Chinook ZD576 - The Concealed Evidence
As to content ? - an appeal to emotion rather than evidence and some rather odd claims and omissions just as misleading as the SO's ridiculous distortion of blame placing ... or, rather, the degree applied.
Emotion ? perfectly natural familial desire to protect the reputations of loved ones ... no disagreement there.
Making assumptions on in-flight activity with no hard evidence to support it . This may make for eye-catching TV 'entertainment', but it does nothing to advance the technical puzzle. Burke's input was posed as being that of a Test Pilot - a wholly different category than his actual post as Unit test pilot which gave him considerable experience operating on type but not the exploratory nature of A&AEE's and Handling Squadron's work. We were offered the latter's conclusions but nothing of substance as to how they were reached. On past (and present) records we are unlikely ever to be so informed !
From the very limited portions of the programme dealing with known crew activity, the absence of basic airmanship principles leaves inevitable unasked/unanswered questions, leaving us with a 'hearts and flowers' concoction.
Overall then, not hugely impressed and left with an itch to know more.
When I first heard the news of the crash, I immediately thought Mt Erebus and Air New Zealand.and, so far, subsequent (very limited) revelations haven't changed that. (I am, of course aware of the inertial input error which exacerbated that situation)
One final thought on the BOI's judgement - I seem to recall that it completely exonerated the Master Loadie from any blame, yet he was, apparently, operating from the jump seat ...perhaps CRM wasn't part of the SOPs ?
Emotion ? perfectly natural familial desire to protect the reputations of loved ones ... no disagreement there.
Making assumptions on in-flight activity with no hard evidence to support it . This may make for eye-catching TV 'entertainment', but it does nothing to advance the technical puzzle. Burke's input was posed as being that of a Test Pilot - a wholly different category than his actual post as Unit test pilot which gave him considerable experience operating on type but not the exploratory nature of A&AEE's and Handling Squadron's work. We were offered the latter's conclusions but nothing of substance as to how they were reached. On past (and present) records we are unlikely ever to be so informed !
From the very limited portions of the programme dealing with known crew activity, the absence of basic airmanship principles leaves inevitable unasked/unanswered questions, leaving us with a 'hearts and flowers' concoction.
Overall then, not hugely impressed and left with an itch to know more.
When I first heard the news of the crash, I immediately thought Mt Erebus and Air New Zealand.and, so far, subsequent (very limited) revelations haven't changed that. (I am, of course aware of the inertial input error which exacerbated that situation)
One final thought on the BOI's judgement - I seem to recall that it completely exonerated the Master Loadie from any blame, yet he was, apparently, operating from the jump seat ...perhaps CRM wasn't part of the SOPs ?
Sqn Ldr Burke had previously flown the Mk2 in Philly. (While I say 'Mk2', to Boscombe it remained an unairworthy prototype for many months after the accident). He had been involved in a UFCM incident while co-pilot to the Boeing test pilot, the latter being injured. (MoD denied this, calling him a liar. His written report was found in Boeing's files some years later. As an aside, RAF witnesses spoke of the test pilot still being in plaster at their next jaunt to Philly). Burke had infinitely more experience of the Mk2 than almost anyone.
The programme was deliberately pitched as being from the families' point of view. Primarily, because a number of attempts to make it had failed at the BBC commissioning stage. It was thought this new approach would stand a better chance, given the BBC's ongoing support for MoD's behaviour. This mostly explains the lack of technical detail, although most of the important points were got across. If you want that detail, in detail, there's books on the subject...
It is correct to say Boscombe's views were not broadcast. But again, they are published. (Subject of this thread).
As dervish said above, there is no evidence whatsoever of airmanship failings. When most people talk of this, they are alluding to MoD's claim that they were too low and not at Safety Altitude. Once again, read the evidence. They were tasked with a flying an aircraft with an Icing clearance was below their Safety Altitude. (In fact, there was no Icing clearance at all, as the section had been removed from the RTS in March 1994. Probably inadvertently, but nevertheless removed). And, of course, it wasn't a legal RTS...
When given this tasking, they were not told that the Mk2 was not to be relied upon in any way whatsoever, and that this was mandated upon the RAF. (Lord Philip confirmed this. It was the only 'new' evidence in his report).
Links to Mt Erebus? I agree. The operator lied on both occasions.
A good point about the forward crewman. One of the known facts that MoD concealed was that his upper door was closed. Evidence from experienced operators said this might indicate he was content with progress and visibility. This was supported by the SuperTANS nav computer being in a mode commensurate with remaining in VMC.
Last edited by tucumseh; 25th Feb 2024 at 19:08.
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Thank you tucumseh.
Just a clarification ... 'basic airmanship'? yes, the query was re. Safety Altitude both here and at Erebus. Re. the BOI's conclusions on the crew culpability, it seems the SOs considered that only the pilots had any responsibility for the safe conduct of the flight - an assumption both arrogant and dangerous.
While the Chinook was the one rotary of which I had no personal experience, I did have experience of the fatal results of failure on the part of 'authority' to deal with an aircraft 'discrepancy' . It is not an experience which should be allowed to pass unquestioned !
Just a clarification ... 'basic airmanship'? yes, the query was re. Safety Altitude both here and at Erebus. Re. the BOI's conclusions on the crew culpability, it seems the SOs considered that only the pilots had any responsibility for the safe conduct of the flight - an assumption both arrogant and dangerous.
While the Chinook was the one rotary of which I had no personal experience, I did have experience of the fatal results of failure on the part of 'authority' to deal with an aircraft 'discrepancy' . It is not an experience which should be allowed to pass unquestioned !
Thank you tucumseh.
Just a clarification ... 'basic airmanship'? yes, the query was re. Safety Altitude both here and at Erebus. Re. the BOI's conclusions on the crew culpability, it seems the SOs considered that only the pilots had any responsibility for the safe conduct of the flight - an assumption both arrogant and dangerous.
While the Chinook was the one rotary of which I had no personal experience, I did have experience of the fatal results of failure on the part of 'authority' to deal with an aircraft 'discrepancy' . It is not an experience which should be allowed to pass unquestioned !
Just a clarification ... 'basic airmanship'? yes, the query was re. Safety Altitude both here and at Erebus. Re. the BOI's conclusions on the crew culpability, it seems the SOs considered that only the pilots had any responsibility for the safe conduct of the flight - an assumption both arrogant and dangerous.
While the Chinook was the one rotary of which I had no personal experience, I did have experience of the fatal results of failure on the part of 'authority' to deal with an aircraft 'discrepancy' . It is not an experience which should be allowed to pass unquestioned !
There was a disagreement between the Board member and Reviewing Officers as to what the forward crewman was doing. And the rear man, according to MoD, had no time to carry out all the duties required of him, such as connector checks, etc. And the relative priority put on those checks made no sense.
The 'itch' I'd like scratched is an explanation of CAS's claim they were 'off course by some miles'.
Time marches on, and with Day having passed away, and Wratten, Graydon, Austin, Bagnall and the rest not saying anything, the whole truth is ever more difficult to uncover. Their silence speaks volumes.
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The demonstrable wrong is the still continuing cover up of those illegal orders that stands in the way of urgent reform of UK Military Air Regulation and Air Accident Investigation. Both must be entirely independent of the MOD and of each other. Only when that is achieved can airworthiness be slowly regained in the military air fleets and avoidable airworthiness related fatal military air accidents greatly reduced. Until then the cost in lives, treasure, and UK Air Power will continue.
For anyone who cannot receive the BBC programmes, I can email them to you using a big file program if you send me PM with your email address. I'm pleased to have mastered this technology thanks to 12-year-old greatniece.
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I watched both episodes yesterday, but I'm not sure viewers were left with a balanced picture, notably some of the key conclusions from the 2011 report.
Examples:
There is a clear "most probable cause" suggested:
1.4.2 The investigating Board found that there were several potential causes of the accident but, despite detailed analysis, were unable to determine a definite cause. They however, concluded that the most probable cause was the selection by the pilots of an inappropriate rate of climb which was insufficient to enable them safely to overfly the high ground of the Mull of Kintyre.
--
Whilst they can suggest what the most probably cause was, most I think would agree the high standard of proof for negligence was not necessarily established. This is what the criticism of the seniors rests upon - and it seems it was right that this aspect was corrected, albeit only years later, which is regrettable.
1.4.18 Applying the high standard of proof, the Board unanimously concluded that they were unable to make any finding of negligence or make any assessment of human failings because of the lack of evidence. After they had briefed Air Vice Marshal Day and his staff they reconsidered the question of human failings and concluded that, although it was likely that Flt Lt Tapper had made an error of judgment in the conduct of the attempted climb over the Mull of Kintyre, it would be incorrect to criticise him for human failings based on the available evidence.
--
However, it is not clear that the error in not having the supporting evidence to find the crew actions responsible necessarily translates into a witch hunt around wider airworthiness :
1.4.19 Criticism that insufficient attention was paid by the Board to the maintenance, engineering and airworthiness aspects of the Chinook, was not in our view, justified. They investigated the problems with the engines’ Full Authority Digital Electronic Control system and other technical malfunctions in the Chinook fleet, and the history of ZD576. They took these matters seriously, but did not expand on them in their report because there was no positive evidence that a malfunction had occurred before or during the accident. Their job was to determine the cause of this accident and make recommendations, not to investigate all aspects of Chinook operations. Moreover, these problems were well known and were being addressed by the Ministry of Defence.
--
If you were to write the story on balance of probabilities, and the report from 2011, you would draw certain conclusions on what probably happened. I'm not sure the BBC programme reflects a balanced view and heavily suggested the cause lay in airworthiness or other factors didn't it? That is not the most probable cause is it?
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In the TV programme, what was the guy referring to when he said the chinook went right when you demanded a left turn?
Examples:
There is a clear "most probable cause" suggested:
1.4.2 The investigating Board found that there were several potential causes of the accident but, despite detailed analysis, were unable to determine a definite cause. They however, concluded that the most probable cause was the selection by the pilots of an inappropriate rate of climb which was insufficient to enable them safely to overfly the high ground of the Mull of Kintyre.
--
Whilst they can suggest what the most probably cause was, most I think would agree the high standard of proof for negligence was not necessarily established. This is what the criticism of the seniors rests upon - and it seems it was right that this aspect was corrected, albeit only years later, which is regrettable.
1.4.18 Applying the high standard of proof, the Board unanimously concluded that they were unable to make any finding of negligence or make any assessment of human failings because of the lack of evidence. After they had briefed Air Vice Marshal Day and his staff they reconsidered the question of human failings and concluded that, although it was likely that Flt Lt Tapper had made an error of judgment in the conduct of the attempted climb over the Mull of Kintyre, it would be incorrect to criticise him for human failings based on the available evidence.
--
However, it is not clear that the error in not having the supporting evidence to find the crew actions responsible necessarily translates into a witch hunt around wider airworthiness :
1.4.19 Criticism that insufficient attention was paid by the Board to the maintenance, engineering and airworthiness aspects of the Chinook, was not in our view, justified. They investigated the problems with the engines’ Full Authority Digital Electronic Control system and other technical malfunctions in the Chinook fleet, and the history of ZD576. They took these matters seriously, but did not expand on them in their report because there was no positive evidence that a malfunction had occurred before or during the accident. Their job was to determine the cause of this accident and make recommendations, not to investigate all aspects of Chinook operations. Moreover, these problems were well known and were being addressed by the Ministry of Defence.
--
If you were to write the story on balance of probabilities, and the report from 2011, you would draw certain conclusions on what probably happened. I'm not sure the BBC programme reflects a balanced view and heavily suggested the cause lay in airworthiness or other factors didn't it? That is not the most probable cause is it?
--
In the TV programme, what was the guy referring to when he said the chinook went right when you demanded a left turn?
JFZ90
I think the best way to summarise any reply to your points is to remind you that MoD admitted all the ‘claims’ made in the programme; and I think a statement to that effect should have been broadcast. It probably explains why MoD declined to take part.
The only slight error was I believe one of interpretation. The journalist you refer to, David Walmsley, who was the first one on the scene, implied the aircraft WOULD go right when a left turn a demanded. In fact, after the Review the Air Staff admitted that the evidence of Sqn Ldr Burke and Boscombe was true, that a control problem might only manifest after a straight run when the turn was attempted. Hitherto, Wratten and Day had denied this could happen. You also have to take this in the context of a Special Flying Instruction of March 1994, which was NOT shown to pilots, that;
‘The characteristic is manifested by very sharp uncommanded inputs to the yaw axis which result in a rapid 3-4 degree change in aircraft heading, in both the hover and when in forward flight when the aircraft is subject to high levels of vibration’.
Contrary to MoD’s claim, Boscombe had warned of high and unacceptable levels of vibration in the Mk2, and this had not been addressed by June 1994.
For the entire campaign the Government and MoD position was to demand ‘new evidence’. The ONLY new evidence set out in the Review by Lord Philip was confirmation that the aircraft was not airworthy, and not to be flown by the RAF. That, this was ’mandated’ upon the Air Staff. Again, MoD fully admitted this, in writing, after the Review. So, I’m not sure how that becomes a ‘witch hunt around wider airworthiness’. It’s simply a statement of known fact. The RAF’s Director of Flight Safety confirmed it for Mk1 in August 1992, and specifically warned of measures needed to ensure Mk2 would be airworthy. None were taken. Later, the RAF Chief Engineer denied this, but one need only compare DFS’s recommendations with the ZD576 BOI report, and the reports into subsequent accidents, such as Nimrod XV230, Tornado ZG710, Hawk XX177, etc. to see the common factors.
The Board did not, and could not, investigate the FADEC system in full, because so much was concealed from them. (And I include Wratten and Day in this). Once again, a simple known fact… There were no Certificates of Design, so it was strictly prohibited to accept it off-contract. Similarly, the whole Mk2 itself. If you study the evidence, and the regulations, FADEC was not even permitted to be in production. (There’s a reason why the Public Accounts and Defence Committees launched investigations into ‘Accepting Equipment Off-Contract’). With due respect to the Board members, not one of them would realise that, and those responsible weren’t about to tell them. The problems with FADEC were indeed well-known. But on the day of the accident they had become even greater, and the RAF was STILL not permitted to fly the Mk2. The actual concern was that Boscombe had underestimated the scale of the problems.
Balance of probabilities, given the known facts, the known problems with the Mk2, and specifically the known problems, faults and defects in ZD576? UFCM. (To which I’d add my own opinion, a cascading electrical failure; the various switch positions, and combinations thereof - which the BOI didn’t assess - pointing to them encountering a major problem). No-one can prove it, but this is a far more likely scenario than any other, and the supporting evidence is in MoD’s own hand. Many people THOUGHT this but regardless of their opinions and theories, it is trumped by MoD’s later admissions - not airworthy, not allowed not be flown, and UFCMs. I think that’s got to be the starting point for any comments.
I think the best way to summarise any reply to your points is to remind you that MoD admitted all the ‘claims’ made in the programme; and I think a statement to that effect should have been broadcast. It probably explains why MoD declined to take part.
The only slight error was I believe one of interpretation. The journalist you refer to, David Walmsley, who was the first one on the scene, implied the aircraft WOULD go right when a left turn a demanded. In fact, after the Review the Air Staff admitted that the evidence of Sqn Ldr Burke and Boscombe was true, that a control problem might only manifest after a straight run when the turn was attempted. Hitherto, Wratten and Day had denied this could happen. You also have to take this in the context of a Special Flying Instruction of March 1994, which was NOT shown to pilots, that;
‘The characteristic is manifested by very sharp uncommanded inputs to the yaw axis which result in a rapid 3-4 degree change in aircraft heading, in both the hover and when in forward flight when the aircraft is subject to high levels of vibration’.
Contrary to MoD’s claim, Boscombe had warned of high and unacceptable levels of vibration in the Mk2, and this had not been addressed by June 1994.
For the entire campaign the Government and MoD position was to demand ‘new evidence’. The ONLY new evidence set out in the Review by Lord Philip was confirmation that the aircraft was not airworthy, and not to be flown by the RAF. That, this was ’mandated’ upon the Air Staff. Again, MoD fully admitted this, in writing, after the Review. So, I’m not sure how that becomes a ‘witch hunt around wider airworthiness’. It’s simply a statement of known fact. The RAF’s Director of Flight Safety confirmed it for Mk1 in August 1992, and specifically warned of measures needed to ensure Mk2 would be airworthy. None were taken. Later, the RAF Chief Engineer denied this, but one need only compare DFS’s recommendations with the ZD576 BOI report, and the reports into subsequent accidents, such as Nimrod XV230, Tornado ZG710, Hawk XX177, etc. to see the common factors.
The Board did not, and could not, investigate the FADEC system in full, because so much was concealed from them. (And I include Wratten and Day in this). Once again, a simple known fact… There were no Certificates of Design, so it was strictly prohibited to accept it off-contract. Similarly, the whole Mk2 itself. If you study the evidence, and the regulations, FADEC was not even permitted to be in production. (There’s a reason why the Public Accounts and Defence Committees launched investigations into ‘Accepting Equipment Off-Contract’). With due respect to the Board members, not one of them would realise that, and those responsible weren’t about to tell them. The problems with FADEC were indeed well-known. But on the day of the accident they had become even greater, and the RAF was STILL not permitted to fly the Mk2. The actual concern was that Boscombe had underestimated the scale of the problems.
Balance of probabilities, given the known facts, the known problems with the Mk2, and specifically the known problems, faults and defects in ZD576? UFCM. (To which I’d add my own opinion, a cascading electrical failure; the various switch positions, and combinations thereof - which the BOI didn’t assess - pointing to them encountering a major problem). No-one can prove it, but this is a far more likely scenario than any other, and the supporting evidence is in MoD’s own hand. Many people THOUGHT this but regardless of their opinions and theories, it is trumped by MoD’s later admissions - not airworthy, not allowed not be flown, and UFCMs. I think that’s got to be the starting point for any comments.
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I continue to turn over the cock up versus conspiracy question in my head.
I have no quarrel with Tecumseh’s account, and as discussed earlier in the thread see the issuing of the RTS by The Scottish Officer as the key enabler for the ensuing tragedy. That said, he did seem to have the gumption to qualify the approval given, restricting it to start up only. Surely evidence in itself that he too knew it wasn’t airworthy, and was issuing the document on other than an entirely voluntary basis?
We surely need to consider how such a clear restriction to the use of the aircraft was ignored, and who ignored it, to the extent of overruling the Pilots request to use another aircraft.
Despite the shambles which preceded it, the system had actually worked. The aircraft was documented as not being fit to fly. How did it come to be flying?
I have no quarrel with Tecumseh’s account, and as discussed earlier in the thread see the issuing of the RTS by The Scottish Officer as the key enabler for the ensuing tragedy. That said, he did seem to have the gumption to qualify the approval given, restricting it to start up only. Surely evidence in itself that he too knew it wasn’t airworthy, and was issuing the document on other than an entirely voluntary basis?
We surely need to consider how such a clear restriction to the use of the aircraft was ignored, and who ignored it, to the extent of overruling the Pilots request to use another aircraft.
Despite the shambles which preceded it, the system had actually worked. The aircraft was documented as not being fit to fly. How did it come to be flying?
The question of what the crewman was doing was raised. Well, one of his duties at this time was to check the DECU connectors every 15 minutes. Apparently this was because of a history of the connectors working loose under the vibration. At some stage in my working life I was part of a team which probably knew as much as anyone about the technology of light duty contacts and I was horrified when that information came out. Now, we all live in an electronic age where very few of us will not have fiddled with a connection to make it work but back in the 90's not many sliding contacts, which I presume that these were, had been designed to switch an active current. You would be surprised at how much damage even a few milliamps can do to rhodium or hard gold contacts. But, for most of us, our lives do not depend on the outcome.
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Relevant ?, irrelevant ?, or coincidental ?
More AFCS Mayhem....
More AFCS Mayhem....
I continue to turn over the cock up versus conspiracy question in my head.
I have no quarrel with Tecumseh’s account, and as discussed earlier in the thread see the issuing of the RTS by The Scottish Officer as the key enabler for the ensuing tragedy. That said, he did seem to have the gumption to qualify the approval given, restricting it to start up only. Surely evidence in itself that he too knew it wasn’t airworthy, and was issuing the document on other than an entirely voluntary basis?
We surely need to consider how such a clear restriction to the use of the aircraft was ignored, and who ignored it, to the extent of overruling the Pilots request to use another aircraft.
Despite the shambles which preceded it, the system had actually worked. The aircraft was documented as not being fit to fly. How did it come to be flying?
I have no quarrel with Tecumseh’s account, and as discussed earlier in the thread see the issuing of the RTS by The Scottish Officer as the key enabler for the ensuing tragedy. That said, he did seem to have the gumption to qualify the approval given, restricting it to start up only. Surely evidence in itself that he too knew it wasn’t airworthy, and was issuing the document on other than an entirely voluntary basis?
We surely need to consider how such a clear restriction to the use of the aircraft was ignored, and who ignored it, to the extent of overruling the Pilots request to use another aircraft.
Despite the shambles which preceded it, the system had actually worked. The aircraft was documented as not being fit to fly. How did it come to be flying?
My opinion, and again I base it on known facts and my agreement with DFS, is that the Army was applying intolerable pressure to fly the Mk2 with it's intended enhancements. Ironic, then, that the reason eight pax were booted off the list was the AUW of ZD576 was insufficient due to FADEC concerns. One unfortunate was reinstated, at the behest of his boss, who 'required' ZD576 be allotted instead of 2 Pumas. He was also on the flight.
That Bagnall has remained quiet speaks volumes. But AOC-inC SC knew, because immediately after the accident he drafted a letter to Bagnall, in response to a letter from Boscombe which had outlined (yet again) the reasons why the aircraft was as not to be flown. Whether or not Bagnall understood any of this can not be known, but it is surely revealing that MoD cannot find the correspondence from Controller Aircraft, yet Ministers have cited the documents either side of it in the file.
If I may add to my comment above about the Committees and 'Accepting Equipment Off-Contract'. When CDP (Sir Robert Walmsley) gave his evidence in March 1999, he admitted Chinook was STILL not airworthy. However, like all Inquiries and reports, he didn't actually use the 'A' word; but he agreed with the Committee that major pre-requisites were simply not yet in place - 5 years after ZD576. Please think about that. If he admitted this, what was omitted? Answer - the Mk2 wasn't allowed to be accepted off-contract. In addition to Chinook, two of my own programmes were case studies, and I submitted my own briefing to Sir Robert. It was immediately torn up by my intermediate line management, a draft brief prepared by a non-technical official, and someone outwith MoD(PE) who had nothing whatsoever to do with the programmes told to sign it. Asked why, the reply was 'We can't have anyone in Directorate of Helicopter Projects telling the truth'. Sir Robert was given complete bollix to tell the Committee. While my brief was not on Chinook, it was clear that the failings were systemic and applied to all aircraft. At the same time, the Chinook Project Director asked me how I'd circumvented the RAF policy denying funding to maintain airworthiness (the subject of the brief). I told him how FAA aircraft were managed and he replied 'We don't do that on Chinook'. No, because you're actively prevented from doing so. The Committee was lied to. There's far more to this than just one or two officers in the Air Staff and at Strike.
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The question of what the crewman was doing was raised. Well, one of his duties at this time was to check the DECU connectors every 15 minutes. Apparently this was because of a history of the connectors working loose under the vibration. At some stage in my working life I was part of a team which probably knew as much as anyone about the technology of light duty contacts and I was horrified when that information came out. Now, we all live in an electronic age where very few of us will not have fiddled with a connection to make it work but back in the 90's not many sliding contacts, which I presume that these were, had been designed to switch an active current. You would be surprised at how much damage even a few milliamps can do to rhodium or hard gold contacts. But, for most of us, our lives do not depend on the outcome.
Tuc I don’t know how you can remain so polite. Guys, this isn’t 2004. So much has been uncovered and put in the public domain. If you’re going to ignore or contradict it then offer a reason. Otherwise it’s trolling.
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Well said, dervish. The BoI was compromised from the start. Denied witnesses, eg the Odiham Test Pilot (who knew more about the 'idiosyncrasies' of the Mk2 than most, having suffered them all on repeated occasions), denied evidence, eg the 'switch on only status' of the aircraft, and most importantly the independence needed by any accident investigator to do its job. That still needs to happen. Mull was the key airworthiness related fatal air accident in the tragic series that preceded and followed it. It still awaits proper investigation and all the evidence ('new' or otherwise) properly considered. The scandal of RAF VSO interference in subverting Military Air Safety must finally be faced up to. Time to bite the bullet and enable reform. What is more important, the cover up or military airworthiness CAS?
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It seems like many of you disagree with the 2011 report (that cleared the pilots) that I quoted.
Their take on most likely cause is quite clear.
I recall the programme mentioned some of the families did not disagree with that either.
Their take on most likely cause is quite clear.
I recall the programme mentioned some of the families did not disagree with that either.
JFZ90
The Review got its main point correct, because it was given irrefutable evidence. A 'mandate' was placed upon the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff - that being the RAF was forbidden from relying on the Mk2 in any way whatsoever.
But it was factually inaccurate on the point used by the Government - poor legal advice meaning the Reviewing Officers didn't fully understand standard of proof. MoD and the Government had, before the Review, stated many times, over a number of years, that they fully understood. As the Shadow Defence Minister said, what's not to understand about 'no doubt'. As ever, you have to take a step further and read their remarks in other reports from the same period. And the evidence from the officer who developed the legal test, saying very senior officers understood it straight away, and fought tooth and nail against its adoption as it would take away their power.
The Review did not have a take on cause, as it was not within its remit. It simply noted the RAF's position.
The programme omitted that it was the Air Staff who, later, admitted the UFCM scenario was plausible, having spent nearly 20 years denying this. That admission was brought about by the discovery, in December 2010 during the Review, of the UFCM Special Flying Instruction mentioned above. Sqn Ldr Burke promptly gave evidence to Lord Philip that he'd never seen it before, even after the accident, but that it described perfectly what he'd experienced, and reported, a number of times in 1993/4.
And it was DE&S who later admitted that the Mk2 was 'not to be relied upon in any way whatsoever' on 2 June 1994. This was a rare occasion when MoD admitted the existence of documents that it has previously denied the existence of, so kudos to the DE&S Helicopter Secretariat for breaking ranks at a time when retired and serving VSOs were serially lying to the media. It is very clear they conducted an internal investigation into the evidence presented to Lord Philip, and a decision made to accept it unconditionally.
In fact, a brief extract of their analysis of the 1992 CHART report was released, when they fact-checked a key piece of evidence to the Review, that CHART had mentioned the Mk2 284 times. The retired VSOs had claimed it didn't mention it at all, and this had been repeated in the House by Liam Fox. Fox promptly wrote to an MP admitting he was misled.
Neither admission proves cause. But both confirm acceptance of considerable, even overwhelming doubt. And that was the argument all along.
Yes, the programme mentioned that some families wished to move on. But that is not the same as accepting the original findings. It would appear the producers couldn't find anyone to say the SROs were right. No-one in their right mind who has read the evidence would think that.
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If you have children, even grandchildren, how will you answer them when they ask, "I thought you always said that the pilots were at fault, even if they couldn't be proved to have been Grossly Negligent"? How will you reply if they discover that you were part of the machinery that found them Grossly Negligent, or worse that you were part of the cover up? "He defended the RAF leadership to the very end" is all very well, until it is proved to have dissembled, subverted, and bullied in order to supress the truth.
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An Inspiration to Us All!
A clear indication that the desire here to uncover the cover up is shared with those who lost loved ones at Mull as we approach the 30th anniversary this year. Herewith yesterday's story from the Campbeltown Courier. In particular the stalwart determination by Dr Susan Phoenix , whose husband Ian was one of the 29 victims of the tragedy, is indeed a noble inspiration to all who are determined that the truth be revealed and Air Safety reform enacted :-
.Chinook ZD576 crashed into the steep hillside in thick foggy conditions on June 2 1994, killing all 25 passengers – almost all the UK’s senior Northern Ireland intelligence experts – and the four Royal Air Force (RAF) crew on board.
The group, which included members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, MI5 and the British Army, had been travelling from RAF Aldergrove near Belfast to a security conference in Inverness two months before the 1994 IRA ceasefire.
Controversy surrounds investigations into the crash, with the RAF’s board of inquiry initially blaming the crash on “gross negligence” by the helicopter’s pilots, Flight Lieutenant Jonathan Tapper and Flight Lieutenant Richard Cook.
After an almost 20-year campaign to clear their names, the men were exonerated in 2011, but the actual cause of the tragedy has never been established.
As the 30th anniversary approaches, the incident has returned to the spotlight, with the BBC recently airing a two-part documentary, Chinook: Zulu Delta 576.
Chinook crash victim's daughter's heartfelt 'thank you' to Kintyre
Mull of Kintyre Chinook crash in the spotlight 30 years on
Among the men killed that night was Detective Superintendent Ian Phoenix, whose wife Dr Susan Phoenix is one of those who is determined to keep fighting for the truth about what happened.
Speaking to West Coast Today, she said: “I remember sitting with some of the other campaigners and technical experts when the announcement was made that the pilots’ names had been cleared.
“I was overwhelmed with emotion but it was double-pronged – I was relieved, but then one of the reporters who had come to be with us whilst the verdict was announced said, ‘Right, that’s it, job done.’
“We all turned to him and said, ‘No – we need to find out what happened. This is only the beginning.’ Then the phone hacking scandal broke and all the attention turned to that.”
Phoenix: Policing the Shadows, a 1996 book co-written by Dr Phoenix, is based on her husband’s diaries and uncovers the workings of covert operations in Northern Ireland. It has recently been turned into an audiobook, narrated by the couple’s son Niven, who also took part in the BBC documentary.
Dr Phoenix said: “Even 30 years on, we can’t let it rest. It was a cover-up and we are pleading with the government for the truth.”
Susan Phoenix and her son Niven are refusing to give up the fight for the truth about the crash.One of the technical experts who Dr Phoenix thanks for supporting the ongoing campaign for justice is David Hill, the author of a book on the tragedy called The Inconvenient Truth.
Mr Hill, a retired aeronautical engineer who worked in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for more than 30 years primarily as an avionics/aircraft programme manager, contributed to the review which eventually cleared the pilots’ names.
He said: "“The government declared the case closed, but there is no legal basis for doing so. The original findings have not been replaced and the aim of the investigation, to prevent recurrence, has not been met.
“If one asks the MoD for the official record, it will supply the original report. Negligent to a gross degree. Manslaughter. The truth remains concealed.”
He added: “The families are seldom given the opportunity to present the truth and on the odd occasion they have, MoD has refused to debate the issue. Their voices must be heard.”
An MoD spokesperson told us the organisation is satisfied a proper probe was carried out.
They added: “The Mull of Kintyre was a tragic accident and our thoughts and sympathies remain with the families, friends and colleagues of all those who died.
“In 2010, the government established the Mull of Kintyre Review, the findings of which were unequivocally accepted.
“This review considered that criticism of the board of inquiry, on the grounds that insufficient attention was paid to airworthiness and maintenance aspects, was unjustified, likewise it did not find new evidence to suggest mechanical failure, and no safety issues with the Chinook mark 2 were raised in the report.”
Mr Hill is now calling for political intervention to help finally establish the cause of the crash.
He said: “The disposition of the case rests with the Lord Advocate in Edinburgh, the senior law officer in Scotland. Successive incumbents have refused to re-open the Fatal Accident Inquiry or instruct the police.
“That is bad enough, but they have, in the process, wilfully ignored the known facts, content in the certain knowledge their 1996 inquiry was lied to.
“However, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal’s Service, which acts on behalf of the Lord Advocate, has considered the ‘new’ facts; albeit briefly.
“Their decision was that, despite the accident and deaths occurring in Scotland, this was a matter for the Metropolitan Police in London, as that is where the offences took place. The Met have not replied to formal complaints. This impasse needs resolving at a political level.”
Argyll and Bute MP Brendan O’Hara this week also joined the calls for clarity.
He said: “Following reports in 2019 that relevant files pertaining to the disaster could be destroyed, I sought confirmation and reassurance from the UK Government that all the files they hold relating to the RAF Chinook helicopter crash would be preserved.
“Although the pilots’ names were finally cleared, the circumstances in which 29 UK service personnel died has never been fully explained. I cannot fathom as to why the MoD would even consider destroying these files which remain the only pathway to establish the truth of what happened.
“As we approach the 30th anniversary, I will write once again to the Secretary of State for Defence seeking confirmation that these files have not, and will not, be destroyed.
“The bereaved families must have that hope of finding out what exactly led to their loved ones losing their lives on that awful night.”
West Coast Today has also contacted the Metropolitan Police for comment but has not yet received a response.
Mr Hill said that while the authorities drag their heels, the family’s heartache continues.
He added: "The bereaved families, all 29 of them, are in limbo. Who caused the death of their loved ones?
“It is clear some accepted the findings against the pilots and moved on as best they could. A small few have always taken a keen interest in the facts and sought to understand them, consumed by grief and the deceits perpetrated upon them.
"This case is not over. Not by a long way.”
West Coast Today - News - ‘We can’t let it rest’ – families refuse to give up fight for Chinook crash truth
EXCLUSIVE: ‘We can’t let it rest’ – families refuse to give up fight for Chinook crash truth
CAMPBELTOWN COURIERNewsMar 1, 2024by Hannah O’HanlonCampaigners are refusing to back down in their bid for the truth about what caused a Chinook helicopter to crash at the Mull of Kintyre..Chinook ZD576 crashed into the steep hillside in thick foggy conditions on June 2 1994, killing all 25 passengers – almost all the UK’s senior Northern Ireland intelligence experts – and the four Royal Air Force (RAF) crew on board.
The group, which included members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, MI5 and the British Army, had been travelling from RAF Aldergrove near Belfast to a security conference in Inverness two months before the 1994 IRA ceasefire.
Controversy surrounds investigations into the crash, with the RAF’s board of inquiry initially blaming the crash on “gross negligence” by the helicopter’s pilots, Flight Lieutenant Jonathan Tapper and Flight Lieutenant Richard Cook.
After an almost 20-year campaign to clear their names, the men were exonerated in 2011, but the actual cause of the tragedy has never been established.
As the 30th anniversary approaches, the incident has returned to the spotlight, with the BBC recently airing a two-part documentary, Chinook: Zulu Delta 576.
READ MORE
Argyll MP pleads for Chinook documents to be preservedChinook crash victim's daughter's heartfelt 'thank you' to Kintyre
Mull of Kintyre Chinook crash in the spotlight 30 years onAmong the men killed that night was Detective Superintendent Ian Phoenix, whose wife Dr Susan Phoenix is one of those who is determined to keep fighting for the truth about what happened.
Speaking to West Coast Today, she said: “I remember sitting with some of the other campaigners and technical experts when the announcement was made that the pilots’ names had been cleared.
“I was overwhelmed with emotion but it was double-pronged – I was relieved, but then one of the reporters who had come to be with us whilst the verdict was announced said, ‘Right, that’s it, job done.’
“We all turned to him and said, ‘No – we need to find out what happened. This is only the beginning.’ Then the phone hacking scandal broke and all the attention turned to that.”
Phoenix: Policing the Shadows, a 1996 book co-written by Dr Phoenix, is based on her husband’s diaries and uncovers the workings of covert operations in Northern Ireland. It has recently been turned into an audiobook, narrated by the couple’s son Niven, who also took part in the BBC documentary.
Dr Phoenix said: “Even 30 years on, we can’t let it rest. It was a cover-up and we are pleading with the government for the truth.”
Susan Phoenix and her son Niven are refusing to give up the fight for the truth about the crash.One of the technical experts who Dr Phoenix thanks for supporting the ongoing campaign for justice is David Hill, the author of a book on the tragedy called The Inconvenient Truth.
Mr Hill, a retired aeronautical engineer who worked in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for more than 30 years primarily as an avionics/aircraft programme manager, contributed to the review which eventually cleared the pilots’ names.
He said: "“The government declared the case closed, but there is no legal basis for doing so. The original findings have not been replaced and the aim of the investigation, to prevent recurrence, has not been met.
“If one asks the MoD for the official record, it will supply the original report. Negligent to a gross degree. Manslaughter. The truth remains concealed.”
He added: “The families are seldom given the opportunity to present the truth and on the odd occasion they have, MoD has refused to debate the issue. Their voices must be heard.”
An MoD spokesperson told us the organisation is satisfied a proper probe was carried out.
They added: “The Mull of Kintyre was a tragic accident and our thoughts and sympathies remain with the families, friends and colleagues of all those who died.
“In 2010, the government established the Mull of Kintyre Review, the findings of which were unequivocally accepted.
“This review considered that criticism of the board of inquiry, on the grounds that insufficient attention was paid to airworthiness and maintenance aspects, was unjustified, likewise it did not find new evidence to suggest mechanical failure, and no safety issues with the Chinook mark 2 were raised in the report.”
Mr Hill is now calling for political intervention to help finally establish the cause of the crash.
He said: “The disposition of the case rests with the Lord Advocate in Edinburgh, the senior law officer in Scotland. Successive incumbents have refused to re-open the Fatal Accident Inquiry or instruct the police.
“That is bad enough, but they have, in the process, wilfully ignored the known facts, content in the certain knowledge their 1996 inquiry was lied to.
“However, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal’s Service, which acts on behalf of the Lord Advocate, has considered the ‘new’ facts; albeit briefly.
“Their decision was that, despite the accident and deaths occurring in Scotland, this was a matter for the Metropolitan Police in London, as that is where the offences took place. The Met have not replied to formal complaints. This impasse needs resolving at a political level.”
Argyll and Bute MP Brendan O’Hara this week also joined the calls for clarity.
He said: “Following reports in 2019 that relevant files pertaining to the disaster could be destroyed, I sought confirmation and reassurance from the UK Government that all the files they hold relating to the RAF Chinook helicopter crash would be preserved.
“Although the pilots’ names were finally cleared, the circumstances in which 29 UK service personnel died has never been fully explained. I cannot fathom as to why the MoD would even consider destroying these files which remain the only pathway to establish the truth of what happened.
“As we approach the 30th anniversary, I will write once again to the Secretary of State for Defence seeking confirmation that these files have not, and will not, be destroyed.
“The bereaved families must have that hope of finding out what exactly led to their loved ones losing their lives on that awful night.”
West Coast Today has also contacted the Metropolitan Police for comment but has not yet received a response.
Mr Hill said that while the authorities drag their heels, the family’s heartache continues.
He added: "The bereaved families, all 29 of them, are in limbo. Who caused the death of their loved ones?
“It is clear some accepted the findings against the pilots and moved on as best they could. A small few have always taken a keen interest in the facts and sought to understand them, consumed by grief and the deceits perpetrated upon them.
"This case is not over. Not by a long way.”
West Coast Today - News - ‘We can’t let it rest’ – families refuse to give up fight for Chinook crash truth
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