The old SE V Twin:-)
The old SE V Twin:-)
Yeah I know some hate this subject & if so we say bye bye to you lot right now:-)
Okay seeing as the WX in Vic of late has been somewhat nasty with very low cloud & fog I'd like some constructive & qualified knowledge of the way the guys who do fly SE IFR (not just the Aero Med operators who operator the PC's) handle this (option wise) when confronted with a missed approach due fog or very low cloud. The old 'what if' that ONLY donk failed when the horses where called upon during go-around. How do you train for such events? Seeing as it's damn dangerous going around with 2 donks at yr disposal I've done quite a few appr's to the min of late & missed out (day & night) thinking God other than the obvious (crash) what is in place for a lost donk when there is only one in the first place.
Great EG. Missed Appr at AY off aDME Arr from Melb. Maneuver around a bit to do a NPA from the other direction. Terrain EVERYWHERE no probs with a spare donk at yr disposal but sheez still floors me that they allow this same Op in a SE plane!!!
I spoke to a pilot some time ago who flew PC's & said they try to enter the circuit at VNE to have enough energy to do a complete circuit to land off. Fine if you can see where ya going & yr not sliding off yr seat due the obvious & you had in the first place Alt to gain that speed but what if it's (WX) on the deck & you where back at low speed in the first place?
Now lets see if we can keep it civilized boys & girls those that know me know that I believe SE IFR Ops is suicide in commercial ops of any nature actually but just want to understand the logic behind those decisions for low level Ops in cloud.
Wmk2 has helmet & shield at the ready for those that are born nasty
Okay seeing as the WX in Vic of late has been somewhat nasty with very low cloud & fog I'd like some constructive & qualified knowledge of the way the guys who do fly SE IFR (not just the Aero Med operators who operator the PC's) handle this (option wise) when confronted with a missed approach due fog or very low cloud. The old 'what if' that ONLY donk failed when the horses where called upon during go-around. How do you train for such events? Seeing as it's damn dangerous going around with 2 donks at yr disposal I've done quite a few appr's to the min of late & missed out (day & night) thinking God other than the obvious (crash) what is in place for a lost donk when there is only one in the first place.
Great EG. Missed Appr at AY off aDME Arr from Melb. Maneuver around a bit to do a NPA from the other direction. Terrain EVERYWHERE no probs with a spare donk at yr disposal but sheez still floors me that they allow this same Op in a SE plane!!!
I spoke to a pilot some time ago who flew PC's & said they try to enter the circuit at VNE to have enough energy to do a complete circuit to land off. Fine if you can see where ya going & yr not sliding off yr seat due the obvious & you had in the first place Alt to gain that speed but what if it's (WX) on the deck & you where back at low speed in the first place?
Now lets see if we can keep it civilized boys & girls those that know me know that I believe SE IFR Ops is suicide in commercial ops of any nature actually but just want to understand the logic behind those decisions for low level Ops in cloud.
Wmk2 has helmet & shield at the ready for those that are born nasty
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Gooday Wally 
You mean like FTDK's latest video which I have enclosed below for your viewing pleasure
.
I might refrain from commenting too much as I have less experience than say Forkie or Chuckles, but one does need to consider their "need" to operate, the likely weather and what would you do if. Local knowledge is a big help of course, but maybe the mental preperation of if it goes quiet you know you have to put down as best you can in a very short viewing window, where as the twin that goes and then loses the plot was never really expecting anything of the sort. Your King Air might be the minimum spec for doing it safely as many twins are marginal according to a lot of the folk here!
This should be a great thread!
You mean like FTDK's latest video which I have enclosed below for your viewing pleasure
.I might refrain from commenting too much as I have less experience than say Forkie or Chuckles, but one does need to consider their "need" to operate, the likely weather and what would you do if. Local knowledge is a big help of course, but maybe the mental preperation of if it goes quiet you know you have to put down as best you can in a very short viewing window, where as the twin that goes and then loses the plot was never really expecting anything of the sort. Your King Air might be the minimum spec for doing it safely as many twins are marginal according to a lot of the folk here!
This should be a great thread!
Yep 'jaba' this thread is dedicated so hopefully will be a great thread. Often I/we have been accused of hijacking a thread but not this time only the Mods will slam it shut (which i suspect they will anyway)
I've seen 'Forkies' Vid, he'smy hero !
Having a B200 as the Min would be nice but we don't live in a fairytale world, besides it's not just the airframe that needs to be capable a lot of twin drivers have killed themselves with one shut down whilst flying low lvl in IMC.
Hey 'Mav' I see the bible is also leather bound like quality Jepps, good one, a 'must have'
I had a 15 yr old kid in the cockpit today (yes I have a working with kiddies pass) as a work experience pax. Few make it there as ya gotta know someone who knows someone who knows someone !!! This kid is nuts about flying!! He already has around 50 hrs on those funny planes (Techno-crap thingies?) & can he fly! He's as good as any of the line pilots at holding a heading & Alt in IMC that I've seen! He mentioned do many fly SE IFR so hence this thread was kind of born from his curiosity about 'what-if' in a SE so here we are trying to answer even someone that is new to the flying game:-) Hopefully I have saved at least one!
Wmk2
I've seen 'Forkies' Vid, he'smy hero !
Having a B200 as the Min would be nice but we don't live in a fairytale world, besides it's not just the airframe that needs to be capable a lot of twin drivers have killed themselves with one shut down whilst flying low lvl in IMC.
Hey 'Mav' I see the bible is also leather bound like quality Jepps, good one, a 'must have'
I had a 15 yr old kid in the cockpit today (yes I have a working with kiddies pass) as a work experience pax. Few make it there as ya gotta know someone who knows someone who knows someone !!! This kid is nuts about flying!! He already has around 50 hrs on those funny planes (Techno-crap thingies?) & can he fly! He's as good as any of the line pilots at holding a heading & Alt in IMC that I've seen! He mentioned do many fly SE IFR so hence this thread was kind of born from his curiosity about 'what-if' in a SE so here we are trying to answer even someone that is new to the flying game:-) Hopefully I have saved at least one!
Wmk2
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Here is a thought for you Wally Forky and Buzzy.
If as Wally asked you get to the minima at say 700 and commence a MA and it quits, chances are you are most often runway aligned, and you will break out albeit below the minima but eventually visualwith a runway lose by and a few hundred feet to salvage something. That is not a lot different to a VMC EFATO, except you might have the failure and be visual with a whole runway ahead of you at 400' and not behind you.
Food for thought.
Of course a night in IMC arrival off an NDB/VOR/DME/GPS which is not runway aligned may present a less favourable view, but as Forkie just said, keep the Night IMC stuff to a minimum.
J
If as Wally asked you get to the minima at say 700 and commence a MA and it quits, chances are you are most often runway aligned, and you will break out albeit below the minima but eventually visualwith a runway lose by and a few hundred feet to salvage something. That is not a lot different to a VMC EFATO, except you might have the failure and be visual with a whole runway ahead of you at 400' and not behind you.
Food for thought.
Of course a night in IMC arrival off an NDB/VOR/DME/GPS which is not runway aligned may present a less favourable view, but as Forkie just said, keep the Night IMC stuff to a minimum.
J
'forky' I think you missed the point here with my thread (that's okay I accept all answers)& a couple of yr comments have me scratching my head but again I need to scratch an itch every now & then If you want to die trying that's yr choice but why put yourself in that position in the first place? Anyway again yr choice & fair enough & I would rather not try to bounce off the walls of why it's safer in a twin we each have our own beliefs, mine isn't shared by you & many more like you.
My thread is more aimed at what training/ideas/thoughts/outs/self discipline procedures one has IF the only donk quits at the bottom of an appr where you didn't get visual not so more the merits of a twin eng craft.
Moving map displays on GPS's must be a good tool for an instant 'where am I' if it does fail, I wonder what pilots do re configuring the craft. Min Spd, wings Lvl, seat belts tight & lots of pillows between you & that Conty just ahead of you that's going to be sitting right beside you (if yr lucky & not actually in yr lap!) in the cockpit in a matter of seconds!
'jaba' yr call is to keep going at the minima, fair enuf one has no choice in a SE but imagine for real that you where at the minima apply power, select gear up flap up & bingo it splutters & almost dies. Now yr clean with a higher stall speed which is fast staring you in the face! Yr now faced with a plane that has no thrust that's usable, yr still in cloud & sure the rwy if it's an aligned one is out there in front of you somewhere but you where flying into a 30 kt H/W so making the strip is marginal at best along with handling a plane that is sinking at over 800 ft per min (EG) with maybe pax on board now screaming adding to yr almost breaking point stress levels & you simply don't see the ground 'till about a 100 ft or so with numerous obstacles directly in yr path. Yr air speed is now hovering around the stall the sink rate is nasty & yr seconds away from possibly the end of yr life & others (if that be the case) That's alright for 'forkie' he's okay with dieing whilst trying would you be??yr just an EG 'jaba' not meant to give you nightmares buddy
Anyway back to the original thread concept. Perhaps add a couple of hundred ft to the Min for a safety buffer meaning a little more time to deal with an eng fail but I guess that negates the whole reason why we do inst appr's in the first place, to get visual.
There is no answer in my mind but simply not do it, fly SE IFR but seeing as it's not illegal to do it for pvt ops it comes down to personal choice but what about those being transported in a SE plane allowed for IFR Ops? They don't have a choice most time is their life expendable?? They make twin engined A/c for very good reasons mainly SAFETY.
Everything about aviation is based around safety but one has to wonder sometimes!
Food for thought
Wally nk2
If you want to die trying that's yr choice but why put yourself in that position in the first place? Anyway again yr choice & fair enough & I would rather not try to bounce off the walls of why it's safer in a twin we each have our own beliefs, mine isn't shared by you & many more like you.My thread is more aimed at what training/ideas/thoughts/outs/self discipline procedures one has IF the only donk quits at the bottom of an appr where you didn't get visual not so more the merits of a twin eng craft.
Moving map displays on GPS's must be a good tool for an instant 'where am I' if it does fail, I wonder what pilots do re configuring the craft. Min Spd, wings Lvl, seat belts tight & lots of pillows between you & that Conty just ahead of you that's going to be sitting right beside you (if yr lucky & not actually in yr lap!) in the cockpit in a matter of seconds!
'jaba' yr call is to keep going at the minima, fair enuf one has no choice in a SE but imagine for real that you where at the minima apply power, select gear up flap up & bingo it splutters & almost dies. Now yr clean with a higher stall speed which is fast staring you in the face! Yr now faced with a plane that has no thrust that's usable, yr still in cloud & sure the rwy if it's an aligned one is out there in front of you somewhere but you where flying into a 30 kt H/W so making the strip is marginal at best along with handling a plane that is sinking at over 800 ft per min (EG) with maybe pax on board now screaming adding to yr almost breaking point stress levels & you simply don't see the ground 'till about a 100 ft or so with numerous obstacles directly in yr path. Yr air speed is now hovering around the stall the sink rate is nasty & yr seconds away from possibly the end of yr life & others (if that be the case) That's alright for 'forkie' he's okay with dieing whilst trying would you be??yr just an EG 'jaba' not meant to give you nightmares buddy
Anyway back to the original thread concept. Perhaps add a couple of hundred ft to the Min for a safety buffer meaning a little more time to deal with an eng fail but I guess that negates the whole reason why we do inst appr's in the first place, to get visual.
There is no answer in my mind but simply not do it, fly SE IFR but seeing as it's not illegal to do it for pvt ops it comes down to personal choice but what about those being transported in a SE plane allowed for IFR Ops? They don't have a choice most time is their life expendable?? They make twin engined A/c for very good reasons mainly SAFETY.
Everything about aviation is based around safety but one has to wonder sometimes!
Food for thought
Wally nk2
Just the reaction I expected of you Dr..........says it all so plz move on TY yr not forced to have a say here:-)
'Mr Buzzy' couldn't agree with you more there. A 'twin' is only as safe as the driver who commands it. A light twin simply gives you more choices, may not always the perfect result but can if handled well buy you time
\Wmk2
'Mr Buzzy' couldn't agree with you more there. A 'twin' is only as safe as the driver who commands it. A light twin simply gives you more choices, may not always the perfect result but can if handled well buy you time
\Wmk2
Last edited by Wally Mk2; 20th Jul 2010 at 11:23.
Wally its not whats in the air that kills you its whats on the ground. No problem with s/e ifr ops per se, but theres lots of places i wouldnt fly a single in vmc or imc.
I'll bite Wally, but only because of all the help you've given me
There are a couple of short windows where we are outside of gliding distance. A missed approach due fog would certainly be one of these windows. The odds of the engine failing (remember, we've got half the chance of an engine failure that you do!) in this critical window are minimal, and as far as I am concerned the reduced risk of mishandling the aircraft in this and other scenarios more or less outweighs the risk.
So, when it does all go quiet in the soup on a foggy night.... Minimum energy speed, wings level, etc., and pray that the cabin strength is really as good as they say.
When its other than fog we're talking about, I tend to keep as much energy as possible up my sleeve, and could glide in from almost any point on the approach other than an ILS.
To compare a Kingair and a PC12, I don't think there is much in it safetywise, but the biggest difference is that in a Kingair the pilot is more likely to be in direct control of the outcome. I think this leads to a confidence in the overall safety, that might not necessarily be real.
How do the safety stats compare for accidents in the overshoot phase of flight?
There are a couple of short windows where we are outside of gliding distance. A missed approach due fog would certainly be one of these windows. The odds of the engine failing (remember, we've got half the chance of an engine failure that you do!) in this critical window are minimal, and as far as I am concerned the reduced risk of mishandling the aircraft in this and other scenarios more or less outweighs the risk.
So, when it does all go quiet in the soup on a foggy night.... Minimum energy speed, wings level, etc., and pray that the cabin strength is really as good as they say.
When its other than fog we're talking about, I tend to keep as much energy as possible up my sleeve, and could glide in from almost any point on the approach other than an ILS.
To compare a Kingair and a PC12, I don't think there is much in it safetywise, but the biggest difference is that in a Kingair the pilot is more likely to be in direct control of the outcome. I think this leads to a confidence in the overall safety, that might not necessarily be real.
How do the safety stats compare for accidents in the overshoot phase of flight?
that's fine 'glek' I hoped you would add to this Energy management is what I guess SE is all about. I would imagine if I where at the controls of a SE in the poo I'd like to be at the top end of the speed range for just that bit more insurance.
Not sure on the stats 'glek' I'd go as far as to say that twins don't favour too well mainly due poor handling in a SE go -around. We practice this in the Sim.leave the flap & gear down on a SE go-around, it's a handful seeing as it's only ever night time in the Sim!
I hope those 'short windows' you mentioned never get looked out of Stay safe buddy
'des' fully agree there:-) But what goes up must come down, just that I like to have some say over when more than where
'pa39' that's a good point, make a command decision well before the bottom of the ride. Way too late to be thinking of what escape plan I have if it goes all quite at the minima.
Wmk2
Energy management is what I guess SE is all about. I would imagine if I where at the controls of a SE in the poo I'd like to be at the top end of the speed range for just that bit more insurance.Not sure on the stats 'glek' I'd go as far as to say that twins don't favour too well mainly due poor handling in a SE go -around. We practice this in the Sim.leave the flap & gear down on a SE go-around, it's a handful seeing as it's only ever night time in the Sim!
I hope those 'short windows' you mentioned never get looked out of
Stay safe buddy'des' fully agree there:-) But what goes up must come down, just that I like to have some say over when more than where
'pa39' that's a good point, make a command decision well before the bottom of the ride. Way too late to be thinking of what escape plan I have if it goes all quite at the minima.
Wmk2
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This is all hypothetical to the max. The fact is look at the fatal accident statistics in all aircraft following an engine failure in singles and twins (both VMC and IMC), and the twins end up being the biggest killers. Simple, true and factual. Enough said.
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Wally
1st
well in a single your choices are???
......... no I would not be cleaned up.....flap is not even touched unit the aircraft is climbing away well and truly, so I am still in the landing config ready to land, even if the engine gives way. and from the minima the runway is generally in front of me still so raising the flap...ala Heathrow B777 is likely to be the scenario.
.............. yep and off most RNAV's thats the kind of approach you need as the MA is still rather steep to the rnway so if the engine fails you will still make the runway, some are further out but most the MA is nicely placed in my opinion.
As forkie said.......its all about risk management. You can not live your life worrying about when the engine will **** itself!
J
1st
'jaba' yr call is to keep going at the minima
Now yr clean with a higher stall speed which is fast staring you in the face!
but you where flying into a 30 kt H/W so making the strip is marginal at best along with handling a plane that is sinking at over 800 ft per min (EG) with maybe pax on board now screaming adding to yr almost breaking point stress levels & you simply don't see the ground 'till about a 100 ft or so with numerous obstacles directly in yr path.
and off most RNAV's thats the kind of approach you need as the MA is still rather steep to the rnway so if the engine fails you will still make the runway, some are further out but most the MA is nicely placed in my opinion.As forkie said.......its all about risk management. You can not live your life worrying about when the engine will **** itself!
J
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And if your in a nice new PC12, fly it at best glide, turn the range knob on the map display down to 1 or 0.5nm and fly the plane onto the runway that will be displayed on the map. If you're looking like not making it (highly unlikely in most cases) convert to minimum impact config, and as previously mentioned, hope the structural integrity of the fuse and seats are as good as they say they are.
Wally,
I believe there was a study once showing that people who choose their own number in a raffle/lottery are more prone to believe that 'their' number will win, despite the odds being exactly the same!
Remeber you've got twice the chance of a failure, thus twice the chance of an unfeatherable failure, twice the chance of an uncontained failure, twice the chance of an uncontrollable engine bay fire, and a lot more chance of that spreading to the fuel tanks and wings!
I believe there was a study once showing that people who choose their own number in a raffle/lottery are more prone to believe that 'their' number will win, despite the odds being exactly the same!
Remeber you've got twice the chance of a failure, thus twice the chance of an unfeatherable failure, twice the chance of an uncontained failure, twice the chance of an uncontrollable engine bay fire, and a lot more chance of that spreading to the fuel tanks and wings!
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SE (Six Engine) IFR ops
My first post and it is thread drift I know, how many engines is enough? An engine probs - airport below minima accident from the 50s...
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Aircraft Commander 1st Lt. Oliver Hildebrandt, Pilot 1st Lt. Walter Ross, and Co-pilot Captain Wilbur Evans, and a crew of thirteen took off from Carswell AFB in B-36B, 44-92035 of the 26th Bomb Squadron of the 7th Bomb Wing at 5:05 A.M. on November 22,1950. The planned 30-hour training mission consisted of air-to-air gunnery, bombing, simulated radar bombing, and navigational training.
Immediately after take-off, the #4 alternator would not stay in parallel with the other three alternators, so it was taken off-line and de-excited three minutes into the flight.
About one minute after the #4 alternator was shut down, flames 8 to 12 feet long erupted from around the air plug of the number-one engine. The left scanner reported the flames to the pilot. Six minutes after take-off, the flight engineer shut down the number-one engine, feathered its propeller, and expended one of its Methyl bromide fire extinguishing bottles. The mission continued on the power of the remaining five engines.
44-92035 cruised to the gunnery range on Matagorda Island at an altitude of 5,000 feet. It arrived at 7:00 A.M. and the gunners began practicing.
Radar Observer S/Sgt. Ray Earl manned the tail turret. The charger for the right gun burned out, so he expended just half of his ammunition. Then the APG-3 radar for the tail turret started acting up, so S/Sgt. Earl secured the set.
Aircraft Commander 1st Lt. Oliver Hildebrandt noted that the vibration from firing the 20mm cannons increased significantly during the fourth gunnery pass. Immediately afterward, radar operator Captain James Yeingst notified Hildebrandt that the APQ-24 radar set blew up and was smoking. Vibration from the firing of the guns was causing shorting between the internal components of the radar. Then the liaison transmitter failed as well.
The cannons in the left forward upper turret and the left rear upper turret stopped firing. The gunners attempted to retract the gun turrets, but the failed turrets would not retract. Gunner S/Sgt. Fred Boyd entered the turret bay, but other problems began to take precedence over the stuck turrets. Boyd was called out of the bay before he could manually crank the turret down.
At 7:31 A.M. the number-three engine suffered an internal failure. The torque pressure fell to zero. The manifold pressure dropped to atmospheric pressure. The fuel flow dropped off, and the flight engineer could not stabilize the engine speed.
The pilot shut down the number-three engine and feathered its propeller. The B-36B had only one operating engine on the left wing, so the pilot aborted the remainder of the training mission and set course for Kelly Air Force Base.
Flight engineer Captain Samuel Baker retarded the spark, set the mixture controls to "normal", and set the engine RPMs to 2,500 to increase the power from the remaining engines. Unknown to Captain Baker, the vibration from the guns had disabled the electrical systems controlling the spark settings and fuel mixture. He immediately discovered that the turbo control knobs no longer affected the manifold pressure.
The B-36B could not maintain its airspeed on the power of the four remaining engines. It descended about 1,000 feet and its airspeed bled off to 135 miles per hour. The pilot called for more power. The flight engineer attempted to increase engine speed to 2,650 RPM and enrich the fuel mixture, but got no response from the engines except for severe backfiring. The fuel mixture indicators for all of the engines indicated lean.
The second flight engineer, M/Sgt. Edward Farcas, checked the electrical fuse panel. Although the fuses appeared to be intact, he replaced the master turbo fuse and all of the individual turbo fuses. He noticed that the turbo-amplifiers and mixture amplifiers were all cooler than normal. He climbed into the bomb bay to check the aircraft power panels and fuses, but could not find any problem there.
Kelly Air Force Base had a cloud overcast at just 300 feet and the visibility was restricted to two miles. The weather at Bergstrom Air Force Base not as bad, with scattered clouds at 1,000 feet, broken clouds at 2,000 feet and 10 miles visibility. Carswell Air Force Base was clear with 10 miles visibility, but it was 155 miles farther away than Bergstrom.
Air traffic control cleared all airspace below 4,000 feet aead of the crippled B-36B. Aircraft Commander Hildebrandt was flying on instruments in thick clouds.
The poor weather at Kelly Air Force Base convinced Hildebrandt to change course from Kelly to Carswell Air Force Base, passing by Bergstrom Air Force Base on the way in case the airplane could not make it to Carswell.
Bombardier Captain Robert Nelson made two attempts to salvo the 1,500 pounds of practice bombs in the rear bomb bay, but the bomb bay doors would not open by automatic or manual control, or emergency procedure.
There was no way to dump fuel to reduce the weight of the B-36B.
The flight engineers resorted to holding down the switches used to prime the fuel system in an attempt to increase fuel flow to the engines. M/Sgt. Edward Farcas held down the prime switches for the number-two and number-four engines while Captain Baker held down the prime switch for the number-five engine and operated the flight engineer's panel. The configuration of the switches did not allow them to prime the number-five engine and the number-six engine at the same time.
The high power demand coupled with the lean fuel mixture made the cylinder head temperatures of the engines climb to 295 degrees C. Flight engineer Baker jockeyed the throttles, decreasing the throttle setting of the engine with the highest cylinder head temperature until another engine grew even hotter. The high temperature caused the gasoline/air mixture in the cylinders to detonate before the pistons reached top dead center, diminishing power and damaging the engines.
Despite the critical situation with the engines, Aircraft Commander Hildebrandt decided to continue past Bergstrom Air Force Base to Carswell. Bergstrom was overcast and its runway was only 6,000 feet long. Carswell offered a much longer runway.
By the time the B-36B reached Cleburne, the backfiring on all engines increased in violence. The number-2, number-5, and number-6 engines were running at 70% power and the number-4 engine was producing only 20% power. The airspeed had dropped off to 130 miles per hour.
Aircraft Commander Hildebrandt attempted to restart the number-one engine, the one that had spouted flames on take-off, but fuel was not getting to its induction system. He tried to restart the number-three engine, but could not unfeather the propeller on that engine.
As the bomber passed to the west of Cleburne, the right scanner reported dense white smoke, oil, and metal particles coming from the number-five engine. After a short while the number-five engine lost power, and Aircraft Commander Hildebrandt feathered the propeller on that engine while still twenty-one miles from Carswell Air Force Base.
The B-36B could not stay airborne on the power of the three remaining failing engines. It was flying at just 125 miles per hour, seven miles per hour above the stall speed, losing both altitude and airspeed.
Howard McCullough and W. Boeten were flying Civil Aeronautics Authority DC-3 N342 near Cleburne. They were notified by Meacham Tower to be on the lookout for 44-92035. They spotted it about five miles south of Cleburne. They observed that the number-one and number-three propellers were feathered and the number-five engine was on fire. They turned to follow the descending bomber.
Aircraft Commander Hildebrandt ordered the crew to bail out of the stricken bomber.
-----------
Aircraft Commander 1st Lt. Oliver Hildebrandt, Pilot 1st Lt. Walter Ross, and Co-pilot Captain Wilbur Evans, and a crew of thirteen took off from Carswell AFB in B-36B, 44-92035 of the 26th Bomb Squadron of the 7th Bomb Wing at 5:05 A.M. on November 22,1950. The planned 30-hour training mission consisted of air-to-air gunnery, bombing, simulated radar bombing, and navigational training.
Immediately after take-off, the #4 alternator would not stay in parallel with the other three alternators, so it was taken off-line and de-excited three minutes into the flight.
About one minute after the #4 alternator was shut down, flames 8 to 12 feet long erupted from around the air plug of the number-one engine. The left scanner reported the flames to the pilot. Six minutes after take-off, the flight engineer shut down the number-one engine, feathered its propeller, and expended one of its Methyl bromide fire extinguishing bottles. The mission continued on the power of the remaining five engines.
44-92035 cruised to the gunnery range on Matagorda Island at an altitude of 5,000 feet. It arrived at 7:00 A.M. and the gunners began practicing.
Radar Observer S/Sgt. Ray Earl manned the tail turret. The charger for the right gun burned out, so he expended just half of his ammunition. Then the APG-3 radar for the tail turret started acting up, so S/Sgt. Earl secured the set.
Aircraft Commander 1st Lt. Oliver Hildebrandt noted that the vibration from firing the 20mm cannons increased significantly during the fourth gunnery pass. Immediately afterward, radar operator Captain James Yeingst notified Hildebrandt that the APQ-24 radar set blew up and was smoking. Vibration from the firing of the guns was causing shorting between the internal components of the radar. Then the liaison transmitter failed as well.
The cannons in the left forward upper turret and the left rear upper turret stopped firing. The gunners attempted to retract the gun turrets, but the failed turrets would not retract. Gunner S/Sgt. Fred Boyd entered the turret bay, but other problems began to take precedence over the stuck turrets. Boyd was called out of the bay before he could manually crank the turret down.
At 7:31 A.M. the number-three engine suffered an internal failure. The torque pressure fell to zero. The manifold pressure dropped to atmospheric pressure. The fuel flow dropped off, and the flight engineer could not stabilize the engine speed.
The pilot shut down the number-three engine and feathered its propeller. The B-36B had only one operating engine on the left wing, so the pilot aborted the remainder of the training mission and set course for Kelly Air Force Base.
Flight engineer Captain Samuel Baker retarded the spark, set the mixture controls to "normal", and set the engine RPMs to 2,500 to increase the power from the remaining engines. Unknown to Captain Baker, the vibration from the guns had disabled the electrical systems controlling the spark settings and fuel mixture. He immediately discovered that the turbo control knobs no longer affected the manifold pressure.
The B-36B could not maintain its airspeed on the power of the four remaining engines. It descended about 1,000 feet and its airspeed bled off to 135 miles per hour. The pilot called for more power. The flight engineer attempted to increase engine speed to 2,650 RPM and enrich the fuel mixture, but got no response from the engines except for severe backfiring. The fuel mixture indicators for all of the engines indicated lean.
The second flight engineer, M/Sgt. Edward Farcas, checked the electrical fuse panel. Although the fuses appeared to be intact, he replaced the master turbo fuse and all of the individual turbo fuses. He noticed that the turbo-amplifiers and mixture amplifiers were all cooler than normal. He climbed into the bomb bay to check the aircraft power panels and fuses, but could not find any problem there.
Kelly Air Force Base had a cloud overcast at just 300 feet and the visibility was restricted to two miles. The weather at Bergstrom Air Force Base not as bad, with scattered clouds at 1,000 feet, broken clouds at 2,000 feet and 10 miles visibility. Carswell Air Force Base was clear with 10 miles visibility, but it was 155 miles farther away than Bergstrom.
Air traffic control cleared all airspace below 4,000 feet aead of the crippled B-36B. Aircraft Commander Hildebrandt was flying on instruments in thick clouds.
The poor weather at Kelly Air Force Base convinced Hildebrandt to change course from Kelly to Carswell Air Force Base, passing by Bergstrom Air Force Base on the way in case the airplane could not make it to Carswell.
Bombardier Captain Robert Nelson made two attempts to salvo the 1,500 pounds of practice bombs in the rear bomb bay, but the bomb bay doors would not open by automatic or manual control, or emergency procedure.
There was no way to dump fuel to reduce the weight of the B-36B.
The flight engineers resorted to holding down the switches used to prime the fuel system in an attempt to increase fuel flow to the engines. M/Sgt. Edward Farcas held down the prime switches for the number-two and number-four engines while Captain Baker held down the prime switch for the number-five engine and operated the flight engineer's panel. The configuration of the switches did not allow them to prime the number-five engine and the number-six engine at the same time.
The high power demand coupled with the lean fuel mixture made the cylinder head temperatures of the engines climb to 295 degrees C. Flight engineer Baker jockeyed the throttles, decreasing the throttle setting of the engine with the highest cylinder head temperature until another engine grew even hotter. The high temperature caused the gasoline/air mixture in the cylinders to detonate before the pistons reached top dead center, diminishing power and damaging the engines.
Despite the critical situation with the engines, Aircraft Commander Hildebrandt decided to continue past Bergstrom Air Force Base to Carswell. Bergstrom was overcast and its runway was only 6,000 feet long. Carswell offered a much longer runway.
By the time the B-36B reached Cleburne, the backfiring on all engines increased in violence. The number-2, number-5, and number-6 engines were running at 70% power and the number-4 engine was producing only 20% power. The airspeed had dropped off to 130 miles per hour.
Aircraft Commander Hildebrandt attempted to restart the number-one engine, the one that had spouted flames on take-off, but fuel was not getting to its induction system. He tried to restart the number-three engine, but could not unfeather the propeller on that engine.
As the bomber passed to the west of Cleburne, the right scanner reported dense white smoke, oil, and metal particles coming from the number-five engine. After a short while the number-five engine lost power, and Aircraft Commander Hildebrandt feathered the propeller on that engine while still twenty-one miles from Carswell Air Force Base.
The B-36B could not stay airborne on the power of the three remaining failing engines. It was flying at just 125 miles per hour, seven miles per hour above the stall speed, losing both altitude and airspeed.
Howard McCullough and W. Boeten were flying Civil Aeronautics Authority DC-3 N342 near Cleburne. They were notified by Meacham Tower to be on the lookout for 44-92035. They spotted it about five miles south of Cleburne. They observed that the number-one and number-three propellers were feathered and the number-five engine was on fire. They turned to follow the descending bomber.
Aircraft Commander Hildebrandt ordered the crew to bail out of the stricken bomber.