Surely it's not really COTS (or MOTS) if you buy 50 year old airframe and then spend years converting them, making a complete cock-up of it in the process.





UK's Rivet Joint Wins Interim Approval To Fly | Defense News | defensenews.com

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What does "interim" apply to? That means the RAF are not permitted to rely on part or all of the aircraft. When will that be lifted?

NoVANav, as PPRuNe's Mr Rivet Joint can you give us an idea of what the endurance level is of the RJ. The Mildenhall-based ones have been heading off the Baltic each day but are only up for six/seven hours tops which doesn't seem very long. Is that about right for ops from a 9,000 ft runway or can they go for longer unrefuelled?

From the MOD website, including video with low passes:


https://www.gov.uk/government/news/r...s-to-the-skies

So do we give kudos to the Duty Holder for growing a pair?

And when was being released to service ever a game which had to be won?

SS

RJ Endurance
 

My info is a bit dated and is based on TF33 engine burn rates. The F108s give about a 20%, or so, decrease in burn rate and more thrust.
Going off Mildenhall and using the overrun there for takeoff, we could put a good 8-9 hour sortie length on the mission. But, we never did as we always had a tanker top us off over the North Sea, prior to crossing Denmark on our way into the Baltic. Usual missions there were about 12-13 hours in duration, with all but 2.5 in the "operating area". We flew until the numbers crossing Bornholm island matched the flight plan fuel load to get us to EGUN with required overhead reserves.
Flying un-refueled out of Athens we would usually brakes release at 0700 and be back over the beach on final at 1530 local.

What Is Cocked-Up about the RAF RJs?
 

Dervish,


What is "cocked up" about ZZ664? Please explain exactly what is meant by this comment.


Please, no broad generalizations, just specific facts that are in evidence and not just wild-eyed conjecture on your part.

novanav

As a UK taxpayer I regard this programme, and the reason it was necessary, as a xxxx-up. I refer you to MoD's own admission that it let a contract that delivered an aircraft that didn't meet its own regulations. That's a xxxx-up in anyone's book.

About Hammond's statement. The bit I quoted doesn't make sense. What is "commercial" about a military aircraft from the US and what is "off the shelf" about an aircraft that has to undergo years of conversion? It's spin and something stinks.

Boy, did H-C screw up that comparison!

Challenger blew up because engineers, giving a warning based on a known defect for the specific conditions of that specific launch, were ignored in that case.

In other weather/temperature conditions the launch would have been safe.


Any time you ignore a clear engineering limit and an accident occurs, saying the air/spacecraft is unsafe, rather than saying it was operated in an incorrect and unsafe manner, is a bullshiite cop-out.



The US Space Shuttle program HAD identified what would be the cause of the Challenger disaster - well over a year in advance!

The manufacturer of the boosters (Morton-Thiokol) had identified the gasket leak from a couple of previous launches, the cause (ice forming in the joint forcing the sections of the booster casing apart, allowing hot gasses to escape out the side of the booster), and that it could cause a catastrophic event.

Specific guidance had been provided to NASA about weather conditions in the 12 hours preceeding a launch, and on the morning of the Challenger launch the booster engineers at M-T, when polled as part of the standard pre-flight process, unanimously declared "unsafe to fly due to the overnight freezing rain and ice remaining on the launch vehicle".

However, since the procedures (later corrected) allowed for a "consensus go" report, rather than a "unanimous go", the NASA engineering head reported "the engineers say go" because the majority of all engineers for all systems thought it was safe as soon as the air temperature rose above a certain level.

The failure that caused the explosion would not have occurred if the launch had been postponed for 6 hours or so - to allow the casing of the booster to heat above that level, as that would have melted the ice, and the booster sections would have properly reseated.

It was operator error, not an unsafe vehicle, that caused the Challenger explosion.

I wouldn't run a sweet shop (or a candy store) using the Haddon-Cave Report as my guide, let alone as an Air Regulator. It was just as subverted a piece of work as the very regulations it was supposedly seeking to reinforce, and for the MAA to base its very being on makes one think of the parable of houses built upon sand.

Rather than using Haddon-Cave as our guide we should see it as part of the problem, in that it was given clear evidence of the deliberate and co-ordinated attack upon UK Military Airworthiness provision by VSOs and chose to ignore it, preferring instead to characterise that time as a 'Golden Period of Airworthiness'. Given such a brazen perversion of the facts one should be wary of accepting anything it says at face value without poking it repeatedly with the proverbial stick.

Am I suggesting that the Haddon-Cave Report was suborned by the very MOD that suborned the Airworthiness Regulations? Yes, I am. Airworthiness Regulation and Air Accident Investigation aren't safe anywhere near the MOD. They are certainly not safe within the MAA and MAAIB as presently formed. Both must be made independent of the MOD and of each other. Only then can we expect them to start doing their respective jobs unhindered.

Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation It Kills!

On Military aircraft, in the UK, we deal with that by inserting a Limitation in the RTS, as ours is a Limitation Based Release process. In the case of Challenger, some would say the “limitation” was so restrictive that it was actually a Constraint (again, I use the UK term). If something (in this case a seal or gasket) has a temp spec that is incompatible with conditions one experiences at launch or during flight, then to me that is a design defect that MUST be rectified before approval to fly in ANY conditions. It is indicative of major problems in your design and approval process and a bit of a clue something bad will happen.


This is exactly what happened on a number of the accidents discussed here. The causes or contributory factors, on Nimrod, Chinook, Sea King ASaC, Tornado/Patriot, Hercules and others were predictable, predicted and notified by engineers; and, as you say, ignored. The most damning part is they were ignored by other engineers (and those who pretended to be engineers). Just as you describe on Challenger.

But as Chug has pointed out, Haddon-Cave actively protected those who ignored the above. Much of his report is good stuff – primarily the bits he simply copies from evidence submitted to him but lets the reader infer he uncovered it all himself. But much of his analysis and opinion is very flawed and he proved himself untrustworthy and sycophantic. And then he got his gong.




Good points above about COTS. No, RJ cannot in any way be described as a COTS procurement. And, while ACM Bollom may have been mentioned in the press release, perhaps one should look a little lower and ask if there is any (a) staff and (b) procedural failure commonality between Nimrod and RJ. Neither bothered much about airworthiness, ignoring advice and instructions and abandoning it to try to save time and money. Maybe one day we’ll see the audit report that spells all this out, and perhaps the MAA will come forth with the truth about what action they took, instead of the sanitised version we’re getting now – again, protecting those responsible. That report makes it clear all the RJ problems were known years ago.

Oh dear. :rolleyes: IF we followed that policy nothing would ever fly again.

And as for:

One assumes by MOD you mean all of those personnel who work hard on accident investigations, doing their best to find causes and recommend improvements for the future. Bit of a slight for all those who have been involved in numerous perfectly acceptable accident investigations over the years!!

RP:_
No Roland, by MOD I mean the VSOs presently in post who are aware of the previous suborning of personnel involved in airworthiness provision and air accident investigation and maintain the covering up of it. I mean the Senior Civil Servants that state that such suborning is proper and that to disobey instructions to subvert the regulations is a disciplinary offence. I mean VSOs that overturn the findings of:-
and substitute their own arbitrary and bizarre findings in their place and yes, I am aware of the CAS's role in a previous life. I mean the MAA that is responsible for airworthiness provision to the MB Mk10 seat for example, whose DG loftily congratulates the MAAIB on the accident report into the death of Sean Cunningham that found that far from having been airworthy it entirely lacked a Safety Case. It might have been more fitting for the MAA to have been cited for dereliction, but of course the MAAIB is nested within the MAA so best not, eh?

I repeat, Airworthiness Regulation and Air Accident Investigation aren't safe anywhere near the MOD. If that's a slight, so be it. The job of an Air Regulator and an Air Accident Investigator is to avoid avoidable accidents and needless deaths, not to continuously have to review them. The only way that works is for the Regulator and Investigator to be independent of the Operator and of each other.
Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation It Kills!

In your opinion; just repeating it doesn't make it any more true. :hmm:

It is and IMHO you are wrong. You are slighting all those military personnel on accident investigations (including those on the MAAIB) who do their utmost to get to the bottom of accidents and who make recommendations for improvements. If there have been a small number of high profile contentious "arbitrary and bizarre" cases your use of the tar brush undermines the validity of the majority of reports where there are no such cases.:ugh:

Well I don't apologise for expressing my opinions, that is surely what discussion is all about. That we are divided by our respective opinions is what arguing our case is all about. Of course repetition doesn't justify, it merely emphasises that faced with your counter argument I am still standing by my case.

That case is that no matter how tirelessly and responsibly those in UK Military Airworthiness Provision and Air Accident Investigation strive, their efforts are undermined by the very organisations for which they work, which are demonstrably at the whim of VSOs and SCSs. As a result, illegal RTS's, grossly unairworthy fleets and dysfunctional accident investigations have resulted. That diminishes our national security and causes unnecessary grief and suffering to the families of those who die as a result.

The very people that you claim that I slight could be more effective in avoiding avoidable accidents and needless deaths if they were no longer subject to possible improper pressures from VSOs. You seem happy that all such pressure that has been applied is known of, is in the past, and will not be repeated. I do not share that view in any way. You seem happy that every BoI and SI has been effective in determining the cause of its accident and preventing a recurrence,
Given the known cases of interference and subversion in that process, how can you be so sure?

This isn't a time to fight change for the sake of it, anymore than it is to change for the sake of change. The Royal Air Force, for one, has to face up to what has been done in its name, to face up to what continues to be done in its name, and then to do the right thing. Its very raison d'etre is at stake here; to carry the Air War to its enemies. If it does not have airworthy aircraft to do that, its prospects are not good.

If we followed that policy then many of the accidents were discuss would never have occurred. But I accept you are in exalted company in believing we should not have a process that aims to eliminate design defects. (If you had said FAULTS I'd tend to agree with you, but they are two entirely different things). It would be interesting seeing the MAA 's reaction to a formal proposal along those lines. Only an idiot would put their name to it.

On the vast majority of examples cited here, the aircraft would have been compliant, safe and available for service use far earlier had mandated policies been implemented up front, instead of taking short cuts and then having to regress. Case in point - Rivet Joint.

Is the release to service documentation available in the public domain, either as a complete document or in a redacted form?

Jet,

What makes you think it has a Release to Service? Likely only to have a small piece of paper that says 'waived'.

SS

I would like to know who has signed what.

JIV

RTSs are not published, although MoD usually satisfies requests under FoI.

Aircraft like RJ will have a significant "Classified" section, which is often withheld even from aircrew and those responsible for day to day maintaining of airworthiness. MoD will never release that - if they have remembered to include it!

But you ask a good question, and SS's is an excellent and very pointed reply! I very much doubt if MoD will satisfy a request in this case. I doubt if the MAA or ACAS will even let other aircraft project teams see it, because it will illustrate just how far the bar has been lowered in order to cover up what they (MAA) have known on RJ for at least 3 years - and just when the Secy of State was first told of the need for a waiver. One thing is for sure; he'll be furious if it is within the last 2 years, and he'll be even more furious at being misled before that. To me, this illustrates just how serious the MAA must believe the failures - they have been well known for upwards of 3 years, yet could not be fixed in that time. It reminds me of Nimrod MRA4 in the late 90s. The project leaders lying to senior staffs and withholding details of slippage and cost escalation. And when senior staffs found out, misleading politicians. As mentioned above; Hammond should be studying old papers to identify the common denominators and names.

UK Rivet Joint flight restores key RAF capability - 5/29/2014 - Flight Global