Mid - Air @ Caboolture
Who do you think you are , some sort of Sky god ?
It's all very well stating your FACTS about who gives way to whom, how do you know the aircraft were even aware of each other?
markis10:
while the Jab was possibly departing 29 u
Redcliffe was showing a 10kt southerly at the time, so a definite possibility.
Any system that relies on perfection of process to be safe, isn't. It is relying on backups, and in this case there are precious few backups.
For the amount of flight operations in Australia, mid-airs are over represented, our system is bettered by many third world airspace. ADSB OUT AND IN makes a difference. Having recently avoided 2 different conflicts in short succession due to ADSB IN, I am concerned by the robustness of Aus airspace.
Last edited by fdr; 29th Jul 2023 at 03:32. Reason: bettered >>> bettered
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Originally Posted by triatholon
the landing aircraft has the right of way
. FACT ! …
The aircraft taking off must give way .
FACT !….
. FACT ! …
The aircraft taking off must give way .
FACT !….
That the Jab was smitten from the sky proves the Pawnee's operations weren't safe - if in fact he wasn't using the active runway...
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Not necessarily an indicator of safety, unless you are a believer in safety through paperwork.
The sentence "Gliders (and the tow aircraft) are permitted to do non-standard circuits" might turn out to be a bit of a problem, if the Pawnee did a non-standard circuit. Better to let CASA write the rules. I hope they have their insurance in order.
The sentence "Gliders (and the tow aircraft) are permitted to do non-standard circuits" might turn out to be a bit of a problem, if the Pawnee did a non-standard circuit. Better to let CASA write the rules. I hope they have their insurance in order.
aewnofrune.org?
Sadly, this thread should be moved to another website, 'armchair experts with no facts rumour network'. A couple of the ruder people's posts (pretty obvious who I'm referring to) can go into a subforum reserved for those who contribute nothing except pointless aggro.
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Stop slagging the Pawnee driver and gliding ops, please.
There is intense speculation about what has happened WRT to who was doing what at which RWY etc.
Please let the experts on the ground do their work, and please allow accurate and primary source facts emerge (from CCTV, from eyewitnesses, first responders etc.).
There are posters on this discussion who know the people involved, and operate out of YCAB, listen to what they might be saying.
Of course the trolls and imbeciles will now come out and slag the ATSB, the police, first responders, YCAB, Pawnee drivers, gliders, Jabiru pilots, CASA, Airservices, the illuminati, chemtrails...
There is intense speculation about what has happened WRT to who was doing what at which RWY etc.
Please let the experts on the ground do their work, and please allow accurate and primary source facts emerge (from CCTV, from eyewitnesses, first responders etc.).
There are posters on this discussion who know the people involved, and operate out of YCAB, listen to what they might be saying.
Of course the trolls and imbeciles will now come out and slag the ATSB, the police, first responders, YCAB, Pawnee drivers, gliders, Jabiru pilots, CASA, Airservices, the illuminati, chemtrails...
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For the amount of flight operations in Australia, mid-airs are over represented, our system is vetted by many third world airspace. ADSB OUT AND IN makes a difference. Having recently avoided 2 different conflicts in short succession due to ADSB IN, I am concerned by the robustness of Aus airspace.
As for two runway operations OCTA, if something is blocking LOS then both radio and ACAS may be blocked as well.
PS even if there was a single runway there's still the chance with a hump in the middle you could get two aircraft taking off in opposite directions, so its not really a two runway issue, it's really a communication and lookout issue.
I don't think we will see a report eventuate on this accident.
Last edited by 43Inches; 29th Jul 2023 at 00:48.
Quote from #43 "For the amount of flight operations in Australia, mid-airs are over represented, our system is vetted by many third world airspace. ADSB OUT AND IN makes a difference. Having recently avoided 2 different conflicts in short succession due to ADSB IN, I am concerned by the robustness of Aus airspace."
OK, great... Can such claims be backed up by comparable statistics?
What do you mean by over-represented? Per aircraft movements, hours in the air, nautical miles covered?
"Our system is vetted by many third world airspace", that comes across as pejorative.
"ADSB OUT AND IN makes a difference", again have you got statistics from the pre ADSB era versus ADSB era?
"Having recently avoided 2 different conflicts in short succession due to ADSB IN", congratulations, the technology has helped you.
"I am concerned by the robustness of Aus airspace", of course you are entitled to your concerns, are they real or perceived? Are your concerns based on robust stats?
Australia has a "big sky", nevertheless a/c will be concentrated around airfields, hence the due diligence required by all operators. In the very large majority of cases, CCT ops at uncontrolled airfields are without incident.
I am of the firm belief that most aviators, whatever their craft, want to and perform ops safely. So when accidents like these occur, refer to the Reason/Swiss Cheese Holes model.
In response to #46 "Not necessarily an indicator of safety, unless you are a believer in safety through paperwork."
Actually I do believe in safety through paperwork, e-flightbags, it is better than nothing. Human memory can be frail, the written word is for all to see.
Any document will have errors, it should be a living thing amenable to iterations, updates and feedback.
If people have quibbles or issues with SOPs, offer helpful feedback.
Someone went to the effort to create a comprehensive SOP for YCAB for good reason. The current YCAB ERSA entry refers to it too.
If operating into an unfamiliar airfield, self brief, use the ERSA entry if one exists, see if a current airfield SOP exists, if required get prior permission, speak to the airfield operator as a courtesy, ask about local procedures, speak to pilots who regularly use the strip. Use all the information at your disposal, you owe it to yourself and your passengers, and your hosts at the airfield you are visiting. It is common sense.
Safety through reading and paperwork or e-flightbags is paramount in aviation. NOTAMS, Wx, flight notifications, Checklists, pilot operating handbooks, SOPs. to name a few.
OK, great... Can such claims be backed up by comparable statistics?
What do you mean by over-represented? Per aircraft movements, hours in the air, nautical miles covered?
"Our system is vetted by many third world airspace", that comes across as pejorative.
"ADSB OUT AND IN makes a difference", again have you got statistics from the pre ADSB era versus ADSB era?
"Having recently avoided 2 different conflicts in short succession due to ADSB IN", congratulations, the technology has helped you.
"I am concerned by the robustness of Aus airspace", of course you are entitled to your concerns, are they real or perceived? Are your concerns based on robust stats?
Australia has a "big sky", nevertheless a/c will be concentrated around airfields, hence the due diligence required by all operators. In the very large majority of cases, CCT ops at uncontrolled airfields are without incident.
I am of the firm belief that most aviators, whatever their craft, want to and perform ops safely. So when accidents like these occur, refer to the Reason/Swiss Cheese Holes model.
In response to #46 "Not necessarily an indicator of safety, unless you are a believer in safety through paperwork."
Actually I do believe in safety through paperwork, e-flightbags, it is better than nothing. Human memory can be frail, the written word is for all to see.
Any document will have errors, it should be a living thing amenable to iterations, updates and feedback.
If people have quibbles or issues with SOPs, offer helpful feedback.
Someone went to the effort to create a comprehensive SOP for YCAB for good reason. The current YCAB ERSA entry refers to it too.
If operating into an unfamiliar airfield, self brief, use the ERSA entry if one exists, see if a current airfield SOP exists, if required get prior permission, speak to the airfield operator as a courtesy, ask about local procedures, speak to pilots who regularly use the strip. Use all the information at your disposal, you owe it to yourself and your passengers, and your hosts at the airfield you are visiting. It is common sense.
Safety through reading and paperwork or e-flightbags is paramount in aviation. NOTAMS, Wx, flight notifications, Checklists, pilot operating handbooks, SOPs. to name a few.
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Safety through reading and paperwork or e-flightbags is paramount in aviation. NOTAMS, Wx, flight notifications, Checklists, pilot operating handbooks, SOPs. to name a few.
Also resist the urge to plan your lunch/meetup, where's the fuel pump, how's the weather conversation on CTAF, use a discrete frequency or land and get out the flight bag/phone. Just tell everyone where you are, where you are going and anything unusual you might be doing that might create conflict.
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Thanks #51 wholeheartedly agree.
Of course paperwork is one of the many tools (but not only) available to us as aviators.
Of course situational awareness is vital, but even in a perfect world there can be confounding factors (distractions, fatigue, empty field myopia, over-transmissions (busy CTAF), non-transmission (button pressed but nothing goes out), looking but not seeing, listening but not hearing, internal and external pressure (real and/or perceived), and so on).
No matter how many hours in command, or level of skill, or diligence, by definition, human factors are so important and not to be discounted, and actually do a pretty good job given the complex tasks expected of us all.
Of course paperwork is one of the many tools (but not only) available to us as aviators.
Of course situational awareness is vital, but even in a perfect world there can be confounding factors (distractions, fatigue, empty field myopia, over-transmissions (busy CTAF), non-transmission (button pressed but nothing goes out), looking but not seeing, listening but not hearing, internal and external pressure (real and/or perceived), and so on).
No matter how many hours in command, or level of skill, or diligence, by definition, human factors are so important and not to be discounted, and actually do a pretty good job given the complex tasks expected of us all.
Not commenting on what happened in this specific case, but how can someone’s ‘Ops Manual’ override e.g. the ‘in vicinity’ CASRs? Anything ‘non-standard’ should be in ERSA itself (or e.g.NOTAMs), so that ‘ordinary’ pilots can find information where it’s ordinarily found.
I understand the logic of having some kind of aerodrome-specific ‘comprehensive guide’, but the risk of it being overlooked by ‘outsiders’ seems obvious to me, even if it’s referred to in ERSA. Again, not saying that has any relevance to this tragedy,
As someone observed earlier, nobody straps in with the intention of operating in a way that increases the risk of a collision.
I understand the logic of having some kind of aerodrome-specific ‘comprehensive guide’, but the risk of it being overlooked by ‘outsiders’ seems obvious to me, even if it’s referred to in ERSA. Again, not saying that has any relevance to this tragedy,
As someone observed earlier, nobody straps in with the intention of operating in a way that increases the risk of a collision.
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Over complication is the enemy of safety in aviation, most pilots are the run of the mill average human, who don't work well with excessive amounts of information. Piloting requires simple direct rules that don't need much brainpower, as the act of piloting the craft itself chews up a lot of the grey matter just keeping it upright. Its all fine to have a wad of paper rules to read through, but reality is, half wont read it properly, just skim, others will read it and forget it 10 seconds later, and so on. That is why aviation is full of drills, repetition, do things out of the ordinary and you lob nasty surprises on the others around you.
Half the drivers out there can't even get the road rules right, some of those are also pilots.
Remember there are rules out there that reflect this, like sales contracts etc, once they reach a certain length for inane things they become invalid as the average person will not be bothered to read it, so can't be held to the contract details.
Half the drivers out there can't even get the road rules right, some of those are also pilots.
Remember there are rules out there that reflect this, like sales contracts etc, once they reach a certain length for inane things they become invalid as the average person will not be bothered to read it, so can't be held to the contract details.
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Not commenting on what happened in this specific case, but how can someone’s ‘Ops Manual’ override e.g. the ‘in vicinity’ CASRs? Anything ‘non-standard’ should be in ERSA itself (or e.g.NOTAMs), so that ‘ordinary’ pilots can find information where it’s ordinarily found.
Acting on the (admittedly possibly incorrect) assumption the Jab was using the active runway and the Pawnee wasn't (due to the reported shorter taxi after rollout), CASR's say "a landing aircraft has right of way", but also say "landing on the runway that is not the into-wind runway must not risk the safety of those using the into wind runway" while you also have the Caboollture Airport SOP's that quite definitely say
"All operators at YCAB are advised that any pilot selecting a runway other than the one which is clearly the ‘active’ runway (by virtue of into wind and minimum cross wind component and established circuit traffic), or that has been nominated as the ‘active’ runway by a radio information communication, then such pilot will lose all right of way privileges and shall conduct the landing or take-off procedure such as to give way to, and maintain separation from all other circuit traffic."
If the pilot of the Pawnee was an average fallible human, they will be feeling like absolute **** right now. I don't know you, but if you are reading this, don't, go be with family, talk about it with them and mates, get some counselling, no man is an island, especially after these events. Anyone that is friends with him, support him and guide them towards some council.
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Construction of Jabiru
The local bank manager in Bundaberg asked me to have a look at the prototype Jabiru being constructed at the airfield, I believe he was backing it. The polystyrene wings didn’t impress me.
Perhaps the Pawnee pilot owes his life to the fragile construction.
Perhaps the Pawnee pilot owes his life to the fragile construction.
Last edited by Nuasea; 29th Jul 2023 at 04:00. Reason: Additional
You mean the foam ribs or the foam sandwich? Standard construction and far from flimsy.
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No-one has mentioned why the Pawnee pilot has landed long. He should have had his wheels on the ground by the intersection even if he was using 24 with its threshold only 350 m distant but for:
(a) excessive float in a quartering tailwind or
(b) deliberately landing long(past the intersection) so as to finish the landing run where the gliders might have been parked due to commercial pressures - an extended final at 70kts being quicker and cheaper than a taxi up to the parked gliders at 10-20kts.
I witnessed a couple of weeks ago the tugs at Boonah doing the same thing, approaching high and landing long so as their roll out finished at the end of the runway in front of the club where the gliders were parked. Of course, there is no cross runway at Boonah.
Also there could be possible confusion due to the renaming of the runway 11/29 from previously 12/30. I don't know when this changed, but it would have been only in the last two years. I checked an old ERSA of mine(17 June 2021) and it still had 12/30 listed. I presume this was done to avoid confusion with Caloundra's runways 12/30.
(a) excessive float in a quartering tailwind or
(b) deliberately landing long(past the intersection) so as to finish the landing run where the gliders might have been parked due to commercial pressures - an extended final at 70kts being quicker and cheaper than a taxi up to the parked gliders at 10-20kts.
I witnessed a couple of weeks ago the tugs at Boonah doing the same thing, approaching high and landing long so as their roll out finished at the end of the runway in front of the club where the gliders were parked. Of course, there is no cross runway at Boonah.
Also there could be possible confusion due to the renaming of the runway 11/29 from previously 12/30. I don't know when this changed, but it would have been only in the last two years. I checked an old ERSA of mine(17 June 2021) and it still had 12/30 listed. I presume this was done to avoid confusion with Caloundra's runways 12/30.
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One more input from me, this time written with a heavy heart since I've since realized that I've met the Jabiru pilot a few months ago in my hangar at Caboolture (he went to school with my brother-in-law) and I also know the Pawnee pilot.
I was earlier struggling to reconcile the Jabiru wreckage trail with a Rwy 11 departure wondering how it ended up so displaced from the 11/29 centreline, also the "low altitude collision" description when all landings on 06/24 normally result in the aircraft being on the ground at the runway intersection. However, I've just had this scenario described:
The Jab is departing from 29 while the Pawnee, on final for 06, tells the Jab that he'll stop before the intersection. However "a Cessna" then crosses 06/24 ahead of the Pawnee, forcing him to go around and thus collide with the Jabiru. The Jabiru turns through 180 degrees and impacts the ground on the 24 threshold while the Pawnee flies another circuit, lands on 06 and then taxies up to the Jabiru wreckage.
Just awful. I'm not about to comment on any blame here.
There have been a few posts suggesting a less than stellar performance from the Caboolture Gliding Club. Could I just add that I've flown out of Caboolture for 24 years now and I've NEVER seen anything to cause me to doubt the safety of their operation. The idiot parachutists yes (now thankfully long gone) and I occasionally look askance at the helicopter operation, but the gliders - never.
I was earlier struggling to reconcile the Jabiru wreckage trail with a Rwy 11 departure wondering how it ended up so displaced from the 11/29 centreline, also the "low altitude collision" description when all landings on 06/24 normally result in the aircraft being on the ground at the runway intersection. However, I've just had this scenario described:
The Jab is departing from 29 while the Pawnee, on final for 06, tells the Jab that he'll stop before the intersection. However "a Cessna" then crosses 06/24 ahead of the Pawnee, forcing him to go around and thus collide with the Jabiru. The Jabiru turns through 180 degrees and impacts the ground on the 24 threshold while the Pawnee flies another circuit, lands on 06 and then taxies up to the Jabiru wreckage.
Just awful. I'm not about to comment on any blame here.
There have been a few posts suggesting a less than stellar performance from the Caboolture Gliding Club. Could I just add that I've flown out of Caboolture for 24 years now and I've NEVER seen anything to cause me to doubt the safety of their operation. The idiot parachutists yes (now thankfully long gone) and I occasionally look askance at the helicopter operation, but the gliders - never.
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