RPI'm sure that much the same was thought by the heroic crews of the Battles and Blenheims pre '39. As I said, it is only my honest opinion and I pray that I be proved wrong were that day ever to come. My fear though is that the RAF would be then revealed to be what I now suspect, thoroughly riddled with unairworthiness. Who would have thought that an Emergency Escape System of all things could turn out to be unairworthy!

My list of Fatal Airworthiness Related Accidents in which 63 died had enemy presence in only one instance. Talk about doing their work for them! I'm afraid that the flat earthers will only be proved wrong after the event. At least in the last big bit unpleasantness we had time to introduce self sealing tanks, armoured windscreens, armour plating behind pilots, etc, in the light of bitter experience. Next time it will be decided 'as is' I suspect. The MAA do not even know what the 'as is' is though. Time to get UK Military Airworthiness sorted, not forever sabotaged!

Didn't the Argosy (of all aircraft) actually have self-sealing tanks, in contrast to the Herc?
If so, why the difference, all those years ago?

cgb:-
Just how much wriggle room do you want? tuc has already confirmed that it is official MOD policy, confirmed up to SoS level, that it is correct to issue an order to suborn UK Military Airworthiness, ie to disregard the Regulations but sign that they have been complied with, and that it is a disciplinary offence to disobey such an order. Surely that is sufficient for any coach and horse combination that the MOD has in mind?

The MAA? I suspect that they are about to realise just how peripheral they are in such matters...

Chug

I think you are confusing operational capability with airworthiness - 2 very different things. Those Blenheims and Battles were probably very airworthy, but they were just outclassed by the opposition's capabilities.

Well, I wasn't RP, merely pointing out that both then and in my future scenario the RAF could be flying aircraft unfit for purpose, for whatever reasons. Your aircraft can only be destroyed once whether it be because it is too slow, unable to defend itself, or self destructs with the entry of a small calibre round into its vitals, or entirely on its own unaided.

I take your point that you make, mine is that it would be entirely theoretical if the day is lost anyway.

The Argosy's wing was derived from that of the Shackleton which in turn used the wing from the Lincoln, which was a modified Lancaster wing, which had its own origins in the Manchester a medium bomber design from the late 1930s, a time when integral fuel tanks were unknown.
The Hercules wing was a clean sheet design from the late 1940's early 1950's.

VX275,
Ah, yes , many thanks, I do remember the early Shacks' bag tanks.
My question came from a remark I heard at Cottesmore in the early 70's when an Argosy man stated that he would rather not be in a Herc. in a combat zone as it did not have self-sealing tanks, unlike his steed.
Unfortunately it seems to have been a prescient remark.

If you wanted dodgy fuel tanks then you couldn't beat the Fairey Fawn from 1926. The over-wing tanks would leak all over the pilot and with sparks coming from the exhausts..... No wonder that the regular RAF decided to keep its DH9As and handed the Fawns over to the Reseve Squadrons in the UK. (This one from 503 Special Reserve Sqn at Waddington).


https://encrypted-tbn1.gstatic.com/i...gC0C3do1dAzjmQ

'Twas an optional extra, which naturally 'we' chose not to option. ****ers.

So how does this work then?
 

A number of USAF C-135B-04-BN, Boeing Model 717-166 were converted to RC-135M then RC-135W.

New build RC-135-01-BN, Boeing Model 739-445B subsequently became RC-135C, then RC-135V or U.

UK purchases KC-135A-27-BN, Boeing Model 717-148, subsequently converted to KC-135R, and now converted to RC-135W by L3.

For starters, how much does the difference in Boeing Model numbers contribute to lack of read-through evidence for UK certification? This is going to get interesting.....

SS

The picture I have in my head is of buying three custom build Cadillacs from GM ... except they were a prior model year.

Chug



CGB



This is the interesting bit of this thread. How do you explain "wriggle room" in regulations? Tuc already said it is a matter of engineering judgment and I know he's right. But if the MAA have to go to the secretary of state for Defence every time what does that mean? The Military Aviation Authority don't have the authority or don't have the judgment? Both?

dervish, to be honest I don't know. I do know that dogmatic application of overly restrictive regulation encourages people to find ways around regulation (Health & Safety, Tippex sniffing and sharp edges on sheets of A4 paper spring to mind). If the airworthiness rules, as they stand, are felt to be overly restrictive I can understand (not condone) people finding ways around them.

Of course, the problem arises in identifying things that do affect airworthiness against those that don't. I have come across engineers who have refused to sign-off aircraft because of the most minor divergence from the procedure (ie, seats have been recovered in the same leather as before but the audit trail is wrong). Clearly the only airworthiness issue here is that a specified paperwork process has not followed - there is nothing inherently unsafe in what has been done. Conversely, a poorly fitted fuel line which does not have an EASA Form 1 (or equivalent) is most definitely a very major issue.

I don't have an answer other than suggesting a root-and-branch review of airworthiness processes in line with guiding principles of ALARP and/or 'proportionate and risk based'. Perhaps a clearer or more expanded definition of the very word 'airworthiness' is a good starting point? We certainly cannot continue writing regulation and then flagrantly ignore it when we see fit.

Maybe Tuc is right with the 'engineering judgement' bit but this judgement has to be at the right level. Otherwise if every man with a spanner was allowed to exercise his engineering judgement we would quickly see divergence of standards and safety.

CGB and others,

I think that the point Tuc (and I) are making is that it's not the regulations, and it's not the 'processes'. They aren't great, but they are sufficient for the job of producing safe and airworthy combat aircraft.

The main problem is that the regulations and processes just aren't being followed. And not 'down in the weeds' (type of leather on seats), but right at the core of the system. Configuration control, management of modifications, maintaining proper records of decisions, requirements management, effective project management - you name it, I can guarantee that there are areas of the MoD that no longer even know how to carry out these basic tasks properly.

Why? Lots of reasons, in my view mainly dilution of technical expertise and over-reliance on project management as a substitute, coupled with an obsession at senior level with meeting schedules, not requirements.

Way forward? Rebuild a bit at a time. Give just one PT a chance to rebuild around a strong technical core with hand picked managers, watch them excel and then apply the lessons across the piece. Utopia, i know....

Best Regards

Engines

Chugalog

You keep spouting off about airworthiness related fatal accidents.

I have knowledge of only one, the Seaking 7 crash.

I, and every single seaking pilot, will tell you that the HISLs did not cause or contribute to that accident, but you, and other non-pilots who frankly have no clue still use it to add to your statistics. That brings the rest into doubt for me.

We used to turn off the previous lights before HISLs were fitted because they also bounced distractingly off the water/clouds at low level.

It is in the very nature of light that it is bright and bounces off things.

What would you have them do?
Invent a light that does not light things up?

We are all trained to operate silent and dark anyway because in a real shooty war we would leave everything turned off fitted and airworthy or not!

It did not cause or contribute to that accident!!

You might as well say that an enormous 200ft thick bouncy shield would have stopped the fatalities so the aircraft was un-airworthy because they had not fitted it.

The 200ft bouncy shield does not exist and neither does the strobe which is not distracting at low level.

Tourist, the point about the baggers HISLs is that they were not fitted IAW the Regulations (see engines post above about not following them) they were simply swapped for the anti-collision lights, without testing per the mandatory procedures. That automatically made the fit, and hence the aircraft, unairworthy. Surprise, surprise the forward ones were then found to cause excess glare under the conditions you describe and it became customary to switch them off. I am not saying whether that caused the mid-air between the i/b-o/b changeover, which seems to have been a classic Swiss Cheese affair anyway. Indeed the BoI carried out specific trials that discounted the HISLs as a possible cause.

What I do say is that it was an airworthiness related accident along with all the others listed. That is all we can say about them all, for they were all both regulated and investigated by the operator, ie the MOD and its subsidiary Services. That is the root problem here, if the regulation and the investigation were independent of the MOD and each other we would then know if the first had provided for an airworthy aircraft (it hadn't) and the second had revealed that (it didn't). We can all huff and puff about wriggle room and Service pride as much as we like. Quite frankly aviation doesn't give a damn and will kill given half a chance. Give it an unairworthy aircraft and its chances of doing so are then greatly increased.

Engines, your post makes sense and you are obviously better placed to provide expert comment. For sure, rebuilding experience levels is a must but this will take a generation to achieve. I find myself asking why did the hierarchy choose to circumvent process? Were there operational/budgetary imperatives? Were the VSOs naive/ignorant? Had the rot already set in? This clearly takes us back to Haddon Cave who threw the pebble (or should I say hand grenade?) in the pond. Do we just ensure a return to compliance with the process(es) or also take the opportunity to ensure that the regulations are wholly fit for purpose?

Chug, we crossed posts. Take my favourite example of a Red Cross on a helicopter. By definition, that aircraft was unairworthy - we had implemented a modification without proper approval. Did that particular unairworthiness 'greatly increase' the chances of the aircraft killing me and some others?

Chugalug

"Surprise, surprise the forward ones were then found to cause excess glare under the conditions you describe "


No, you are not listening.

It had always been the case that we had turned off the previous flashing lights!

It was not a new phenomena!

The old flashing lights flashed and the new flashing lights flashed. Both were routinely switched off at low level.

To say that the crash was airworthiness related is totally misguided at best and dishonest at worst.

If one of the crew was wearing a t-shirt rather than an aircrew sweater, then that would also by your definition make it un-airworthy, but it does not make it crash.

Indeed as you say the BOI discounted it as a factor so stop citing it as an airworthiness related accident.

Guys,

Perhaps I can help defuse the temperature a bit. Lion's den and all that, but I think it's worth a go.

Aircraft crash for all sorts of reasons. Fact. In almost all cases, there's what used to be called a 'chain of events' (these days it's the 'holes in the cheese lining up') that leas to the eventual accident/incident. In a lot of accidents, there's an airworthiness 'link' or 'hole' somewhere. It may, or may not, have been the 'primary' cause of the accident, or it may have been a 'contributory'. It might not have even been in the chain.

It's clearly over-egging the case to state that EVERY accident where an airworthiness angle was present was therefore an 'airworthiness related' event.

However, it's the job of us engineers to ensure that when a military aircraft enters the operational world (at the 700 desk) , it's as free as practicable (choosing my words carefully here) from potential airworthiness 'links'. Where the skill (and training, and experience) comes in is recognising potential airworthiness issues and using the proven systems to remove them.

But remember that engineers are military personnel as well, and should be committed to fighting the war as hard as they damn well can. That means making aircraft available to the aircrew to go and do the stuff. With my background, where the engineers and aircrew (and everyone else) was floating around on a large war canoe in harm's way, the engineers were accorded the same level of respect and regard that they accorded the aircrew. Lots, usually. I could never have done their job. They could never have done mine. Together, as a team, we kicked serious ass in the name of HM Queen. And all of our squadron came back, thank the Good Lord.

So, my job was, and remained for some time, to get aircrew into the air as often as possible, as safely as possible. That meant judgement calls all the time. Later on, the job remains the same but in the environs of the MoD. Your job as a project engineer is to focus like a killing laser on delivering military capability as safely as possible. Identify the big issues and hound them mercilessly until they fall at your feet screaming for mercy. Then kill them. Then find the next one and kill that. Sounds aggressive? Meant to be. Our aircrew deserve nothing less.

'Nit Picking' is usually the last refuge of the truly incompetent engineer who has too much experience (in one area) and not enough learning. They are best countered by strong and technically aware managers.

I suppose what I'm saying is that taking any argument to extremes usually leads in stalemate or worse, name calling. Even worse, it can obscure the issues. What guys like Tuc and Chug are flagging up is that the system in the UK MoD is failing to deliver the correct level of airworthiness (safety) to the aircrew. it's doing that by not observing its own systems and processes. (Example - Read the recent Hawk SI and see how the BoI had to admit that they couldn't find records of meetings at which airworthiness decisions were made). Why? Tons of reasons, main ones (I think) are lack of technical training and experience and application of 'schedule fear' forcing people into short cuts.

I hope this little rant helps - we are all trying to fight the same battle, I think.

Best Regards as ever to absolutely everyone

Engines

Tourist, what you did or didn't do with or without the 'previous flashing lights' (Anti-Collision ones?), which I have no reason to believe were not airworthy, is between you and your SOPs. I'm talking about the 'later Flashing Lights' (High Intensity Strobe Lights) which are far more intense, as their name implies. You can't simply swap them over like changing a light bulb, the new fit requires trials not only because of the potential for blinding the crew, which is obviously greatly enhanced, but also because of the internal potential to induce unwanted radiation interference with the electronics fit. That's not my idea, that is the mandated requirement of the Regulations, in order that the modification works safely. As this was a UK Military mod the Regulations were ignored of course and the aircraft was made unairworthy. That's not my idea, it is a direct result of the Regulations being thus suborned.

The problem is not with the Regulations, which as engines says are perfectly adequate for the job. The problem is people. People who give illegal orders to suborn the Regulations. People who discard the Regulations, lest they be quoted. People who cover up the suborning. People who subvert Accident Investigations so that the suborning remains covered up. People who hound qualified and experienced engineers out of the airworthiness posts and replace them with unqualified and inexperienced non-engineers so that the suborning continues. Those people shared one thing in common, they were all VSOs. They have now reduced UK Military Aviation to the point where it cannot go out and order a new aircraft without getting it spectacularly wrong, hence this thread.

As to not calling the Sea Kings mid-air Airworthiness Related, I'm afraid it was and I'll go on calling it that unless and until the BoI is recalled to consider new evidence (ie new evidence, not new evidence that the MOD says is not new). That BoI/SI should be convened by a truly independent MAAIB. Unacceptable? Then I go on calling it airworthiness related (not 'caused' though, until so found by the SI).

Ridiculing airworthiness says more about your mindset than mine, you can't pick and choose which Regs you will comply with and which not. Anyway, are aircrew sweaters subject to an airworthiness process? They may well be approved aircrew wear rather than non-approved t-shirts, but airworthy?

Cgb likewise, why is a Red Cross painted on the side of a helicopter a cause of unairworthiness? I'm afraid that playing the 'HSE' card, or having it played upon you, isn't what this is about. I'm not a jobsworth, I simply want UK Military Aircraft to be airworthy so that they can serve our purpose and not that of our enemies. That requires an independent military airworthiness authority, something that the Military Aviation Authority is not.