFTS.

Dogimed,
There is no hypocrisy in my previous post. Rather, I've posed the view that unfounded speculation posted on a web site that is accessed by the mainstream news media and held up to be truth is not contributing in a positive fashion to the flight crews careers. Indeed given that the fact that the REX group are actively pushing for route expansion as well as pushing for more medical evacuation work, it would be reasonable to assume that this incident will quickly become a political football.
My concern is purely for the flight crew in pointing what I have in the previous post. I'm assuming that you yourself are working in the industry. Put yourself in Dom and Zoes shoes for just one moment. Think about the pressures that they are facing right now apart from the obvious effects from last weeks ditching.
Think about that the fact that here is the mild possibility that regardless of the facts that exist, they may become scapegoats for an organisations shortcomings, whether that organisation be a government department, a company or not for profit organisation. All that work over 10 years or more for what??!!
Have you considered that or indeed that there but for the grace of God go you?
I'm not a hypocrite sport. Just a bloke who has given up God knows how much to be a part of this industry. I love it.
What I detest is the elements that exist within and on the fringes of this industry that seem to collectively possess the instincts of a reptile...not above eating its own young on occasion!
I was at a dinner with some senior types from a major health organisation over the last few days. Guess what the major point of conversation was?
Take another guess as to where these blokes were getting their info from? Thats right, you guessed it.....here and Crikey.
Do they care as to whether the "facts" quoted here are accurate or not. Nope.They seemed only worried about the political consequences and how it affected them and their careers. Nothing else.
So I can't say as to whether I know the facts or not. I don't profess to be "an expert of some standing whose opinion would be considered favourably in any court in the land" (I can't believe some pompous arse would post something like that!!!!).
The only thing I can say is that a political maestrom is brewing, and uninformed fools posting on this website aren't helping the crew, companies or people involved in any way, shape or form by giving an opinion here!

gadrivr and lester
 

About time someone posted something sensible.
If the rest of you lot had it your way Dom would already be tarred and feathered.
Can't wait to see the facts published, a few retractments might be forthcoming. Yeh right.

GADRIVR, or is that idiot? And Lester. Both of you failed comprehension heh? Read what is written. I wrote "OFF FORUM"

No wonder Pprune descends into bun fights. Sorry Mods.

GADRIVR

If this whole thread never happened, the ditching did though.... the result would be the same for the crew. Their careers were screwed about the time the wx went bad. Thats prior to the swim and long before this thread even started.

Get used to the fact that this is the world we live in. What the media do with this thread and some very good thought provoking material is up to them. The fact is of course they research bugger all, but that will not change the state of the pilots future at all. Of course they were heroes a week ago until a few of us started to read the press and say.......hang on a minute!

I wish I could say it will be a lot better for them. It could have been a lot worse. :uhoh:

Listen, Brian Arbaham, Zeebee,Wiley & Others.
I am not arguing for the the plausibility of any specific other chain of events other than that which you guys already seems to have decided transpired out there the other night. Why - because I just don't KNOW and I was merely cautioning you to refrain from forming firmly held opinions (and voicing them in public) before some more FACTS are on the table. You guys are like a bunch of religious zealots purporting to KNOW without having access to the REAL FACTS, but that somehow the opinion you form based on what you BELIEVE to be true, just HAS to be true - because you believe it!

Ohh, and I am not saying don't discuss it, I am well aware of the nature of some of the most ardent contributors to this forum and hence spend very little time frequenting it. All I was trying to say, was that by publicly crucifying one of our colleagues before the best available facts are in, you are not doing him or his company any favors and that there COULD be mitigating circumstances explaining why they ended up in the drink. Just think about it for a second - if your methodology in accident investigation was meritorious, the ATSB would be completely superfluous.

So let me say it again - just back off a little, there MAY be more than what meets the eye:=

I think everyone needs a Bex and a good lie down. And a day off the keyboard! :E

Self included!

Bollocks. Please PM a reference to where anyone has.

Interesting bit RECOMMENDATION : R20000040

Output No: R20000040
Date Issued: 22 February 2000
Background:

SUBJECT - RELIABILITY OF NORFOLK ISLAND FORECASTS

SAFETY DEFICIENCY

The meteorological forecasts for Norfolk Island are not sufficiently reliable on some occasions to prevent pilots having to carry out unplanned diversions or holding.

FACTUAL INFORMATION

Related Occurrences

During the period 1 January 1998 to 31 March 1999, occurrences involving unforecast or rapidly changing conditions at Norfolk Island reported to the Bureau included the following:

199801482

A British Aerospace 146 (BAe146) aircraft was conducting a regular public transport (RPT) passenger service from Sydney to Norfolk Island. The terminal area forecast (TAF) for Norfolk Island indicated that cloud cover would be 3 octas with a cloud base of 2,000 ft. Approaching Norfolk Island, the crew found that the area was completely overcast. After conducting an instrument approach, they determined that the cloud base was 600 ft, which was less than the alternate minima. Fuel for diversion to an alternate airfield was not carried on the flight because the forecast had not indicated any requirement.

199802796

Before a Piper Navajo Chieftain aircraft departed for an RPT passenger service from Lord Howe Island to Norfolk Island, the TAF for Norfolk Island did not require the carriage of additional fuel for holding or for diversion to an alternate airfield. Subsequently, the TAF was amended to require 30 minutes holding and then 60 minutes of holding. The pilot later advised that he became aware of the deteriorating weather at his destination only after he had passed the planned point of no return (PNR). However, the aircraft was carrying sufficient fuel to allow it to hold at Norfolk Island for 60 minutes. When the aircraft arrived in the Norfolk Island circuit area, the pilot assessed the conditions as unsuitable to land due to low cloud and rainshowers. After approximately 45 minutes of holding, the weather conditions improved sufficiently for the pilot to make a visual approach and landing.

199804317

A BAe146 aircraft was conducting an RPT passenger service from Brisbane to Norfolk Island. When the crew were planning the flight, the Norfolk Island TAF included a steady wind of 10 kt and thunderstorm conditions for periods of up to 60 minutes. Approximately 30 minutes after the aircraft departed, the TAF was amended to indicate a mean wind speed of 20 kt with gusts to 35 kt. As the aircraft approached its destination, the Unicom operator reported the wind as 36 kt with gusts to 45 kt. The crew attempted two approaches to runway 04 but conducted a go-around on each occasion because of mechanical turbulence and windshear. The pilot in command then elected to divert the aircraft to Auckland. The wind gusts at Norfolk Island did not decrease below 20 kt for a further 3 hours.

199900604

While flight planning for an RPT passenger service from Lord Howe Island to Norfolk Island, the pilot of a Piper Navajo Chieftain found that the TAF required the carriage of fuel sufficient for a diversion to an alternate aerodrome. As the aircraft was unable to carry sufficient fuel for the flight to Norfolk Island and then to an alternate aerodrome, the flight was postponed. Later in the day, the forecast was amended to require the carriage of 60 minutes of holding fuel and the flight departed carrying the additional fuel. Approximately 20 minutes after the aircraft departed Lord Howe Island and more than one hour before it reached its point of no return (PNR), the TAF was amended again to require the carriage of alternate fuel. The pilot did not request or receive this amended forecast and so continued the flight.

Following the flight's arrival overhead Norfolk Island, the pilot conducted a number of instrument approaches but was unable to land the aircraft due to the poor visibility. After being advised of further deteriorations in conditions, the pilot made an approach below the landing minima and landed in foggy conditions with a visibility of 800m. Subsequent investigation determined that the actual conditions at Norfolk Island were continuously below alternate minima for the period from 2.5 hours before the aircraft departed from Lord Howe Island until 6 hours after the aircraft landed.

Meteorological information

The Norfolk Island Meteorological Observing Office, which is staffed by four observers, normally operates every day from 0400 until 2400 Norfolk Island time. When one or more observers are on leave, the hours are reduced to 0700 until 2400 daily. Hourly surface observations by the observers, or by an automatic weather station when the office is unmanned, are transmitted to the Sydney Forecasting Office where they are used as the basis for the production and amendment of TAFs and other forecasts.

Weather conditions are assessed by instrument measurements, for example, wind strength, temperature and rainfall, or by visual observation when observers are on duty, for example, cloud cover and visibility. There is no weather-watch radar to allow the detection and tracking of showers, thunderstorms and frontal systems in the vicinity of the island. The wind-finding radar on Norfolk Island is used to track weather balloons to determine upper level winds six-hourly when observers are on duty. It cannot detect thunderstorms or rainshowers.

Pilots in the Norfolk Island area can contact the Met Office staff on a discrete frequency for information about the current weather conditions.

The reliability of meteorological forecasts is a factor in determining the fuel requirements. As forecasts cannot be 100% reliable, some additional fuel must be carried to cover deviations from forecast conditions.

A delay of one hour or more can exist between a change occurring in the weather conditions and advice of that change reaching a pilot. The change has to be detected by the observer or automatic weather station and the information passed to the Forecasting Office. After some analysis of the new information in conjunction with information from other sources, the forecaster may decide to amend the forecast. The new forecast is then issued to Airservices Australia and disseminated to the Air Traffic Services (ATS) staff who are in radio contact with the pilot. It is then the pilot's responsibility to request the latest forecast from ATS.

Alternate minima

Alternate minima are a set of cloud base and visibility conditions which are published for each airfield that has a published instrument approach procedure. The alternate minima are based on the minimum descent altitude and minimum visibility of each of the available instrument approaches. When the forecast or actual conditions at an airfield decrease below the alternate minima, aircraft flying to that airfield must either carry fuel for flight to an alternate airfield or fuel to allow the aircraft to remain airborne until the weather improves sufficiently for a safe landing to be conducted.

A pilot flying an aircraft that arrives at a destination without alternate or holding fuel and then finds that the weather is below landing and alternate minima is potentially in a hazardous situation. The options available are:

1. to hold until the weather improves; however, the fuel may be exhausted before the conditions improve sufficiently to enable a safe landing to be made;

2. to ditch or force-land the aircraft away from the aerodrome in a area of improved weather conditions, if one exists; or

3. attempt to land in poor weather conditions.

All of these options have an unacceptable level of risk for public transport operations.

The alternate minima for Norfolk Island are:

1. cloud base at or above 1,069 ft above mean sea level (AMSL) and visibility greater than 4.4 km for category A and B aircraft; and

2. cloud base at or above 1,169 ft AMSL and visibility greater than 6 km for category C aircraft.

The available alternate aerodromes for Norfolk Island are La Tontouta in Noumea (431 NM to the north), Lord Howe Island (484 NM to the south-west) and Auckland NZ (690 NM to the south-east). Lord Howe Island may not be suitable for many aircraft due to its short runway. Flight from Norfolk Island to an alternate aerodrome requires a large amount of fuel, which may not be carried unless required by forecast conditions or by regulations.

Australian regulations

Prior to 1991, the then Civil Aviation Authority published specific requirements for flights to island destinations. For example, flights to Lord Howe Island were required to carry fuel for flight to an alternate aerodrome on the mainland Australia, and flights to Norfolk Island and Cocos Island, where no alternate aerodromes were available, were required to carry a minimum of 2 hours of holding fuel.

In 1991, Civil Aviation Regulation (CAR) 234 was enacted. This regulation provided that an aircraft would not commence a flight unless the pilot in command and the operator had taken reasonable steps to ensure that the aircraft was carrying sufficient fuel and oil to enable the proposed flight to be undertaken in safety. The regulation did not specify the method for determining what was sufficient fuel in any particular case. Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 234-1(0) dated March 1991, provided guidelines which set out one method that could be used to calculate fuel requirements that would satisfy CAR 234. CAAP 234-1 did not contain any special considerations or requirements when planning a flight to an island destination.

In August 1999, Civil Aviation Order 82.0 was amended to require all charter passenger-carrying flights to Norfolk Island and other remote islands to carry fuel for the flight to their destination and to an alternate aerodrome. The alternate aerodrome must not be located on a remote island. This requirement to carry additional fuel does not apply to regular public transport flights to a remote island.

European Joint Aviation Regulation

The European Joint Aviation Regulation (Operations) 8.1.7.2 states: "at the planning stage, not all factors which could have an influence on the fuel used to the destination aerodrome can be foreseen. Consequently, contingency fuel is carried to compensate for ... deviations from forecast meteorological conditions."

Traffic levels

In February 2000, approximately 11 regular public transport aircraft land at Norfolk Island every week, including Boeing 737 and Fokker F100 aircraft. An additional 20 instrument flight rules and 12 visual flight rules flights are made to the island every week by a variety of business and general aviation aircraft.

ANALYSIS

Reports to the Bureau, including those detailed in the factual information section above, indicate that the actual weather conditions at Norfolk Island have not been reliably forecast on a number of occasions. Current regulations do not require pilots of regular public transport aircraft to carry fuel reserves other than those dictated by the forecast weather conditions. The safety consequences of an unforecast deterioration in the weather at an isolated aerodrome like Norfolk Island may be serious.

The present level of reliability of meteorological forecasts and the current regulatory requirements are not providing an adequate level of safety for passenger-carrying services to Norfolk Island.

SAFETY ACTION

As a result of these occurrences, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority has commenced a project to review the fuel requirements for flights to remote islands.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation) recommends that the Bureau of Meteorology should review the methods used and resources allocated to forecasting at Norfolk Island with a view to making the forecasts more reliable.
Response from: Bureau Of Meteorology
Date Received: 27 April 2000
Response Status: Closed - Accepted
Response Text:

In response to your letter of 25 February 2000 relating to Air Safety Recommendation 20000040 and the reliability of meteorological forecasts for Norfolk Island, the Bureau of Meteorology has explored a number of possible ways to increase the reliability of forecasts for flights to the Island.

There are several factors which determine the accuracy and reliability of the forecasts. The first is the quality and timeliness of the baseline observational data from Norfolk Island itself. The second is the information base (including both conventional surface observational data and information from meteorological satellites and other sources) in the larger Eastern Australia-Southwest Pacific region. The third is the overall scientific capability of the Bureau's forecast models and systems and, in particular, their skill in forecasting the behaviour of the highly localised influences which can impact on conditions on Norfolk Island. And the fourth relates to the speed and responsiveness with which critical information on changing weather conditions (forecast or observed) can be conveyed to those who need it for immediate decision making.

As you are aware, the Bureau commits significant resources to maintaining its observing program at Norfolk Island. While the primary purpose of those observations is to support the overall large-scale monitoring and modelling of meteorological conditions in the Western Pacific, and the operation of the observing station is funded by the Bureau on that basis, it is staffed by highly trained observers with long experience in support of aviation. As far as is possible with available staff numbers, the observers are rostered to cover arrivals of regular flights and rosters are adjusted to cover the arrival of notified delayed flights.

The Norfolk Island Terminal Aerodrome Forecast (TAF) is produced by experienced professional meteorologists located in the Bureau's New South Wales Regional Forecasting Centre in Sydney. The terminal forecast provides predictions of wind, visibility, cloud amount and base height and weather routinely every six hours. Weather conditions are continuously monitored and the terminal forecast is amended as necessary in line with air safety requirements. The forecasters have full access to all the Bureau's synoptic meteorological data for the region and guidance material from both Australian and overseas prediction models. As part of the forecasting process, they continuously monitor all available information from the region including the observational data from Norfolk Island itself. When consideration of the latest observational data in the context of the overall meteorological situations suggests the need to modify the terminal forecast, amendments are issued as quickly as possible.

Despite the best efforts of the Bureau's observing and forecasting staff, it is clear that it is not always possible to get vital information to the right place as quickly as it is needed and the inherent scientific complexity of weather forecasting means that occasional serious forecast errors will continue to be unavoidable. That said, the Bureau has carefully reviewed the Norfolk Island situation in order to find ways of improving the accuracy and reliability of its forecasts for aviation through a range of short and longer-term means.

As part of its strategic research effort in forecast improvement, the Bureau of Meteorology Research Centre is undertaking a number of projects aimed at increasing scientific knowledge specifically applied to the provision of aviation weather services. Research projects are focussed on the detection and prediction of fog and low cloud and are based on extensive research into the science of numerical weather prediction. However, with the current level of scientific knowledge, the terminal forecasts for Norfolk Island cannot be expected to be reliable 100 percent of the time. Based on figures available for the period January 1998 to March 2000 (some 12 000 forecast hours), the Bureau's TAF verification system shows that for category A and B aircraft when conditions were forecast to be above the minima, the probability of encountering adverse weather conditions at Norfolk Island airport was 0.6%.

As part of its investigations, the Bureau has considered the installation of a weather watch radar facility at Norfolk Island with remote access in the NSW Regional Forecast Centre. Although routine radar coverage would enable the early detection of precipitation in the vicinity of the Island, investigations suggest that the impact of the radar images in improving forecast accuracy would be on the time-scale of one to two hours. This time frame is outside the point of no return for current aircraft servicing the route. It was concluded that the installation of a weather watch radar would be relatively expensive and would only partially address the forecast deficiencies identified in Air Safety Recommendation R20000040. The Bureau will however keep this option under review.

To increase the responsiveness of the terminal forecasts to changes in conditions at Norfolk Island, the Bureau has issued instructions to observing staff to ensure forecasters at the Sydney RFC are notified directly by telephone of any discrepancies between the current forecast and actual conditions. This arrangement will increase the responsiveness of the system particularly during periods of fluctuating conditions. In addition the Bureau has provided the aerodrome manager with access to a display of the latest observations to ensure the most up to date information is relayed to aircraft.

The Bureau is actively participating in the review of fuel requirements for flights to remote islands being undertaken by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.

I regret the delay in replying to your letter but the Bureau has felt it important to look carefully at all aspects of the Norfolk Island forecast situation and consider the full range of possibilities for forecast improvement within the resources available to us. We will continue to work on forecast improvement for Norfolk Island as resources permit.

I'll take two Bex Capt.

Jabawocky.... I rest my case.....Geez, thank God you're not in the ATSB!:{
Brian....you just don't get it do you?:ugh:
I repeat....idiot!
I'm off to work!:ok:

I've been shooting some approaches into Norfolk on the flight sim and also flown the same route from Apia to Norfolk, I had 3 goes at getting in and then diverted to Noumea with plenty of fuel on board.... head winds and all...

Don't know why they ditched! Sounds like not enough fuel up lifted to me!! :O

Colonel,,,,,,Now THAT is a wind up!
To clarify my last comments BA.....I understand exactly what it is that you've posted. Interesting.
Now look at it through the eyes of a left leaning political aspirant who has been reading the newspapers and opinions posted here by so called experts to build himself/herself a case against the Rex group acquiring more business!
It then takes on a different tone. Geez:{
Now I'm really going to work!

Lets face it Pel-Air have always been a second rate outfit. 3 WW1124's destroyed with fatalities so far?

The Vic Ambulance Service will learn the hard way.

Hopefully those that chartered this Flight will use JetCity Rescue next time. Very Professional and run by a Professional Pilot. I'm sure LC would never have allowed this to happen.

GADRIVR,
I understand your frustration with the tone and content of some of the posts. In particular direct attacks on the pilot and operator in many posts do not represent constructive comment. Additionally after the investigation is concluded it may show that some or all of the information provided by those with experience in flying to Norfolk island and other remote destinations is not relevent to the accident being discussed. That is always the way with such discussions without access to the source data. However I for one have learnt something from posts such as Brians above and do not want to see the discussion degenerate into a slanging match.
As for the media they initially bought the company line, then put out reports saying an investigation is going on and have now shut up. Not as bad as it could be for the crew and generally positive. If they are shown to have done a competent job in the circumstances I'm sure it will all come out in the long run and the pilot community will back them.
In the mean time I have been interested in how other people have attacked the problem of remote island operations and as Brians post shows some have been lucky rather than good!
Bombs

Time for everyone to take a bit of 'time out' here I think!
 

GADRIVR,

As BombsGone said at post #357:

I can also understand that, but what I can't understand GADRIVR is your comment at post#353 which on the face of it, appears to be directed in response to Brian's post at #352 which in reality is just a repeat of an ATSB Recommendation (R20000040).

You said:

I omitted your smilies in the quote! I give up GADRIVR. What doesn't Brian get, and why's Brian an idiot for quoting an ATSB Recommendation? :eek:

Re-read what Bryan said WRT Australian Regulations as follows:

That's really not so hard to undestand, is it?

Apart from that, I agree with you that everyone here needs to 'calm down' and let the ATSB and/or CASA work out what happened and why it happened.

EXEK1996; only a fool tries to use a safety concern to win a commercial argument in aviation. Professionals certainly don't, so I am sure LC and the team at JetCity will think your a plonker as well and won't thank you for including them in your little spray :hmm:

Whatever your outside perceptions of Pel-Air, they have been around for a very long time and have kept a loyal long term customer base throughout (some of them for their entire existence). I can't think of too many people over the years who have convinced a Pel-Air customer to change teams. I can't imagine why Vic Air Ambulance would be any different, or NSW if they win it.

Chainsaw, I believe GADRIVR's frustration with Brian was caused by his response to my statement that;
to which Brian responded;
So let me just take the first line in Brian's original assertion that I quoted earlier where Brian says;

Lets first define the word "ergo". My thesaurus says it means;
ergo [ˈɜːgəʊ]sentence connector therefore; hence[from Latin: therefore]
Adv.1.ergo - (used as a sentence connector) therefore or consequently.

The first part of the quoted sentence is used to ascertain that there was no mayday or other communication given. Based on the absence of a radio call, Brian then draws the consequence that the ditching was unintentional, ie he purports to KNOW that we are dealing with a CFIT.

Whilst there might be some merit in saying that there is a possibility that the absence of a Mayday call could be because the flight crew had unintentionally impacted water, there are literally dozens of OTHER, some would claim equally plausible explanations why a radio call was not forthcoming?

You only need to tune in 121.5 for a few hours flight to hear the "guard police" jumping all over some poor hapless soul that had intended to talk to his company and accidentally had the wrong frequency tuned, so is it not possible that perhaps they in the heat of the moment had managed to tune the wrong frequency? Is that not a plausible explanation for the missing Mayday call?

Also, show me a pilot who claims to never have accidentally omitted a Mayday call while wiping his sweaty hands hanging on for his dear life to the controls whilst practicing emergencies in the simulator, and I'll show you a person who deal with the truth lightly.

Or perhaps the radio could be U/S, or the microphone selector pushed to some other radio, or a complete or partial electrical failure and the list goes just goes on and on.

My point remains that we must not claim to KNOW, when we at this stage only have circumstantial evidence to build a case.

It doesn't take much imagination to picture the level of tension, nerves and apprehension present in the cockpit after a few go-arounds in the pea soup on a dark and stormy night at Norfolk, as the options are being narrowed down with diminishing fuel reserves - exactly to what level they had reduced, will no doubt be established as the FACTS are being established by the organization tasked with investigating this incident.

Brian, again with respect - I just believe that we would be well advised to take a step back with the speculation. The Internet is NOT a hotel-bar, where you can judge your audience based on how well you know them or how many beers they buy you. An opinion voiced in a public forum is instantly ALL OVER THE INTERNET, to anyone interested in the matter at hand and the clueless journos in this country get most of their so-called "expert advise" from places like PPRUNE, so your speculations goes instantly MUCH further that you had possibly intended.

Cheers guys - I'm off to work too.....

By shear coincidence my wife and I saw a stage play of Arthur Miller's "The Crucible" last week.

Sadly, I see GADRIVR as a kind of John Proctor...:rolleyes:

Why don't we all give this a rest now?
 

Oh dear.............

:eek:

Where's on earth is the evidence that the night in question's now all of a sudden become a 'dark and stormy' one boeingbender? :ugh:

C'mon boeingbender, just how many "guard police" do you think were around Norfolk at the time your 'scenario' was supposed to be taking place???

Long bow I'm afraid! :ugh:

As suggested previously........maybe it's time for folks to take a bit of 'time out' here, stop the speculation, and to give this thread a bit of a rest for the time being to let reality catch up with/overtake fantasy?

Story made it to UK
 

I'm sorry, but while the press turn this into a hero story I feel all comments on pprune are fair,no matter what their stance is.

Someone is manipulating the media without all the facts and when they are bought to light there will be no headlines from the media, as that same person will use their press manipulation to gag it.

May the healthy debate continue in the hope that the facts will be revealed. But the way I see it, this airplane was a long way down a one way road that had the sign DEAD END ahead.:(

Nagging thought in the back of my mind;

Was Norfolk the intended destination on departure?

Would we think differently if it turned out Norfolk was in fact the alternate?


I have no actual information, but since everybody else is chiming in with hair brained and half developed thoughts, I might as well join in.....