Lonewolf 50, I'm not saying why these two aircraft collided because I don't know. What I am querying is why the operator was so sure that it was not because both their fwd HISLs were switched off. As tuc rightly points out all the other holes in the cheese slices meant that this compromised their last line of defence. As to both calling visual, visual with what? You mentioned a smoking gun, might that not have been the Lynx?

I don't expect anyone to know why these aircraft collided, and if they say they do I would suspect an agenda of some sort. My point all along is that, in common with all other Military Air Accident investigations to date, this was investigated under the auspices of the operator. That does not make for objective conclusions on which one can build in order to avoid avoidable accidents. That is the whole point of Aircraft Accident Investigation.

In the meantime a question mark hangs over this tragedy. One thing we do know though is that the HISLs had been fitted in contravention of the Airworthiness Regulations and had not been subject to trials, as well as other LRU discrepancies mentioned by Dervish . That is why it remains an Airworthiness Related Accident.

Guys,

Perhaps I can help here.

As I posted before, it's rare for any accident or incident to have a single, lone, cause. I almost every case where a BoI (now an SI) takes place, there are a number of factors involved. Some are what used to be called 'primary' - they were in the direct chain. Some were called 'contributory' - in old speak, they had an influence on the chain, but weren't actually part of it. And some were just observations. I hope you can already see that there is plenty of scope for disagreement and variation in how these factors are assessed and reported. And that's in an accident where the cause is definitely established. When the cause can't be established (as in the MoK crash), the field is left open for speculation, dispute and disagreement. This thread shows that in spades.

The difficulty that Tuc and Chug constantly highlight is in the area where shortcomings in 'airworthiness' are a factor.

Achieving an 'airworthy' aircraft (which I see as one that is safe to maintain, fly and operate, including on ops) starts with requirements, runs through design, acceptance, configuration management, and then into maintenance and operation. Oh, and that old bug bear modifications. The issues Tuc and Chug are highlighting is that the actions of VSOs (some in the MoD, some in the RAF - and there's a difference) have damaged the MoD's current ability to properly manage and deliver that 'airworthiness' process.

So, when an SI finds that there was a shortcoming in the MoD's 'airworthiness management system', the question arises whether it is a result of historical decisions by those VSOs, or the failure of those on the ground at the time to do the job. Here's a hard idea - it could be both. Or either. The decision is harder if the airworthiness factor is probably the primary cause. The real challenge (at least in my view) is how the MoD moves forward.

What I don't think what necessarily helps is trying to use casualty figures from accidents that don't have 'airworthiness' as a primary cause as a main argument for change. (Sorry, Chug, if you disagree). But what I do think is absolutely flaming vital is that the MoD gets its 'airworthiness house' in order as soon as practicable. And if that means highlighting some of the more horrible lapses that have occurred and are occurring (Chinook RTS, abuse of STFs, lack of basic technical competencies, putting schedule before safety), then I'm all for that. The arguments for fixing these can stand on their own merits, in my view.

I've already posted my ideas for change on the ground. My preferences for organisational change would be, for a starter, to see the MAAIB removed from the MAA, expanded and made directly accountable to the SoS for defence, or his PUS. MAAIB reports could then be separate from any MAA SIs, with their own chain of conclusions and observations. Oh, and published separately.

Next, policy and strategy for 'military air safety' should be stripped out of the MAA. Location? I'd say an independent Commission reporting to the SofS for Defence.

That would leave an in MoD' 'MAA' developing the detailed regulations and orders required to implement them.

What I think also needs a thorough scrub is the MoD's system for 'assurance' and even 'inspection' We've seen any number of recent scandals in the NHS where alledgedly responsible 'assurance' organisations couldn't find their own a**e with a map, let alone problems on the ground. My own view is that many areas of MoD have been too ready to shrug their shoulders and let the MAA have responsibility for seeing that things are done right. That responsibility starts with the person doing the job, and should run right up through every department. The recent Hawk accident SI should be a wake up call for this area.

I suppose there aren't any easy answers. My parting thought is this - we must never let 'airworthiness' (or 'air safety') become such a 'holy grail' that it damages our ability to deliver effective and acceptably safe kit to the front line in a timely way. I'm with Tourist all the way on this one. The teams doing the 'airworthiness' job need to be professional and brave enough to tell the politicians when they can't do that, and to defend (and explain) the trade offs that will have to be made to achieve the military aims.

Best Regards to all as ever

Engines

tuc, I suggest you stop. You have a distinct advantage. :ok:


tourist, atg, can we please have your thoughts on how the current problems on Rivet Joint could have been avoided and how MoD should now proceed? You criticize excessive process. You criticize tuc, who has said he agrees with you and has presented his own thoughts. What alternatives do you suggest? Alternatives don't mean the other is wrong. It seems to me more good has come out of this thread by discussing what does and doesn't work than has come out of RJ so far. MoD has admitted it knew of the problems years ago yet 7 months after delivery of the first aircraft it is going cap in hand to Hammond. What should Hammond do?

Engines:-
I'm not using casualty figures as a main argument for anything other than to underline the gravity of a situation whereby the operator is judge and jury of its own conduct as well as of its own accidents. We have time and again seen instances whereby evidence has been withheld from BoI's, witnesses have been withheld from BoIs, BoI findings have been changed upon 'review', families have been serially lied to, coroners have been lied to, and evidence offered to address this subversion refused as not being 'new'. All that is over and above the deliberate suborning of Regulations to the extent that knowingly grossly unairworthy aircraft were illegally released to service.

Given such conduct I cannot see how anything can be taken at face value from such a source. That is why I call accidents 'airworthiness related' whereby the only reason that proven airworthiness shortcomings were not found to have contributed to an accident was because the operator said so. Air Safety has to be founded in trust or it is nothing. UK Military Air Safety has now reached that nadir and must be placed in independent hands to restore that essential trust, ie an independent MAA and MAAIB, both of the MOD and each other.

With respect, the MOD will never get its house in order, and airworthiness will remain unsafe in its hands. As to:-
Who on earth is proposing that? The whole point of Air Safety in Military Aviation is to enhance Operational Capability. The reason there is an OC problem now is because of the unairworthiness infecting the whole military airfleet, which in turn is because of action/inaction by the MOD. It is nothing less than a national scandal.

"That responsibility starts with the person doing the job, and should run right up through every department."

I thought that was what Cullen said...........

certainly a lot of oil companies moved to that - no special safety department, safety is a line responsibility and it's on your head as a director/manager/supervisor if the brown stuff hits the fan

pity BP never managed to get their US subsids to recognise it..............

Bl00dy Hell :eek:

That is some kind of sweeping statement!! And probably a gross over exaggeration. Just think about all those military aircraft out there flying around serially un-airworthy.

I used to fly one type where paperwork grounded the fleet ensuring we delivered NO capability. The F700s ended up so big they had to be split into 2 because of the "husbandry log"; no airworthiness issues recorded, but lots of trivia and aircraft spent weeks, if not months, NOT flying. That's an example of the airworthiness tail wagging the OC dog. I'm beginning to think that Fatter Gator was right.

be fair RP!

Tecumseh at al have spent pages explaining how they believe that "airworthy" means it meets the specs especially on failures and failure rates - if it doesn't meet those then it cannot be "airworthy" by definition

The others reckon if it can stagger off the ground and get back without killing any of the crew or taxpayers it must be fine

the MoD obviously haven't a clue otherwise SOMEONE should have stood up and said "Will this pass any Safety Case review?"

Hammond is now on the grill - say No and the SO's and the Treasury will go mad, they will breif against hm in the Press ("Minister wastes Zillions")

say YES and be placed, if something goes wrong, to be viliified ("Murderer of our brave lads .......")

Chug,

I really don't think we are very far apart, and I fully support the brave and proper stance you and Tuc have led. However, we have to bring the aircrew with us on this.

The point I was making was that it is possible for the less competent engineer to make airworthiness a 'fetish', a sort of 'holy grail', instead of applying their professional judgement and expertise to solve the problem and get the aircraft into service. I've had first hand experience of that (thankfully uncommon) side of the argument. Out of date Def Stans don't help when they are used as a sort of 'holy writ'. To be brutally honest, Boscombe lost a deal of cred because of attitudes like that. I don't think it was fair, but it happened, and the RAF managed to build a whole slew of OEUs to replace the AAEE function off the back of that perception.

I absolutely support using all best means to get the point over - but one thing I was always told in HQ staff was that you have to carry all the stakeholders with you. If 'airworthiness' is sen as an obstacle to effective combat operations, then I fully agree with you that it's an indictment of the attitude of generations of VSOs and those customers (aircrew). However, we also have to realise that there's a perception problem out there.

I suppose my focus is on the people at the sharp end doing the job properly. The regs aren't great, but they are sufficient for the job. The system isn't fab, but if the project engineers do their job right, the system won't stop them. The biggest challenge I see is getting the people on the desks back up to a level of technical expertise and experience that allows them to properly manage and deliver the kit. Of course, they need the support and encouragement of their superiors, and that's where your excellent points come in, in my view.

A more independent MAA? I've offered my thoughts on that. A more independent MAAIB, to produce really independent reports, yes. A rework of the currently flawed SI system? Definitely. But whatever you end up calling it, there will have to be some sort of MoD 'air safety administration house', to keep specs and regs up to date, and to carry out the 'QA' function (sorry, old speak there) to keep the desks honest as best they can.

Very much hoping that we stay on the same(ish) page here,

Yours ever

Engines

I apologise for being a thick, geriatric Pongo, but can someone explain for me in one, max two simple sentences without abbreviations, acronyms and other coding what exactly the problem is that keeps the beast grounded?
And try to be polite. I may be a trained killer but I am a sensitive one.

Tuc

"You call it a success, and from the very narrow viewpoint of front line operators"

I appreciate that you only have our best interests at heart, but that quote pretty much sums up how badly you misunderstand what a military's purpose is.


I struggle to find a more valid viewpoint other than that of the front line operator.


Dervish

I have no knowledge of the RJ so have refrained from commenting on the
situation.

If pressed I would just say that I would have no issues with flying it. The US produce good aircraft.

I'm all for taking everyone with us on this, Engines, particularly the men and women at the very sharp end. What I'm not for is the good old British fudge, whereby we make lots of changes, rename everything and everybody and basically carry on as before with the same jobs being done by the same people as before, ie pre and post Haddon-Cave.

It is because that Report dodged the real issue, of naming and shaming the real culprits responsible for this mess, and instead in time honoured way fed a few sacrificial lambs for slaughter that the MAA is the incompetent inept bunch of jobsworths that it is. If that is what you mean by:-
then we are indeed in violent agreement. It is that kind of jobsworth attitude that raises the hackles of the likes of Roland and has the effect of alienating the very people for which Air Safety strives, Military Aircrew. That is why the MAA and MAAIB have to be free of the MOD's malevolent dead hand. Their civilian DGs will have to have a lot of discretion to exercise thanks to the dysfunctional mess that is UK Military Air Safety. An unenviable task which will mean coming clean about the extent and cause of this scandal. For a start they need to show Haddon-Cave for the sham it is, and tell us all about what really went on during the so called 'Golden Period of Airworthiness'. At least then crews will be better informed about problems involving their fleet, their systems, and what is planned to deal with them.
It won't be easy, there will be many problems, but at least there will be the chance to get the military fleets airworthy again. At the moment that just isn't going to happen.

Tourist, you say you know little about RJ, well me too. I'd want rather more to reassure me that it was a viable prospect than a 'made in USA' sticker (dated presumably 1964, though that is quite close to your chosen Golden Year of 1968, I guess).

Chugs: If by "operator" you refer to the Royal Navy, or the Mod, you and I shall part company on this point in disagreement.

Having investigated accidents in the USN, I find your assertion that military investigations do not make for objective conclusions on which one can build in order to avoid avoidable accidents to be false.

Back to RJ, the topic of this thread, and its various program challenges.

Genstabler, in simple terms, there isn't a complete set of paperwork to say that the design, build and continued provision of the aircraft is safe. It may be safe, it may not, but without the paperwork it is automatically assumed to be unairworthy.

Not wanting to marginalise the argument, it's like buying organic food at the supermarket without the shop being able to confirm, with complete certainty, that the food is actually organic.

Bloody hell! What idiot authorised the deal?

Whoever held the reins on 22nd March 2010.

I'm not sure who said this:
"The military now lives in a world where if you need something done quickly and effectively, you step outside the military framework and get it cleared the civilian route!!

We deployed a UOR to Afghan totally bypassing Boscombe because it was the only way to get the capability to theatre inside a decade and a billion dollars..

How crazy is it that the civvys can pretty much glue anything they want to an airframe and the military cannot!!


The fact is that whatever UOR you installed without Boscombe's advice is likely to be undone at the soonest possible opportunity because it is...NOT AIRWORTHY. The mere fact that it currently works does not make it airworthy.

The main reason that MOD can't do this work unaided is simply because...THEY CAN'T DO IT.

The above collection of statements utterly supports Chug's & Tuc's fully justified drive to get a properly qualified and independently operating MAA...as opposed to the one masquerading as an aviation authority in Bristol today.

In my limited experience of working with one rather significant IPT they were severely understaffed, totally unqualified and generally incompetent in their designated tasks.

Those that were held responsible for the Maintenance Schedule had no concept of what was required - I considered their whole department as "Document holders" rather than Schedule Managers. They'd done no reviews in at least five years and their Data was a mess. Literally, they were a bunch of "City Fathers" sitting around clumps of desks waiting for their pensions. I remember one particularly pathetic Sqn Ldr who literally couldn't/wouldn't talk to me without a support crowd behind him.

It took me just 6 months to convince their (AOC's) bosses of the mess their most dependant data was in and for them pay "us civvy's" to take it off them. (£6m for the initial investigation, I believe)
It took a further two years to clean the triplicated "records" that were handed over.

I will stop before I go too far...Red Wine, and all that, leading to Red Mist.

Actually, it would be more correct to say that "there isn't a complete set of UK-standard paperwork"!

As far as I can see, they haven't gone through all the US-standard paperwork yet to see if all the info needed to meet the UK-standard is present, and it appears they feel it will be quicker/cheaper to get a waiver than to work to transfer that info to the UK paperwork.

There may well be gaps (some significant) between the info in the US-standard paperwork and that required for the UK-standard paperwork, but I have not seen anything saying that the MOD has actually found that out.

No, it will be pulled out because it didn't go through all the bureaucratic channels and get all the right boxes ticked.

It may well have no detrimental affect whatsoever on the actual safety of flying & operating the aircraft, but that's not what is the issue - if it didn't get the full process then it is automatically assumed to be unsafe, whether it actually is or not, and whether removing it degrades the combat capability of the aircraft (and thus decreasing the safety of those relying on the aircraft to fight the enemy) or not.

There is a difference between being NOT AIRWORTHY because it actually is unsafe and being labeled NOT AIRWORTHY because the right paperwork wasn't done - but the MOD and many posters here believe the two are one and the same.

Yes, the ideal purpose of the paperwork is supposed to be to insure the actual, real-world safety of the aircraft with the modification, but the real-world purpose often ends up as insuring the paperwork is proper without regard to what happens outside the office.

Testing is as (or more) important as the paperwork process, but from what I have read testing is no longer a priority, as it costs more than a couple of office-workers checking tick-boxes.

Couple of thoughts...

1. The USAF have been operating RJs for years and, AFAIK, they don't fall out of the sky on a regular basis
2. The USAF operates RJs out of the UK on a daily basis - often with UK crews. Somebody must have authorised this and "taken the risk"
   
   
   I've read all the arguments about paperwork and audit trails and I understand the point that Tuc, etc are trying to get across, and I also understand the pain of the needless loss of family members due to negligence and cost cutting by those who had a duty of care to protect them (to the best of their ability).
   
   
   Unfortunately, as is often the case, I feel that the real issue (Govt cost cutting and negligence by key service individuals) has been lost in the noise and everyone is now hiding behind the "audit trail" argument. Common sense and logic has gone out of the window and no doubt in part due to the authorisers being terrified of ending up in jail if the unthinkable ever did happen.
   
   
   All the while the crews and jet sit around and we as a nation miss out on a valuable capability.
   
   
   Only in blighty!

And many posters here ascribe themselves the powers of the Almighty. How on earth do you know if something is safe when you instal it, when you service it, when it gets older and older if you don't keep a fully audited paperwork trail of its history?

All the bits that were installed on the Nimrod MR2 to provide it with AAR capability were presumably considered safe but the installation did not conform to the Airworthiness Regulations. As is the way with airworthiness shortcomings fate took its time to strike, but strike it did.

All the bits that comprised the MB Mk10 ejection seat were considered safe, so safe indeed that a Safety Case did not even exist, lots of paperwork saved there! As is the way with airworthiness shortcomings fate took its time to strike, but strike it did.

Would you buy a used car purely on the verbal assurances of a glib salesman, or would you insist on seeing written evidence of a full service history? After all, it's just so much bloody paperwork...

Ah, yes - the "if the paperwork doesn't outweigh the aircraft then no paperwork exists" argument.

There IS a "full service history" of the aircraft in question, and of the modifications in question - as well as of the other aircraft (which are closely-related to the ones you bought) with those modifications.

But since it isn't a UK service history, then... :rolleyes:

Yes, there should be an examination of whether there is any potential conflict or difference that hasn't been tested - and then test them to determine if there is or isn't an actual conflict or problem with the difference(s).



Re-read my post. I never said that we shouldn't have the safety paperwork, I said that we shouldn't let "following only the UK process" become the only goal!