How many aircraft do not have an indication that pitot heaters are on other than a switch position?

Greenknight, it isn't the quantity rather than the quality of the paperwork that is of concern. Are you saying that the RJ standing at Waddington is fully airworthy according to the US Military Airworthiness Regulations? That at least would be a start, but we have as yet to clear that first hurdle. Certainly there seems to be a problem with the UK Regulations, or why else isn't it even now being lovingly caressed by the very people waiting to take it to their bosoms?

Does the word 'ringer' mean the same there as it does here?

Who signed this baby out of L3? Aircraft don't just levitate without someone signing her off...how did it get to the UK???



From Aviation Week:

"Who signed this baby out of L3? Aircraft don't just levitate without someone signing her off...how did it get to the UK???"

Well, it's unlikely to have been an SAC Tech on a detachment from Waddo. Whomever it was will have been under quite some pressure to deliver "something" at the required time...and probably with an IOU in his back pocket for delivery to the MAA and Waddington.

Well that's an "interesting" position - "the only reason an aircraft modified to USAF specifications was allowed to fly in the US was bribery"!

I have nothing to say to that, nor anything more to you - ever.


Of course, this* is an attitude I find rampant on this site, so it shouldn't surprise me.


* The US military only operates via corruption and bribery by the contractors - nothing ever actually meets specifications or regulations - everything is authorized by someone who was bribed to do so.

Anfrewn



Precisely the point I made some time ago. One is not permitted to use, exclusively, the historical argument to justify future safety. (That's a regulation, not an opinion). But one is required to exercise engineering judgement if, for example, the audit trail is lacking. This has been done successfully for many years, and obviously applies to most UK military aircraft after the 1991 policy to knowingly NOT have a complete audit trail.

This is where the current drift of this thread, and those commenting on airworthiness, has gone astray. It is advisable, indeed a mandated requirement, to have a complete audit trail; but if the "system" has its own defences in depth (experience, competence, resources etc) then it is not the be all and end all of airworthiness.


But a major problem arises when you also get rid of most of the staff who were specifically trained to exercise this engineering judgement. And then raise the grade/rank of those who are permitted to exercise it. The former is now openly admitted by MoD. The latter is kept quiet. So, where we are now is past the critical point. Far too many savings have been made at the expense of safety. What I, certainly, moan and groan about was we saw this coming over 20 years ago, notified the powers that be; and they abrogated their responsibility to such a degree as to be criminal.



One other point I'd make. Try to remember that one first attains airworthiness, then maintains it. Attaining it is a prerequisite to deciding on Fitness for Purpose - the practical Operational Capability that is mentioned. And airworthiness facilitates serviceability. What MoD now lacks is a clearly defined boundary of responsibility between Attaining/Maintaining and FFP.

The Attaining and Maintaining should be largely invisible to front line; more so the former. The reason you are hearing so much of it is not because of too much process. It is because the process has been willfully ignored and, having been caught out, MoD no longer has anyone who knows how to resurrect the system. The system grinds to a halt as many decisions have to be taken by too few.


As for Rivet Joint. Who is underwriting the aircraft? Boeing, L-3 or the USAF? Pick any one and it is the wrong answer. All 3 must be involved, and the first question I'd ask is the nature of this relationship in the contract. It is a procurement strategy fraught with risk.

tourist



I think I've posted often enough on the subject to have demonstrated the safety of aircrew has always been my primary concern. To make my position clear, I think the front line operators should be able to rely upon those behind them to do their jobs properly. Operators have enough to think about without worrying about things going on in DE&S, the MAA and London. They rightfully expect to be presented with an airworthy aircraft that meets its specification (or has acceptable limitations) and has an acceptable Aircraft Data Set. That is what I meant by narrow viewpoint. It is not a criticism. What I criticise is when operators are distracted by suspicions that all is not well; like Flt Lt Tapper was on Chinook. It was utterly extraordinaruy that he felt the need to visit Racal and even more so that he was allowed to. That single fact, and what lay beneath, should have been a bloody great red flag to his superiors. But they were too busy actively preventing those at the rear doing their jobs.


Having said that, I always wanted and encouraged aircrew involvement. Again, and I know you're sick of me saying this, it is actually mandated yet the necessary resources were chopped and it is seldom implemented now. How many routinely attend Design Reviews? Believe it or not, the regulations actually acknowledge aircrew are pretty busy, and make provision for Design Reviews to be taken to them, at (in your case) Typed Air Stations. Another regulation that is routinely ignored nowadays. The aim here is that what turns up on Day 1 comes as no surprise and the limitations are acceptable, understood and manageable. To cite Chinook again, none of this happened and what they were given came as a huge surprise and had no clearance whatsoever.

To cite Rivet Joint, the aircraft that turned up is lying unused with the airworthiness certification process slipping daily. By definition, the Aircraft Data Set is incomplete and grossly immature. Question: did this come as a surprise to Rivet Joint users? If so, why? If not, when did they know, what did they know, who did they report it to and what action was taken?

.... when did they know ?
 

..... Seemingly the MAA and DE&S knew over two years ago.

NB I've been trying to guess what's been blacked out (and whether it would fit the black bit or has been lengthened or shortened to fool us nosy beggars.)


http://i1271.photobucket.com/albums/...g?t=1399285570


Seemingly the US Government through L3 at Greenville though the extract doesn't use the U word


http://i1271.photobucket.com/albums/...g?t=1399286657

Provisional Apologies in advance ....

I'm not sure if these extracts answer Tucumseh's questions, or even if I've understood his questions correctly. This may also be old stuff that's been posted before. It seemed vaguely relevant.

LFH

If the MoD is not yet satisfied with ZZ664 which remains parked at Waddington, why is it OK for 51 Sqn to continue to accumulate thousands of flying hours on the USAF fleet of very similar aircraft?
51 Squadron Personnel Reach 20,000 Operational Flying Hours | The Insight Online

RC-135W Rivet Joint
 

I may be wrong but I'm pretty sure that when the procurement of Rivet Joint aircraft for the RAF was first announced, it included a statement that a "pooled fleet" of USAF/RAF RC-135Ws would be created. Presumably this means that when major upgrades take place throughout the life of the system, the RAF will get "issued" with a different airframe from the Depot (L-3) to maintain the size of the operational fleet (the alternative would be to only operate 2/3 at a time) as agreed by the Joint Program Office. Presumably, the way airworthiness is being handled currently, this will cause significant delays whenever the RAF gets back a different airframe to the one it gave back for upgrade, particularly when the earlier model it is based upon is different - as eluded to earlier in the thread (various previous RC-135 variants and KC-135Rs).

I also came across this:

UK May Waive Rivet Joint Certification Requirements | Defense News | defensenews.com

Pooled Fleet
 

Pooled fleet means the RAF aircraft will enter the upgrade and maintenance PDM flow as part of the overall RJ fleet. The RAF will only be flying the three designated airframes, 664, 665, and 666. This means two aircraft will probably be available at any one time for ops, not three.


Although L-3 has tremendously improved the time required for PDM and Block upgrades, usually a third of the overall RJ fleet is in Greenville at a time. The flow chart of this looks like a cascading series of PDM periods with the individual RJ aircraft coming through about every three years. This has worked to keep the fleet upgraded with the latest aircraft operational and mission equipment since the 1970s, and should be good enough for the RAF.


Unless, of course, the whole certification disaster discussed in the previous 34 pages of comments screws the whole thing up. Biggest loser will then be the RAF, MOD and the UK---left without a premier airborne SIGINT platform.

RC-135W Availability
 

NoNav,

Thanks - I didn't realize a third of the USAF fleet was at L-3 at any given time - makes perfect sense now. The UK often only had 2 out of 3 x Nimrod R1 available (and presumably less for a while after one was lost and had to be replaced by converting a MR2).

The question above is the one I posed in an earlier post, see #2 below....

Although Tuc gave a very comprehensive response to my main points (thanks Tuc:ok:) I am not sure that particular point was directly addressed.

From a pure airworthiness point of view then the current failure to progress to RTS does not stack up. Surely if there was a known issue with RJs that meant they were more likely to suffer a catastrophic failure then UK MoD would not allow them to continue to operate over the UK and/or with UK crews. I fully realise these RJs are operated under US jurisdiction but not sure that would wash very well with Joe Public in Newmarket if one landed on his house and it was proven to be airworthiness related (and even worse if it were proven that UK SoS for Defence, Service Chiefs, etc knew about it!)

Hence my assertion in original post that any delays in Safety Case approval and RTS are NOT inherently related to lack of airworthiness but much more related to a collective unwillingness to accept the risk of an incomplete audit trail. Might be a slightly easier decision for someone to make if the basic design of the thing didn't pre-date the Ark!

As others have alluded to all of this was well known at time of procurement but some bright spark decided to accept that particular risk - can only assume he's NOT the same individual now involved in sign-off.

One point that has been brought up a couple of times already, but does not seem to have registered, is that the RAF RJs are unique aircraft, not merely more USAF RJs with different roundels.

All the USAF RJs were originally built as EC135B, and have served their 40+ year careers in the relatively benign environment of communications platforms or intelligence gathering.

The RAF RJs are converted from surplus KC135A (latterly KC135R) which will have led a very different operational career. I am sure that L3 and Boeing have taken the different stresses involved in AAR into consideration, as well as the complications or removing the boom and associated plumbing.

These changes will surely have generated a mountain of unique paperwork which will presumably have to be (or have been) checked and verified by the UK authorities.

Summarizing: The RAF RJs are NOT merely more USAF RJs, so please don't use that argument.

Thanks for making that point.

As to that mountain, and the point we discussed a few pages back on configuration control:

It appears that the obstacle to IOC is a due diligence action in the UK.
If they identify documentation either missing (part of the original order) or gaps that need to be filled ( a contract mod to get ahold of same documentation) then once again UK MoD due diligence function is on tap for that.

If the assertions that nobody is left in the MoD who can do such due diligence, where does one hire that specialized skill set?

PPRuNe Consulting Services? :E:ok:

RJs from KC-135s
 

Sorry Iwasaspotter,


That argument does not carry any water, except literally.
The impact of a career as a KC does not put any additional stress on a -135 airframe as service in any other of the many, many special missions the 135 fleet has performed.
Besides, the RCs did NOT come from EC-135s. Most of the current W fleet were modified from M-models which were originally converted from C-135Bs. Some additional aircraft were converted from Bs directly to Ws when the fleet increased (61-4125, 126, 130). The U and V models were purchased directly for the RC-135B role. Being in the last batch of KC-135As purchased, the three RAF aircraft are 19 years younger than the original KC-135A batch. Just ahead of the RC-135Bs, which were the last of the 135 production.
Since the airframes have all had the same wing re-skin, TCTOs and other general airframe work then the only additional modifications are the ones undertaken to convert them to the RC-W version.
There is no difference between the RAF conversions and the original existing RC-135Vs, except designation as a W. (Done recently for standardization as the original B models have electric flaps and the KC-135Rs, RC-135Vs have hydraulic.


Give it a rest! The modified aircraft are NOT different, except for the retention of water heaters for the required UK "brew-up" requirement.

RJs from KC-135s
 

NoVANav

So what is the Boeing model number of the UK aircraft?

Are you saying that Boeing had 'rebuilt' the aircraft from the ground up to a different 'Model' standard?

SS

"How did it get to the UK"
 

An interesting question. From what I understand it was delivered several months ahead of 'schedule' the original date being Q1 '14 but BS promising the UK / DE & S Project Lead that all was well; thoroughly tested and the evidence trail fully available and substantiated hence the delivery advanced to Nov 13. Alas it appears that the US forgot one crucial piece of the jigsaw....please generate and provide the substantiating evidence to the UK so the certification process can proceed.

Having sat on the sidelines and reviewed the various posts on this forum with interest, it is reassuring to know that there are many educated colleagues who appear to know more about 664's certification criteria/ substantiation evidence available to the UK than the Procuring PT and those involved in trying to get this aircraft into the skies above the UK....I too sit here with interest, but am a realist, and the BS programme office are no more profficient at providing evidence than those departments within the UK community generating the plethora of UOR's to which no proven; auditable and certified modification exist.

Regrettably, many posts do not seem to be factually correct and, to be honest, there are many inaccurate posts starting to appear. Whilst in accordance with US processes the aircraft may be both Airworthy and Certifiable, the evidence available to the UK is not sufficiently robust to provide a comprehensive Safety Arguement to both the Duty Holder and MAA. It appears as simple as that!!!!!

Many flying hours does not make an aircraft safe....Concorde; Nimrod; Chinook.

Either a platform has sufficient evidence or it does not. The choice for those who decide to recommend and endorse the Safety Case is simple. Put your neck on the line and hope 'Hadden Cave 2' never occurs, or follow due diligence as defined and mandated by the MAA Regulations and seek sufficient; robust; ACCURATE and substantiated data, or bow to political pressure and hope that those 'politicians' and RAF Officers who have many fat stripes, but limited substance when it comes to holding a pen to the paper support you when the going gets tough.

I therefore pose one question......which may/ may not be true, but the the rumours abound.....why has the current Engineering Authority (EA) for the platform now declined/ rejected/ returned his Letter of Airworthiness Authority.

If the truth be known, and this proven to be accurate, then there is no smoke without fire and perhaps those who advocate a rapid clearance for the aircraft would like to accept his responsibility....I am sure there are those within the DE & S; DH; MAA; CAS community who would only too gladly provide you with both the pen and the noose should you wish to take up this offer.

I was sure there was a "like" button on here somewhere.

If there isn't one? - there should be!

Nice post, Rivetman, but can you answer me this:
Was that paid for and required in the original contract/documents/agreements, or is this an over and above requirement now levied?

Who is "the US" in this case?
USAF?
State Department?
DoD?
L-3?
Boeing?

Thanks. Again, your post was well worth the read. :ok: