Not just in the UK. :{
Overhaul at the depot level which is combined with a conversion/reconfiguration requires massive documentation. I think what you refer to is in all of those boxes. If it isn't, trouble ahead.
I read this as "configuration changes made in the process of getting them over to the RAF customer." Did I understand you correctly?
So long as the configuration record is sound, I'd reckon on the MoD staff being able to reconcile. That, however, isn't always as simple as it sounds. :mad:
Access to the drawings, which can get tricky when one deals with vendors, subs, qualified vendors, and such. They either conform to print/spec or they don't. If access to the drawings and specs is not part of the package ... oh boy, a few more pounds (add zeroes to the right as necessary) will be needed to get that included. (I hear that the term "contract modification" causes some program managers to become apoplectic :p ).

Lonewolf

I agree with your assessment, except;

That would be a fair assumption if talking about an organisation that understands that CC is mandated and a fundamental pre-requisite to a valid Safety Case.

However, this is MoD we're talking about, and it is well over 20 years since our airworthiness leaders pulled the plug on funding and the need for staff to implement these regulations. In March 1999, our Chief of Defence Procurement (4 Star, Sir Robert Walmsley, retired Admiral) confirmed in evidence to the Public Accounts Committee that CC was lacking on whole aircraft fleets (the specific question was on Chinook) and then made his position on this quite clear by upholding disciplinary action against staffs who dared to insist it be carried out. This remains MoD's formal position.

Following the original 1991 policy, these issues became standing risks on any MoD aviation programme. That is, the policy meant you must assume you WILL hit problems. At first, perhaps minor; but as time progressed and gaps in CC increased, they would become major showstoppers. Regulations governing approvals require such risks to be mitigated. It is one reason why one cannot insert "100%" against the probability of occurrence in a risk register. If it is 100% you CANNOT seek approval to proceed. You MUST deal with it beforehand.

The situation on Rivet Joint would seem to be that MoD recognised the risk but did not do anything about it; at least not in a timely fashion or before seeking approval to proceed. This may sound like a simple case of deciding to deal with it in parallel with the main programme - in MoD's words, "proceed at risk". However, the dangers are obvious. MoD's risk management strategy has, for many years, been; By all means identify the risk, but wait to see if it becomes a problem before doing anything. This policy, enthusiastically implemented by many VSOs, has killed many. 7 on the Sea King ASaCs. 2 on Tornado ZG710. 29 on Chinook ZD576. And many more. The chances are that, once approval was granted, risk management was off-loaded onto some untrained junior; as it was on Nimrod MR2. On that programme, the hapless individual was named and shamed by the **** Haddon-Cave, but the VSOs who consciously denied him the training and resources to do the job were praised. That ethos has not yet changed for the better.

Thanks for that explanation. The old problem of "doing more with less" generally leads to crap outcomes in some way.

Hoping that the research into the condition of the aircraft proceeds apace and they get to serve their intended purpose. It's a great capability.

For consideration by the United Kingdom’s
Military Aviation Authority (MAA)

Rivet Joint Aircraft "Safety"
 

At the risk of "stirring the pot", all the questions about the C-135 airframes, conversions, records, etc. is what we call BxxxSxxT!

I have about 4000 hrs in both KCs and various RCs in ops; survived a KC mid-air collision with an F-4C that took our boom off, smashed the rear fuselage and dented/damaged the left horizontal and elevator; was Air Staff program manager for one of the RC versions (RC-135U, Combat Sent); and have remained familiar with new block versions, L-3 COMM operations at the Greenville, TX support facility and how the Big Safari office manages the program after retiring from USAF and moving to the space recce realm.

To say that there is anything "wrong" with the airframe, conversion to RJ standard, testing, understanding airframe problems or documentation is totally unacceptable. The particular KC airframes converted to RJs 18, 19, 20 come from the last block of KC-135s built, in the batch just before the RC-135Bs, from which the current RC-135Vs and Us are derived.
The Greenville facility (Majors Field) has had cognizance of the RC-135 program since the late '60s when the original aircraft were modified (then under E-Systems Corp). A very expert location, with a workforce dedicated to developing, integrating and supporting special missions aircraft. This same facility is responsible for many other modifications, including E-4 airborne command posts and others, Bundes Marine 'Peace Peak" SIGINT Atlantiques, and Saudi RE-3s. In fact, during my last visit a few years ago I glimpsed an RAF Canadair Sentinel on the ramp.

The RJs are modified and upgraded every three years in what is called Phase Depot Maintenance. PDM is a complete major parts removal inspection, repair, upgrade and re-wire of aircraft and mission systems. For example, I have even seen entire aft fuselage skin panels replaced due to urine corrosion from the aft loo due to poor crewmembers' "aim" during airborne ops. The process of converting a KC to RC configuration is even more detailed. Boeing work in the past decades has mostly been confined to wing skin replacement in the 1980's (entire C-135 fleet mod) and re-engining to the CFM F108-201 fanjets.

This is all to say that these aircraft are not safe due to some paperwork plans floated to correct MoD/RAF internal problems over the years is wrong. There is a very valid reason the MoD/RAF bought the jets "to the same standard" as the USAF. Interoperability is one, but more importantly, there are fewer problems when the jets are the same as the rest of the fleet. Fleet-wide maintenance, problem identification, upgrades all flow smoothly. The RAF RJs will become part of a fleet of 20 and enter the upgrade cycles in the same flow as the USAF jets, with the exception of UK life support (life rafts, etc,) and putting the galley water heaters back in for "brew ups".


I recently heard the Australian ambassador speak on defence issues "down under". The one thing he emphasized, when asked about the recent order for Boeing P-8A Poseidon patrol aircraft was, "You get the best equipped, lowest maintenance, highest operational rate from equipment bought from the U.S. IF you buy the exact same version the U.S. is also operating."
I would hope the U.K. has finally figured this out after the Spey-powered Phantoms (costing 3 times a regular F-4) turned out to be slower at a lower max altitude. The Aussies learned the lesson with the Collins boat fiasco.

After the decades-long tail of the Comet-derivatives, Comet, Nimrod, Nimrod AEW (a 'good' one there) and finally the MRA.4 total waste, I believe the RAF is getting the best bank for the buck in the -135. After all, Boeing designed and built it to '50s standards ("overbuilt" I'd say) and it has been modified, humps added, trailed 5-mile long aerials, had more sections cut-out for sensors, added B-47 wing racks for jammer pods, long noses, bulbous noses, round noses, extended fuselage tails, more than four different engines, chin bulges and just about every other external indignity added. "Flying" through the flak of UK bogus paperwork will be, as you say from the BoB book, "A Piece of Cake"!

This long post is to attempt to set the record straight, Having engaged in long, enjoyable nights debating aircraft with many Brit friends, I am under no illusion that this will end the petty back and forth. I do enjoy the blather. Additionally, I would discount the previous post as from someone with a very bad personal ax to grind about 55th maintenance. Usually individuals on this track have many other personal issues.

Bill

Two very interesting posts there by cpants and NoVANav.

The former goes much further than MoD has been prepared to admit. Please do post a link. If such information was presented to Congress in 2008, before the RJ contract was let, then I think MoD's commercial director will be very interested if it wasn't disclosed as part of negotiations. If it WAS disclosed, MoD are in the clag - again.


And MoD have actually admitted what NoVANav says is wrong. (It isn't a rumour started here on pprune; we are simply discussing the issues MoD have revealed). That doesn't mean NoVANav is wrong. Far from it. The problem could be MoD doesn't understand the information provided from the US. Perhaps the breakdown is in the link between Boeing and L3(?). Immaturity of understanding is itself a good reason not to release the aircraft. In fact, it is mandated.


The one thing I'd say is I wouldn't be so dismissive of something that, at face value, is utterly outrageous. MoD claimed the Chinook and Nimrod were airworthy. Independent Reviews accepted the fact they were not, known not to be by senior officers and this fact covered up. No one would believe these senior officers would lie about this to the bitter end, but they did. And no one would believe the MAA would continue this deceit, but they do.

A lot of people - the Great British Public, the press, MP's, the Treasury..... - are going to have a lot of questions if the RAF ground Rivet Joint on the basis it "is not airworthy" when dozens of the damn things are swanning around the sky and have been for years without serious problems

No doubt people of the "Common Sense party" & "Health & Safety gone mad" views will also be heard

From the outside it seems that the MoD is saddled (or saddled itself) with a Safety system that impedes the acquisition of anything but new aircraft documented to UK Standards

I leave it to wiser men and women to decide whether this is a good thing or not.........................

:confused::confused:

Indeed. Sometimes it is easier to present reasons for saying 'no' than finding ways of saying 'yes'.

I'll go back a few years when I was presented with a particular task where we needed to paint a nice Red Cross on the side of one of the RAF's finest support helicopters. The helicopter det EngO decided to ring Hels back in the UK to get approval; the answer was no. A quiet, 'offline' chat with EngO resulted in a nice pair of red crosses, a completed task and no dead puppies (or even pilots).

Tucumseh - pm sent.

Anyone else want the book link mentioned above ? - please pm me.

LFH

I presume Cpants is actually referring to airframe 62-4137

.......RC-135E "Rivet Amber" was at that time the most sophisticated reconnaissance plane of the US Air Force. It was converted to this configuration in 1963 to fly reconnaissance missions against the Soviet re-entry range off the Kamchatka Peninsula. On June 5, 1969, Rivet Amber departed Shemya for a flight to Fairbanks for routine maintenance. About thirty minutes after departing Shemya, Rivet Amber (callsign Irene 92) transmitted the following message to Elmendorf AFB: "Elmendorf Airways, Irene 92 experiencing vibration in flight. Not certain of the emergency. We have the aircraft under control, Irene 92." This was the last radio contact with the flight. Unidentified microphone keying clicks continued until 10:22. The aircraft crashed at sea.

After more than three weeks of intensive search and rescue operations, the efforts were called off. Neither a single piece of wreckage nor any personnel were ever found.

A Report on the RC-135E "River Amber" (62-4137) Lost Over The Bering Sea - June 5 1969

Answer; leave them on USAF register and dry hire them in...

Worked in WW2 and early Cold War . B-29, Neptune , Sabre eg ...

Pardon this mere civvy joining in.

Putting those three airframes on a US military register may well be a solution to this particular issue. However, what remains to be solved is a deep systemic problem in the MOD/RAF. It is probably the case that those three aircraft are airworthy and suitable for the intended purpose, but they are haunted by a series of disgraceful and deliberate lapses in proper airworthiness maintenance.

I wonder if the powers that be in Whitehall would be willing to admit our shortcomings, accept that we have lost a degree of expertise and accept help to restore a meaningful airworthiness certification capability.

In the meantime, whilst admiring the truly gallant efforts of all military personnel at the sharp end, they deserve better. I have lost all faith in the top table.

Just out of interest. If MOD/RAF are having such problems with crossover of US to UK acceptance/standards/airworthiness/documentation etc with Rivet joint that has been flying all these years what will be the situation with the F35.

Daily Mail Article from 12 April
 

This article is so totally wrong as to be unbelievable!


"U.S. Army Air Force", "gathering dust in a boneyard for retired planes...", buying to replace a Nimrod spy plane that crashed in Afghan...(that jet was a patrol aircraft). "RAF has completed a refit" (actually done by L-3 COMM not the RAF) are all totally wrong statements by a clueless reporter.


The only accurate statement in the whole article was: 'The fact it is a re-engineered older aircraft doesn’t affect the capability on board; it just means that a different safety case has to be presented.'

Wonderful 'Fleet Street' reporting. Guess is should have not expected anything better.

None!
 

Mickj3 asked about problems with the F-35. If MOD/RAF are having such problems with crossover of US to UK acceptance/standards/airworthiness/documentation etc with Rivet joint that has been flying all these years what will be the situation with the F35

Won't be any as it is a new aircraft and RAF are participating from the start. If the MAA has problems with those circumstances then the RAF had better decide never to buy any new aircraft.

Mickj3:-
Would that were all there was to this shambles. It's not so much the problem as you describe, more a problem with the MOD/MAA, which doesn't 'do' airworthiness. It doesn't do airworthiness because it rid itself of anyone who could and, just for good measure, binned all the Regs.

Of course, none of that happened according to the Haddon-Cave Report, which now has the status of the Holy Grail, so instead new Regs are made on the hoof as and when required. That is no way to run a whelk stall, let alone Military Airworthiness and it's all now coming to a head, with RJ just this week's item on an ever lengthening list that no amount of stove-piping can conceal.

For those who are of a mind that if someone else is happy then so should we be, I would remind them that others were happy with the airworthiness of the Chinook Mk2 and the Nimrod Mk2, which together killed 43 people in just two airworthiness related accidents alone.

UK Military Airworthiness Provision and Military Air Accident Investigation are both in dire need of reform. To achieve that they must be freed from the MOD and from each other.

Only then can the rebuilding of UK Military Air Safety commence.

Only then can we have confidence in being told that any UK Military aircraft is airworthy or not.

Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation it Kills!

To ORAC
 

Bit Twiddler said:
"Say, for example, part of the fuselage needed changing and L3 swapped it with a part off the rest of the RJ fleet which had an incomplete history and completely different flying hours, then what happens."

This "exchange process" is actually quite common throughout the world's aviation regulations. However, it is (in 99% of all the requirements I've dealt with) based upon confirmed knowledge of the status of the replacement part prior to installation.

This works well where you have properly logged and documented parts removed, preserved and stored, from airframes withdrawn from service for economic reasons or even some that have been designated BER.

To use parts that have no known history or documented record of usage is just playing with fire. They may have the look and feel of OEM parts but they are no better than Bogus Parts.

Novanav


Agree about the Daily Wail. The point contributors are making is this is the bit MoD just don't get!



This doesn't necessarily follow!

The desperately sad deaths caused in the Chinook & Nimrod crashes was made much worse by the rush for VCO's and the MoD to shift the blame

We have to ask though if these two incidents should drive the whole policy of RAF equipment purchase and use.

The RAF has loses between 12 and 20 people every year in simple accidents, many of them related to vehicles. Are we saying that we shouldn't allow anyone to drive or ride in a vehicle?? Or is there an "acceptable" level of risk based on experience (e.g the chances of being struck by lightning) AND the need to get the job done??