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Tourist:-
..."avoid all avoidable accidents at all costs and sod OC", and the returns are now not worth the effort. This is where your proposition founders. The reason an elderly US aircraft (which has been miraculously zero lifed we are told) is standing forlorn and neglected in the rain at Waddington isn't because of MAA Airworthiness zealots, because there are none. The MAA doesn't do Airworthiness, it doesn't know how to, thanks to the deliberate destruction of UK Military Airworthiness Provision. That aircraft is the cost of that malevolence, as was MR2, as was MRA4, as was HC3. It isn't the cost of the aircraft that is the problem, but the cost of ineptness. The jobsworths that are often quoted as the unacceptable face of airworthiness are merely a sign of that endemic ineptness. The whole MAA structure has to be rebuilt, outwith the MOD and under a civilian DG. Many of those who got us where we are now still inhabit the MAA and have to be got rid of. The old Regulations have to be regained and built upon to ensure a firm foundation upon which airworthiness provision can be reformed. The inevitable cost will not be because of airworthiness but because of the lack of it, so blame those who caused that, prosecute them and even bankrupt them in order to help pay for it. If airworthiness is not regained then OC will suffer, it certainly wont be enhanced! In the meantime UK Military Airworthiness will remain heavily compromised, and the SoS will be kept busy signing off waiver after waiver. He is about to do so for RJ I expect, for it seems that the paperwork, that alfred so confidently expects to catch up with it, was eaten by the dog. I wouldn't advise the SoS to say so though when he makes his 'courageous' statement to the HoC, which will of course reveal the MAA to be the toothless dog that it really is (so it couldn't have been the one that ate it, could it?). |
Tourist
I'll take that as a NO, you haven't expressed your opinions to the BoI president. It has been pointed out to me my post was lacking. The 4 wrong LRUs were two in each aircraft, not 4 in each. My phrasing was poor. I understand MoD admitted this under freedom of info but didn't realise it was an admission. :mad: which might explain why it was withheld from the inquiries. But the bottom line was the aircraft were nowhere near the aircraft spec and that contributed to their problems. Is a BoI required to check things like that? You may be right that poor situational awareness had little impact, but the BoI disagreed. In a head-on it's an obvious consideration. I know others here see the similarities between this and other accidents, and MoD making the same mistakes on RJ. |
There you go making 2+2=5 again.
Of course situational awareness was the problem! They flew into each other! What I'm saying is that the LRUs had no effect on their situational awareness or lack of re the other a/c. What do you think the LRUs did? I'll take that as a NO them. You have not got a single Bagger to support your crusade. |
You have not got a single Bagger to support your crusade. Don't shoot the messengers tourist. UK Military Aviation is riddled with unairworthiness. I cannot see how the MAA can point to any fleet or any system and declare it airworthy, for they do not know how to. As fatal air accident after fatal air accident occurs, as often as not it turns out to be Airworthiness Related. That may not be flagged up by the SI, it certainly wont be flagged up by the MOD as it settles with the family, nor with the Coroner, and certainly not with us, but turn out it often does. That is no way to run a whelk stall let alone an air force. Prevention is better than cure and a competent and independent authority is essential for that. That is where we have to start. It will be a long process because repair takes time, only destruction is instantaneous. We have to repair airworthiness before we go to war with an operationally capable air force, or we will not prevail IMHO. |
I remember the aftermath of one accident. When the BoI report was published, pinpointing an unairworthy system as a contributory factor;
1. DEC order a separate investigation into who approved the fit of the offending system and why. 2. IPT staff lie to the investigator, naming a civilian programme manager as the guilty party, claiming they know nothing of (a) the system fitted to their aircraft despite it being the subject of a Service Deviation in their RTS, or (b) the staff in their IPT who had approved its use without first testing or trailling it. 3. When written and photographic evidence clears the programme manager and proves the IPT staff have lied to an official investigation, the investigation is stopped on the grounds that the “guilty” party is too senior to be pursued. The staff who lied to or withheld evidence from the investigation are praised and advanced. 4. None of the above is revealed to the BoI or Coroner, except by the programme manager who is not called as a witness. 5. MoD continues to this day to name and blame the civilian programme manager in correspondence with families, denying the aircraft in the photographic evidence is the aircraft type in question. (Yes, really! Photographs taken from 50 feet away and tail number clearly visible). 6. At the inquest MoD witnesses lie and mislead, refusing to provide evidence to the Coroner. Their successors continue in this vein. 7. Subsequent questions in Parliament force the IPT to admit they knew of this system going back to the 1980s, yet the previous lies are still condoned and repeated. 8. When they ask for the BoI to be reconvened to hear the above, the BoI President offers to help families expose the truth. When told the truth, he withdraws; possibly because the evidence proves the RTS does not reflect the crashed aircraft, but a different, older Mark. An example that will ring bells with those interested in, for example, the Chinook Mull of Kintyre crash, where MoD knowingly blamed the wrong people, withheld evidence and lied to inquiries. And the aircraft had an invalid RTS. And still you say the above is acceptable behaviour ......... Follow the lies because that is where the truth can be found. Alone, the offending system may not have caused the accident, but a behavioural trend like this tells you something is making MoD very nervous. Why else do they lie? RIP…. Lt Philip Green, RN Lt Antony King, RN Lt Marc Lawrence, RN Lt Philip West, RN Lt James Williams, RN Lt Andrew Wilson, RN Lt Thomas Adams, USN Died 22nd March 2003 |
Just read Tourist's last post.
Do you know what LRUs dervish is talking about? Or why they are designated LRUs in that aircraft? dervish, you are a naughty boy but absolutely right. I don't think the IPT would be able to answer that one either. Where I'd agree with tourist is it was less critical in this case (as there was so much else that went wrong), but nevertheless a contributory factor and most definitely a situational awareness issue. Another similarity with Chinook Mk2 is the crash occurred just after a very immature variant entered service too quickly; but experience has hopefully ironed out these fatal wrinkles. |
Go on.
Somebody explain to me in small words how these incorrect LRU's affected SA on that occasion? Tuc Your description of the Mk7 " a very immature variant entered service too quickly" The entire aviation description of the Mk7 "The best bit of procurement in recent military history" "And still you say the above is acceptable behaviour " No, I don't. I honestly don't give a flying **** about their behaviour as long as decent aircraft get to the front line. By decent I don't mean safe, though that is nice to have. By decent I mean capable. |
Tourist, I think you do perfer safe, operable aircraft. What seems to be the point in question is how many places to the right of the decimal must be shown for reliability to render an aircraft safe/airworthy.
The Sea King collision reminds me of a similar collision off of the coast of California, VP-50, two P-3C's, back on March 21, 1991. That wasn't an airworthiness issue, it was two aircraft being to close to each other at the same altitude. Bad vis, of course. Won't comment further, as this seems to be a pet peeve for some folks. |
Yes, Lone, you are correct.
When the whole flight safety thing was begun it was for very real reasons, but the pendulum has swung too far to the point that it is now driving the entire process and making a joke of our military. |
. Tourist When the whole flight safety thing was begun it was for very real reasons, but the pendulum has swung too far to the point that it is now driving the entire process and making a joke of our military. I honestly don't give a flying **** about their behaviour as long as decent aircraft get to the front line. By decent I don't mean safe, though that is nice to have. By decent I mean capable.] Do you really want to return to the days of 1952 because that is what you are advocating, and that would certainly put an end to military capability. You still haven't said if you would take personal liability for a RJ coming down in the middle of Lincoln; are you man enough to take on the challenge? SS |
" a very immature variant entered service too quickly" The entire aviation description of the Mk7 "The best bit of procurement in recent military history" "Maturity" has a formal definition in MoD, measured (at the time) in technology and system integration readiness levels. ASaC was close, but short cuts had been ordered in critical Safety Case areas by the same non-technical staffs; for example, structural and electrical integrity. The Critical Design Review for the whole aircraft was waived by a non-engineer, which of course would have flagged the contributory factors noted by the BoI (yet again, because they'd been flagged in 1994-97). Similarly, system integration was largely waived. This crucial work was conducted in the background by Westland (a sub-sub-contractor, but actually leading player) and the programme manager, and hidden from the non-engineers and beancounters. That is what resulted in the "best bit of procurement in recent military history"; not the formal contracts and behaviour of ASE, DHSA, the IPT and parts of MoD(PE). Therefore, in a way I disagree with it being the "best bit of procurement", because it was actually the willingness of a small team of 2 (!) to serially disobey orders that made it SEEM a success. But you wouldn't want all programmes to be run like this, if only because there are so few willing to risk their careers, and even fewer who would know how! As the aircraft had not been "Proven to work in its final form and under expected conditions", by (Secy of State and Chief Scientific Advisers') definition it was still a prototype. I'd slightly modify that statement if 849 had conducted trials on the way to the Gulf and the results had been fed back and plugged into the ongoing conversion programme, and ADS retrospectively amended - but I know the latter was not. One of the unproven parts (because the RN had stated there was no requirement at all for HISL and hence trials had not been scheduled) was using HISL or the new avionics off a ship, at night. When non-technical staff agreed HISL could be fitted to the 2nd Mk7 trials aircraft, no trials took place. (MoD claims it was in the first aircraft, but the pictures don't lie). Thus the first HISL trial was conducted by the BoI, who confirmed the installation (not HISL itself) did not meet the laid down design and airworthiness criteria. (With respect, this is where you don't recognise the difference between HISL and the HISL installation. No one has ever said HISL was not airworthy; it was the installation, which is much more than the strobe, combined with concept of use and lack of other defences in depth). The BoI were not told others had concluded the same some years before, so presented it as a revelation. Unverified read-across was granted from HAS Mk6 (not AEW Mk2) to Mk7. Forgive me as a mere civilian, but the HAS Mk6 is quite different, and operated quite differently, with different systems, so read across would be so difficult to justify it would be cheaper and quicker just to trial the Mk7 properly, on an opportunity basis during a scheduled trial sortie. Which was recommended; and rejected, again, by non-technical staff. An order was issued that the regulations should be ignored, but a declaration made that they had been complied with. To this day MoD serially lies about this issue, despite the probing questions of various MPs representing the families. (Come on, all this stuff is freely available). Every single mandated regulation governing Naval Service Mods was breached by this act, yet doing the job properly would have been easier and cheaper (because the NSM was deemed physically non-compliant by Westland, and functionally unsafe by the programme manager - the latter confirmed by the BoI). What the BoI failed to address was the fact the Safety Case was not updated by the IPT when they fitted HISL behind the PM's back. How could it be - there had been no trials and Westland had snagged the installation design. However, an upside was the RN's renewed interest and support for the Mission System part of the programme (ASE having withdrawn RN support in 1995), epitomised by the superb 849 team at Boscombe. Good guys, let down a little by a rather oblique reference to safety criticality misleading the inquest, when a firm statement was needed as to the content of their IFF MAR recommendation report. (The original one, before succumbing to pressure to retract). That was fixed and made safe in the Mk7, but Tornado refused to, resulting in the Patriot shootdown of the same day. Another story...... |
Spey
"You still haven't said if you would take personal liability for a RJ coming down in the middle of Lincoln; are you man enough to take on the challenge?" Nope, and the challenge in itself is indicative of the problem. If there is a one in a million chance of something happening, then it will eventually happen. Should the man who made the decision to take a one in a million risk be penalised because it eventually happens? No, the world should sit back and say "Sh1t Happens" This idea that commanders should have personal liability if a reasonable risk is taken and the unlikely happens is stupidity and is calcifying our militaries ability to fight. It is easy to see in todays military that nearly all commanders are becoming risk averse. They are constantly worried about going to jail rather than winning. "Do you really want to return to the days of 1952 because that is what you are advocating" I have never advocated that actually, but a quick glance at the graph I posted earlier would make 1968 seem optimum. The big easy gains have been made. The low hanging fruit have been plucked, but we still have the ability to operate. Every year after that has been totally ineffective at reducing accidents at a growing cost to capability. |
Tuc
How, exactly does the un-airworthy installation of HISL cause to aircraft to crash? It was turned off. The previous fit would also have been turned off. The pilot may also have been wearing incorrect underpants. The Observer may have had a non cleared crayon. To say that this makes the accident airworthiness related is b@llocks. In the regime of flight they were in, the bagger and a pinger were operating in exactly the same way. And I have both Mk6 and 7 in my logbook. Incidentally, you know that after all this palava, they decide to leave HISLs on the Mk7? So the process did not tick the boxes, but the bit of kit has a clean bill of health. So if they had followed the correct process, the HISL would have been fitted and the accident would still have happened. The military now lives in a world where if you need something done quickly and effectively, you step outside the military framework and get it cleared the civilian route!! We deployed a UOR to Afghan totally bypassing Boscome because it was the only way to get the capability to theatre inside a decade and a billion dollars.. How crazy is it that the civvys can pretty much glue anything they want to an airframe and the military cannot!! |
Farewell PPRuNE
It started so well and has descended over the years into a mediocre shop for one-sided vitriolic diatribes and personal insults. I hope the 'crusading' does more good than satisfying the cyber ego's of faceless commentators. The thought of reading through another depressing essay on airworthiness will help me resist the urge to look at this site again. If your intentions are well-meaning, I wish you goodbye and good luck. FG Inverness. |
Fatter Gator, if I have been instrumental in your abrupt departure then please stick around and take me to task. I can assure you that all I want is to see the airworthiness that operated on my behalf and of which I was blissfully unaware be there for those who do Military Aviation today. Why else would I be forever chuntering on about it? Self aggrandisement? A bit difficult being, as you say, that I post anonymously. On the other hand if you support Military Air Safety then stick around and post accordingly.
This isn't an entertainment, it's supposed to be an exchange between aviation professionals. Now we can all slip below the high bar that infers, self most definitely included, but if our intentions are honourable and we are not being two faced then we can all gain from the process, whether we be pro or con. The problem about announcing one's departure is that it can follow the Law of Diminishing Returns as one comes and goes... Which Law brings us of course back to you Tourist. I'm confused as to why the previous practice of switching off fwd Anti-Collision lights in the conditions that pertained at the time of the accident somehow means that switching off the later fwd HISLs was not a factor in the mid air collision of the two i/b o/b Seakings? I know that the BoI said they were not, but that trial was then the only formal one to date, ie no such trials had been carried out on the Mk7 previously. Even your can-do civvies would have trialled them, having 'glued' them on, wouldn't they? Now I am an old retired fixed wing truckie, with very few rotary hours and they all pax, but isn't the whole raison d'etre of such devices to avoid collisions (there's a clue there somewhere in the name)? So with both aircraft having switched off said devices it follows that the risk of collision is increased doesn't it, yet the BoI finds that it wasn't and indeed that the HISLs had no bearing on it. Can you see the difficulty here? Operator illegally fits HISLs, 7 killed and two a/c lost in a mid-air, operator investigates accident, operator finds HISLs not to be a factor. Perhaps they weren't, but that is why the civvies have a regulator and an investigator separate and independent of the operators and of each other. That is all I ask for, all we ask for. Is it really so much? |
This isn't an entertainment |
Chug
This has become like arguing with the chemtrail freaks. If you cannot see that an incorrect process, no matter how incorrect it is, for fitting a good piece of kit has no bearing on an accident then you need a tinfoil hat. You are questing for conspiracy. Personally I think a straight read across from the mk 6 is perfectly reasonable. All bagger pilots at the time were ex mk6 and comfortable with its operation. Apart from its spacky wobble it flies the same too plus generally operated in the vicinity of the ship the same. |
Ah, but it is. Tourist, Nimrod was an incorrect process. Chinook was too many to list, Tornado was, etc. The Mk 10 seat was just about missing paper, the Safety Case. It killed its pilot by not doing what its job was, saving him from a zero zero ejection. And how do you know that your 'good piece of kit' wont wait 30 years before killing you, Tourist? How do you know that it ever was a 'good piece of kit' in the first place? How do you know if it still is? Anyway, my question was not about whether the HISLs were good or bad, my question was how do we know that switching off the fwd ones on both baggers was not the cause of them colliding with one another? You say it wasn't, you say all the other baggers say it wasn't, the BoI President said it wasn't, but you tell us it was your custom as operators to switch them off anyway, and the Anti Collision Lights that preceded them, so you would all say that wouldn't you? You may all be right, but it would be better if that were confirmed by a truly independent MAAIB rather than the same operator, wouldn't it? |
how do we know that switching off the fwd ones on both baggers was not the cause of them colliding with one another At the risk of incurring your wrath ... if both pilots reported to the controllers that they had visual on the other, and if the procedural control of altitude separation were being maintained (or not), then perhaps the lights being on or off is only part of the problem and not quite the "smoking gun" that it is being protrayed as. (If not being sold as such, that is how this line is coming off, perhaps unintentionally). Night formation has its share of hazards regardless of kit installed. Closure rates can be deceptive day or night, and certainly much tougher at night. FWIW, a very good friend of mine made a small mistake in closure rate back in 1984, flying an A-6 over the Med, during a low level rendezvous with his flight lead. Daytime. (RIP, Pat. :( ) If these two Sea Kings were doing a join up in the dark ... it only takes a small mistake for things to go wrong. |
How, exactly does the un-airworthy installation of HISL cause to aircraft to crash? You continue to ignore repeated statements that no-one has ever claimed HISL caused the crash. It was a contributory factor, and the point is that WHY it was a contributory factor is part of the systemic airworthiness failings within MoD, which link this discussion to the thread subject. Specifically, in this case, refusal to obey mandated regulations. To say that this makes the accident airworthiness related is b@llocks. In the regime of flight they were in, the bagger and a pinger were operating in exactly the same way. And I have both Mk6 and 7 in my logbook. Incidentally, you know that after all this palava, they decide to leave HISLs on the Mk7? So the process did not tick the boxes, but the bit of kit has a clean bill of health. So if they had followed the correct process, the HISL would have been fitted and the accident would still have happened. For example, If the HMS Liverpool Lynx had not encroached into the Carrier Control Zone without permission, flying across outbound ASaC’s nose at a critical point (on the precise track inbound would have been on a couple of minutes later on final approach), with lights off, then perhaps outbound would not have called “Visual”. (The diagrams derived from radar traces later published by RNFAISC demonstrate this vividly. When asked about the Lynx, MoD only ever talk about Inbound's perspective, avoiding the question of Outbound confusing her with the Inbound ASaC. In fact, at the critical point, the Lynx was directly behind the Outbound ASaC (as seen by Inbound), but the question as to how these converged targets would appear on their radar was not asked). Why did MoD lie about this? One witness said the Lynx was half a mile from Liverpool when the collision occurred. Another said the aircraft was on deck with the crew speaking to maintainers. An obvious conflict, so why did the Coroner shout down the father of outbound’s pilot when he asked for the conflict to be reconciled? Mr Green’s understandable outburst of "WHAT A FIX" sums up the inquest and post-BoI investigation (which MoD now claim didn’t happen). The military now lives in a world where if you need something done quickly and effectively, you step outside the military framework and get it cleared the civilian route!! We deployed a UOR to Afghan totally bypassing Boscome because it was the only way to get the capability to theatre inside a decade and a billion dollars.. How crazy is it that the civvys can pretty much glue anything they want to an airframe and the military cannot!! This programme is a classic example of requirements not being set properly, but MoD getting very lucky. You call it a success, and from the very narrow viewpoint of front line operators, who didn’t see and probably don’t care what their seniors formally endorsed, then of course it was a success. But you should tell your bagger friends what the RN DIDN’T endorse, and so were a “gift” from the civilian PM. The Full Mission Trainer. Ask them how they’d have got on since 2003 without one! It wasn’t accidentally omitted from the requirement. It was specifically stated it was not wanted or needed. They’d still be flying under the late 2002 Switch On Only release, which did not permit operational use. Active Noise Reduction, Airborne Video Recording System (a vital source of data to the BoI, whose endorsement of it was the first), a working and safe IFF, a working comms system; and so on. So much of what they have was unendorsed and/or rejected, with robust lobbying to cancel critical components of the Mk7 programme supported by RN staffs. Do they realise the endorsed requirement was a simple radar transmitter power upgrade with a few minor upgrades to various LRUs? Hence, the original project (not programme) title of “Radar System Upgrade” and the RN's insistence that 849 would simply shut down for a week-end while all cabs were converted (only 8, not 13), and the modified LRUs stuffed into the old decrepit Trainer. You couldn't make that up. (RSU was re-named “Mission System Upgrade” in 1995 at PE’s behest, but it was but one project within a much larger programme. It was a device to gently point out the RN hadn’t asked for anything that could actually be put to any use – which is a common cause of failed projects). The programme (not project) only got back on track when ASE(N) withdrew RN support, leaving the civilian MoD(PE) staff relatively free from interference, and to set the requirements and do the job properly. Is there a lesson there? It is little wonder the senior staffs didn’t want the Post Project Evaluation report written, or anywhere near the powers that be. It is a conundrum that is very relevant to the thread subject. |
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