Channel 7 Sunday Night Program About VH-MDX
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Channel 7 Sunday Night Program About VH-MDX
Participants in this site may have seen the advertisements on Channel Seven that are running for their top rating show, Sunday Night, which is going to air this Sunday 1st June at 7.30pm. The program will cover that terrible VH-MDX Cessna 210 crash in the Barrington Tops area. This is where five people were killed and the crash site has never been discovered. The families of those on board have never had closure and been able to arrange proper burials.
I was extensively interviewed and probably had a different perspective to most. I blame the situation on the military airspace at Williamtown, which is situated right in the centre of one of the busiest air routes in the world. Even today the Enroute Supplement mentions flight limitations on how you cannot flight plan over Williamtown below 10,000 feet.
On the night of the accident (9th August, 1981), the Flight Service Officer even asked the pilot if he wanted to try and get direct tracking over Williamtown. The Pilot agreed, however was quickly told there would be a delay. Imagine holding out there over the mountains in turbulent winds, waiting for however long it would take for the flight details to be sent to Williamtown and for the controller to provide the clearance – it was CAVOK at Willi at the time.
The Pilot decided to take the risk and follow the normal route which diverts around Williamtown but puts an aircraft and its passengers over some of the most rugged country in Australia – if, indeed, the world! Of course, the winds reported that night was up to 70 knots and so there would have been a gigantic rotor. Pilots who have flown in that area in high winds all know just how violent it can be.
Of course, nothing has changed. You can’t file a flight plan across Williamtown if it’s active. I mentioned in my interview that I don’t know anywhere else in the world where such a situation exists. My experience on my flights around the world is that in other countries the military facilitate all traffic through their airspace in every way they can; they don’t use the Australian principle of ‘sterilising’ airspace whenever the airspace is made active – the whole airspace becomes active and others are restricted and can’t file a flight plan through the airspace.
Also, remember in those days - and what’s not in the BASI Report is that the Pilot never, ever spoke to a radar controller - it was all going second and third-hand to the Flight Service Officer. I’m glad I fixed that when I was Chairman of CAA – but I remember the resistance to having airspace that was covered by radar actually then allowing the pilots to talk directly to the radar controller – as it is today.
I have a feeling that this will be a very disturbing program.
I was extensively interviewed and probably had a different perspective to most. I blame the situation on the military airspace at Williamtown, which is situated right in the centre of one of the busiest air routes in the world. Even today the Enroute Supplement mentions flight limitations on how you cannot flight plan over Williamtown below 10,000 feet.
On the night of the accident (9th August, 1981), the Flight Service Officer even asked the pilot if he wanted to try and get direct tracking over Williamtown. The Pilot agreed, however was quickly told there would be a delay. Imagine holding out there over the mountains in turbulent winds, waiting for however long it would take for the flight details to be sent to Williamtown and for the controller to provide the clearance – it was CAVOK at Willi at the time.
The Pilot decided to take the risk and follow the normal route which diverts around Williamtown but puts an aircraft and its passengers over some of the most rugged country in Australia – if, indeed, the world! Of course, the winds reported that night was up to 70 knots and so there would have been a gigantic rotor. Pilots who have flown in that area in high winds all know just how violent it can be.
Of course, nothing has changed. You can’t file a flight plan across Williamtown if it’s active. I mentioned in my interview that I don’t know anywhere else in the world where such a situation exists. My experience on my flights around the world is that in other countries the military facilitate all traffic through their airspace in every way they can; they don’t use the Australian principle of ‘sterilising’ airspace whenever the airspace is made active – the whole airspace becomes active and others are restricted and can’t file a flight plan through the airspace.
Also, remember in those days - and what’s not in the BASI Report is that the Pilot never, ever spoke to a radar controller - it was all going second and third-hand to the Flight Service Officer. I’m glad I fixed that when I was Chairman of CAA – but I remember the resistance to having airspace that was covered by radar actually then allowing the pilots to talk directly to the radar controller – as it is today.
I have a feeling that this will be a very disturbing program.
Dick, it probably won't lead to anything being changed, just a bunch of people shaking their heads is wonderment and tsk-tsk-ing and changing the channel to watch CSI.
I lost 3 mates as an indirect result of that search, when a RAAF Huey had a problem on that search, and landed. It subsequently crashed while investigating the problem.
I expect there will be the oft-quoted groups of people with their own theories on where MDX is, and good luck if they find it - nearby will be the vertically-buried remains of a couple of Mirages as well.
I lost 3 mates as an indirect result of that search, when a RAAF Huey had a problem on that search, and landed. It subsequently crashed while investigating the problem.
I expect there will be the oft-quoted groups of people with their own theories on where MDX is, and good luck if they find it - nearby will be the vertically-buried remains of a couple of Mirages as well.
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Some small points
Dick,
I certainaly agree with your comments about trying to go through/over/around Williamtown, and certainly share your enthusiasm in trying to bring the story to a close, but I have a few small points about your post -
The controller had just provided a clearance for AZC, a C206 at 8000, the same level as MDX was requesting, and MDX was closing on him. He was offered 7000 or 9000, but declined it. The delay was only a few minutes, and wouldn't require much holding. Any holding that MDX was required to do would have been over the posistion that he was in at the moment, at 8000ft on a line roughly TAREE-NABIAC, practically over the ocean, where conditions were CAVOK and relativly smooth. There was a westerly wind blowing, but well outside of the range of the mountain induced turbulance. The place he finally elected to take up his original planned route was roughly over Nabiac. The decision to take up the original planned track was solely the choice of the PIC. The arguement about risk of SE flight at night or in IMC is for another place! We suspect that he was unaware at this point that his vac pump had failed (or was very nearly about to fail).
Whilst this may be factually correct, it did not contribute to the situation, and communications between Sector 1, FIS 5 and Williamtown Tower were communicated effectivly and promptly. The controller at Williamtown was operating inside the framework and left and right of arcs as dictated to him by policy at the time.
Hopefully we can bring this to a conclusion soon. If you want to discuss it with me at all, feel free to PM me!
I certainaly agree with your comments about trying to go through/over/around Williamtown, and certainly share your enthusiasm in trying to bring the story to a close, but I have a few small points about your post -
On the night of the accident (9th August, 1981), the Flight Service Officer even asked the pilot if he wanted to try and get direct tracking over Williamtown. The Pilot agreed, however was quickly told there would be a delay. Imagine holding out there over the mountains in turbulent winds, waiting for however long it would take for the flight details to be sent to Williamtown and for the controller to provide the clearance – it was CAVOK at Willi at the time.
Also, remember in those days - and what’s not in the BASI Report is that the Pilot never, ever spoke to a radar controller - it was all going second and third-hand to the Flight Service Officer.
Hopefully we can bring this to a conclusion soon. If you want to discuss it with me at all, feel free to PM me!
I blame the situation on the military airspace at Williamtown, which is situated right in the centre of one of the busiest air routes in the world.
Dr
Last edited by ForkTailedDrKiller; 30th May 2014 at 05:04.
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RatsoreA
At the present time I am looking at the transcript of the communications and I cannot see at any stage that the MDX pilot was offered 7,000 or 9,000 feet and declined this. In fact, my transcript shows that at 18:53-47 he was told by Sydney Flight Service that the airspace at a high level in Williamtown was non-VMC. He then came back and said,
He was then told to remain outside controlled airspace with the flight service officer saying,
At 18:54-39 he then said,
Sydney FSU said,
Then at 18:55-33 the pilot said to Sydney flight service,
RatsoreA, it is pretty clear to me that the pilot thought he would probably have considerable holding, which is normal at Williamtown, and he didn’t want to do that over tiger country in pitch darkness at night. He possibly had good lights ahead of Williamtown and Newcastle, but pitch black behind him which he would have to turn into if he was going to hold.
Most importantly, I reckon the fact that the pilot was not able to talk directly to a radar controller did contribute to the accident. That was because when the pilot turned away from the correct heading, the flight service officer didn’t tell him because the FSO did not know!
I find it fascinating that BASI made no recommendation about using the radar more effectively.
At the present time I am looking at the transcript of the communications and I cannot see at any stage that the MDX pilot was offered 7,000 or 9,000 feet and declined this. In fact, my transcript shows that at 18:53-47 he was told by Sydney Flight Service that the airspace at a high level in Williamtown was non-VMC. He then came back and said,
“I’d prefer to go coastal”.
“I will advise clearance as soon as possible”.
“MDX, well, ah, we’re coming up to it pretty shortly”.
“Roger, remain outside controlled airspace while attempting to gain airways clearance”.
“MDX, rather than wait for clearance we’ll go via Craven. Thank you.”
Most importantly, I reckon the fact that the pilot was not able to talk directly to a radar controller did contribute to the accident. That was because when the pilot turned away from the correct heading, the flight service officer didn’t tell him because the FSO did not know!
I find it fascinating that BASI made no recommendation about using the radar more effectively.
Yes. But if it had been kept simple with a prompt clearance through Williamtown which was CAVOK they might all be alive today.
I think the holes in the Swiss cheese were already starting to line up for that flight when it departed Cooly.
The PIC could also have declared an emergency and gone anywhere he liked!
Dr
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Dick,
I strongly suspect that you are not in possesion of all the information or the FULL transcript. I am. I have also interviewed personally, at length both the FIS 5 FSO and the Williamtown controller.
The delay between MDX being offered to track via WLMTN is 5 minutes and 29 seconds, 08:50:31 (offered to track over WLTM) to 08:56.00 (turning to Craven).
During that time, there was near constant communications between FIS 5, Sector 1, and Williamtown, to get clearance through the Williamtown zone.
Betwen 08:52.22 and 08:53.00, Williamtown controller said to FIS 5 that 7 or 9 was available. It then went to Sector 1, who informed them that their sector was non-VMC.
I would hardly call the area SWS of Taree 'Tiger country', which it the area he would have had to hold in. Out to the west, over the Tops, certainly. But the area he would be required to hold in, and only for another 30-40 seconds, is quite ok.
MDX was not under radar control, and was outside the area of responsibility of Sector 1 and 2. He was essentially "OCTA" in that area. Also, the Williamtown Radar only operated out to 48nm.
As I said, I suspect that you are operating under not having all the information regarding this. If you like, PM me, and I will share with you everything. It will very much open your eyes about MDX!
I strongly suspect that you are not in possesion of all the information or the FULL transcript. I am. I have also interviewed personally, at length both the FIS 5 FSO and the Williamtown controller.
The delay between MDX being offered to track via WLMTN is 5 minutes and 29 seconds, 08:50:31 (offered to track over WLTM) to 08:56.00 (turning to Craven).
During that time, there was near constant communications between FIS 5, Sector 1, and Williamtown, to get clearance through the Williamtown zone.
Betwen 08:52.22 and 08:53.00, Williamtown controller said to FIS 5 that 7 or 9 was available. It then went to Sector 1, who informed them that their sector was non-VMC.
I would hardly call the area SWS of Taree 'Tiger country', which it the area he would have had to hold in. Out to the west, over the Tops, certainly. But the area he would be required to hold in, and only for another 30-40 seconds, is quite ok.
Most importantly, I reckon the fact that the pilot was not able to talk directly to a radar controller did contribute to the accident. That was because when the pilot turned away from the correct heading, the flight service officer didn’t tell him because the FSO did not know!
As I said, I suspect that you are operating under not having all the information regarding this. If you like, PM me, and I will share with you everything. It will very much open your eyes about MDX!
… the Williamtown Radar only operated out to 48nm.
Do you mean the maximum range of the radar was 48nm?
Or do you mean the Radar controller’s range of responsibility in the sky ended at 48nm?
It’s the difference between not being on radar at all on the one hand, and being on radar but not within the radar controller’s area of responsibility on the other.
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Creampuff -
That!
This -
Was much smaller! In fact, the operator on that night was not yet qualified to rely on radar for separation. He knew how to use, and could use it to assist his situational awareness, but, he was only 'qualified' to use procedural separation for aircraft in his airspace.
Do you mean the maximum range of the radar was 48nm?
This -
Or do you mean the Radar controller’s range of responsibility in the sky ended at 48nm?
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I am specifically referring to the SURAD, that was installed there and was operating in Aug '81. The PPI (Plan position indicator) that the controller had access to, was centred on Williamtown airport, and the outer edge of the PPI was 48nm. The MTI (moving target indicator, for those of you playing along at home, like a filter for clutter) was set at 44nm. There were range rings at every 10nm on the PPI, and a compass rose set around the outside edge. There were permanently displayed 'echoes' between 44 and 48nm that were the Barrington Tops.
There were other radars at Williamtown (and still are) but the only one being used for ATC duties, or even manned, on that night was the one I just described above. Would you like me to send a picture?
As for the last part of your post, you'll have to PM me.
There were other radars at Williamtown (and still are) but the only one being used for ATC duties, or even manned, on that night was the one I just described above. Would you like me to send a picture?
As for the last part of your post, you'll have to PM me.
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Inclined to agree with Dick regarding military airspace, I never could understand, in a modern day and age of the cruise missile, the strategic sense of having the means of defense parked right next to the means of supply.
On the odd occasion, when they have enough money, or the mood takes them, RAAF willy have been known to put an aircraft into the air thus blocking nearly all the airspace between Willy and Dubbo in the low to mid FL's to civilian traffic.
I guess it never affected the Rat or other airlines to any extent at high levels, but of course GA at mid levels, well they are just the dregs of the industry, not worthy of consideration.
I've come out of Armidale bound for Wagga in a metro, fifteen in the back, very wide eyed, stuck at 7000 ft in the most appalling weather ( One of those days when you scope the radar and go OH sh..T and turn it off) and had to endure the pounding, severe ice, etc. all the way to Mudgee before I could get a climb, because RAAF Willy had a hard on and an F16 practicing steep turns or whatever, over Singleton. Had to do it a few times in a Citation as well.
Always wondered Dick just how many tails are sticking out of the trees on the Barrington's? bet there's more than officially recognized.
On the odd occasion, when they have enough money, or the mood takes them, RAAF willy have been known to put an aircraft into the air thus blocking nearly all the airspace between Willy and Dubbo in the low to mid FL's to civilian traffic.
I guess it never affected the Rat or other airlines to any extent at high levels, but of course GA at mid levels, well they are just the dregs of the industry, not worthy of consideration.
I've come out of Armidale bound for Wagga in a metro, fifteen in the back, very wide eyed, stuck at 7000 ft in the most appalling weather ( One of those days when you scope the radar and go OH sh..T and turn it off) and had to endure the pounding, severe ice, etc. all the way to Mudgee before I could get a climb, because RAAF Willy had a hard on and an F16 practicing steep turns or whatever, over Singleton. Had to do it a few times in a Citation as well.
Always wondered Dick just how many tails are sticking out of the trees on the Barrington's? bet there's more than officially recognized.
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Thorny,
I actually agree with the problems getting through Mil airspace. I go back and forth from Sydney and Brisbane, and I get tired of spending the extra fuel to go and see scone from the air! Evans head particularly sh$ts me!!!
But it's not the controllers fault, they are operating inside the rules and framework that is set for them.
And there is quite a few planes in trees! Off the top of my head, there's a skipper, a macchi, a mirage, a Hudson, and Mdx! By no means an exhaustive list, it's been a long week and it's beer o'clock!
I actually agree with the problems getting through Mil airspace. I go back and forth from Sydney and Brisbane, and I get tired of spending the extra fuel to go and see scone from the air! Evans head particularly sh$ts me!!!
But it's not the controllers fault, they are operating inside the rules and framework that is set for them.
And there is quite a few planes in trees! Off the top of my head, there's a skipper, a macchi, a mirage, a Hudson, and Mdx! By no means an exhaustive list, it's been a long week and it's beer o'clock!
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Rats, I agree it aint the controllers, its the system. This Cr..P does not occur overseas, Australia is still living in a Second world war time warp.....no a first world war time warp!!!