Originally Posted by
falcon900
I continue to turn over the cock up versus conspiracy question in my head.
I have no quarrel with Tecumseh’s account, and as discussed earlier in the thread see the issuing of the RTS by The Scottish Officer as the key enabler for the ensuing tragedy. That said, he did seem to have the gumption to qualify the approval given, restricting it to start up only. Surely evidence in itself that he too knew it wasn’t airworthy, and was issuing the document on other than an entirely voluntary basis?
We surely need to consider how such a clear restriction to the use of the aircraft was ignored, and who ignored it, to the extent of overruling the Pilots request to use another aircraft.
Despite the shambles which preceded it, the system had actually worked. The aircraft was documented as not being fit to fly. How did it come to be flying?
Precisely.
My opinion, and again I base it on known facts and my agreement with DFS, is that the Army was applying intolerable pressure to fly the Mk2 with it's intended enhancements. Ironic, then, that the reason eight pax were booted off the list was the AUW of ZD576 was insufficient due to FADEC concerns. One unfortunate was reinstated, at the behest of his boss, who 'required' ZD576 be allotted instead of 2 Pumas. He was also on the flight.
That Bagnall has remained quiet speaks volumes. But AOC-inC SC knew, because immediately after the accident he drafted a letter to Bagnall, in response to a letter from Boscombe which had outlined (yet again) the reasons why the aircraft was as not to be flown. Whether or not Bagnall understood any of this can not be known, but it is surely revealing that MoD cannot find the correspondence from Controller Aircraft, yet Ministers have cited the documents either side of it in the file.
If I may add to my comment above about the Committees and 'Accepting Equipment Off-Contract'. When CDP (Sir Robert Walmsley) gave his evidence in March 1999, he admitted Chinook was STILL not airworthy. However, like all Inquiries and reports, he didn't actually use the 'A' word; but he agreed with the Committee that major pre-requisites were simply not yet in place - 5 years after ZD576. Please think about that. If he admitted this, what was omitted? Answer - the Mk2 wasn't allowed to be accepted off-contract. In addition to Chinook, two of my own programmes were case studies, and I submitted my own briefing to Sir Robert. It was immediately torn up by my intermediate line management, a draft brief prepared by a non-technical official, and someone outwith MoD(PE) who had nothing whatsoever to do with the programmes told to sign it. Asked why, the reply was 'We can't have anyone in Directorate of Helicopter Projects telling the truth'. Sir Robert was given complete bollix to tell the Committee. While my brief was not on Chinook, it was clear that the failings were systemic and applied to all aircraft. At the same time, the Chinook Project Director asked me how I'd circumvented the RAF policy denying funding to maintain airworthiness (the subject of the brief). I told him how FAA aircraft were managed and he replied 'We don't do that on Chinook'. No, because you're actively prevented from doing so. The Committee was lied to. There's far more to this than just one or two officers in the Air Staff and at Strike.