AA Crash Jamaica
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Locked Door What you say gets one's attention, and I have no defense, except to say, we have extremely busy skies, and all the situations you describe seem to originate with ATC. Is that your point? If so, why the "Airmanship" comment?
411A I don't agree. Each accident is separate, I see no connection cultural or operational at AA. I'm sure the FAA will have something to say about it. What I see in the Jamaica accident is a lack of integration in the approach, HUD or no. I'll bet you two bucks and a beer if the PF had an unextended MLG, he would have landed safely.
bear
411A I don't agree. Each accident is separate, I see no connection cultural or operational at AA. I'm sure the FAA will have something to say about it. What I see in the Jamaica accident is a lack of integration in the approach, HUD or no. I'll bet you two bucks and a beer if the PF had an unextended MLG, he would have landed safely.
bear
We can see this almost monthly/annually, with many incidents/accidents aplenty.
Cali, Colombia was the absolute final straw...IF I had been in charge of the FAA at that time, their operating certificate would have beeen withdrawn, pronto.
Cali, Colombia was the absolute final straw...IF I had been in charge of the FAA at that time, their operating certificate would have beeen withdrawn, pronto.
Seems to me the 1995 Cali tragedy was the first fatal accident had since the Chicago DC-10 crash in 1979.
16 years without a fatality. At the time it was one of the longest runs a Major had without a fatal accident.
Criticism of AA or any other airline for the benefit of learning to improve our industry is accepted and shouldn't be infringed. 411A's track record for years on PPrune has been one of vile contempt for any US Major carrier and especially AA. A few years ago, a retired AA pilot who had been a well respected Chief Pilot, was tragically killed in a light twin accident along with another AA pilot. 411A in true disgusting and revolting fashion castigated them immediately for the accident before their bodies had even been removed from the burning wreckage.
It's pure scum mates. The record exists on Pprune.
Sorry for the dust up.
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Seems to me the 1995 Cali tragedy was the first fatal accident had since the Chicago DC-10 crash in 1979.
Imagine, lifting an engine with a fork lift, and in doing so, severely damaging the pylon...completely contrary to the manufactures maintenance clearly written guidelines.
If we look carefully at AA ops over the last years, severe lack of judgement can be noticed, at the training/maintenance/flight ops levels.
In other words...presently, AA is a disgrace to its former rather proud name.
A few years ago, a retired AA pilot who had been a well respected Chief Pilot, was tragically killed in a light twin accident along with another AA pilot. 411A in true disgusting and revolting fashion castigated them immediately for the accident before their bodies had even been removed from the burning wreckage.
The pilot failed to observe the aircrafts limitations with regard to fuel tank selection on takeoff, and thereby created a smoking hole.
Even in retirement, he couldn't get it right.
Quite typical.
Bearfoil,
My point is that it's not productive to single out one operator when it almost seems to be a national culture towards aviation that is causing these problems, with management, atc and flightcrew leaving a lot to be desired. You make a fair comment with the fact that the USA has busy airports but it's no excuse. LHR or AMS are good examples of how well it can be done from the ATC side.
One case as an example. We were operating a heavy jet into SFO, having just turned down a visual approach and requested r/v on to 28R. Atc got a little narked at our request for extra track miles and despite receiving the extra miles we turned onto the localiser at approx 10dme 1000ft above the glideslope at 200kts. Atc ask if we're visual with the (major US carrier) 767 a mile ahead on the parallel localiser. We eventually spot them 1000ft above us (so they're at 5000ft). We use gear and speedbrake to get stable on the g/s by 5dme and sit back and watch the show.
The 767 dangles everything and then chases the g/s, we're expecting to see a missed approach but they just keep coming down. At 3 dme they're still 700ft high. At 1.5 dme they get below the g/s and fly level at 400ft, then go deep and land well past the tdz. Their GPWS must've been going mental, with multiple 'sink rate' and 'glideslope' warnings. At no point were they stable on the approach vertical profile.
Who could've performed better? ATC should never have offered such a short approach. The flightcrew should never have accepted it, and should have gone around when it became apparent how sporty the approach was. The training department should be shot for ever giving the impression that that was a safe way to operate a heavy jet. The airline management are at fault for creating a culture where that type of flying is acceptable, and for not having an automatic reporting system for flagging that type of behaviour and correcting it.
On that occasion, onto a long dry runway in CAVOK met with a good headwind they got away with it. Their safety margins were severely eroded but a minor distraction, or shift in the wind could have caused a catastrophe. On a dark stormy night in Bermuda?
Until the collective mentality changes, these incidents will continue to happen and people will get hurt.
LD
My point is that it's not productive to single out one operator when it almost seems to be a national culture towards aviation that is causing these problems, with management, atc and flightcrew leaving a lot to be desired. You make a fair comment with the fact that the USA has busy airports but it's no excuse. LHR or AMS are good examples of how well it can be done from the ATC side.
One case as an example. We were operating a heavy jet into SFO, having just turned down a visual approach and requested r/v on to 28R. Atc got a little narked at our request for extra track miles and despite receiving the extra miles we turned onto the localiser at approx 10dme 1000ft above the glideslope at 200kts. Atc ask if we're visual with the (major US carrier) 767 a mile ahead on the parallel localiser. We eventually spot them 1000ft above us (so they're at 5000ft). We use gear and speedbrake to get stable on the g/s by 5dme and sit back and watch the show.
The 767 dangles everything and then chases the g/s, we're expecting to see a missed approach but they just keep coming down. At 3 dme they're still 700ft high. At 1.5 dme they get below the g/s and fly level at 400ft, then go deep and land well past the tdz. Their GPWS must've been going mental, with multiple 'sink rate' and 'glideslope' warnings. At no point were they stable on the approach vertical profile.
Who could've performed better? ATC should never have offered such a short approach. The flightcrew should never have accepted it, and should have gone around when it became apparent how sporty the approach was. The training department should be shot for ever giving the impression that that was a safe way to operate a heavy jet. The airline management are at fault for creating a culture where that type of flying is acceptable, and for not having an automatic reporting system for flagging that type of behaviour and correcting it.
On that occasion, onto a long dry runway in CAVOK met with a good headwind they got away with it. Their safety margins were severely eroded but a minor distraction, or shift in the wind could have caused a catastrophe. On a dark stormy night in Bermuda?
Until the collective mentality changes, these incidents will continue to happen and people will get hurt.
LD
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locked door makes a good point
you make a good point about being stable etc and intercepting GS at the correct altitude (prefer slightly below)...indeed at 10 dme somewhere around 3000' to 3200' would be fine.
sadly, many of the newly minted 767 captains came from commuter pilot background...and turboPROP at that...
and they make things work...not pretty at all and a good chance for problems.
I came up the commuter ranks and hated the cutting of corners and ''crowbar'' approaches as we called them.
I refused them at the big line as captain. a great landing starts 10 miles out in my book.
sadly, many of the newly minted 767 captains came from commuter pilot background...and turboPROP at that...
and they make things work...not pretty at all and a good chance for problems.
I came up the commuter ranks and hated the cutting of corners and ''crowbar'' approaches as we called them.
I refused them at the big line as captain. a great landing starts 10 miles out in my book.
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locked door makes a good point
...you make a good point about being stable etc and intercepting GS at the correct altitude (prefer slightly below)...indeed at 10 dme somewhere around 3000' to 3200' would be fine.
sadly, many of the newly minted 767 captains came from commuter pilot background...and turboPROP at that...
and they make things work...not pretty at all and a good chance for problems.
I came up the commuter ranks and hated the cutting of corners and ''crowbar'' approaches as we called them.
I refused them at the big line as captain. a great landing starts 10 miles out in my book.
...you make a good point about being stable etc and intercepting GS at the correct altitude (prefer slightly below)...indeed at 10 dme somewhere around 3000' to 3200' would be fine.
sadly, many of the newly minted 767 captains came from commuter pilot background...and turboPROP at that...
and they make things work...not pretty at all and a good chance for problems.
I came up the commuter ranks and hated the cutting of corners and ''crowbar'' approaches as we called them.
I refused them at the big line as captain. a great landing starts 10 miles out in my book.
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I've had a gawk at 587's raw FDR traces. The rudder channels looked like a seismograph from a Krakatoa type event, I kid you not. In addition to the unreal swings of the needles, the box only recorded rudder data at 1 hertz, that's 1 data point per second. Despite that low data collection rate, the readout was such a mess that they had to use statistical analysis from similar aircraft to "recreate" a plausible data stream. In other words, the NTSB cooked the data to fit their suspected cause.
What I am not saying is that there is something inherently wrong with a CFRP vertical fin, nor with the A300, but this particular aircraft and a few others of similar age and operational history showed abnormalities in the rudder on more than one occasion.
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I don’t know why but there seems to be something wrong with 411A’s analyses of AA and their pilot group, their pilot training and their aircraft maintenance. I have no dog in the fight but I simply have to wonder why he has selected this airline in particular for so many failures and especially when he discusses the flight training component of their historical safely record. 411A has on several occasions spoken to his experience with Pan American’s 707 flight training and calling it the "finest training" in the world. Ergo, if I was trained there then I must be one of the finest pilots in the world? The fact is that Pan Am did have a rock solid training program back when the 707/DC8 was new to the business; however they had a very high loss rate with a corresponding loss of life. Why he chooses to besmirch this group is beyond reason unless he has some close up and personal experience with them. Why the demonic attack and for what purpose? I simply don't see it as benefiting anyone at this stage of an investigation.
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I was a trifle cavalier when I first posted on the Newark thread. I mentioned a design trait I admire, and a short "good job". Frankly, and I think unfairly, here we get a bit too deep into criticism, too early and too nasty. UA did a nice job of perfecting a good outcome from (ostensibly) a purely mechanical defect. Here, in Jamaica, crew criticism has degenerated into an all too typical rehash of old resentments and way overboard condemnation of an entire country's performance, with one of us suggesting a Legacy needs shutting down.
So far, it looks like an a/c is broken because in general terms the pilot flying let things get even a little bit ahead of his approach. All are ok, and the a/c can be replaced. For once, and I mean no undeserved defence of this crew, the pilots didn't stall, or space a basic, or, or, or, etc. Tough R/W, Wx the sh1t, long hours into the last flight, etc. But for the Grace of God.
bear
So far, it looks like an a/c is broken because in general terms the pilot flying let things get even a little bit ahead of his approach. All are ok, and the a/c can be replaced. For once, and I mean no undeserved defence of this crew, the pilots didn't stall, or space a basic, or, or, or, etc. Tough R/W, Wx the sh1t, long hours into the last flight, etc. But for the Grace of God.
bear
Why he chooses to besmirch this group is beyond reason unless he has some close up and personal experience with them. Why the demonic attack and for what purpose? I simply don't see it as benefiting anyone at this stage of an investigation.
Precisely my point.
This has gone on for years with 411A's posts on PPrune. I for one have no problem with vaild criticism and analysis of safety issues and problems, the poster obviously has some deep and disturbing phsycological problem with AA pilots.
Perfect example is his response to my post. He justifies the poor engine work of 31 years ago to make his point about damning the operation today. Not too long ago in another anti-AA tirade, he went as far back to the 1950's B707 accidents to prove his point that AA was a rogue operation. I guess he missed my question regarding the Cali accident being the "final straw" with AA record instead of it being the first accident in 16 years. True sign of blind anger and vengence is when one starts talking in circles.
And the two pilots who died in the light twin accident? Yes, according to the NTSB, they killed themselves. My problem with 411A was he danced over the dead bodies of those fellow Airman literally in this case before the bodies had been removed from the wreckage. Of course he knew the reason for the crash. As I mentioned, when a fellow pilot (or alleged pilot in 411A's delusional mind) mouths off before all the information is gathered, it reaches a low level that should not be tolerated.
I don't know the reason for his vindictiveness. Maybe in the 1970's his dog ran next door to the rich AA DC10 Captain's house, and jumped all over him in joy because it liked him better than 411A. Maybe after that, his wife went over to retrieve the dog, but found out she liked jumping on the rich AA DC10 Captain better than 411A too.
Last edited by WhatsaLizad?; 13th Jan 2010 at 22:11.
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411A refers to an accident involving two AA pilots in what sounds like a privately owned airplane. Was that by chance the YAK that crashed near Heber, UT? I know there were a couple of retired AA guys both of which were killed in that accident.
Spooky 2
No it was a another twin from Chicago to Minnesota I believe. One guy was a retired AA Chief Pilot, the other was an active AA pilot, maybe a Chief.
Not sure of the type, maybe a P Navajo.
No it was a another twin from Chicago to Minnesota I believe. One guy was a retired AA Chief Pilot, the other was an active AA pilot, maybe a Chief.
Not sure of the type, maybe a P Navajo.
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VApilot, Since you have this data can you tell me where the rudder inputs were transmitted from? Rudder actuator or rudder pedals. If the front end of the vertical stab was waving in the slipstream were the rudder inputs causing the wild swings that threw the engines off or the front of the vertical stabilizer breaking lose? Also were the rudder inputs, if from the actual rudders, causing the yaw or trying to correct for a separating VS? Never have been able to get an answer to that.
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Not sure of the type, maybe a P Navajo.
Yes, a Navajo.
The before takeoff checklist in that airplane required the main fuel tanks to be selected (IE:main tanks to engines), which is very similar to most all medium GA twin engine aircraft, yet...one fuel tank selector was set to the aux tank, which contained little fuel.
A very basic mistake, and even then, the airplane could have continued to fly OK on the remaining operating engine, but did not do so due to pilot mishandling.
A classic case of simply not paying attention, and not following the written checklist.
Cali Colombia...a rushed approach due to a runway change, duff gen in the FMS, but through this, the pilots simply disregarded the RMI raw data indications, and flew the airplane into a hill, following the magenta line.
Crew error, no more nor less, of a very basic type.
Little Rock...attempting to land with a TS right over the airfield.
Crew error here, too.
Add all these up, and combine them with 587, the DC-10 at Chicago (maintenance error, on a grand scale...the pilots did the best they could under the circumstances), Jamaica just recently (details uncertain at this time, however it would appear a long deep landing combined with a tailwind, then overrun) and I find rather basic errors on the part of AA pilots/maintenance staff to be....simply not acceptable.
One certainly hopes these deficiencies are corrected, and AA can once again be the very safe airline it once was.
I rest my case.
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As I recall from a simulation I saw, the Ruddering got into phase with the Yaw, rather than in opposition to it, each successive 'correction' actually making the Yaw worse, followed by an even more pronounced Yaw, until the assembly separated. The Rudder stayed 'attached' for a time, but separated from the VS fairly soon after the separation from the fuselage. I think the initial conclusion was that the FO was bicycling the pedals, but that that is in serious dispute at this point?
Relative to the DC-10, the FO took off and lost the left engine, then buried his right foot to the floor to correct for yaw. The Captain took over, and some say his foot slipped or he didn't continue with full right rudder, and the subsequent Yaw left/roll at handover was unrecoverable.
bear
As I recall from a simulation I saw, the Ruddering got into phase with the Yaw, rather than in opposition to it, each successive 'correction' actually making the Yaw worse, followed by an even more pronounced Yaw, until the assembly separated. The Rudder stayed 'attached' for a time, but separated from the VS fairly soon after the separation from the fuselage. I think the initial conclusion was that the FO was bicycling the pedals, but that that is in serious dispute at this point?
Relative to the DC-10, the FO took off and lost the left engine, then buried his right foot to the floor to correct for yaw. The Captain took over, and some say his foot slipped or he didn't continue with full right rudder, and the subsequent Yaw left/roll at handover was unrecoverable.
bear
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As I remember, the KORD DC-10 crash was caused by the crew obediently going for best single-engine rate of climb--they had no idea they'd literally LOST an engine, with concommitant leading-edge and slat damage--and that turned out to be the wrong thing to do in the circumstances, unbeknownst to them. Never heard the pilot's-foot-slipped theory...
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'Locked Door's' first posting is well worth reading a couple of times.
Whilst I totally agree that the majority of people we share the skies with are professional, the 'culture' with aviation safety in the USA is completely wrong.
Could you imagine asking a controller in the UK or France for the ball scores? Or 'hey, what's the ride like' when you're on a NAT track? Followed by, 'American 231 where you go'in to'?
Are these wastes of airtime necessary?
SRJ
Whilst I totally agree that the majority of people we share the skies with are professional, the 'culture' with aviation safety in the USA is completely wrong.
Could you imagine asking a controller in the UK or France for the ball scores? Or 'hey, what's the ride like' when you're on a NAT track? Followed by, 'American 231 where you go'in to'?
Are these wastes of airtime necessary?
SRJ
It's not just AA, although they do seem to be having more instances of poor airmanship than the other US majors. Every time I fly to US airspace I see things and hear things that make my skin crawl. For whatever reason there's a very different attitude to aviation in the US, both from ATC and the flight crew perspective. Don't get me wrong, there are some very competent individuals but there doesn't seem to be any control of those that underperform. And there are a lot of them.
I've had a TCAS RA on finals, parachutists spotted passing by our flightdeck, been shouted at for querying the landing runway after the 3rd switch, seen a near vertical visual approach by a 767 in SFO, and approach continued into the centre of a huge cell in Washington resulting in a g/a and a radio call along the lines of 'um, we're having trouble maintaining altitude', a visual approach that crossed the threshold at 600ft (from our TCAS).... All from US majors. And don't even get me started on LAHSO. Gash is a word that springs to mind.
The list goes on but you get the point, flying into US airspace can be like entering a 3rd world environment but the locals don't seem to be able to see it. Quite honestly I'm amazed there aren't more fatal accidents over there.
Just me two pennies' worth.
LD
I've had a TCAS RA on finals, parachutists spotted passing by our flightdeck, been shouted at for querying the landing runway after the 3rd switch, seen a near vertical visual approach by a 767 in SFO, and approach continued into the centre of a huge cell in Washington resulting in a g/a and a radio call along the lines of 'um, we're having trouble maintaining altitude', a visual approach that crossed the threshold at 600ft (from our TCAS).... All from US majors. And don't even get me started on LAHSO. Gash is a word that springs to mind.
The list goes on but you get the point, flying into US airspace can be like entering a 3rd world environment but the locals don't seem to be able to see it. Quite honestly I'm amazed there aren't more fatal accidents over there.
Just me two pennies' worth.
LD
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Mr. P51: First, let me say there is only one rudder on the A300/A310 series.
Second, I do not have any 'data' in my possession, but have witnessed the FDR raw traces, which by the way, are not exactly raw. The A300/310 series came equipped at the time of AA's (among other airlines) purchase of them, with one of the worst performing FDR's on the market. These units were soon de-certified for use in later build aircraft. Not an Airbus issue, but worth mentioning.
The key issue the NTSB publicly admitted, was the problematic 'filtering' of raw data before it ever got to the FDR recording media. This alone, by the NTSB's own analysis, precluded them from ever really knowing exactly where in its travel range that aircraft's rudder was and when.
They were unable to sanely explain how in the space of under 8 seconds there could have been four "commanded" rudder reversals. Yet, they managed to ultimately and unfairly place the blame solely on the FO's dead lap. It boggles the mind.
Second, I do not have any 'data' in my possession, but have witnessed the FDR raw traces, which by the way, are not exactly raw. The A300/310 series came equipped at the time of AA's (among other airlines) purchase of them, with one of the worst performing FDR's on the market. These units were soon de-certified for use in later build aircraft. Not an Airbus issue, but worth mentioning.
The key issue the NTSB publicly admitted, was the problematic 'filtering' of raw data before it ever got to the FDR recording media. This alone, by the NTSB's own analysis, precluded them from ever really knowing exactly where in its travel range that aircraft's rudder was and when.
They were unable to sanely explain how in the space of under 8 seconds there could have been four "commanded" rudder reversals. Yet, they managed to ultimately and unfairly place the blame solely on the FO's dead lap. It boggles the mind.