Meteor Accident Statistics
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Meteor Accident Statistics
One probable explanation for what seems to have been a pretty relaxed acceptance by the Service of these horrific accident rates is that most/many of the instructers were ex-wartime, as were virtually all of the supervisers, and the wartime accident rates were equally horrific. John Blakely may have the stats, but I seem to recall figures showing that almost half of all a/c and aircrew casualyies during the war were accidental ones. So, as far as the Service was concerned, with the war only five or six years behind it, what had changed?
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Post War Accident Statistics
I am sure both John Farley and John Purdey are spot on with their comments. I have not seen the detailed wartime accident figures but I am certain that I did see a comment that confirms JP's figures that more than half of aircrew casualties were flying accident rather than directly combat related. I seem to recall a couple of films that displayed the characters mentioned by JF - High Flight with Ray Milland in 1956 and a Cranwell based one whose name I cannot recall, and these I am sure influenced my decision to join the RAF - it had been the Navy up to then. I do not recall reading anything about accident rates even though casualties were still in three figures as late as 1957. Fortunately the world of flight safety was made safer by my short-sightedness although I thoroughly enjoyed the Chipmunk at Henlow, but even as an engineer I certainly noticed a difference of aircrew attitude towards the rules and regulations (minimum fuel states, cross-wind limits, etc) in my time as regularly flying JEngO on a Lightning Sqn in the 60s and my return to the flight line as a Phantom SEngO in the 70s.
I would leave it to others to decide which were (or are) the "Happy Days" but one thing that is for sure is that at £50M a "pop" or whatever it turns out to be there will be no place to the Meteor approach to training, as described by JF, on JSF! Perhaps that is also part of the answer - sadly it was not just aircrew lives that were seen as "cheap" in the late 40s/early50s.
I would leave it to others to decide which were (or are) the "Happy Days" but one thing that is for sure is that at £50M a "pop" or whatever it turns out to be there will be no place to the Meteor approach to training, as described by JF, on JSF! Perhaps that is also part of the answer - sadly it was not just aircrew lives that were seen as "cheap" in the late 40s/early50s.
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"The Johns" (Farley and Purdey) are "spot on". I did the Driffield course in the summer of '51 and then instructed at Middleton ("creamed") in 52/53.
Having done FTS and got my wings on Harvards I found there was a huge change, not only in performance, but in attitudes between FTS at Oakington and the AFS at Driffield. Of course, we "stues" were at first overawed ( I mean sh1t-scared!) by the reputation the Meteor had got itself outside the immediate community. But, once on the course at Driffield, despite the black humour of the Flt Sgt who did the airframe systems in ground school (his every point seemed to be illustrated by the story of some poor sod who had fogotten it and dug himself a deep hole in the terrain), and particularly once we had had our first demo ride in the T7, which was exhilarating in the extreme, we greatly enjoyed the aeroplane and the course. Driffield were operating from Carnaby that summer. The crew room was a tent and this lent a wartime armosphere of informality which was a refreshing blast from the usual FTC bullsh1t
The Meteor was never a dream to fly compared with, say, the Hunter. It was not "viceless" but so long as you obeyed a few simple rules you were OK. Systems were crude but intelligible to technophobes like me who always had troubles with wiggly amps
and complex systems. Flight controls were mechanical and needed a measure of brute force in certain situations. Trimmers were also operated by wires and knobs. The main inadequacies were in the flight instruments in early marks (vacuum driven with narrow toppling limits and extended re-erection times), the lack of any Nav Aid except ground DF stations accessed by VHF, and the lack of an ejection seat in the T7 and the F4, which was used for solo work. There was no pressurisation in the T7 and it was usually, in my memory, u/s in the F4s. With the Mk 16 Economiser system you were then supposed to be limited to 30,000 ft. But you often ignored this limit to get the job done. There were a number of fatalities ascribed to blokes simply forgetting to connect their oxygen hose!
The many accidents due to practising asymmetric overshoots and landings and spinning have been discusssed earlier. It may be true that fewer chaps would have "got the chop" if these manoeuvres had not been practised. Failed engines were a rare event; the Derwents seemed to absorb endless punishment without complaint. In dogfights at high altitude you just jammed the throttles hard against the instrument panel and. if you spared the jpts a glance you were horrified at what you saw. Centrifugal compressors were highly tolerant of ice and fod. As a demo, I believe RR used to empty buckets of ice cubes straight from the fridge into the intakes. There was the odd clunk and puff of steam from the jet pipe. As for spinning, I never heard of anyone getting inadvertently into a spin from a combat manoeuvre. You had to try hard to get into one, and recovery was straightforward if you took the textbook action. If you arsed about you could provoke an inverted spin, and that is how some chaps bought it.
To describe the Meatbox as a "deathtrap" is a gross calumny. I remember my two tours on it with considerable affection. There was an element of macho about it; control forces at high Mach and in asymmetric overshoot were high and its contemporary rival (the Vampire) was regarded with considerable disdain by the Meatbox aviators. "Screaming kiddy-cars" ! The accident rate notoriety probably fed this macho culture. Periodically the press would run a bit of a campaign about it, but it soon petered out. After all, casualties were few compared with the war from which the country had quite recently emerged. Many years later under the 30-year rule some blistering Minutes from Churchill to the S of S were released; but they did not seem to have much impact at the time. The Korean War build-up dictated priorities. Reinforcing the front line No 1, Flight Safety No 2 by a wide margin.
The only sense in which the Meatbox could be described as a deathtrap was the bale-out case in the Mk4s and 7s which had no ejection seat. The party line used to be do not contemplate a bale-out except as a last-ditch option; you would probably impale yourself on the tailplane bullet fairing. Always try to get it onto the ground in a survivable attitude. The Mk 4 cockpit in particular was a fortress with armour plating behind and the four 20mm barrels anchored into the structure either side of the cockpit. We had a student at Middleton forced-land at a bomber base. He did not make the runway and ploughed through the bomb-dump shedding all the airfame as he went until he was left in just the cockpit. He was stunned but OK. Of course you were in real trouble if you ran low on gas at night over somewhere like the desert. This happened to me once or twice in the Middle East- once in a T7 between Akrotiri and El Adem. We were over cloud and called for a Contriolled Descent. El Adem only had a manual D/F and started feeding me reciprocals. When we got in they put 320 gals into the main tanks (capacity 325).
Finally, one has to admit that, at Middleton certainly, there was what would be regarded today as a heavy-drinking culture. Being a "jet-jock" in those days seemed inseparable from being a two-fisted drinker. I remember being "first off" one New year Morning, pitch dark and straight into a 200 ft cloudbase and driving rain. It was 0700 and I had got to bed at about 0300 much the worse for wear. The student never touched the controls on that ride.!
Having done FTS and got my wings on Harvards I found there was a huge change, not only in performance, but in attitudes between FTS at Oakington and the AFS at Driffield. Of course, we "stues" were at first overawed ( I mean sh1t-scared!) by the reputation the Meteor had got itself outside the immediate community. But, once on the course at Driffield, despite the black humour of the Flt Sgt who did the airframe systems in ground school (his every point seemed to be illustrated by the story of some poor sod who had fogotten it and dug himself a deep hole in the terrain), and particularly once we had had our first demo ride in the T7, which was exhilarating in the extreme, we greatly enjoyed the aeroplane and the course. Driffield were operating from Carnaby that summer. The crew room was a tent and this lent a wartime armosphere of informality which was a refreshing blast from the usual FTC bullsh1t
The Meteor was never a dream to fly compared with, say, the Hunter. It was not "viceless" but so long as you obeyed a few simple rules you were OK. Systems were crude but intelligible to technophobes like me who always had troubles with wiggly amps
and complex systems. Flight controls were mechanical and needed a measure of brute force in certain situations. Trimmers were also operated by wires and knobs. The main inadequacies were in the flight instruments in early marks (vacuum driven with narrow toppling limits and extended re-erection times), the lack of any Nav Aid except ground DF stations accessed by VHF, and the lack of an ejection seat in the T7 and the F4, which was used for solo work. There was no pressurisation in the T7 and it was usually, in my memory, u/s in the F4s. With the Mk 16 Economiser system you were then supposed to be limited to 30,000 ft. But you often ignored this limit to get the job done. There were a number of fatalities ascribed to blokes simply forgetting to connect their oxygen hose!
The many accidents due to practising asymmetric overshoots and landings and spinning have been discusssed earlier. It may be true that fewer chaps would have "got the chop" if these manoeuvres had not been practised. Failed engines were a rare event; the Derwents seemed to absorb endless punishment without complaint. In dogfights at high altitude you just jammed the throttles hard against the instrument panel and. if you spared the jpts a glance you were horrified at what you saw. Centrifugal compressors were highly tolerant of ice and fod. As a demo, I believe RR used to empty buckets of ice cubes straight from the fridge into the intakes. There was the odd clunk and puff of steam from the jet pipe. As for spinning, I never heard of anyone getting inadvertently into a spin from a combat manoeuvre. You had to try hard to get into one, and recovery was straightforward if you took the textbook action. If you arsed about you could provoke an inverted spin, and that is how some chaps bought it.
To describe the Meatbox as a "deathtrap" is a gross calumny. I remember my two tours on it with considerable affection. There was an element of macho about it; control forces at high Mach and in asymmetric overshoot were high and its contemporary rival (the Vampire) was regarded with considerable disdain by the Meatbox aviators. "Screaming kiddy-cars" ! The accident rate notoriety probably fed this macho culture. Periodically the press would run a bit of a campaign about it, but it soon petered out. After all, casualties were few compared with the war from which the country had quite recently emerged. Many years later under the 30-year rule some blistering Minutes from Churchill to the S of S were released; but they did not seem to have much impact at the time. The Korean War build-up dictated priorities. Reinforcing the front line No 1, Flight Safety No 2 by a wide margin.
The only sense in which the Meatbox could be described as a deathtrap was the bale-out case in the Mk4s and 7s which had no ejection seat. The party line used to be do not contemplate a bale-out except as a last-ditch option; you would probably impale yourself on the tailplane bullet fairing. Always try to get it onto the ground in a survivable attitude. The Mk 4 cockpit in particular was a fortress with armour plating behind and the four 20mm barrels anchored into the structure either side of the cockpit. We had a student at Middleton forced-land at a bomber base. He did not make the runway and ploughed through the bomb-dump shedding all the airfame as he went until he was left in just the cockpit. He was stunned but OK. Of course you were in real trouble if you ran low on gas at night over somewhere like the desert. This happened to me once or twice in the Middle East- once in a T7 between Akrotiri and El Adem. We were over cloud and called for a Contriolled Descent. El Adem only had a manual D/F and started feeding me reciprocals. When we got in they put 320 gals into the main tanks (capacity 325).
Finally, one has to admit that, at Middleton certainly, there was what would be regarded today as a heavy-drinking culture. Being a "jet-jock" in those days seemed inseparable from being a two-fisted drinker. I remember being "first off" one New year Morning, pitch dark and straight into a 200 ft cloudbase and driving rain. It was 0700 and I had got to bed at about 0300 much the worse for wear. The student never touched the controls on that ride.!
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FV: it wasn't just the 4 and 7 that didn't have a bang seat, none of the N/F versions had it.
I am sure you know that, I just wanted to remind the others who might not be as knowledgeable.
I am sure you know that, I just wanted to remind the others who might not be as knowledgeable.
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I agree with FV, the Johns have put in a nutshell what I meant in my previous post, and far better than I did. And thank you FV for rebutting the 'death trap' syndrome so eloquently.
I did the Drffield course in early 52, so did not quite overlap with FV, but it was just the same when I was there, though we only used Carnaby for circuits and so on, and I seem to remember one could do VDF QGHs there.
I do remember one of our number managing to overshoot on one having made a mess of his approach, from what should have been an impossible position (too low, slow, full flap?, but I doubt it), he came in looking rather shaken. He was later creamed off to CFS!
I also remember my first low level navex, made the first turning point OK, steep turn onto next heading, what next heading? Compass toppled, found myself again low and fast over York Minster, found Driffield having been like a headless chicken for some time, landed, DCO in the auth book, had a beer, learned from it. And FVs New Years Day adventure reminded me of pairs snake climbs to 30G or so through typical warm front weather after a similar nights over indulgence. Didn't know what 'the leans' was till then, or what it was to put my trust in my pairs leader who had left the bar at the same time as myself!
During my tour at Horsham St Faith, 52-54, I remember five fatals, only one of which, a landing on one (I think after a mech.shut down rather than practice) was due to aircraft problems. Two were collisions, one collected the weight from the flag in the cockpit after breaking too late and underneath during air to air firing, and the other was overexuberence at low level, if I remember. There may have been others, but memory fades.
So, 'death trap' no, and though it did catch the unwary now and again, it was a forgiving and fun to fly aeroplane.
I did the Drffield course in early 52, so did not quite overlap with FV, but it was just the same when I was there, though we only used Carnaby for circuits and so on, and I seem to remember one could do VDF QGHs there.
I do remember one of our number managing to overshoot on one having made a mess of his approach, from what should have been an impossible position (too low, slow, full flap?, but I doubt it), he came in looking rather shaken. He was later creamed off to CFS!
I also remember my first low level navex, made the first turning point OK, steep turn onto next heading, what next heading? Compass toppled, found myself again low and fast over York Minster, found Driffield having been like a headless chicken for some time, landed, DCO in the auth book, had a beer, learned from it. And FVs New Years Day adventure reminded me of pairs snake climbs to 30G or so through typical warm front weather after a similar nights over indulgence. Didn't know what 'the leans' was till then, or what it was to put my trust in my pairs leader who had left the bar at the same time as myself!
During my tour at Horsham St Faith, 52-54, I remember five fatals, only one of which, a landing on one (I think after a mech.shut down rather than practice) was due to aircraft problems. Two were collisions, one collected the weight from the flag in the cockpit after breaking too late and underneath during air to air firing, and the other was overexuberence at low level, if I remember. There may have been others, but memory fades.
So, 'death trap' no, and though it did catch the unwary now and again, it was a forgiving and fun to fly aeroplane.
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henry crun
I hoped you might pop up and correct my deliberate omission! I hope all's well with you down there? I am saving a bottle of Lindauer Rosé for New Years Eve and will drink to "the Old and Bold". Cheers! - Mike
I hoped you might pop up and correct my deliberate omission! I hope all's well with you down there? I am saving a bottle of Lindauer Rosé for New Years Eve and will drink to "the Old and Bold". Cheers! - Mike
One reason that there was no sustained outcry over the loss rates (aside from the the post-war mentality and the fact that people accepted that flying was dangerous) was that, well into the 1970s, crashes were not officially reported to the media. Some were not reported at all and many were only covered in the Little Snoring Gazette & Informer, after reporter Bloggs saw a column of smoke over the base and called the PR office. Something like that might make the Telegraph on a slow day but not consistently.
At the time, Flight International was compiling accident info from the Little Snoring and other sources, and trying to get the MoD to report rates per 100,000 hours or whatever. The MoD's response was akin to the famous case of Arkell v. Pressdram, but eventually the policy did get changed.
And to link this to another thread - to this day, the F-104 is regarded as a uniquely dangerous machine, but that's because all the losses - at least the German ones - were counted and reported at the time. Not sure whether the Luftwaffe issued press releases, or what, but it happened. But in other places the number of aircraft in service in the first place was secret, and finding out how many had crashed (even an unofficial count) was quite a task.
At the time, Flight International was compiling accident info from the Little Snoring and other sources, and trying to get the MoD to report rates per 100,000 hours or whatever. The MoD's response was akin to the famous case of Arkell v. Pressdram, but eventually the policy did get changed.
And to link this to another thread - to this day, the F-104 is regarded as a uniquely dangerous machine, but that's because all the losses - at least the German ones - were counted and reported at the time. Not sure whether the Luftwaffe issued press releases, or what, but it happened. But in other places the number of aircraft in service in the first place was secret, and finding out how many had crashed (even an unofficial count) was quite a task.
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LO
I think you have got it about right. Isolated jet crashes rarely made the national press; maybe a short paragraph at the bottom of an inside page in the Telegraph on a slow news day. The attitude of the general public was shrug, yaaawn, "dogs bark, ducks quack, jets crash. The pilots are all mad anyway". I do not think the old Air Ministry was generous with press releases, with the result that most people were not aware of what was going on. Which is what their Airships probably wanted. And it was kind to the NoK and others closely involved.
It went pear-shaped on the day the formation from Driffield flew into Flamborough Head. This hit the headlines in the Evening Standard in the early afternoon. There was a dining-in-night that evening and the poor old OO spent the afternoon and evening answering the phone and dealing with the press and anxious relatives and girl-friends (mine included!). The President, if I recall, gave blanket permission for officers to leave the dinner to answer the calls of frantic Mums, Dads and girl-friends. The ironic twist was that the wing-men who "went in" were Netherlands Air Force officers. One randy young sod acquired much merit in the eyes of his colleagues by fielding no less than three calls!
I think you have got it about right. Isolated jet crashes rarely made the national press; maybe a short paragraph at the bottom of an inside page in the Telegraph on a slow news day. The attitude of the general public was shrug, yaaawn, "dogs bark, ducks quack, jets crash. The pilots are all mad anyway". I do not think the old Air Ministry was generous with press releases, with the result that most people were not aware of what was going on. Which is what their Airships probably wanted. And it was kind to the NoK and others closely involved.
It went pear-shaped on the day the formation from Driffield flew into Flamborough Head. This hit the headlines in the Evening Standard in the early afternoon. There was a dining-in-night that evening and the poor old OO spent the afternoon and evening answering the phone and dealing with the press and anxious relatives and girl-friends (mine included!). The President, if I recall, gave blanket permission for officers to leave the dinner to answer the calls of frantic Mums, Dads and girl-friends. The ironic twist was that the wing-men who "went in" were Netherlands Air Force officers. One randy young sod acquired much merit in the eyes of his colleagues by fielding no less than three calls!
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Re: Meteor Accident Statistics
Over the holiday I found the following link
http://switchboard.real.com/player/e...2F00031453.WMV
I hope you can view it.
However it intrigued me, as a pal new of a Wadhurst resident at the time, who said the pilot had been overflying his parents house!
I found very little info, which has intrigued me even further.
All I have found (which I believe to be correct) is: pilot - Lennard Stoat, aged 19, aircraft - Meteor NF12 or 14, possibly WS661. Pilot and nav buried in Wadhurst cemetary.
The Wadhurst Historical Society have dedicated their next meeting at the end of January to this incident (it being its 50th anniversary).
I have been in touch with one of their historians, who gave most of the above info, and they also wish to fill in more detail.
Have not been able to find anything else about this unfortunate crash, but there seems to be plenty about others, eg Milthorpe, Westcliff, Flamborough Head, etc.
When I started, this forum came up early in the search. And after reading all this topic, it would seem that many of its contributors were involved at the time. Any further information would be most welcome. It seems so strange that almost nothing has been heard of this incident, especially as the newsreal of the time covered it.
I must say that until I read this forum topic I had no idea that the post war jet age was so dangerous! Or that the loss of life so great!
http://switchboard.real.com/player/e...2F00031453.WMV
I hope you can view it.
However it intrigued me, as a pal new of a Wadhurst resident at the time, who said the pilot had been overflying his parents house!
I found very little info, which has intrigued me even further.
All I have found (which I believe to be correct) is: pilot - Lennard Stoat, aged 19, aircraft - Meteor NF12 or 14, possibly WS661. Pilot and nav buried in Wadhurst cemetary.
The Wadhurst Historical Society have dedicated their next meeting at the end of January to this incident (it being its 50th anniversary).
I have been in touch with one of their historians, who gave most of the above info, and they also wish to fill in more detail.
Have not been able to find anything else about this unfortunate crash, but there seems to be plenty about others, eg Milthorpe, Westcliff, Flamborough Head, etc.
When I started, this forum came up early in the search. And after reading all this topic, it would seem that many of its contributors were involved at the time. Any further information would be most welcome. It seems so strange that almost nothing has been heard of this incident, especially as the newsreal of the time covered it.
I must say that until I read this forum topic I had no idea that the post war jet age was so dangerous! Or that the loss of life so great!
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Re: Meteor Accident Statistics
pendrifter: This probably won't tell you anything new; Broken Wings has the following entry.
20.1.65...Meteor NF12...WS661...Unit AWOCU... Wadhurst, Sussex...Hit houses while low flying. 2 fatal in aircraft, 2 fatal on ground.
20.1.65...Meteor NF12...WS661...Unit AWOCU... Wadhurst, Sussex...Hit houses while low flying. 2 fatal in aircraft, 2 fatal on ground.
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Re: Meteor Accident Statistics
The following text is passed on from my father.
Topic: Meteor Accident Statistics.
"The Driffield story is gruesome. I was on course 1 in 1949. Whilst the 30 students did the ground school the Instructors were getting 10 hours on type: the T7. We did 30 hours each in 6 weeks and three students were killed in this time. The recovery system was primitive. An airman in the home out on the airfield passed bearings to the Tower who controlled the QGH; the let down came in over Flamborough Head and, as the aircraft (in cloud) flew over Carnaby airstrip, the local controller there told Driffield ATC that an aircraft was passing. They gave instructions to descend at 300fpm with bearings given via the homer. All being well one broke cloud at about 300 feet looked for Driffield church on the left and landed straight ahead.
On one day in November I flew 6 sorties, most at 30k to 40k unpressurised and on the sixth I fell asleep; fortunately it was a dual trip and I woke up when the QFI said I had flown through the overhead. My end of course summary shows 24 single engine landings. An airman with a trolley-ac was permanently positioned on the upwind ORP so that we could restart and taxi in after ‘flame-out’ landings! (MODFOs eventually stated that multi-engined aircraft should not be flown ‘flamed-out’ below 4000ft. Very wise, but it took a lot of experience to make that rule). Relighting in the air in the early Marks was exciting as the relight buttons were on the forward lower console on the port side; relighting the starboard engine was hard enough but the port one was a barrel of laughs with ‘fly the aeroplane’ ringing out in your ears. In later marks the relight buttons were repositioned on the HP cock, also as the result of ‘experience’.
On my first tour on Meteor 4’s and then 8’s I did three Committees of Adjustment whilst still a Pilot Officer. One needed a bit of luck as well as skill to survive; with 60 hours on type I was leading a pair and both our radios failed; we only had basic four channel sets. Unfortunately we did not hear the general recall and one can imagine the confusion with us both trying to formate on each other to give hand signals to tell each other that our radios had failed and that we were short of fuel and wanted the other guy to lead him safely down. By the time that was sorted I realised that we were uncertain of our position somewhere over the UK with10/10ths cloud below and about 50gallons a side. I was coming to the conclusion that we might have to bail out (invert, trim forward, mind the intakes, mind the tail) when I saw a tiny hole in the cloud, which exposed an intersection of two runways. With my No 2 in line astern (he had 40 hours on type) we made an extremely rapid descent, got through the hole and with a cloud base of 150ft max and ½ a mile vis attempted a low level circuit. I missed the runway first time but thankfully ATC sent a land rover to the threshold and a corporal, to whom I am eternally indebted, fired off yellow Verey’s. I got in on the second go, on a runway of 1400 yards; as I came to a halt outside ATC my starboard engine stopped for lack of fuel. Parking brake on, I ran upstairs to enquire of my No 2. ‘You lost him on the second pass said a laconic American voice; ‘anyway we closed the airfield ½ an hour ago’. After what seemed like an hour P2 Br……..n rang up to say he had landed at a disused airfield. Flying at about 100ft at 130 knots he had realised he was lined up with an old runway; he dropped everything and managed to stop in time but the brakes were burnt out. Two more minutes on that heading and he would have hit nearby radio masts. A ground party soon brought over some fuel and new brakes, and we were off home when the clag lifted. To allow us to reflect on our sins I got two week-ends orderly officer and the P” a weekend as orderly sergeant; at the very least he should have got a green endorsement. Eventually an Instrument Rating system was introduced but my first tour was nearly over before I took my first IRT.
The later series of Meteors including the modified T7’s had the relight buttons on the HP cocks, which was a great step forward. Later, as a staff QFI at CFS, where the ‘flame-out’ landings were mandatory, I generally relit the dead engine on approach, especially at night on the short runway; that technique provided the Instructor with a margin of safety and also allowed him to demonstrate more effectively to the student the error of his ways.
On my CFS course in 1952 we had, I recall, 14 accidents but nobody seemed to be terribly agitated about the accident rate. The CFI and Examining Wing seemed more interested in examining the extreme aspects of inverted spinning. During the 30 years of flying I only recall one instance of a pilot getting into an inadvertent full spin. To get into an inverted spin on most types required considerable skill and determination to achieve. And yet they persisted until one poor chap suffered significant eye damage at minus 3 ½ g in the back seat of a Wyvern in such a manoeuvre. Needless to say my final night test was a ‘flame-out’ single-engined landing from the back seat on the short runway! I went back to Driffield as a QFI and I remember a particular course with eight students: four were scrubbed: two were killed, both plunging into a field at the beginning of the downwind leg at night; the other two went LMF. Lots of SCT for the staff.
One of the problems in that era was the hostility between Fighter Command and Flying Training Command. Fighter Command would not release their pilots to become QFI’s and FTC would not let any that they did get hold of return to operational squadrons until they had served 4 ½ years as QFI’s. It did get better eventually but not much. Whilst I always felt CFS, and their attitude to front line units, had a lot to answer for. I am the first to admit that I did not realise how much I had to learn about flying until I started to try to teach others.
As for the Meteor it was a great aircraft if treated with the proper respect and the pilots of 77 Squadron RAAF will bear witness to absorb punishment. There was, of course, a Vampire flight on Course 1 at Driffield and aircrew selection reached its peak when it came to selection for the Meteor: ‘Shortest on the left, tallest on the right, in one rank: Size’. I’m glad I was 6ft 2”; I was lucky enough to fly all marks from the 4 to the 14 but they took a terrible toll amongst young pilots.
On a later tour on Swift 7’s we had two Meteor hacks. Our role was test firing Skyflash missiles without warheads at pilotless Fireflies over Cardigan Bay; unfortunately the system was so effective it knocked the targets down almost every time so it was decided that we should use the Meteors as ‘out of range targets’; as Flight Commander I took the first turn accompanied by a young engineer sergeant who wanted to be a pilot. The idea was that the missile would not have the power to reach the target at 4,000 yards. As we heard the missile being launched the Sgt said ‘You look left Sir and I’ll look right’; fortunately the boffins got the maths right. We also used them for target towing in the Far East; as expected they all survived a few ricochets off the flat. Glosters built them to last.
In those balmy days of the early fifties the accident rate was around 10 per 10,000 hours; 25 years later all our efforts at ‘flight safety’ had brought it, for the first time, to marginally lower than 1 per 10,000 hours. At a flight safety meeting in the late 70’s there was much hand-wringing over an increase in the rate to 1.2. I suggested that mathematically it was likely that, having reached 0.925, the rate would rise marginally and I asked, how was it that we were now berating the aircrew and ground crew for accomplishing a rate that, only two years earlier, we were praising them for achieving. The lid of my career was finally nailed down that day; not for nothing was the fifth floor in the MOD known as the ‘Group Captains graveyard’!"
And as a Javelin Survivor.................
"Amend the Flip Cards?
Even with its duplicated hydraulic systems, the Flip Cards for Javelin emergencies always seemed to end with the words ABANDON THE AIRCRAFT! Night fighting often developed into a winding match; Inevitably the slow-speed and stall warners would start up. If you were lucky, you had a pre-warner on board; the Navigator sometimes used to shine a torch across the wing to see if the stall warners were flicking. Concerned navigators would give the pilot their own form of audio warning.
A major problem with the Javelin was the danger of a super stall from which there was supposedly no recovery. A good friend of mine was a Nav in one of the Javelin squadrons, operating out of Waterbeach. His pilot got them into a situation one night, probably close to a super stall, form which there appeared to be no recovery; the pilot told him to eject. Unfortunately, immediately after ejecting his arms began to fail and he suffered, as Hoffnung would have put it, multiple injuries to both limbs.
The following day, when he was recovering in hospital, he was visited by his pilot and his Squadron Commander. The Navigator was incensed to discover that the pilot had regained control of the aircraft immediately after the navigator had ejected. Perhaps, said the CO we should amend the flip cards; before ‘abandon the aircraft’ we should insert ‘invite the Nav to eject’; at last there be a worthwhile role for them.
The Nav in question retired to manage a brewery in East Anglia; fortunately he had no problem in raising his elbows."
Topic: Meteor Accident Statistics.
"The Driffield story is gruesome. I was on course 1 in 1949. Whilst the 30 students did the ground school the Instructors were getting 10 hours on type: the T7. We did 30 hours each in 6 weeks and three students were killed in this time. The recovery system was primitive. An airman in the home out on the airfield passed bearings to the Tower who controlled the QGH; the let down came in over Flamborough Head and, as the aircraft (in cloud) flew over Carnaby airstrip, the local controller there told Driffield ATC that an aircraft was passing. They gave instructions to descend at 300fpm with bearings given via the homer. All being well one broke cloud at about 300 feet looked for Driffield church on the left and landed straight ahead.
On one day in November I flew 6 sorties, most at 30k to 40k unpressurised and on the sixth I fell asleep; fortunately it was a dual trip and I woke up when the QFI said I had flown through the overhead. My end of course summary shows 24 single engine landings. An airman with a trolley-ac was permanently positioned on the upwind ORP so that we could restart and taxi in after ‘flame-out’ landings! (MODFOs eventually stated that multi-engined aircraft should not be flown ‘flamed-out’ below 4000ft. Very wise, but it took a lot of experience to make that rule). Relighting in the air in the early Marks was exciting as the relight buttons were on the forward lower console on the port side; relighting the starboard engine was hard enough but the port one was a barrel of laughs with ‘fly the aeroplane’ ringing out in your ears. In later marks the relight buttons were repositioned on the HP cock, also as the result of ‘experience’.
On my first tour on Meteor 4’s and then 8’s I did three Committees of Adjustment whilst still a Pilot Officer. One needed a bit of luck as well as skill to survive; with 60 hours on type I was leading a pair and both our radios failed; we only had basic four channel sets. Unfortunately we did not hear the general recall and one can imagine the confusion with us both trying to formate on each other to give hand signals to tell each other that our radios had failed and that we were short of fuel and wanted the other guy to lead him safely down. By the time that was sorted I realised that we were uncertain of our position somewhere over the UK with10/10ths cloud below and about 50gallons a side. I was coming to the conclusion that we might have to bail out (invert, trim forward, mind the intakes, mind the tail) when I saw a tiny hole in the cloud, which exposed an intersection of two runways. With my No 2 in line astern (he had 40 hours on type) we made an extremely rapid descent, got through the hole and with a cloud base of 150ft max and ½ a mile vis attempted a low level circuit. I missed the runway first time but thankfully ATC sent a land rover to the threshold and a corporal, to whom I am eternally indebted, fired off yellow Verey’s. I got in on the second go, on a runway of 1400 yards; as I came to a halt outside ATC my starboard engine stopped for lack of fuel. Parking brake on, I ran upstairs to enquire of my No 2. ‘You lost him on the second pass said a laconic American voice; ‘anyway we closed the airfield ½ an hour ago’. After what seemed like an hour P2 Br……..n rang up to say he had landed at a disused airfield. Flying at about 100ft at 130 knots he had realised he was lined up with an old runway; he dropped everything and managed to stop in time but the brakes were burnt out. Two more minutes on that heading and he would have hit nearby radio masts. A ground party soon brought over some fuel and new brakes, and we were off home when the clag lifted. To allow us to reflect on our sins I got two week-ends orderly officer and the P” a weekend as orderly sergeant; at the very least he should have got a green endorsement. Eventually an Instrument Rating system was introduced but my first tour was nearly over before I took my first IRT.
The later series of Meteors including the modified T7’s had the relight buttons on the HP cocks, which was a great step forward. Later, as a staff QFI at CFS, where the ‘flame-out’ landings were mandatory, I generally relit the dead engine on approach, especially at night on the short runway; that technique provided the Instructor with a margin of safety and also allowed him to demonstrate more effectively to the student the error of his ways.
On my CFS course in 1952 we had, I recall, 14 accidents but nobody seemed to be terribly agitated about the accident rate. The CFI and Examining Wing seemed more interested in examining the extreme aspects of inverted spinning. During the 30 years of flying I only recall one instance of a pilot getting into an inadvertent full spin. To get into an inverted spin on most types required considerable skill and determination to achieve. And yet they persisted until one poor chap suffered significant eye damage at minus 3 ½ g in the back seat of a Wyvern in such a manoeuvre. Needless to say my final night test was a ‘flame-out’ single-engined landing from the back seat on the short runway! I went back to Driffield as a QFI and I remember a particular course with eight students: four were scrubbed: two were killed, both plunging into a field at the beginning of the downwind leg at night; the other two went LMF. Lots of SCT for the staff.
One of the problems in that era was the hostility between Fighter Command and Flying Training Command. Fighter Command would not release their pilots to become QFI’s and FTC would not let any that they did get hold of return to operational squadrons until they had served 4 ½ years as QFI’s. It did get better eventually but not much. Whilst I always felt CFS, and their attitude to front line units, had a lot to answer for. I am the first to admit that I did not realise how much I had to learn about flying until I started to try to teach others.
As for the Meteor it was a great aircraft if treated with the proper respect and the pilots of 77 Squadron RAAF will bear witness to absorb punishment. There was, of course, a Vampire flight on Course 1 at Driffield and aircrew selection reached its peak when it came to selection for the Meteor: ‘Shortest on the left, tallest on the right, in one rank: Size’. I’m glad I was 6ft 2”; I was lucky enough to fly all marks from the 4 to the 14 but they took a terrible toll amongst young pilots.
On a later tour on Swift 7’s we had two Meteor hacks. Our role was test firing Skyflash missiles without warheads at pilotless Fireflies over Cardigan Bay; unfortunately the system was so effective it knocked the targets down almost every time so it was decided that we should use the Meteors as ‘out of range targets’; as Flight Commander I took the first turn accompanied by a young engineer sergeant who wanted to be a pilot. The idea was that the missile would not have the power to reach the target at 4,000 yards. As we heard the missile being launched the Sgt said ‘You look left Sir and I’ll look right’; fortunately the boffins got the maths right. We also used them for target towing in the Far East; as expected they all survived a few ricochets off the flat. Glosters built them to last.
In those balmy days of the early fifties the accident rate was around 10 per 10,000 hours; 25 years later all our efforts at ‘flight safety’ had brought it, for the first time, to marginally lower than 1 per 10,000 hours. At a flight safety meeting in the late 70’s there was much hand-wringing over an increase in the rate to 1.2. I suggested that mathematically it was likely that, having reached 0.925, the rate would rise marginally and I asked, how was it that we were now berating the aircrew and ground crew for accomplishing a rate that, only two years earlier, we were praising them for achieving. The lid of my career was finally nailed down that day; not for nothing was the fifth floor in the MOD known as the ‘Group Captains graveyard’!"
And as a Javelin Survivor.................
"Amend the Flip Cards?
Even with its duplicated hydraulic systems, the Flip Cards for Javelin emergencies always seemed to end with the words ABANDON THE AIRCRAFT! Night fighting often developed into a winding match; Inevitably the slow-speed and stall warners would start up. If you were lucky, you had a pre-warner on board; the Navigator sometimes used to shine a torch across the wing to see if the stall warners were flicking. Concerned navigators would give the pilot their own form of audio warning.
A major problem with the Javelin was the danger of a super stall from which there was supposedly no recovery. A good friend of mine was a Nav in one of the Javelin squadrons, operating out of Waterbeach. His pilot got them into a situation one night, probably close to a super stall, form which there appeared to be no recovery; the pilot told him to eject. Unfortunately, immediately after ejecting his arms began to fail and he suffered, as Hoffnung would have put it, multiple injuries to both limbs.
The following day, when he was recovering in hospital, he was visited by his pilot and his Squadron Commander. The Navigator was incensed to discover that the pilot had regained control of the aircraft immediately after the navigator had ejected. Perhaps, said the CO we should amend the flip cards; before ‘abandon the aircraft’ we should insert ‘invite the Nav to eject’; at last there be a worthwhile role for them.
The Nav in question retired to manage a brewery in East Anglia; fortunately he had no problem in raising his elbows."
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Re: Meteor Accident Statistics
Henry Crun and Pendrifter,
I presume Henry you had a slip of the pen. The Wadhurst crash was Jan 55.
The local press of the day reported the aircraft had come down from North Luffenham (NF12/14 OCU) to buzz his girlfriend's home (immaterial) and overcooked it. I was on 85 at Malling at the time and my memory tells me it was a bit of a grotty day with rain and very windy. The Station Commander had everyone in a hangar the next day to give us a rant on unauthorised LF. He was quite concerned that the local populace in Wadhurst would think that the Meteor had come from Malling - 15 miles away. I know crash reporting received little notice in those days but the Wadhurst affair did generate headline coverage in the the local and national press.
I presume Henry you had a slip of the pen. The Wadhurst crash was Jan 55.
The local press of the day reported the aircraft had come down from North Luffenham (NF12/14 OCU) to buzz his girlfriend's home (immaterial) and overcooked it. I was on 85 at Malling at the time and my memory tells me it was a bit of a grotty day with rain and very windy. The Station Commander had everyone in a hangar the next day to give us a rant on unauthorised LF. He was quite concerned that the local populace in Wadhurst would think that the Meteor had come from Malling - 15 miles away. I know crash reporting received little notice in those days but the Wadhurst affair did generate headline coverage in the the local and national press.
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Re: Meteor Accident Statistics
Bof: You are right, that was a slip of the pen, the date according to Broken Wings was 20.1.56.
Pendrifter also quotes the Wadhurst Historical Society wishing to commemorate 50th anniversary, which suggest that the 1956 date is correct.
Bof, check your PM's
Pendrifter also quotes the Wadhurst Historical Society wishing to commemorate 50th anniversary, which suggest that the 1956 date is correct.
Bof, check your PM's
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Re: Meteor Accident Statistics
Talking of Meteor stats, low flying, press reaction et al, do any of you old and bold remember the summer of 55 or 56, the case of the Bournemouth Buzzer? The parents of one of the guys on 153 at Malling were on holiday at Bournemouth. So our hero gets into an NF14 and goes down to show the flag. He did it in spades!! Not only did he do a "Hun from the sun" straight down a packed beach a few feet above the water, but he then committed the cardinal sin of turning round and coming back again!! Result - Front page in the Mail or Express, giant picture of two deckchairs framing this side-on image of a Meteor night fighter clearly resplendent in 153's markings smoking down the beach. At the "subsequent Court Martial" Fg Off LP predictably had his tea leaves read and later joined the RCAF!! A bit stoopid, but great sport!!
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Re: Meteor Accident Statistics
I can confirm that, Laurie P was my instructor on T33's at Macdonald, Canada, in early 58, still a Flying Officer, but getting considerably more pay than an RAF F/O. I came back and subsequently flew Mk7's and 8's at Strubby on the All Weather Jet Refresher course. Unfortunately there were still people being killed by the Meteor even in 61.
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Re: Meteor Accident Statistics
Perhaps its time "someone" organised a Meatbox reunion along the lines of the Hunter reunions. One full tour could be the qualification Any volunteers?
Any volunteers?
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Re: Meteor Accident Statistics
Wadhurst Meteor Crash
Still on-going - but must end this week (in order to send to Wadhurst Historical Society)!
One correction pilot age 23.
I think I've found which squadrons were flying NF12 or 14 (most seem to have both available to them) about this time.
25, 46, 64, 85, 152 and 153. But from the RAFs site, squadron histories, none are mentioned as flying from North Luffenham!
Bof comments that the NF12 came down from Luffenham. From somewhere (and I can't find where now!) I read that 238 OCU flying Meteors from North Luffenham, disbanded in March '58. No record of start date.
Also, but not confirmed by RAF squadron histories, 165 Squadron flew Meteors from Jan '56 to March '58.
Does anyone have any memories of Luffenham '55-'57 etc?
I am amazed at the wealth of info on this, and many other topics, in these forums. And truely grateful to you venerable gentlemen for taking the time to post it. I was aviation mad as a kid in this era, but while always interested, the enthusiasm waned. Now at 60 years old, the internet has rekindled my interest. Hours spent at the screen viewing a massive array of topics (my daughter complains she can't get on line, 'cos I hog the Mac!), thanks to you guys who did it. Straight from the horses mouth, so to speak!
Just one thing - I have at last learnt how to text! But now I come up many new terms, VDF QVH, etc?
Still on-going - but must end this week (in order to send to Wadhurst Historical Society)!
One correction pilot age 23.
I think I've found which squadrons were flying NF12 or 14 (most seem to have both available to them) about this time.
25, 46, 64, 85, 152 and 153. But from the RAFs site, squadron histories, none are mentioned as flying from North Luffenham!
Bof comments that the NF12 came down from Luffenham. From somewhere (and I can't find where now!) I read that 238 OCU flying Meteors from North Luffenham, disbanded in March '58. No record of start date.
Also, but not confirmed by RAF squadron histories, 165 Squadron flew Meteors from Jan '56 to March '58.
Does anyone have any memories of Luffenham '55-'57 etc?
I am amazed at the wealth of info on this, and many other topics, in these forums. And truely grateful to you venerable gentlemen for taking the time to post it. I was aviation mad as a kid in this era, but while always interested, the enthusiasm waned. Now at 60 years old, the internet has rekindled my interest. Hours spent at the screen viewing a massive array of topics (my daughter complains she can't get on line, 'cos I hog the Mac!), thanks to you guys who did it. Straight from the horses mouth, so to speak!
Just one thing - I have at last learnt how to text! But now I come up many new terms, VDF QVH, etc?
Re: Meteor Accident Statistics
31 March 1955: RCAF leave North Luffenham.
April 1955: RAF Night and All Weather OCU is formed to train all front-line Meteor aircrew in all-weather flying. (The old gate guard NF14 was from this period.)
April 1956-December 1956: Meteor NF11s from 228 OCU at Leeming are detached to North Luffenham due to runway resurfacing at Leeming.
January 1957: N&AW OCU merges with 238 OCU from Colerne with Brigands, Valettas and Balliols.
February 1957-March 1958: 111 Sqn Hunters are detached to North Luffenham due to runway resurfacing at North Weald.
June 1958: 238 OCU disbanded, North Luffenham placed on Care and Maintenance until re-opened as a Thor missile base the next year.
April 1955: RAF Night and All Weather OCU is formed to train all front-line Meteor aircrew in all-weather flying. (The old gate guard NF14 was from this period.)
April 1956-December 1956: Meteor NF11s from 228 OCU at Leeming are detached to North Luffenham due to runway resurfacing at Leeming.
January 1957: N&AW OCU merges with 238 OCU from Colerne with Brigands, Valettas and Balliols.
February 1957-March 1958: 111 Sqn Hunters are detached to North Luffenham due to runway resurfacing at North Weald.
June 1958: 238 OCU disbanded, North Luffenham placed on Care and Maintenance until re-opened as a Thor missile base the next year.