RatsoreA
At the present time I am looking at the transcript of the communications and I cannot see at any stage that the MDX pilot was offered 7,000 or 9,000 feet and declined this. In fact, my transcript shows that at 18:53-47 he was told by Sydney Flight Service that the airspace at a high level in Williamtown was non-VMC. He then came back and said,
“I’d prefer to go coastal”.
He was then told to remain outside controlled airspace with the flight service officer saying,
“I will advise clearance as soon as possible”.
At 18:54-39 he then said,
“MDX, well, ah, we’re coming up to it pretty shortly”.
Sydney FSU said,
“Roger, remain outside controlled airspace while attempting to gain airways clearance”.
Then at 18:55-33 the pilot said to Sydney flight service,
“MDX, rather than wait for clearance we’ll go via Craven. Thank you.”
RatsoreA, it is pretty clear to me that the pilot thought he would probably have considerable holding, which is normal at Williamtown, and he didn’t want to do that over tiger country in pitch darkness at night. He possibly had good lights ahead of Williamtown and Newcastle, but pitch black behind him which he would have to turn into if he was going to hold.
Most importantly, I reckon the fact that the pilot was not able to talk directly to a radar controller did contribute to the accident. That was because when the pilot turned away from the correct heading, the flight service officer didn’t tell him because the FSO did not know!
I find it fascinating that BASI made no recommendation about using the radar more effectively.