AA Crash Jamaica
I wonder how much reverse was used.
Idle reverse to 'save fuel' is a common practice now. So common that many Pilots will not use max reverse even when needed.
Idle reverse to 'save fuel' is a common practice now. So common that many Pilots will not use max reverse even when needed.
Are you a pilot? If not, please state your analysis of reverse thrust operations in transport aircraft.
Thank you
So why didn’t the crew not realise they were far from the touchdown zone...
waves-dubai (#347), the short answer is probable due to them being human; everyone suffers error.
The more difficult question to answer is, what can the industry and individuals do about it.
Eminent scientists tell us the human condition is difficult to change and that it’s easier to change the conditions in which we work.
In this instance, it’s not about changing the weather etc (might be how to avoid it), but to consider the systematic and organisational issues which can influence human behaviour. Motivation - goal-seeking is a powerful force, thus time or fuel pressures as noted earlier provide a subconscious bias in our thinking. (Do the Feds really still log ‘on-time' arrival / departure?!?)
Individually, we must understand that we are error prone, both from the physical senses (illusions and disorientation) and in our thoughts – assessments, reasoning (judgement), and decisions.
We tend to see what we want to; we underestimate the risks in options, overestimate our capabilities – we think that we are better than we are.
Similarly we think we know more than is necessary for evaluating a situation, yet when judging the situation, perhaps with not knowing the rationale behind many of the regulations or company SOPs, we let a poor situation become worse. Etc, etc, etc.
Then we get tired / fatigued, suffer illness, and suffer personal pressures; we get up-tight about situations, are concerned about our personal performance, we fear for our jobs.
Perhaps we need the experience of having done something similar, but most important recognising why we suffered the error and why we behave as we did. We must recognise that although the outcome of that situation appeared to have been safe, in reality it was not, and must not be repeated. The behaviour must not become habitual; reality has a nasty habit of returning with vengeance.
Individually, and as an industry, when operating in a difficult commercial climate, we often operate too close to the edge of safety.
Do we always know where the boundary between safety and an accident is?
Often quoted is the need to balance safety with commerce; yet many eminent opinions suggest that this is not the case - I agree.
You can have high safety levels and commercial success, but this involves compromise, skilled management, critical thinking, and controlled behaviour, from both the organisation and the individual.
The more difficult question to answer is, what can the industry and individuals do about it.
Eminent scientists tell us the human condition is difficult to change and that it’s easier to change the conditions in which we work.
In this instance, it’s not about changing the weather etc (might be how to avoid it), but to consider the systematic and organisational issues which can influence human behaviour. Motivation - goal-seeking is a powerful force, thus time or fuel pressures as noted earlier provide a subconscious bias in our thinking. (Do the Feds really still log ‘on-time' arrival / departure?!?)
Individually, we must understand that we are error prone, both from the physical senses (illusions and disorientation) and in our thoughts – assessments, reasoning (judgement), and decisions.
We tend to see what we want to; we underestimate the risks in options, overestimate our capabilities – we think that we are better than we are.
Similarly we think we know more than is necessary for evaluating a situation, yet when judging the situation, perhaps with not knowing the rationale behind many of the regulations or company SOPs, we let a poor situation become worse. Etc, etc, etc.
Then we get tired / fatigued, suffer illness, and suffer personal pressures; we get up-tight about situations, are concerned about our personal performance, we fear for our jobs.
Perhaps we need the experience of having done something similar, but most important recognising why we suffered the error and why we behave as we did. We must recognise that although the outcome of that situation appeared to have been safe, in reality it was not, and must not be repeated. The behaviour must not become habitual; reality has a nasty habit of returning with vengeance.
Individually, and as an industry, when operating in a difficult commercial climate, we often operate too close to the edge of safety.
Do we always know where the boundary between safety and an accident is?
Often quoted is the need to balance safety with commerce; yet many eminent opinions suggest that this is not the case - I agree.
You can have high safety levels and commercial success, but this involves compromise, skilled management, critical thinking, and controlled behaviour, from both the organisation and the individual.
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Using ILS guidance at low altitude requires good beam quality. Some Cat 1 installations suffer low altitude beam bend and the GS may suffer more than normal ‘parabolic’ distortion, the latter taking the aircraft high.
Also be mindful that the HUD generates its own GS reference line.
HUD brochure
Zeffy, so without precision centreline guidance (offset LOC), the HUD could only be used in the ‘visual’ mode, and except for the flight path vector, the landing has to be made on what the pilot can see ‘outside of the HUD’. Also AFAIR, the ‘self generated GS’ is actually an aircraft referenced descent angle for FPV comparison – the GS is not earth referenced as the ILS GS is.
So if the approach and landing involves poor visibility or weak runway lighting, then the HUD is of no great benefit and if it detracts visual attention from the real world, it could be a hazard.
The link is mostly sales blurb, but in the VMC mode I assume that the FPV is based on an inertial reference opposed to being airmass derived. If the latter, then there might be some very interesting flare results in a tailwind.
So if the approach and landing involves poor visibility or weak runway lighting, then the HUD is of no great benefit and if it detracts visual attention from the real world, it could be a hazard.
The link is mostly sales blurb, but in the VMC mode I assume that the FPV is based on an inertial reference opposed to being airmass derived. If the latter, then there might be some very interesting flare results in a tailwind.
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PEI_3721
Also AFAIR, the ‘self generated GS’ is actually an aircraft referenced descent angle for FPV comparison – the GS is not earth referenced as the ILS GS is.
If the HUD's 3.0-deg reference line is deep in the touchdown zone or even at the far end of the runway, the airplane is above the desired path.
The pilot need only temporarily place the FPV short of the runway until the 3.0-deg GS reference line moves "down" to the desired spot in the TDZ. Typical visual technique is to place the GS reference line on the PAPI. Once the GS reference line is on the PAPI lights, the FPV is moved back "up" to the GS reference line.
Headwind, tailwind, crosswind... doesn't matter -- the position of the FPV precisely indicates where the airplane is going.
The HUD is a wonderful piece of techology and very well suited for night-time, "black hole" approaches.
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regarding the little rock crash...if the captain had armed correctly...ok
if the copilot had caught the mistake...ok
BUT BOTH SHOULD HAVE VERIFIED DEPLOYMENT on touchdown and activated them manually...it is nice sound hearing the spoiler handle move...and without it the landing is WRONG.
the copilot should have been further briefed that just cuz he is flying with a chief pilot, he isn't relieved from alerting the captain to errors.
HOW TO PREVENT this jamaica crash again...anywhere:
abolish downwind/tailwind landings
grooved runways at all jet airports
touchdown zone lighting ,vasi and all known approach aids
EMAS over runs at all jet airports
retrain all pilots that they will lose their job (with exceptions) for not going around if landing won't happen in the touchdown zone.
if the copilot had caught the mistake...ok
BUT BOTH SHOULD HAVE VERIFIED DEPLOYMENT on touchdown and activated them manually...it is nice sound hearing the spoiler handle move...and without it the landing is WRONG.
the copilot should have been further briefed that just cuz he is flying with a chief pilot, he isn't relieved from alerting the captain to errors.
HOW TO PREVENT this jamaica crash again...anywhere:
abolish downwind/tailwind landings
grooved runways at all jet airports
touchdown zone lighting ,vasi and all known approach aids
EMAS over runs at all jet airports
retrain all pilots that they will lose their job (with exceptions) for not going around if landing won't happen in the touchdown zone.
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...we fear for our jobs.
What absolute nonsense.
Never, in 43 years of professional flying, have I been in 'fear' for my job.
Ever.
What we seem to have here is pilots with no backbone.
Certainly, that is their problem...as it
most certainly is not mine...and many other pilots that I know.
The 'new' breed, it seems, is 'scared' of their own shadow.
How very unfortunate.
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411A, I'm curious as to how you managed an average of 2 posts per day, every day, for the last 10 years! when do you get the time to fly!
Anyway folks, this thread is about trying to land a 737NG, not the Space Shuttle, basic airmanship is being lost through reliance on technology, and when it goes sideways, the technology gets the blame. If there's any doubt, there's no doubt..go around.
Anyway folks, this thread is about trying to land a 737NG, not the Space Shuttle, basic airmanship is being lost through reliance on technology, and when it goes sideways, the technology gets the blame. If there's any doubt, there's no doubt..go around.
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Greybeard
Have there been other landing accidents in planes equipped with HUD?
Animation
FWIW, the MDW accident was also a landing with a significant tailwind component.
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Thanks, Zeffy. The ad you linked is for Collins Flight Dynamics HGS. Last I knew, AA was using Marconi (?) HUD. I don't know if that makes a difference, though. I had forgot about SW at MDW when I posed the question.
GB
GB
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411A, I'm curious as to how you managed an average of 2 posts per day, every day, for the last 10 years! when do you get the time to fly!
I'm not a bar fly, so respond here accordingly...just to keep the young ones in line.
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I've landed at San Jose Costa Rica in a 757 with an authorized 15 knot tailwind because circling would have put us into the clouds because of rising terrain. The airport is at 3000 feet landing uphill. Next leg we flew to MIA and a cell was moving in from the west, us landing east. About a 4 mile final we got the windshift to a 15 knot tailwind. We had a 13,000 ft runway at sea level but now were not legal. I knew if we went around we would end up at Orlando because the cell would then close the airport for a while. Yes we decided to land because we had just done the same thing up in the higher airport with a much shorter runway. Was it right? No. It made sense and we heard nothing about it. Happened almost 10 years ago but the rules are the same today. What is safe and what is legal sometimes aren't the same. Normal tailwind limits for us on the 757 was 10 knots unless it was a special airport. I see it still is.
Here's another one that almost went pear-shaped
YouTube - Toncontin Feb 2009 - Risky Landing
Quite what the PIC was thinking god alone knows!
YouTube - Toncontin Feb 2009 - Risky Landing
Quite what the PIC was thinking god alone knows!
Zeffy, thanks for the clarification – HUD #353.
However, Re The pilot need only temporarily place the FPV short of the runway until the 3.0-deg GS reference line moves "down" to the desired spot in the TDZ. Typical visual technique is to place the GS reference line on the PAPI. Once the GS reference line is on the PAPI lights, the FPV is moved back "up" to the GS reference line.
If the pilot cannot see or perhaps comprehend where the touchdown zone is, nor perhaps see the PAPI (were they working / installed) then the HUD visual mode might be little more than a distraction. Technology is a wonderful thing, but most systems have limits, even pitfalls.
IMHO (and experience with HUD) it could be quite feasible that if the pilot was using HUD he was concentrating on maintaining a reasonable flight path in the turbulent tailwind conditions that he overlooked the GS reference ‘sliding’ down the runway well beyond a sensible touchdown point.
However, Re The pilot need only temporarily place the FPV short of the runway until the 3.0-deg GS reference line moves "down" to the desired spot in the TDZ. Typical visual technique is to place the GS reference line on the PAPI. Once the GS reference line is on the PAPI lights, the FPV is moved back "up" to the GS reference line.
If the pilot cannot see or perhaps comprehend where the touchdown zone is, nor perhaps see the PAPI (were they working / installed) then the HUD visual mode might be little more than a distraction. Technology is a wonderful thing, but most systems have limits, even pitfalls.
IMHO (and experience with HUD) it could be quite feasible that if the pilot was using HUD he was concentrating on maintaining a reasonable flight path in the turbulent tailwind conditions that he overlooked the GS reference ‘sliding’ down the runway well beyond a sensible touchdown point.
DtA
A couple of those landings and Captains start thinking that they are bulletproof, the brakes will always save them. Next thing, co-pilots take that experience with them to the left seat and the whole operation believes carrying lots of speed on base and finals is OK and the brakes work fine.
That landing is a cautionary tale, but not about THAT landing
GF
A couple of those landings and Captains start thinking that they are bulletproof, the brakes will always save them. Next thing, co-pilots take that experience with them to the left seat and the whole operation believes carrying lots of speed on base and finals is OK and the brakes work fine.
That landing is a cautionary tale, but not about THAT landing
GF
411A Re “...we fear for our jobs. 'We' do? What absolute nonsense.” (#355)
You obviously missed an earlier reference, or perhaps did not read it – see page 100
‘Pilots’ risk perception and risk management: their role in plan Continuation errors’.
Statistics from a survey of N American commercial pilots show that 16% had professional fears – loosing a job, and 79% had physical fear of the consequences of operations / job related.
Even if you do not fear for your job, there are probably some good quotes about those who go flying without fear, which might address your apparent invulnerability.
You obviously missed an earlier reference, or perhaps did not read it – see page 100
‘Pilots’ risk perception and risk management: their role in plan Continuation errors’.
Statistics from a survey of N American commercial pilots show that 16% had professional fears – loosing a job, and 79% had physical fear of the consequences of operations / job related.
Even if you do not fear for your job, there are probably some good quotes about those who go flying without fear, which might address your apparent invulnerability.
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The Tegucigalpa approach looked normal until the flair. You have to plant it if you go 700 ft beyond the threshold in our operation or go around. Did about 600 of them in the 757 and none needed the last thousand feet. Looked like he needed almost every foot of it. I never went around because I wouldn't float past the first taxiway 700 ft past threshold. It is a fun approach but you have to be careful.
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There is no glide slope guidance at TGU. You don't even line up on final until 100 ft because of the hill on final. Sink rate is around 1200 fpm to flare. and gpws normally is sounding unless you have at least a 10 knot headwind and do it perfectly. EGPWS, best to turn it off once visual with the runway. Less unneeded distraction.