Meteor Accident Statistics
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Re: Meteor Accident Statistics
In the late 60s a chap I knew [I remember his name, Sqn, etc but won't publish] was posted to the Far East to fly TT Meteors for the Navy. The story goes that he was towing a banner for ship AA to have at when the airframe began to shudder violently and the rudders tramping so bad that he had to retract his legs right back to prevent injury.
He dumped the banner and gingerly limped home. On shutdown, he discovered shell holes on the rudder and fin. He got mad and went in search of a Navy officer to thump in revenge. Unfortunately, the chosen officer was a Captain RN. He was restrained before he could throw the career-fatal punch, and not unsurprisingly, said Captain RN demanded to know why. Individual was taken to crewroom, where he was fed a large slug of brandy.
A few hours later, a RN chopper landed unannounced on the grass outside the crewroom. Several large blokes ran in, tied up and blindfolded pilot and flew off with him. Three days later, RN helio again lands unannounced on grass in front of Sqn and said pilot was unceremoniously bundled out. Pi**ed as a f*art.
It was the RN's way of saying sorry - he had been treated like a king - drove the boat, flew the chopper, fired the guns, etc. RN could do no wrong after that. BoI? What BoI? Totally unnecessary, it was felt - someone under training screwed up. Period.
He dumped the banner and gingerly limped home. On shutdown, he discovered shell holes on the rudder and fin. He got mad and went in search of a Navy officer to thump in revenge. Unfortunately, the chosen officer was a Captain RN. He was restrained before he could throw the career-fatal punch, and not unsurprisingly, said Captain RN demanded to know why. Individual was taken to crewroom, where he was fed a large slug of brandy.
A few hours later, a RN chopper landed unannounced on the grass outside the crewroom. Several large blokes ran in, tied up and blindfolded pilot and flew off with him. Three days later, RN helio again lands unannounced on grass in front of Sqn and said pilot was unceremoniously bundled out. Pi**ed as a f*art.
It was the RN's way of saying sorry - he had been treated like a king - drove the boat, flew the chopper, fired the guns, etc. RN could do no wrong after that. BoI? What BoI? Totally unnecessary, it was felt - someone under training screwed up. Period.
Re: Meteor Accident Statistics
Originally Posted by pendrifter
Just one thing - I have at last learnt how to text! But now I come up many new terms, VDF QVH, etc?
VDF = VHF Direction Finder. When a pilot transmits on VHF (Very High Frequency) VDF gives a bearing to/from the station called. In years gone by, it was often used in conjunction with a 'VDF let-down procedure' to assist pilots find an airfield, especially in poor weather.
QVH - possibly a typing error, and could be QGH, which is a 'Q Code' abbreviation for 'Controlled Descent Through Cloud'. A similar procedure to the above, mainly used by the military.
(Edited for technical accuracy - please see later post by Flatus Veteranus for more info on QGHs).
Last edited by spekesoftly; 14th Jan 2006 at 23:34.
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Re: Meteor Accident Statistics
I was at North Luffenham from Mar to May 1956 taking a new nav through the OCU on the NF12 and 14.
My log book says it was 228 OCU for that period.
My log book says it was 228 OCU for that period.
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Re: Meteor Accident Statistics
Pendrifter and other oldies
OK, I have done a bit more checking. Wadhurst crash was definitely 20/1/56.
Your list of squadrons had a few holes! Firstly, no numbered squadrons at Luffenham, it was 238 OCU and, as Beagle said also had all the Brigands, a couple of Valettas and a Balliol or two which moved up there from Colerne to join the NF12/14s. In 54 all crews went through 228 OCU at Leeming on AI Mk10 and NF11s. We arrived on 85 which was the first NF12/14 Sqn with AI 21 (APS57) and we had to do the AI conversion on the sqn. They had recently replaced their NF 11s with brand new aircraft. Most AI 21 Sqns had just a few 12s with the majority being 14s. 25 Sqn were also there having moved up from Vampire NF10s. Sometime around 1956 Their Lordships decided to have more NF Sqns, so 25 and 85 had to give up 5 crews and 4 aircraft each. A quick top up from the OCU and they were able to announce a new Sqn - 153 had been formed. Omitted to say that the overall crew numbers had only gone up by about 4. Some of the NF11 sqns re-equipped with Javelins when the Sandys axe fell, including 60 at Tengah.
It seems hard to believe that at one time we had as many Meteor NF Sqns in the Air Force than we have total Fighter, Bomber, Maritime and Transport Sqns now.
Flatus
Excellent idea, we already have a get together at Malling of the Meteor Wing every couple of years (with the odd Mozzie and Vamp 10 guy thrown in to give additional colour!!). As ever with these things who is going to org it?
It could be a hell of a blast though - all those squadrons!!
FJJP
Remember when the Sqn PAI would show you your CG film after an Air/Air ex.
The angle-off on the banner would be coming off frame by frame as you got closer until suddenly in the top corner of the pic appeared a tail-on shot of the Meteor tug creeping towards the middle of the film. This usually produced an immediate exit of the cine room by the pilot concerned, and a simultaneous roar of anger from the tug pilot who realised how close he had been. Happy days.
OK, I have done a bit more checking. Wadhurst crash was definitely 20/1/56.
Your list of squadrons had a few holes! Firstly, no numbered squadrons at Luffenham, it was 238 OCU and, as Beagle said also had all the Brigands, a couple of Valettas and a Balliol or two which moved up there from Colerne to join the NF12/14s. In 54 all crews went through 228 OCU at Leeming on AI Mk10 and NF11s. We arrived on 85 which was the first NF12/14 Sqn with AI 21 (APS57) and we had to do the AI conversion on the sqn. They had recently replaced their NF 11s with brand new aircraft. Most AI 21 Sqns had just a few 12s with the majority being 14s. 25 Sqn were also there having moved up from Vampire NF10s. Sometime around 1956 Their Lordships decided to have more NF Sqns, so 25 and 85 had to give up 5 crews and 4 aircraft each. A quick top up from the OCU and they were able to announce a new Sqn - 153 had been formed. Omitted to say that the overall crew numbers had only gone up by about 4. Some of the NF11 sqns re-equipped with Javelins when the Sandys axe fell, including 60 at Tengah.
It seems hard to believe that at one time we had as many Meteor NF Sqns in the Air Force than we have total Fighter, Bomber, Maritime and Transport Sqns now.
Flatus
Excellent idea, we already have a get together at Malling of the Meteor Wing every couple of years (with the odd Mozzie and Vamp 10 guy thrown in to give additional colour!!). As ever with these things who is going to org it?
It could be a hell of a blast though - all those squadrons!!
FJJP
Remember when the Sqn PAI would show you your CG film after an Air/Air ex.
The angle-off on the banner would be coming off frame by frame as you got closer until suddenly in the top corner of the pic appeared a tail-on shot of the Meteor tug creeping towards the middle of the film. This usually produced an immediate exit of the cine room by the pilot concerned, and a simultaneous roar of anger from the tug pilot who realised how close he had been. Happy days.
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Re: Meteor Accident Statistics
Bof,
Would that be West Malling by any chance ? A quick scan of a book I own states that there were several Meteor Sqns based there during the 1950's includeing 25,85,153 and 500. I used to be there as a staff cadet on 618 VGS and have many happy memories of what was a fantastic airfield (now sadly the Kingshill estate and an Asda !).
C130JB
Would that be West Malling by any chance ? A quick scan of a book I own states that there were several Meteor Sqns based there during the 1950's includeing 25,85,153 and 500. I used to be there as a staff cadet on 618 VGS and have many happy memories of what was a fantastic airfield (now sadly the Kingshill estate and an Asda !).
C130JB
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Re: Meteor Accident Statistics
C130
Yup. West Malling, we tended to just call it Malling. NF Sqns were 25 and 85 from '53 to about '57 together with 500 (RAuxAF) Meteor 8s. 153 formed about '56 with NF.
Yup. West Malling, we tended to just call it Malling. NF Sqns were 25 and 85 from '53 to about '57 together with 500 (RAuxAF) Meteor 8s. 153 formed about '56 with NF.
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Re: Meteor Accident Statistics
Hi Bof,
Yes, after my last posting, I thought I'd got it worked out. I tracked down the list of NF12/14 squadrons before your earlier reply which mentioned North Luffenham (until then the station had not been mentioned!). And you have confirmed my findings.
Sorry to have got so many people doing the research! This www is good stuff
I don't think our local library in Bodmin, Cornwall, could have turned up such a massive amount of relevant information and certainly not from so many people "doing the bis" at the time.
Once again my many thanks to all!
Still intrigued why I cannot trace any form of official enquiry, but enough is enough!
Yes, after my last posting, I thought I'd got it worked out. I tracked down the list of NF12/14 squadrons before your earlier reply which mentioned North Luffenham (until then the station had not been mentioned!). And you have confirmed my findings.
Sorry to have got so many people doing the research! This www is good stuff
I don't think our local library in Bodmin, Cornwall, could have turned up such a massive amount of relevant information and certainly not from so many people "doing the bis" at the time.Once again my many thanks to all!
Still intrigued why I cannot trace any form of official enquiry, but enough is enough!
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Re: Meteor Accident Statistics
My father was a Nav/instructor on 238 OCU (he survived a Brigand crash and had previously survived a crash in an NF11 whilst on 96 Sqn) I have asked him to have a look at this thread and see whether he can provide any more info.
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Re: Meteor Accident Statistics
All has become clear!
Received from Air Historical Branch (RAF)
20.1.56 Meteor NF12, WS661. AWOCU, North Luffenham.
Time of Accident 15.23. Duration of Flight 43 mins. Training Flight.
Pilot Stoate L.C.M. F/O, aged 23. Navigator Paterson, A.W. (F/O).
" The A/C took off to carry out a local flying excercise which was designed to keep the pilots within 60 nautical miles off base. Approx 35 minutes later the A/C was seen over the village of Wadhurst, 120 miles from base, where the pilot's parents resided. After circling the village at least once, the pilot made a very low run in a steeply banked and slightly diving turn to port past his parents home. Whilst still in the turn the A/C struck two bungalows at an estimated height of 25ft above ground level and burst into flames. Both crew members and two civilians were killed.
The pilot disobeyed briefing instruction and indulged in unnecessary, unauthorised and dangerous low flying, and through an error of judgement caused his A/C to crash".
It also transpires that the navigator was buried in Scotland.
A sad ending!
Many thanks to all who took time to investigate, and post info for us.
We have made up the information covering the crash, aircraft details, and official papers, as comprehensive as we can, which will be on its way to the Wadhurst Historical Society this week, to arrive in time for their meeting on 20 January. For those in the area, I believe that local tv news will be covering a memorial service taking place on that day.
Once again many thanks to all.
Received from Air Historical Branch (RAF)
20.1.56 Meteor NF12, WS661. AWOCU, North Luffenham.
Time of Accident 15.23. Duration of Flight 43 mins. Training Flight.
Pilot Stoate L.C.M. F/O, aged 23. Navigator Paterson, A.W. (F/O).
" The A/C took off to carry out a local flying excercise which was designed to keep the pilots within 60 nautical miles off base. Approx 35 minutes later the A/C was seen over the village of Wadhurst, 120 miles from base, where the pilot's parents resided. After circling the village at least once, the pilot made a very low run in a steeply banked and slightly diving turn to port past his parents home. Whilst still in the turn the A/C struck two bungalows at an estimated height of 25ft above ground level and burst into flames. Both crew members and two civilians were killed.
The pilot disobeyed briefing instruction and indulged in unnecessary, unauthorised and dangerous low flying, and through an error of judgement caused his A/C to crash".
It also transpires that the navigator was buried in Scotland.
A sad ending!
Many thanks to all who took time to investigate, and post info for us.
We have made up the information covering the crash, aircraft details, and official papers, as comprehensive as we can, which will be on its way to the Wadhurst Historical Society this week, to arrive in time for their meeting on 20 January. For those in the area, I believe that local tv news will be covering a memorial service taking place on that day.
Once again many thanks to all.
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Re: Meteor Accident Statistics
Spekesoftly
I am sorry to sound pedantic, but the term "QGH" (|Controlled Descent Through Cloud) was in use long before UHF came in. In fact I do not believe that Meteors ever had UHF in squadron service. We never got beyond 2 x 10-channel VHF boxes, crystal-tuned.
There were two forms of VHF/DF. The first sort was situated in a caravan out on the airfield and was a manually operated directional antenna. The operator was connected to Approach Control in the tower by a landline and squawk-box. If an aircraft called for "A course to Steer" or "Homing" (QDM)or a True Bearing (QTE) he would be asked by Approach Control to give a long transmission. (The days of the week, a few numbers, or Mary Had a Little Lamb were common). The operator would "nul" this transmission and pass the bearing to the Approach Controller, who would pass it to the aircraft. There was a significant risk of an inexperienced or overloaded DF operator passing a reciprocal. This happened to me one night between Akrotiri and El Adem in 1956 and almost ran me out of fuel. The other problem was capacity limitation. A really sharp operator could handle up to two or three aircraft (or pairs) at once in a QGH. I believe that lack of capacity at Carnaby in the summer of 1951 lay behind the Flamborough Head tragedy.
During the period 1952-53 the manual DFs were replaced by Cathode Ray tube presentation at the Approach Controller's station. This was known as CRDF but still operated in the VHF band. It speeded up production considerably and a good controller could deliver up to about six QGHs simultaneously.
Both systems fed aircraft into a GCA which was operated from a caravan on the airfield. The Director marshalled aircraft into a stream and handed them off to a final "talk-down" precision controller. I believe that "break-off" was officially 200 ft agl, but "if needs must" a good talk-down controller could take you much lower.
I am sorry to sound pedantic, but the term "QGH" (|Controlled Descent Through Cloud) was in use long before UHF came in. In fact I do not believe that Meteors ever had UHF in squadron service. We never got beyond 2 x 10-channel VHF boxes, crystal-tuned.
There were two forms of VHF/DF. The first sort was situated in a caravan out on the airfield and was a manually operated directional antenna. The operator was connected to Approach Control in the tower by a landline and squawk-box. If an aircraft called for "A course to Steer" or "Homing" (QDM)or a True Bearing (QTE) he would be asked by Approach Control to give a long transmission. (The days of the week, a few numbers, or Mary Had a Little Lamb were common). The operator would "nul" this transmission and pass the bearing to the Approach Controller, who would pass it to the aircraft. There was a significant risk of an inexperienced or overloaded DF operator passing a reciprocal. This happened to me one night between Akrotiri and El Adem in 1956 and almost ran me out of fuel. The other problem was capacity limitation. A really sharp operator could handle up to two or three aircraft (or pairs) at once in a QGH. I believe that lack of capacity at Carnaby in the summer of 1951 lay behind the Flamborough Head tragedy.
During the period 1952-53 the manual DFs were replaced by Cathode Ray tube presentation at the Approach Controller's station. This was known as CRDF but still operated in the VHF band. It speeded up production considerably and a good controller could deliver up to about six QGHs simultaneously.
Both systems fed aircraft into a GCA which was operated from a caravan on the airfield. The Director marshalled aircraft into a stream and handed them off to a final "talk-down" precision controller. I believe that "break-off" was officially 200 ft agl, but "if needs must" a good talk-down controller could take you much lower.
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Re: Meteor Accident Statistics
Flatus
Re the 200ft limit for an instrument approach. Somebody asked me recently, and I had to think. In fact during training on Chippies and Harvards in 52/53 we had no limits. The duty instructor or OC Flying used to make the decision whether flying was "on" based on the met briefing, or they would send some brave QFI up to take a look!! If it was "on" and subsequently got really claggy the duty man would make a general call to all troops airborne and recall or divert everybody. At least we had TBA in the Harvards (no glidepath information) but an approach in real low viz conditions was considerably more difficult than a GCA or later ILS. After training we went for a spell on fighter sqns where we just made the approach, (full GCA or rememember ACR7) and one just came on down until you landed or more usually chickened out! Thankfully that didn't last long before the colour code was introduced and airfields were declared green, red or black. Might be wrong about those colours but no doubt you or some other oldie will correct me.
Re the 200ft limit for an instrument approach. Somebody asked me recently, and I had to think. In fact during training on Chippies and Harvards in 52/53 we had no limits. The duty instructor or OC Flying used to make the decision whether flying was "on" based on the met briefing, or they would send some brave QFI up to take a look!! If it was "on" and subsequently got really claggy the duty man would make a general call to all troops airborne and recall or divert everybody. At least we had TBA in the Harvards (no glidepath information) but an approach in real low viz conditions was considerably more difficult than a GCA or later ILS. After training we went for a spell on fighter sqns where we just made the approach, (full GCA or rememember ACR7) and one just came on down until you landed or more usually chickened out! Thankfully that didn't last long before the colour code was introduced and airfields were declared green, red or black. Might be wrong about those colours but no doubt you or some other oldie will correct me.
Re: Meteor Accident Statistics
Flatus,
Many thanks for your welcome correction, and I've edited my previous post accordingly.
As always, I enjoyed reading your recollections.
Many thanks for your welcome correction, and I've edited my previous post accordingly.
As always, I enjoyed reading your recollections.
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Re: Meteor Accident Statistics
Bof
I am operating at the limits of my memory here, but my figure of 200ft min for a GCA probably assumed a Master Green card. The ground kit was superb (American, I believe) and the operators were specialists who did not double-up in Approach Control like they did later with ACR7/PAR. As I remember it with GCA the precision ("talk-down") controller would warn you that you were approaching minimums and then keep talking in an advisory capacity. The Meatbox was ideal in the approach configuration. Drop full flap approaching the glide-path, set the speed at about 125, vsi at about 250 fpm down and revs at about 11,000 depending on the wind (I would not argue over these settings!), trim it out and RELAX . Glosters did the rest.
The ACR7/PAR was coming in when I was at CFS in '57. I thought it was in every way an inferior system.
I am operating at the limits of my memory here, but my figure of 200ft min for a GCA probably assumed a Master Green card. The ground kit was superb (American, I believe) and the operators were specialists who did not double-up in Approach Control like they did later with ACR7/PAR. As I remember it with GCA the precision ("talk-down") controller would warn you that you were approaching minimums and then keep talking in an advisory capacity. The Meatbox was ideal in the approach configuration. Drop full flap approaching the glide-path, set the speed at about 125, vsi at about 250 fpm down and revs at about 11,000 depending on the wind (I would not argue over these settings!), trim it out and RELAX . Glosters did the rest.
The ACR7/PAR was coming in when I was at CFS in '57. I thought it was in every way an inferior system.
Re: Meteor Accident Statistics
Flatus,
I suspect the 'American Kit' you mention was probably MPN11/CPN4 - combined search radar and PAR. There were one or two still in RAF use in the early seventies.
I suspect the 'American Kit' you mention was probably MPN11/CPN4 - combined search radar and PAR. There were one or two still in RAF use in the early seventies.
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Our GCA at Horsham was excellent, and we also got DME during my tour, only distance if I remember, but since the ground station was on base, it was most helpful. I remember one approach in distinctly murky weather, as No.2 in a pairs GCA. I saw the runway and made a dirty dart, and got down OK just as my leader overshot into the murk, and ended up at some unlikely place like Swanton Morley on one engine. I don't know if he didn't see the runway lights, or was looking after his No.2 by not doing the dirty dart bit! Don't know what that says about sticking to ones leader through thick and thin, but I was quite glad to get down.
Having always had GCA or ACR7 for bad weather approaches in the RAF, it came as quite a shock when doing my Civil Licence to have to do it all off my own bat for NDB and ILS approaches, rather than having very skilled people telling me what to do!
All of which is getting away from the subject of this thread, but as has been said before, not so much to do with the aeroplane, more to do with how we operated at the time.
Having always had GCA or ACR7 for bad weather approaches in the RAF, it came as quite a shock when doing my Civil Licence to have to do it all off my own bat for NDB and ILS approaches, rather than having very skilled people telling me what to do!
All of which is getting away from the subject of this thread, but as has been said before, not so much to do with the aeroplane, more to do with how we operated at the time.
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A somewhat abridged version of a note written by my father:
23.1.1953, I made my first flight on 96 Sqn., R.A.F. Ahlhorn, a sector recce with Mike (Isherwood)-Bennett, in WM150. We took off at 1117 hrs. and were airborne for exactly 1 hour. There had been little or no flying prior to this date because of bad weather conditions, primarily snow. Three days later I was airborne again, with my normal pilot Pete Driscoll, and again we flew a sector recce, getting airborne at 0950 hrs., in WM182, and landing at 1100 hrs.
Two days later, 28.1.1953, we took off in WM149, at 0950 hrs., to carry out M.P.I.s with our playmate, Val Harder and his navigator, Don Busby. Several other pairs, including aircraft from 256 Sqn., took off ahead of us and Pete and I were last to get airborne.
Apart from the Squadron Commanders, Flight Commanders and a few experienced pilots who had Master Green Cards, the others had only White Cards and could not fly if the cloud base was below 1,000 ft. Weather conditions were poor, but within the limits, however, something obviously went wrong with the Met forecast that morning, because within moments of getting airborne, Ahlhorn A.T.C. aborted all the sorties and instructed us to divert to Oldenburg because the weather had closed in and the cloud base had fallen to 700 ft. In fact Met had really got it wrong, because not only was the weather “Harry Clampers” but we also experienced the most horrendous icing I have ever seen, with the ice on the leading edges growing at a rate of knots before our eyes.
We were diverted to Oldenburg because they had the luxury of G.C.A., which had not yet been installed at Ahlhorn. We all immediately came under control of A.T.C. Oldenburg and formed a queue, with Val and Don next to last and Pete and I behind.
There appeared to be a problem with the aircraft flown by Kiwi Graves and his navigator, Ron Lawrence, from 256. Oldenburg thought that Kiwi’s compass was u/s and gave him priority. By the time it was our turn, with everyone else having landed, Oldenburg didn’t seem to know where we really were, although we were identified as being over Osnabruck at one point. The penny hadn’t dropped with Oldenburg that it wasn’t Kiwi Graves’ compass that was u/s - it was ours. Eventually, they lost us completely and by then we were over Holland.
A.T.C. at the Dutch Air Force base at Twente took over control, but they too experienced difficulties, lost us, and control was handed over to the Dutch at Leeuwarden. Shortly after Leeuwarden took over we ran out of fuel and, surprise, surprise - the engines went quiet. Pete sent out a Mayday and we started our way down. As we did so, the last thing we heard on the RT was a slanging match between the Controllers at Twente and Leeuwarden, with each blaming the other for our predicament !
Leaving the two controllers to sort it out between themselves we continued our descent. By now there was no cloud below us and visibility was perfect - that being so, I thought there was little excuse for Pete to shortly demolish twelve of the few trees that grew in Holland !
Still continuing our descent, we followed the usual procedures, but instead of releasing my parachute harness, in my cack-handed way, I unfastened my safety harness !! I yelled to Pete to “Hang on!” - Well, there wasn’t a lot he could do, was there? - so I moved with a certain amount of alacrity, and re-fastened it again.
We jettisoned the drop-tanks then the canopy, passed under some power lines, clobbered the aforementioned trees and then I looked ahead. To port a house was coming up, to starboard another. I could not see directly in front because the view was blocked by the radar, but beyond the radar, and ahead, was an embankment about 100 ft. high - and for all I knew, more houses between us and the embankment. Anyway, as Pete put the aircraft down, I braced myself and on initial impact chipped my left kneecap on the Mk. 10 Tilt switch. We stopped short before the houses and although in fact there were none immediately in front of us, before the aeroplane came to a complete halt, we both leapt out. Unfortunately, we both leapt at exactly the same time, with Pete veering to the left, and me to the right. Consequently, we collided and sent each other flying. Picking ourselves up, we continued our dive for a nearby ditch. We thought that there might be some residual fuel in the tanks, or that there might be fumes which could ignite. This possibility was reinforced when we heard a hissing from the aircraft. Gingerly poking our heads above the top of the ditch to take a look, we felt complete idiots when we realised that the hissing was from the oxygen supply, which was still switched on. Our flight had lasted 1 hr.45 mins.
Pete went to one of the houses to phone for help while I stood guard over the aeroplane. At the first house Pete knocked someone answered the door, took one look at him and promptly shut the door in his face! He had better luck at the next house and was able to phone the police. The Chief of Police from Zwolle, accompanied by a number of his officers arrived, followed swiftly by a large number of Dutch Army personnel.
The Chief of Police drove us to the nearby Army base, where the Colonel had us driven on in his car to the Dutch Air Force Station at Leeuwarden. There we were greeted by the Station Commander, who turned out to be a friend of our own Station Commander, Gp. Capt. Piers Kelly. He phoned PK and after a brief chat put Pete on the phone to explain what had happened.
We were then taken to the Mess, where we were kitted out in Dutch uniforms before being taken to the Bar. The loan of the uniforms was necessary because of the way we were dressed under our flying suits - the heating system in the NF11 was activated automatically when the pressurisation system was switched on, with no means of controlling the temperature and it was normally too hot. Consequently, Pete had no shirt under his flying suit and I had neither shirt nor trousers.
Once in the Bar, we were joined by a large number of pilots from the base, who promptly started to fill us with Bols Gin and meatballs. After who knows how many of both someone suggested we should all go out on the town ( Zwolle ). This was thought to be a good idea, so we changed our Dutch uniforms for “civvies”, which some people were kind enough to lend us, and off we set for Zwolle - in an ambulance. We thought this an odd form of transport but were grateful later on, as it turned out - but not for any medical reasons.
We had a hilarious and eventful night and whilst we were enjoying ourselves in what we thought was a harmless manner, there were obviously other people who didn’t appreciate our hilarity. We failed to take the management seriously in two night-clubs when they asked us to leave, but realised they were serious in both places when the police arrived and, courteously of course, also asked us to leave. Being officers and gentlemen we left - also courteously, of course! It was after leaving the second night-club that we appreciated our transport and gratefully took advantage of the offer of the beds in the ambulance whilst the rest of the party stood like sardines, which was probably just as well as they probably wouldn’t have been able to keep upright otherwise!
The following morning, we had a farewell meeting with the Station Commander, an R.A.F. Liaison Officer and someone from the Dutch Government. We had our photograph taken for the Station Photo Album, which contained photos of Churchill, Eisenhower, Prince Bernhard and other notables - Pete and I thought it highly amusing that we were going to appear with that lot, but I don’t know what they would have thought!
Eventually, an Anson from R.A.F. Jever arrived for us and off we set. The Station Commander at Jever was Gp. Cptn. Powell-Sheddon, who had been our Wing Co. Flying at Ahlhorn and he had instructed the Anson to land at Jever first. When we taxied in after landing he was there to greet us on the apron and immediately took us off to the Mess and the bar, where he rapidly returned us to the state we had been in the previous night! Somewhat later that day we arrived back at Ahlhorn, feeling somewhat tired and emotional.
Nearly four months later, on 18th May, 1953, Pete and I were involved in another incident -
We took off at 1115hrs. that day for G.C.I.s, and as we were rolling, A.T.C. yelled to us to abort as we had an engine on fire! Unfortunately we were committed, and had to get airborne. Pete shut down the engine, turned and started the procedure for landing. Having a full fuel load we were overweight and therefore had to jettison the drop-tanks, which Pete did on the airfield and then landed. It turned out that an oil filler cap had been left off during servicing and this was what had caused the problem.
As a sequel to our Dutch visit, at the end of March, 1954, we went to Sylt for air firing practice but before the exercises were finished a number of us were sent to Essen for a N.A.T.O. paper Exercise.
We travelled by train, dressed in uniform as normal, and while waiting for transport from the railway station more than a few people walking past spat at us. When we arrived at the Army Camp, where the Exercise was taking place, we were told that under no circumstances were we to go out in uniform - the local population hated the R.A.F. who had destroyed almost the whole city. Even then, in 1954, there were very few buildings standing, with little rebuilding of the city centre having been done.
However, we were also told that we were not allowed outside the camp at all. We all thought this was a bit much, so when we went out in the evenings we had to “escape” over the wall surrounding the camp. German people in bars that we managed to find asked if we were “Army”, to which we replied “Yes” and were immediately welcomed! Returning to camp after such evenings out and having to climb the wall to get back in was always, for some reason, more difficult than getting out.
Whilst there, a group of Dutch pilots arrived, and it turned out to be the guys from Leeuwarden who, on seeing me, insisted that we should all go out together, to which we reluctantly agreed. I saw it as an opportunity to repay their hospitality to Pete and myself, because during our night out in Zwolle they refused to let either of us spend a single cent. However, they repeated their performance in Essen and this time refused to let me spend a pfennig!
23.1.1953, I made my first flight on 96 Sqn., R.A.F. Ahlhorn, a sector recce with Mike (Isherwood)-Bennett, in WM150. We took off at 1117 hrs. and were airborne for exactly 1 hour. There had been little or no flying prior to this date because of bad weather conditions, primarily snow. Three days later I was airborne again, with my normal pilot Pete Driscoll, and again we flew a sector recce, getting airborne at 0950 hrs., in WM182, and landing at 1100 hrs.
Two days later, 28.1.1953, we took off in WM149, at 0950 hrs., to carry out M.P.I.s with our playmate, Val Harder and his navigator, Don Busby. Several other pairs, including aircraft from 256 Sqn., took off ahead of us and Pete and I were last to get airborne.
Apart from the Squadron Commanders, Flight Commanders and a few experienced pilots who had Master Green Cards, the others had only White Cards and could not fly if the cloud base was below 1,000 ft. Weather conditions were poor, but within the limits, however, something obviously went wrong with the Met forecast that morning, because within moments of getting airborne, Ahlhorn A.T.C. aborted all the sorties and instructed us to divert to Oldenburg because the weather had closed in and the cloud base had fallen to 700 ft. In fact Met had really got it wrong, because not only was the weather “Harry Clampers” but we also experienced the most horrendous icing I have ever seen, with the ice on the leading edges growing at a rate of knots before our eyes.
We were diverted to Oldenburg because they had the luxury of G.C.A., which had not yet been installed at Ahlhorn. We all immediately came under control of A.T.C. Oldenburg and formed a queue, with Val and Don next to last and Pete and I behind.
There appeared to be a problem with the aircraft flown by Kiwi Graves and his navigator, Ron Lawrence, from 256. Oldenburg thought that Kiwi’s compass was u/s and gave him priority. By the time it was our turn, with everyone else having landed, Oldenburg didn’t seem to know where we really were, although we were identified as being over Osnabruck at one point. The penny hadn’t dropped with Oldenburg that it wasn’t Kiwi Graves’ compass that was u/s - it was ours. Eventually, they lost us completely and by then we were over Holland.
A.T.C. at the Dutch Air Force base at Twente took over control, but they too experienced difficulties, lost us, and control was handed over to the Dutch at Leeuwarden. Shortly after Leeuwarden took over we ran out of fuel and, surprise, surprise - the engines went quiet. Pete sent out a Mayday and we started our way down. As we did so, the last thing we heard on the RT was a slanging match between the Controllers at Twente and Leeuwarden, with each blaming the other for our predicament !
Leaving the two controllers to sort it out between themselves we continued our descent. By now there was no cloud below us and visibility was perfect - that being so, I thought there was little excuse for Pete to shortly demolish twelve of the few trees that grew in Holland !
Still continuing our descent, we followed the usual procedures, but instead of releasing my parachute harness, in my cack-handed way, I unfastened my safety harness !! I yelled to Pete to “Hang on!” - Well, there wasn’t a lot he could do, was there? - so I moved with a certain amount of alacrity, and re-fastened it again.
We jettisoned the drop-tanks then the canopy, passed under some power lines, clobbered the aforementioned trees and then I looked ahead. To port a house was coming up, to starboard another. I could not see directly in front because the view was blocked by the radar, but beyond the radar, and ahead, was an embankment about 100 ft. high - and for all I knew, more houses between us and the embankment. Anyway, as Pete put the aircraft down, I braced myself and on initial impact chipped my left kneecap on the Mk. 10 Tilt switch. We stopped short before the houses and although in fact there were none immediately in front of us, before the aeroplane came to a complete halt, we both leapt out. Unfortunately, we both leapt at exactly the same time, with Pete veering to the left, and me to the right. Consequently, we collided and sent each other flying. Picking ourselves up, we continued our dive for a nearby ditch. We thought that there might be some residual fuel in the tanks, or that there might be fumes which could ignite. This possibility was reinforced when we heard a hissing from the aircraft. Gingerly poking our heads above the top of the ditch to take a look, we felt complete idiots when we realised that the hissing was from the oxygen supply, which was still switched on. Our flight had lasted 1 hr.45 mins.
Pete went to one of the houses to phone for help while I stood guard over the aeroplane. At the first house Pete knocked someone answered the door, took one look at him and promptly shut the door in his face! He had better luck at the next house and was able to phone the police. The Chief of Police from Zwolle, accompanied by a number of his officers arrived, followed swiftly by a large number of Dutch Army personnel.
The Chief of Police drove us to the nearby Army base, where the Colonel had us driven on in his car to the Dutch Air Force Station at Leeuwarden. There we were greeted by the Station Commander, who turned out to be a friend of our own Station Commander, Gp. Capt. Piers Kelly. He phoned PK and after a brief chat put Pete on the phone to explain what had happened.
We were then taken to the Mess, where we were kitted out in Dutch uniforms before being taken to the Bar. The loan of the uniforms was necessary because of the way we were dressed under our flying suits - the heating system in the NF11 was activated automatically when the pressurisation system was switched on, with no means of controlling the temperature and it was normally too hot. Consequently, Pete had no shirt under his flying suit and I had neither shirt nor trousers.
Once in the Bar, we were joined by a large number of pilots from the base, who promptly started to fill us with Bols Gin and meatballs. After who knows how many of both someone suggested we should all go out on the town ( Zwolle ). This was thought to be a good idea, so we changed our Dutch uniforms for “civvies”, which some people were kind enough to lend us, and off we set for Zwolle - in an ambulance. We thought this an odd form of transport but were grateful later on, as it turned out - but not for any medical reasons.
We had a hilarious and eventful night and whilst we were enjoying ourselves in what we thought was a harmless manner, there were obviously other people who didn’t appreciate our hilarity. We failed to take the management seriously in two night-clubs when they asked us to leave, but realised they were serious in both places when the police arrived and, courteously of course, also asked us to leave. Being officers and gentlemen we left - also courteously, of course! It was after leaving the second night-club that we appreciated our transport and gratefully took advantage of the offer of the beds in the ambulance whilst the rest of the party stood like sardines, which was probably just as well as they probably wouldn’t have been able to keep upright otherwise!
The following morning, we had a farewell meeting with the Station Commander, an R.A.F. Liaison Officer and someone from the Dutch Government. We had our photograph taken for the Station Photo Album, which contained photos of Churchill, Eisenhower, Prince Bernhard and other notables - Pete and I thought it highly amusing that we were going to appear with that lot, but I don’t know what they would have thought!
Eventually, an Anson from R.A.F. Jever arrived for us and off we set. The Station Commander at Jever was Gp. Cptn. Powell-Sheddon, who had been our Wing Co. Flying at Ahlhorn and he had instructed the Anson to land at Jever first. When we taxied in after landing he was there to greet us on the apron and immediately took us off to the Mess and the bar, where he rapidly returned us to the state we had been in the previous night! Somewhat later that day we arrived back at Ahlhorn, feeling somewhat tired and emotional.
Nearly four months later, on 18th May, 1953, Pete and I were involved in another incident -
We took off at 1115hrs. that day for G.C.I.s, and as we were rolling, A.T.C. yelled to us to abort as we had an engine on fire! Unfortunately we were committed, and had to get airborne. Pete shut down the engine, turned and started the procedure for landing. Having a full fuel load we were overweight and therefore had to jettison the drop-tanks, which Pete did on the airfield and then landed. It turned out that an oil filler cap had been left off during servicing and this was what had caused the problem.
As a sequel to our Dutch visit, at the end of March, 1954, we went to Sylt for air firing practice but before the exercises were finished a number of us were sent to Essen for a N.A.T.O. paper Exercise.
We travelled by train, dressed in uniform as normal, and while waiting for transport from the railway station more than a few people walking past spat at us. When we arrived at the Army Camp, where the Exercise was taking place, we were told that under no circumstances were we to go out in uniform - the local population hated the R.A.F. who had destroyed almost the whole city. Even then, in 1954, there were very few buildings standing, with little rebuilding of the city centre having been done.
However, we were also told that we were not allowed outside the camp at all. We all thought this was a bit much, so when we went out in the evenings we had to “escape” over the wall surrounding the camp. German people in bars that we managed to find asked if we were “Army”, to which we replied “Yes” and were immediately welcomed! Returning to camp after such evenings out and having to climb the wall to get back in was always, for some reason, more difficult than getting out.
Whilst there, a group of Dutch pilots arrived, and it turned out to be the guys from Leeuwarden who, on seeing me, insisted that we should all go out together, to which we reluctantly agreed. I saw it as an opportunity to repay their hospitality to Pete and myself, because during our night out in Zwolle they refused to let either of us spend a single cent. However, they repeated their performance in Essen and this time refused to let me spend a pfennig!
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Legalapproach: Your father was unlucky the missing oil cap caused a fire at that late stage on takeoff, my similar event had a different result.
In my case there was a bloody great bang in the starboard engine on takeoff just after I let the brakes off, so I was able to stop and vacate.
One thing still puzzles me, as I ran clear of the smoke my nav was well ahead of me and going away, how he got there I shall never know because I was the one who opened the canopy !
In my case there was a bloody great bang in the starboard engine on takeoff just after I let the brakes off, so I was able to stop and vacate.
One thing still puzzles me, as I ran clear of the smoke my nav was well ahead of me and going away, how he got there I shall never know because I was the one who opened the canopy !