Deliverance, thank you for the encouragement. You are right, there never was a Golden Age (certainly Haddon Cave's Golden Period of airworthiness is utter bunk!) and there never will be. All I can promise is an independent MAA that will be resented, just as its civilian sister is, and an MAAIB that will be the subject of moaning for the time it takes to publish Accident Reports. It was ever thus and shall be evermore. What I can say is that, were they to be independent of the MOD and of each other, then we can expect UK Military Aviation to reclaim the airworthiness that it once possessed, together with unbiased , objective, and comprehensive Air Accident Investigations that will not be afraid to point the finger at the Airworthiness Authority should it be called for.

I know that many BoI Presidents have not flinched from that in the past (and a word of apology here to the ASaCs President, who did indeed find the aircraft to be unairworthy, mea culpa!), but on the whole the investigation of the operator by the operator is prone to error to say the least (Mull as always being the prime example).

Airworthiness is not a preoccupation at squadron level, it certainly wasn't at mine. It is enough to fill your mind with SOPs, FOBs, ASIs, Pilots Notes, Tech Pubs, F700s etc etc. You assume that airworthiness is a given, summed up by Anthony Alowishus Hancock as he cheerily transmits, "Going well, tell the designer chappie!". It is a terrible indictment of those who set out to destroy it, that they also destroyed that trust and confidence in the back-room boys (and girls!). All that has to be repaired and trust regained. It is going to be a long hard road to regain all that has been lost. Time is of the essence because it has cost too many lives already. Time to put things right by admitting the past, prosecuting the transgressors, and freeing the MAA and MAAIB from the MOD and from each other.

The question isn't about people who do their jobs properly and implement process, but those who don't. Managed properly, very few of us should be aware of this detailed stuff that goes on in the background. We should just get a safe aircraft without any fuss.

The Nimrod case exposed that this background stuff wasn't being done and brought it to the the fore. We should be worrying about those who think it is unnecessary.

And I have no problem with any of this process, but the moment it is suggested that a fleet should be grounded, in toto, to allow the paperwork to catch up is the moment that airworthiness killed OC. Moreover, if the process demonstrates that an aircraft is not "airworthy", I still think it should be retained in service.

Alfred,

Airworthy is not a hard-edged condition. That's why the SofS defines airworthiness as a probability. Tuc has posted the full definition up thread. The existence of that probability is why Engines, Tuc, Chug and others all insist experience and technical knowledge is essential to make the judgement that the probability has been reduced sufficiently to meet the definition. Anyone with the competence to make the decision will want evidence as a basis.

BUT, until someone has ploughed through the paperwork trail the decision maker does no know what evidence there is to form the basis for a decision. If there is no evidence, or not enough evidence, the aircraft is not airworthy and should not be flying in peacetime. It's not just about OC or aircrew or engineers or other Service people's lives - it's about schools and hospitals and football crowds not receiving several tons of metal at high speed. It's also about integrity- being able to believe that the weapon system you are handed as safe actually is safe to go and practice with.

Retaining an aircraft in service with a known airworthiness problem can be done Sometimes, often even, the problem can be lived with, by adjustment of what the aircrew and engineers do with the aircraft so that the risk is acceptable. This has been done on many occasions, often as soon as an AAIB/RNAAIU investigation has revealed a potential problem.

Sometimes it can't . In the latter case grounding is the only option. The classic example was the Buccaneer. A spar failed. The airworthiness problem was that the spar design was not suited to the way the aircraft was being used and the ongoing test programme was based on the wrong things. The aircraft was grounded, the spars were fixed and the test programme was fixed.

N

Bengo

"Retaining an aircraft in service with a known airworthiness problem can be done Sometimes, often even, the problem can be lived with, by adjustment of what the aircrew and engineers do with the aircraft so that the risk is acceptable. This has been done on many occasions, often as soon as an AAIB/RNAAIU investigation has revealed a potential problem. "

That is the problem.

The adjustment causes a loss of capability, otherwise we would have been doing it in the first case!

How about we take a big picture look at the problem, and in some instances just say "the risk is large but the gain is worth it, carry on"

The problem is that though that is the right decision in some cases, the current system will send the officer who had the balls to sign it off to jail when the inevitable accident occurs, thus no sane man including me would sign it.

As an officer in the military it is not unacceptable to send men to their deaths in the interest of the bigger picture. ie winning the war.
99% of winning the war is done in peacetime training.
All Army officers know it. The projected losses of a Para assault or a feint etc are horrifying.
All Navy Officers know it. An engine compartment fire re-entry or damage control in the lower decks is not going to be pretty. For some reason it doesn't apply to aviation though.

Indeed, the single skin of every warship places it in immense danger everytime it goes to sea. Hell, we conduct RAS at distances of 30ft for hours at a time between 30,000 tonnes of ships: that certainly wouldn't pass an airworthiness test. I am willing to bet my entire career that the steering systems involved don't have a safety chain that the aviation system seems to be demand.

Whilst this should not be a race to the bottom, there are distinctly different levels of "practicable" involved - one involves massive effort for the final 1 or 2%, the other is much more comfortable with the 20 - 80% solution. Unfortunately, the former has taken over as the default process, hence the horrific loads being carried by the infantry in HERRICK, which has probably contributed to the tactical loss on the ground.

ATG

Well said.

Tourist,

The simple answer to why we do is it that our political masters demand it. They do that because the risk from military aviation is wider than just to the aircraft and those in it. Ministers don't want an accident which involves lots of civilians. Have one, and as a soon as the cause is attributed to airworthiness failure, then the aircraft fleet involved will at least be grounded.

If we were prepared to fly exclusively on isolated ranges with no-one else there and no risk of interaction with civilian air traffic then I expect the airworthiness bar would be a lot lower. The systems airworthiness requirements for RPAS/UAS/'drones' and the limits placed on their operation are an example of this.

In a RAS (and I've been there for several) it's a handful of warships and an RFA in the middle of the 'oggin practising an activity that has been provided for under the Colregs. When it all goes pear shaped, as it has several times, there is no-one involved apart from those doing it. Ships are required to be seaworthy and someone has to sign to say they are. The systems involved in ships are subject to a process similar, but not so stringent, as airworthiness in design, construction and upkeep. It's not so stringent because the risks to all involved are a lot lower. Sometimes this goes wrong too -Upholder anyone?

I agree that it is necessary sometimes to have people die in order to win the battles and the war, or even in peacetime to preserve the lives of the rest of the ship's company. It helps if you have not killed too many of them with faulty equipment beforehand. That's what airworthiness is about.


Albert,


RAS is not that much different from flying a couple of large a/c similar distances apart for flight re-fuelling. That was done regularly and at night too, albeit usually not with the towline above populated areas I expect. The RAF only stopped because the large aircraft with capability as receivers went out of service. I expect it was at least as safe as a RAS though the consequences of failure were probably greater for those involved


N

hmm, if your RAS (at what 10knots or so?) goes wrong - 2 big ships collide in the middle of an empty bit of ocean (I would hope it is done in waters clear of other vessels..) However, 1 Typhoon AAR-ing with a tanker at a slightly faster speed :) - if that goes wrong - who knows where the wreckage will end up and who/what may be under it. Risk includes a look at the effects of an unwanted event...

edited to add - snap! with Bengo (wot he said!)

Bengo

I think you are correct that this comes from politicians, but that does not make it ok.

The public would be upset about an aircraft piling through the roof, yes, but not half as upset as they will be if we end up speaking German/Russian/Swahili etc because we had an ego military that looks shiney in peacetime but can't do the business because we forgot how to live with risk.

Incidentally, in the bad old days before flight safety was invented and the skys were full of crashing aircraft, how many piled into cities causing mass loss of life?

When doing a risk assessment, one should take into account not just the consequences of something happening, but also the chances of it happening.

Bengo/Sandy Parts - if a RAS goes wrong you could lose upto 1000 people. I'm not aware of an aircraft crash that has killed that many people.

Hell, losing NOTTINGHAM would've lost upto 45 people in one go if it had happened slightly differently. ENDURANCE was an utter fluke to not be run onto shore during her flooding, and she had about 60 people on-board. Aviation is nothing special I'm afraid.

Tourist,

I disagree that because it comes from politicians it is not necessarily OK. Not always the best decision or for the best reasons, often, but always OK- it has to be unless it is clearly illegal. That's the basis on which the UK military runs. The logical extension of it not being OK is the ability to pick and choose which wars we fight or which Ministers we obey. That's a different debate to airworthiness.


In the bad old days before Flight Safety, the RN were losing so many men and aircraft in preventable accidents that something had to be done. It was done by a programme called 'We have a Problem' aimed at finding and fixing the various causes of accidents. Many were part of what we call the airworthiness process now. Not often in Design or Construction, but certainly in modifications, maintenance and operational practice.

Fortunately the FAA was operating at sea so, as you say, they were not spearing into civilians, but others (John Derry in the DH110 and others at different air displays) did.

I don't disagree with your premise that in wartime anything that should fly (and any aircrew who might be declared fit enough to fly it) are an asset we should get airborne if needed. I have signed off repairs to aircraft that should have gone to fourth line, but Fleetlands were not where the aircraft was and the aircraft was needed for operations. Similar authority to decide on the fitness to fly of an aircraft is (or was) vested in all RN AEO's. However, fitness to fly operationally is not airworthiness.

I also agree there are two elements of a risk assessment, but in assessing likelihood it is essential to remember that whether you have won millions on the lottery or not, the likelihood of winning them in this week's draw is just the same as it was last week and the same as it has been since the lottery started. Not having had an accident is just the same.


N

AAR with large ac
 

BEngo

E3, C130J?

Tourist

It was the BoI that stated it was airworthiness related, quoting some of the regulations that were not met. Have you written to the BoI President (Cdre Hawkins) telling him he is misguided and dishonest? Didn't think so.

I'm the first to admit I know very little about how the RN operate that aircraft but I've read the BoI and RNFAISC reports. You have said in the past that both aircraft had serviceable and operating radar and that both aircraft were serviceable. The reports say otherwise and that the effect was to render the HISL their last line of defence, and it was switched off. Or the forward one was, and the aft was dim and obscured.

There are other things I don't entirely understand but seem to have been withheld from the BoI and RNFAISC. At least 4 LRUs in the avionics system that were the wrong type, directly related to the loss of situational awareness the BoI concluded was a likely cause. The only explanation for one of the faults was another LRU was missing entirely. Lots of seemingly minor holes in slices of cheese but put together didn't do the crews any favours.

I'm told (this is a rumour site after all) that all of the above would have been avoided had MoD not got shot of its corporate knowledge at a vital time. I don't like long posts so I'll stop there, at a point Engines, Tuc, Chug etc reached long ago. All I'll say is if you disagree with the BoI then argue with them, not people who quote the reports.

Bengo

If politicians decide, or through ignorance allow the British military to become a "look pretty and zoomy in peacetime but **** all use at war" vanity project military like so many other around the world, then that is not ok!!

We should obey the governments order as to who and when we fight, but we should not stand by and allow the destruction of our military.

It is a vicious circle.

The flight safety movement was started for the very good reason that our loss rate was affecting our OC, and initially had a very good definition, something like - "To increase operational capability by reducing our unnecessary loss rate"

This was a brilliant idea as these kind of loss rates are unsustainable.

http://i404.photobucket.com/albums/p...tos/Losses.jpg

This was very successful, but has slowly plot shifted to something like - "avoid all avoidable accidents at all costs and sod OC", and the returns are now not worth the effort.
http://i404.photobucket.com/albums/p...cidentrate.jpg

The initial gains were spectacular, but the law of diminishing returns has flight safety firmly in its grasp.

Because of this, despite the fact that in all other realms of manufacturing things have got cheaper, aircraft have got more expensive!

Every new airworthiness requirement and test costs more money which makes the aircraft more valuable which makes the loss more damaging to the military so we buy less so they become more expensive per airframe to cover development cost which get more expensive as requirements are brought in to avoid more losses etc etc ad infinitum until eventually we have 3 Typhoons and a Merlin which nobody can afford to fly.

Dervish

This is what exasperates me.

You are talking about LRUs as if they had some effect on the accident.

If you had any, and I do mean any knowledge of how a bagger operates and it's capabilities you would know how much that does not matter in this incident.

If the aircraft had not been fitted with HISLs, it would still have switched of the forward anti col and thus been in exactly the same config at the moment of the crash.
Do you understand what I am saying?
The Anti cols would have been off if fitted.
The HISLs were off.
THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE!!!


Have you ever found a single bagger to support your crusade?
Seriously?
Do you not think that that might be a bit of a pointer that the other baggers-friends of the deceased- have never come forward and said "OI! This aircraft was a unfit to fly and killed our mates!"?
Have you considered that it is because it is not the problem?

Can someone explain to me, succinctly, what it is about the RAF variant of Rivet Joint that is expected to not be airworthy? :confused:
Airframe?
Avionice?
Fire Suppression?
ENgines?
Fuel system?
Flight Control System?
Autopilot?

What is it that has somebody's back up?

IF NDA's do not permit this, I understand.

Hi Lonewolf

I have seen a couple of specific issues mentioned, but without serious provenance.

If I've got this right, it's seems it's the UK Airworthiness process itself that's not particularly Airworthy. With very bad history over 30 odd years, the current setup has yet to prove itself. They stated publicly about two years ago (but without mentioning specifics) that RJ will not comply with current or previous UK regulations ! What they've been doing since then, heaven only knows. Polishing the administrative/political fudge probably, while the only delivered example apparently sits outside in the rain, when it should be in a nice warm hangar with all the experts getting to know every nut and bolt.

OTH in respect of "Known Unknowns" I wonder whether last year's Shell 77 accident and the current Boeing top down (or bottom up) review of all the tail-end smart stuff which might have contributed, might be something that would present a more practical problem for the UK authorities, until the review is complete in a year or so - precisely because the UK won't be able to anticipate or fudge the results of the review. Also, I have no idea whether UK Dutch Roll indoctrination/ simulator/ flight training for E-3 Sentry and RJ, has any of the shortcomings mentioned in the Shell 77 accident report.

LFH

Quote:
Can someone explain to me, succinctly, what it is about the RAF variant of Rivet Joint that is expected to not be airworthy?

I'm told the RAF 'variant' of Rivet Joint is identical to the American one - or that it is supposed to be

FATTER GATOR
Gator,

See my post #591. Not even based on the same Boeing Model number.

SS