RP, I'm not arguing about what was the cause of the tragic loss of 230 and its 14 occupants. Like other UK Military Air Accidents it is compromised by being investigated to all intents and purposes by the operator. The freeing of the MAAIB from the MOD is as vital to UK Military Air Safety as is that of the MAA being similarly free, and just as important is that they be freed of each other.

The point about the dry bay plumbing is that it was contrary to the Airworthiness Regulations and known to be. As with similar 'anomalies', they were suborned by the UK Military Airworthiness Regulator, aka the MOD, aka the Operator. This Forum is littered with UK Airworthiness Related Fatal Military Air Accidents where the cause of the accident is disputed. So be it, for they were all investigated by the operator anyway. The point is that whatever the causes they were all unairworthy, and an Air Force riddled with unairworthy aircraft faces a bleak future, especially if it has to go to war with one that has respected and sustained its airworthiness.

In this country it took a 700 year old institution to tell its Air Force, not yet 100 years old, that 'there is something wrong with its bloody aircraft'. High time it took note instead of sneering at such warnings.

Regardless of personal opinion, the irrefutable facts are;

1. MoD (specifically, Alcock, Graydon and Bagnall) were advised by the RAF's Inspector of Flight Safety that Nimrod (and other types) were not airworthy. The specific failings with regard to fuel systems were advised in 1996 by DRA. The systemic failings were first reported in detail in January 1988 by civilian staffs, and in general terms by RAF engineers in 1985. These notifications were supported in reports by Director Internal Audit, Equipment Accounting Centre, Man(S)Org and others; the DIA one submitted direct to PUS in June 1996.

2. All were ignored.

3. More detailed evidence, expanding upon all of the above, was submitted to both the XV230 Coroner and Haddon-Cave.

4. Both agreed with IFS and the later submissions (although neither was told about IFS's evidence in any great detail, as MoD withheld it. It was made available in detail to Lord Philip, who accepted it in full. Not that he had much choice!).

5. Government accepted the findings and established the Military Aviation Authority (not the Nimrod Aviation Authority, thereby accepting that the failings were systemic).




Much is made in the press of Rivet Joint not meeting "new" regulations. It doesn't meet the old ones either, an inconvenient fact bodyswerved by the MAA. It has NEVER been deemed safe for an aircraft not to be under configuration control and have an invalid safety case or safety argument. The press can be forgiven for not understanding this, but MoD/MAA are being highly disingenuous.


Like most, I eagerly await Philip Hammond's decision. Does he refuse to issue a waiver and face castigation because his department has made the same mistake yet again. Or does he sign, and drive a bus through Haddon-Cave and, effectively, negate the need for the MAA. Think about that last one. The MAA has, effectively, recommended to Hammond that they need not exist.

If he signs, he is sending out a powerful message. Mandated Airworthiness regulations are optional. That is, we're back to square one, as this is what his predecessors ruled so many times in the past, killing so many in the process.

Whose old ones? I'm guessing that the USAF might argue slightly differently.

That's quite a leap. Surely this is what risk management is all about? If he accepts that we can never achieve the safety case that you, DV and Chug want because the evidence simply does not exist (because the aircraft is one that has been operated for many years by a nation with different requirements and regulations) then he passes the waiver and he accepts the risk.

RP,

Indeed, Hammond personally will be accepting the risk and imposing it on the servicemen and women who have to fly in the aircraft. I wonder if he will be able to accurately quantify that risk for them? "Duty of Care" is the phrase that springs to mind.

If he does accept the risk he is also waiving his own requirement for the probability of a life endangering accident to be less than 1 in 10-6, which tucumseh quoted in detail above. If that level of safety is not required for RJ why is it different to the other a/c operated by the Services?

N

he may of course take into account the risks of NOT having Rivet Joint in service and the losses to British servicemen and women and British interests that might thus occur......................

damned whatever he does I beleive

Well, it's about identifying the risk, mitigating it and preventing recurrence. Importantly, assessing whether it applies elsewhere and preventing compartmentalisation.

In this case, the basic risk (flat refusal to implement mandated regs) was identified, but neither mitigated nor recurrence prevented. So, it has happened again, and again. The same risks have recurred with monotonous regularity; the issue I have is that some have mitigated them with effortless competence, while others have ignored them or failed miserably to mitigate them. Yet MoD prefer to endorse the latter while vilifying the former.



No, it is the Safety Case HE DEMANDS, and legislates for in law. DV, Chug and myself merely point out that his predecessors have ruled that VSOs were correct in issuing orders that this legislation, and the direct orders they were under from SofS, could be ignored and false declarations made that they had been implemented.

I infer from this that you do not see a need for a compliant Safety Case, so perhaps you could offer an alternative? I have said before, if he signs a waiver and a viable alternative means of assuring safety is agreed, then I'm fine with that. What worries me is that this programme is some years old now, the first aircraft was delivered last October (?), and here we are 6 months later asking for a waiver of supposedly mandated regulations. If MoD had identified all the risks (as they claim), and they could not be mitigated, why was the request for waiver not on Ainsworth's desk all those years ago? As I said before, no-one in MoD has the authority to proceed with expenditure under such circumstances. (Or, even if Bernard Gray has been granted such authority recently, then he'd be foolish to sign given the "novel and/or contentious" nature of the risk. And given his background, I wonder if he CAN be granted such delegation? Or if he even wants it!).

Tuc

Gratifying though it is to have those like yourself trying to keep us safe, you seem to believe that the safety of the aircrew should be of paramount importance.

It shouldn't.

If you want safe then don't join the military.

Military is about operational capability.

People trying to make us safe have pretty much destroyed ours.

We now have vastly more capable aircraft than when I joined but a reduction in capability because we are not allowed to operate them to the limit or anywhere near the limit or even get them airborne because nobody can prove it's safe!

It never was safe!!
"safety" will make us lose the next war. Lets see how "safe" that is.

Not just operators...
 

Tourist,

Whilst I applaud your 'can do regardless' attitude, airworthiness is not there just for you to agree to accept the risk - airworthiness is also there to protect third parties. Would YOU be willing to underwrite the liability if a Rivet Joint came down in the middle of Lincoln due to a risk that hadn't been mitigated and demonstrated to be ALARP?

Tourist, we've threads here on the Reds 0/0 ejection (1), the Sea Kings' collision (7), the Tornado blue on blue (2), the Hercules in Iraq (10), the Nimrod in Afghanistan (14), and of course the Mull Chinook (29), and that's your conclusion?

Yes, the idea is to keep you alive and your aircraft intact, not for your ultimate survival, but so that you can do what we pay you for, to close with our enemies and to destroy them. If instead you are killed by your ejection seat, so blinded by your HISLs that you switch them off, cannot be seen and suffer a mid-air, unwarned of your IFF failure and hence shot down, destroyed by as little as a small arms round penetrating your tactical aircraft's fuel tanks, destroyed by your aircraft's AAR system, or simply ordered to fly a grossly unairworthy aircraft that kills you and all its occupants, then you are poor value for money and the enemy prevails. Is that the good operational capability of which you speak?

This forum (Military Aircrew) is like MoD in microcosm.

After spending years becoming a "Suitably Qualified and Experienced Person" (which notably excludes proven competence, but that's MoD for you) you are granted Airworthiness & Technical and Financial Approval Delegation. (Two different, but related things). Your letters of delegation spell out your legal obligation, and point you to the laws that say how long you can be imprisoned for if you fail in that obligation.

At no point does your delegation permit you to waive this obligation just because aircrew don't want you to implement the safety regulations.

Then an Unsuitable, Unqualified and Inexperienced (and incompetent) Person self-delegates and instructs you to ignore your legal obligation, ordering you to make false written declarations, exposing yourself to legal action.


When you meet your legal obligation and refuse, he has a hissy fit and runs to his boss, the very man who has granted you your delegation. The boss delegates the matter downwards and instructs the UN-SQEP to judge his own case. He rules in his own favour.

You escalate, in accordance with the regulations. At each stage you are simply going back up through the airworthiness chain, with the odd diversion into Personnel. At each stage, all the way to PUS, you are knocked back. How dare you try to keep our aircrew safe. You MUST obey the order to commit fraud. The disciplinary action taken against you stands, and will remain in your personnel record for all time.

On the occasions (plural) it happened to me, the airworthiness chain was (dis)graced by, variously, Senior Captain (RN), Commodore (RN), Retired Admiral (RN) - by now the Chief of Defence Procurement, Air Commodore and Air Vice Marshal. To be fair to the Senior Service, they only gave me a formal warning. The Junior Service threatened dismissal. The action they took was immaterial; the point is they took action against those who sought to protect aircrew, and aircrew died. The direct linkage was accepted by Haddon-Cave and Lord Philip, and various Coroners.

But, if that's who you want looking after your skin, then I'd love to be a fly on the wall if you showed your family this post and the fully verifiable evidence.

tuc,
Is it not also an offence to obey an illegal order ? I seem to recall that this was so in English Common Law long before the Nuremburg trials made it explicit.

I've been reading cpants' book.

What particularly impressed me is the fact the US "system" acknowledges the concept of civilian staffs being unfairly disciplined for meeting legal obligations, and provides various independent redress routes. In MoD, the system simply cannot cope with such a concept and permits offenders to judge their own case. Yes, you can pursue redress to PUS, the final arbiter (you are expected to resign if you disagree with his decision), but in practice PUS simply sends it back down to the offender to uphold his original ruling. So, PUS is seldom seen to actually issue a decision.

There is one notorious and well known exception. The victim (ex-RAF, then civvy Principal/Grade 7) appealed to the Cabinet Secretary, who over-ruled PUS and awarded an enhanced pension as compensation. However, the Cabinet Secretary is no longer Head of the Home Civil Service; that is now a separate post and the incumbent Sir Robert Kerslake has reverted to type and ruled refusal to commit fraud is an offence. In writing. Got the letter.

Also, early on, cpants hints at making recordings of interviews at which he was bullied and harassed. :D:D I was once told by a V senior RN officer, if someone lies to you, record all subsequent conversations. I have some very interesting ones, including one of the VSOs I mentioned above acknowledging I had been instructed to commit an offence, that the person issuing the order had done no wrong, whereas I was guilty as charged because I'd refused to commit fraud. MoD deny this interview took place. :ugh: Which is another reason for recording it. When I asked for the minutes, the minutes secretary had been mysteriously posted. Much to her relief probably. Who'd want to work for Baker?

ancient

Correct. But in the above cases it has been formally ruled no illegal order has been issued, and God+1 has said so. Due to the process I describe, you go round in circles as the issuer of the order is the one who decides if it is legal. It is probably easier to fight such a case if you are a serviceman?

Chugalug2
 

Chug, that is slightly disingenuous. Just as there isn't enough evidence to say that the Mull crash was gross negligence on behalf of the pilots, there is also a lack of evidence that (un)airworthiness caused the crash. Please don't use the Mull as an example of how people have died due to a failure of the airworthiness system; we simply cannot make that assumption.

"Is it not also an offence to obey an illegal order ? I seem to recall that this was so in English Common Law long before the Nuremburg trials made it explicit."




Yes, but you may well get the comment in your ACR "...is overly rule-bound" after asking your Boss (politely) to switch off his non-authorised personal laptop during flight! (the more immediate response was to tell me to "f*** O**").

cgb, you are quite right, we do not know why 29 people died on the Mull, principally because it was investigated by a compromised BoI (ask the CAS!) which in any case was overruled by the operator (thank God the civvies can't do that). The point I was making to Tourist is that the aircraft was Grossly Unairworthy and 29 people died in it. Its unairworthiness was not even considered a possibility as a cause by the BoI, giving us some clue as to the degree of that compromise.

I have already raised my concern and bewilderment that those fighting the Wratten and Day infamous finding discounted airworthiness also. Are the Armed Services now given a lecture following attestation about the evils of airworthy aircraft? Some of the hostility raised by those challenging airworthiness beggars belief. It is cheaper simply to retain fully qualified airworthiness engineers and have them implement the Regulations than have the present system whereby they have been got rid of and their places taken by the unqualified, inexperienced, obedient, and pliant. Simply finding fault in the crew in the inevitable subsequent fatal accidents fools fewer and fewer. Of course you have a right to your beliefs, but the RAF has a right to airworthy aircraft. If it went to war now in a hostile air environment it would be 1939 all over again IMHO.

Seriously? In case you hadn't noticed, the RAF (and FAA and AAC) have been to "war" a few times in recent years. I'm not quite sure why any of the aircraft that have operated successfully in those relatively benign environments would be any less successful in a more hostile operation??

Cows Getting Bigger - Re post 575 – and also referring back to your post 528.

Would it be too disingenuous to suggest that if the 'airworthiness system' had worked 'properly' as some here would wish, the Chinook RTS might possibly have been withheld pro tem (ie - it would not have been released to squadron service) while certain issues were examined ? If so, is it then a step too far to suggest that that specific flight would not have taken place on that specific day and therefore that specific accident would not have occurred – might never have occurred - at least not in the circumstances and terms we know about ?

LFH

Chug, I think we are both barking up the same tree albeit from opposite sides. It is my view that there has to be some 'wriggle room' within the airworthiness system. Taking my previous example of not being allowed to stick a red cross on the side of an SH asset, it is clear that the tail was wagging the dog. There was not safety or capability related issue in that scenario but the Hels staff in the UK were clearly process driven and would not issue an authorisation until the defined process was followed; we were task driven and took the 'risk' in ignoring the UK directive.

OK, that relatively small issue does not even compare to Nimrods in Afghanistan or Chinooks which should have been locked-up in hangars rather than playing in the mist with a load of important people on board. However, it does make one wonder whether the processes are fit for purpose.

Lordflash, how far do we take that argument? Should I not pop down to the shops at risk of being knocked down? My point about the Mk2 and the Mull is that it may have been a Mk1 instead - we just don't know. The only truly safe answer was to never task any asset in the first place.

Likewise there is no guarantee that ESF would have stopped 179 going down.