Chinook ZD576 - The Concealed Evidence
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Chinook ZD576 - The Concealed Evidence
David Hill has now published this final book in his Mull of Kintyre trilogy. As usual it is in both Kindle format for £2.99, and in a paper book version at £6.99 plus P&P (hint, add Citadel of Waste at the same time for free delivery!). It contains the evidence that was submitted to Lord Philip's Mull of Kintyre Review but had been withheld by the RAF/MOD, even from its own BoI. That evidence led to the announcement from SoS for Defence Liam Fox setting aside the infamous Reviewing Officers' Finding of Gross Pilot Negligence and raised the question, then why was ZD576 lost with all 29 occupants? The RAF/MOD has still to answer that question and the cover up continues...
Edited to add that David wishes to emphasise that by its very nature this is more a reference book rather than simply telling a story. I suspect his readers will take it in their customary stride!
Edited to add that David wishes to emphasise that by its very nature this is more a reference book rather than simply telling a story. I suspect his readers will take it in their customary stride!
Last edited by Chugalug2; 25th Jan 2024 at 09:19. Reason: Author's comment
Top Answer
25th Jan 2024, 11:45
If you "admit where you went wrong" you open yourself up to legal redress, sued for damages, etc. Reputations are also ruined, people do/should lose their jobs, pension, perks etc..
Far simpler for those at the top to deflect attention, blame someone else, invent a false narrative, do a bit of gas lighting - and I'm not just talking about the Chinook here (post office scandal just a recent example), it's widespread.
Far simpler for those at the top to deflect attention, blame someone else, invent a false narrative, do a bit of gas lighting - and I'm not just talking about the Chinook here (post office scandal just a recent example), it's widespread.
Thanks chug. I'd noticed a two part film scheduled on BBC N. Ireland and looks like the first part is this Monday at 2240. Presumably for the upcoming 30th anniversary. I can pick it up here on a good day but it'll be on iplayer. Part 1 is "Catastrophic Loss" and part 2 "Dead Men Don't Talk".
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Thread Starter
This year will mark the 30th anniversary of the terrible tragedy that occurred on the slopes of the Mull of Kintyre on 2nd June 1994. Little wonder then that a renewed focus on this, the worst of all the airworthiness related fatal accident threads featured on this forum (Nimrod, Hercules, Sea Kings, Tornado, Hawks) is now becoming apparent. The BBC NI is airing a two part programme, "Chinook Zulu Delta 576" next Monday and the week following. It starts at 1040pm for 1 hour. If you can't tune in to BBC NI then it will be on iPlayer too.
BBC One - Chinook: Zulu Delta 576, Series 1, Catastrophic Loss
PS Thanks Dervish, we crossed, but all the better to highlight the importance of the occasion. I for one will be setting the PVR to record both programmes.
BBC One - Chinook: Zulu Delta 576, Series 1, Catastrophic Loss
PS Thanks Dervish, we crossed, but all the better to highlight the importance of the occasion. I for one will be setting the PVR to record both programmes.
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Channel 966 on the Sky box for those who have it
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Channel 863 (outside NI) on Virgin - I have set a series link to record on my TiVo box
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What I don't understand with these government style cover ups is why bother. Just admit where you went wrong and then 30-40 years later no one will be talking about it.
Cover it up and have it fester far longer.
Cover it up and have it fester far longer.
If you "admit where you went wrong" you open yourself up to legal redress, sued for damages, etc. Reputations are also ruined, people do/should lose their jobs, pension, perks etc..
Far simpler for those at the top to deflect attention, blame someone else, invent a false narrative, do a bit of gas lighting - and I'm not just talking about the Chinook here (post office scandal just a recent example), it's widespread.
Far simpler for those at the top to deflect attention, blame someone else, invent a false narrative, do a bit of gas lighting - and I'm not just talking about the Chinook here (post office scandal just a recent example), it's widespread.
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Agreed Biggus. If you put your hand up to issuing an RTS into squadron service for a knowingly grossly unairworthy aircraft, ignoring a CA clearance permitting switch on use only (for static training), you'll end up doing time. Or should do! Hence the cover up that continues still.
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Tabs please !
See also BBC Scotland on Tuesday evening.
David Hill has now published this final book in his Mull of Kintyre trilogy.
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Paula Vennells was not stripped of her honour, she elected to return it. That seems justified as it was awarded for he time as CE of the Post Office.
Would you have Sir John Day hand back awards unconnected with the Mull of Kintyre? If so, it'd set an interesting precedent.
I know you probably mean Wratten and Day, but CAS (Graydon) was also a reviewing officer. The biggest lie of them all was, in my opinion, his claim to Marshal of the RAF Sir John Grandy that they 'were some miles off course'. The letter was submitted to the Mull of Kintyre Review in evidence.
The Board obviously didn't have that 'evidence' as they foolishly assumed the aircraft was heading for a waypoint close to the light house, unaware of Graydon's first hand evidence. However, Graydon has chosen not to reveal what course they should have been on, so it's a fair assumption that the Board was right; and so was the waypoint evidence held in the nav computer, which aligned with the route planning map.
And of course AVM John Day had, he claimed, absolute knowledge of what was seen by the crew from the cockpit; an unimpressed Lord Philip saying 'Sir John Day’s approach places the onus of disproving negligence on the deceased, which is also wrong’.
He also claimed to the Lords that Beinn na Lice was an almost sheer cliff face extending over 600 feet higher at point of impact, and they headed straight for it. No doubt the Board, who actually visited the gentle slopes, were puzzled over that one.
It's easy to get confused, because 600 feet is also the minimum height the cloud base was above the aircraft, according to the statement by the only an eye-witness to the approach. Or at least the only statement published. The RO's position was the cloud base was 700 feet lower, but again they didn't reveal their source. As this statement destroys the RO's case, one can only wonder what the unpublished ones say.
A close second in the porky stakes is the claim by the Air Staff that at the time (2 June 1994) there was no such thing as a Release to Service. (The Master Airworthiness Reference). The Air Staff copy from 7 months before was given to the Review. Lord Philip was distinctly unimpressed with that one, and a Minister was eventually forced to issue an apology.
There's lots more!
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If you haven't read any of the books its not inapt at all. It's a fair question.
I know you probably mean Wratten and Day, but CAS (Graydon) was also a reviewing officer. The biggest lie of them all was, in my opinion, his claim to Marshal of the RAF Sir John Grandy that they 'were some miles off course'. The letter was submitted to the Mull of Kintyre Review in evidence.
The Board obviously didn't have that 'evidence' as they foolishly assumed the aircraft was heading for a waypoint close to the light house, unaware of Graydon's first hand evidence. However, Graydon has chosen not to reveal what course they should have been on, so it's a fair assumption that the Board was right; and so was the waypoint evidence held in the nav computer, which aligned with the route planning map.
And of course AVM John Day had, he claimed, absolute knowledge of what was seen by the crew from the cockpit; an unimpressed Lord Philip saying 'Sir John Day’s approach places the onus of disproving negligence on the deceased, which is also wrong’.
He also claimed to the Lords that Beinn na Lice was an almost sheer cliff face extending over 600 feet higher at point of impact, and they headed straight for it. No doubt the Board, who actually visited the gentle slopes, were puzzled over that one.
It's easy to get confused, because 600 feet is also the minimum height the cloud base was above the aircraft, according to the statement by the only an eye-witness to the approach. Or at least the only statement published. The RO's position was the cloud base was 700 feet lower, but again they didn't reveal their source. As this statement destroys the RO's case, one can only wonder what the unpublished ones say.
A close second in the porky stakes is the claim by the Air Staff that at the time (2 June 1994) there was no such thing as a Release to Service. (The Master Airworthiness Reference). The Air Staff copy from 7 months before was given to the Review. Lord Philip was distinctly unimpressed with that one, and a Minister was eventually forced to issue an apology.
There's lots more!
I know you probably mean Wratten and Day, but CAS (Graydon) was also a reviewing officer. The biggest lie of them all was, in my opinion, his claim to Marshal of the RAF Sir John Grandy that they 'were some miles off course'. The letter was submitted to the Mull of Kintyre Review in evidence.
The Board obviously didn't have that 'evidence' as they foolishly assumed the aircraft was heading for a waypoint close to the light house, unaware of Graydon's first hand evidence. However, Graydon has chosen not to reveal what course they should have been on, so it's a fair assumption that the Board was right; and so was the waypoint evidence held in the nav computer, which aligned with the route planning map.
And of course AVM John Day had, he claimed, absolute knowledge of what was seen by the crew from the cockpit; an unimpressed Lord Philip saying 'Sir John Day’s approach places the onus of disproving negligence on the deceased, which is also wrong’.
He also claimed to the Lords that Beinn na Lice was an almost sheer cliff face extending over 600 feet higher at point of impact, and they headed straight for it. No doubt the Board, who actually visited the gentle slopes, were puzzled over that one.
It's easy to get confused, because 600 feet is also the minimum height the cloud base was above the aircraft, according to the statement by the only an eye-witness to the approach. Or at least the only statement published. The RO's position was the cloud base was 700 feet lower, but again they didn't reveal their source. As this statement destroys the RO's case, one can only wonder what the unpublished ones say.
A close second in the porky stakes is the claim by the Air Staff that at the time (2 June 1994) there was no such thing as a Release to Service. (The Master Airworthiness Reference). The Air Staff copy from 7 months before was given to the Review. Lord Philip was distinctly unimpressed with that one, and a Minister was eventually forced to issue an apology.
There's lots more!
Nothing in the handling of the Chinook accident sat well, and the concerns related to the acceptance for use of the DEECs smacks of expediency and has a possibility to have been a factor in the event. The greatest concern is that a defence service which has arguably a tradition of competency fails to remove the stigma of less than independent competent investigation into its own disasters. This is unfortunately a situation that exists in many services but does not sit well with the relabelling of the regulation of defence aviation to include the term "Safety". Where command has oversight of the mishaps, there is an unacceptably high risk of expediency that has potential to continue risks needlessly.
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If you haven't read any of the books its not inapt at all. It's a fair question.
I know you probably mean Wratten and Day, but CAS (Graydon) was also a reviewing officer. The biggest lie of them all was, in my opinion, his claim to Marshal of the RAF Sir John Grandy that they 'were some miles off course'. The letter was submitted to the Mull of Kintyre Review in evidence.
The Board obviously didn't have that 'evidence' as they foolishly assumed the aircraft was heading for a waypoint close to the light house, unaware of Graydon's first hand evidence. However, Graydon has chosen not to reveal what course they should have been on, so it's a fair assumption that the Board was right; and so was the waypoint evidence held in the nav computer, which aligned with the route planning map.
And of course AVM John Day had, he claimed, absolute knowledge of what was seen by the crew from the cockpit; an unimpressed Lord Philip saying 'Sir John Day’s approach places the onus of disproving negligence on the deceased, which is also wrong’.
He also claimed to the Lords that Beinn na Lice was an almost sheer cliff face extending over 600 feet higher at point of impact, and they headed straight for it. No doubt the Board, who actually visited the gentle slopes, were puzzled over that one.
It's easy to get confused, because 600 feet is also the minimum height the cloud base was above the aircraft, according to the statement by the only an eye-witness to the approach. Or at least the only statement published. The RO's position was the cloud base was 700 feet lower, but again they didn't reveal their source. As this statement destroys the RO's case, one can only wonder what the unpublished ones say.
A close second in the porky stakes is the claim by the Air Staff that at the time (2 June 1994) there was no such thing as a Release to Service. (The Master Airworthiness Reference). The Air Staff copy from 7 months before was given to the Review. Lord Philip was distinctly unimpressed with that one, and a Minister was eventually forced to issue an apology.
There's lots more!
I know you probably mean Wratten and Day, but CAS (Graydon) was also a reviewing officer. The biggest lie of them all was, in my opinion, his claim to Marshal of the RAF Sir John Grandy that they 'were some miles off course'. The letter was submitted to the Mull of Kintyre Review in evidence.
The Board obviously didn't have that 'evidence' as they foolishly assumed the aircraft was heading for a waypoint close to the light house, unaware of Graydon's first hand evidence. However, Graydon has chosen not to reveal what course they should have been on, so it's a fair assumption that the Board was right; and so was the waypoint evidence held in the nav computer, which aligned with the route planning map.
And of course AVM John Day had, he claimed, absolute knowledge of what was seen by the crew from the cockpit; an unimpressed Lord Philip saying 'Sir John Day’s approach places the onus of disproving negligence on the deceased, which is also wrong’.
He also claimed to the Lords that Beinn na Lice was an almost sheer cliff face extending over 600 feet higher at point of impact, and they headed straight for it. No doubt the Board, who actually visited the gentle slopes, were puzzled over that one.
It's easy to get confused, because 600 feet is also the minimum height the cloud base was above the aircraft, according to the statement by the only an eye-witness to the approach. Or at least the only statement published. The RO's position was the cloud base was 700 feet lower, but again they didn't reveal their source. As this statement destroys the RO's case, one can only wonder what the unpublished ones say.
A close second in the porky stakes is the claim by the Air Staff that at the time (2 June 1994) there was no such thing as a Release to Service. (The Master Airworthiness Reference). The Air Staff copy from 7 months before was given to the Review. Lord Philip was distinctly unimpressed with that one, and a Minister was eventually forced to issue an apology.
There's lots more!
Cock-up or conspiracy?
The latter seems to be suggested but, as is so often the case, the former might be more likely. I know many people gravitate towards the idea of conspiracy, but is there actual evidence of this that would stand up in court were someone to be prosecuted for something like perjury? Your use of porky implies it was a lie, but was it a deliberate falsehood?
Thread Starter
Fascinating and thanks for filling in some blanks.
Cock-up or conspiracy?
The latter seems to be suggested but, as is so often the case, the former might be more likely. I know many people gravitate towards the idea of conspiracy, but is there actual evidence of this that would stand up in court were someone to be prosecuted for something like perjury? Your use of porky implies it was a lie, but was it a deliberate falsehood?
Cock-up or conspiracy?
The latter seems to be suggested but, as is so often the case, the former might be more likely. I know many people gravitate towards the idea of conspiracy, but is there actual evidence of this that would stand up in court were someone to be prosecuted for something like perjury? Your use of porky implies it was a lie, but was it a deliberate falsehood?
The big conspiracy here was to grant an RTS to a knowingly grossly unairworthy aircraft. Too many people knew it was unairworthy and why, except the aircrew who were told nothing but suspected it nonetheless. As tuc suggests, read the book. There is too much to lay it all out here.
Tecumseh, you have more than a passing interest and knowledge in CAE 5000 etc,, and the previous basis of certification related to MTC and to continued airworthiness, are you able to expand on the "There's lots more"?
Nothing in the handling of the Chinook accident sat well, and the concerns related to the acceptance for use of the DEECs smacks of expediency and has a possibility to have been a factor in the event. The greatest concern is that a defence service which has arguably a tradition of competency fails to remove the stigma of less than independent competent investigation into its own disasters. This is unfortunately a situation that exists in many services but does not sit well with the relabelling of the regulation of defence aviation to include the term "Safety". Where command has oversight of the mishaps, there is an unacceptably high risk of expediency that has potential to continue risks needlessly.
Nothing in the handling of the Chinook accident sat well, and the concerns related to the acceptance for use of the DEECs smacks of expediency and has a possibility to have been a factor in the event. The greatest concern is that a defence service which has arguably a tradition of competency fails to remove the stigma of less than independent competent investigation into its own disasters. This is unfortunately a situation that exists in many services but does not sit well with the relabelling of the regulation of defence aviation to include the term "Safety". Where command has oversight of the mishaps, there is an unacceptably high risk of expediency that has potential to continue risks needlessly.
When I say there are lots more examples, I'm also referring to the book 'Citadel of Waste' and (I haven't counted them, but probably over 40) case studies, across air, land and sea domains, over a period of 35 years.
Many of these examples of waste led directly to fatal accidents; and in the ZD576 case this can be seen in a Director Flight Safety report of August 1992 in which he complains of that year's 25% cut in direct airworthiness funding (the second of three successive cuts). What he didn't know was it was done to compensate for quite deliberate waste, and the book explains why, by whom, and quotes from the warnings they were given as to the effect their fraud would have on air safety. If you're warned of that, by specialist staff, auditors, and other senior officers and officials, and continue, then that is deliberate. If more than one person is involved, and the act serves to conceal an offence, then (to address Rheinstorff's question) that is a conspiracy.
Might I suggest, for the price of a cup of coffee, you get the Kindle version and then ask anything you like. I'm happy to explain.
Rheinstorff. Cock-up or conspiracy. What more do you need than Lord Philip confirming that it was mandated upon the Air Staff that the Chinook HC Mk2 was not to be relied upon in any way, and he was prohibited from signing an RTS; but he did? MoD has been invited many times by various parts of the media to debate this openly, but has always refused.
The book(s) list those who knew, by name. Not one said anything, or came forward during the Mull of Kintyre Review. There's even written evidence the Senior Reviewing Officer knew this before he wrote his remarks. A letter was written shortly after the accident demanding that the work to declare the Mk2 airworthy be hastened. (Not much Boscombe can do when all they have is an unrepresentative prototype). While the House of Lords did well overall, their act of allowing this to be concealed extended the campaign for 10 years. That's an awful lot of people involved, just in that one example.
I've done attaining and maintaining airworthiness a lot more recently than continuing! I've always felt your career should work backwards through this sequence, but that's no longer MoD policy, and it shows. In my day, many moons ago, you were examined in both MoD and CAA procedures before being allowed to do continuing; then the others were formal appointments whereby you were (uniquely) named in the contracts. So never believe MoD when it says responsible individuals can't be identified.
When I say there are lots more examples, I'm also referring to the book 'Citadel of Waste' and (I haven't counted them, but probably over 40) case studies, across air, land and sea domains, over a period of 35 years.
Many of these examples of waste led directly to fatal accidents; and in the ZD576 case this can be seen in a Director Flight Safety report of August 1992 in which he complains of that year's 25% cut in direct airworthiness funding (the second of three successive cuts). What he didn't know was it was done to compensate for quite deliberate waste, and the book explains why, by whom, and quotes from the warnings they were given as to the effect their fraud would have on air safety. If you're warned of that, by specialist staff, auditors, and other senior officers and officials, and continue, then that is deliberate. If more than one person is involved, and the act serves to conceal an offence, then (to address Rheinstorff's question) that is a conspiracy.
Might I suggest, for the price of a cup of coffee, you get the Kindle version and then ask anything you like. I'm happy to explain.
Rheinstorff. Cock-up or conspiracy. What more do you need than Lord Philip confirming that it was mandated upon the Air Staff that the Chinook HC Mk2 was not to be relied upon in any way, and he was prohibited from signing an RTS; but he did? MoD has been invited many times by various parts of the media to debate this openly, but has always refused.
The book(s) list those who knew, by name. Not one said anything, or came forward during the Mull of Kintyre Review. There's even written evidence the Senior Reviewing Officer knew this before he wrote his remarks. A letter was written shortly after the accident demanding that the work to declare the Mk2 airworthy be hastened. (Not much Boscombe can do when all they have is an unrepresentative prototype). While the House of Lords did well overall, their act of allowing this to be concealed extended the campaign for 10 years. That's an awful lot of people involved, just in that one example.
When I say there are lots more examples, I'm also referring to the book 'Citadel of Waste' and (I haven't counted them, but probably over 40) case studies, across air, land and sea domains, over a period of 35 years.
Many of these examples of waste led directly to fatal accidents; and in the ZD576 case this can be seen in a Director Flight Safety report of August 1992 in which he complains of that year's 25% cut in direct airworthiness funding (the second of three successive cuts). What he didn't know was it was done to compensate for quite deliberate waste, and the book explains why, by whom, and quotes from the warnings they were given as to the effect their fraud would have on air safety. If you're warned of that, by specialist staff, auditors, and other senior officers and officials, and continue, then that is deliberate. If more than one person is involved, and the act serves to conceal an offence, then (to address Rheinstorff's question) that is a conspiracy.
Might I suggest, for the price of a cup of coffee, you get the Kindle version and then ask anything you like. I'm happy to explain.
Rheinstorff. Cock-up or conspiracy. What more do you need than Lord Philip confirming that it was mandated upon the Air Staff that the Chinook HC Mk2 was not to be relied upon in any way, and he was prohibited from signing an RTS; but he did? MoD has been invited many times by various parts of the media to debate this openly, but has always refused.
The book(s) list those who knew, by name. Not one said anything, or came forward during the Mull of Kintyre Review. There's even written evidence the Senior Reviewing Officer knew this before he wrote his remarks. A letter was written shortly after the accident demanding that the work to declare the Mk2 airworthy be hastened. (Not much Boscombe can do when all they have is an unrepresentative prototype). While the House of Lords did well overall, their act of allowing this to be concealed extended the campaign for 10 years. That's an awful lot of people involved, just in that one example.
Rheino ...
'It' is now seven books long ... covering thirty years of 'undetected crime' mostly via bad head-office decisions, followed by conspiracy, lies and self-serving, blame-shuffling cover-ups that has so far killed over a hundred service folk unnecessarily. Not on the scale of several dear leaders elsewhere, I admit, but with no apology, no visible change of practice and no come-uppance.
Much of it is still going on today and there is still little but prayer to prevent further similar accidents and further MoD-inflicted unnecessary loss of life.
Back to Mr Hill's new book - 'The Concealed Evidence' - referring to Appendix 5 dealing with AMSO (later to become AML) and AP830 - Leaflet DM87.
In 1987 the 'cold war' had a couple of years to run and the invasion of Kuwait was not far off. AMSO and DM87 were so damaging to UK military posture over so many years, that under other regimes, this would have been treated as sabotage and treason and the perpetrators punished accordingly.
Just an obliging view... - ... LFH
...
But here I am and so is this subject, so forgive me if I try to elicit some information on it. I wasn't asking for all the information, just some views it and of course no-one is obliged to answer. I don't think that's unreasonable.
Much of it is still going on today and there is still little but prayer to prevent further similar accidents and further MoD-inflicted unnecessary loss of life.
Back to Mr Hill's new book - 'The Concealed Evidence' - referring to Appendix 5 dealing with AMSO (later to become AML) and AP830 - Leaflet DM87.
In 1987 the 'cold war' had a couple of years to run and the invasion of Kuwait was not far off. AMSO and DM87 were so damaging to UK military posture over so many years, that under other regimes, this would have been treated as sabotage and treason and the perpetrators punished accordingly.
Just an obliging view... - ... LFH
...
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