Originally Posted by
Cornish Jack
As to content ? - an appeal to emotion rather than evidence and some rather odd claims and omissions just as misleading as the SO's ridiculous distortion of blame placing ... or, rather, the degree applied.
Emotion ? perfectly natural familial desire to protect the reputations of loved ones ... no disagreement there.
Making assumptions on in-flight activity with no hard evidence to support it . This may make for eye-catching TV 'entertainment', but it does nothing to advance the technical puzzle. Burke's input was posed as being that of a Test Pilot - a wholly different category than his actual post as Unit test pilot which gave him considerable experience operating on type but not the exploratory nature of A&AEE's and Handling Squadron's work. We were offered the latter's conclusions but nothing of substance as to how they were reached. On past (and present) records we are unlikely ever to be so informed !
From the very limited portions of the programme dealing with known crew activity, the absence of basic airmanship principles leaves inevitable unasked/unanswered questions, leaving us with a 'hearts and flowers' concoction.
Overall then, not hugely impressed and left with an itch to know more.
When I first heard the news of the crash, I immediately thought Mt Erebus and Air New Zealand.and, so far, subsequent (very limited) revelations haven't changed that. (I am, of course aware of the inertial input error which exacerbated that situation)
One final thought on the BOI's judgement - I seem to recall that it completely exonerated the Master Loadie from any blame, yet he was, apparently, operating from the jump seat ...perhaps CRM wasn't part of the SOPs ?
There are some known facts that bear repeating:
Sqn Ldr Burke had previously flown the Mk2 in Philly. (While I say 'Mk2', to Boscombe it remained an unairworthy prototype for many months after the accident). He had been involved in a UFCM incident while co-pilot to the Boeing test pilot, the latter being injured. (MoD denied this, calling him a liar. His written report was found in Boeing's files some years later. As an aside, RAF witnesses spoke of the test pilot still being in plaster at their next jaunt to Philly). Burke had infinitely more experience of the Mk2 than almost anyone.
The programme was deliberately pitched as being from the families' point of view. Primarily, because a number of attempts to make it had failed at the BBC commissioning stage. It was thought this new approach would stand a better chance, given the BBC's ongoing support for MoD's behaviour. This mostly explains the lack of technical detail, although most of the important points were got across. If you want that detail, in detail, there's books on the subject...
It is correct to say Boscombe's views were not broadcast. But again, they are published. (Subject of this thread).
As dervish said above, there is no evidence whatsoever of airmanship failings. When most people talk of this, they are alluding to MoD's claim that they were too low and not at Safety Altitude. Once again, read the evidence. They were tasked with a flying an aircraft with an Icing clearance was below their Safety Altitude. (In fact, there was no Icing clearance at all, as the section had been removed from the RTS in March 1994. Probably inadvertently, but nevertheless removed). And, of course, it wasn't a legal RTS...
When given this tasking, they were not told that the Mk2 was not to be relied upon in any way whatsoever, and that this was mandated upon the RAF. (Lord Philip confirmed this. It was the only 'new' evidence in his report).
Links to Mt Erebus? I agree. The operator lied on both occasions.
A good point about the forward crewman. One of the known facts that MoD concealed was that his upper door was closed. Evidence from experienced operators said this might indicate he was content with progress and visibility. This was supported by the SuperTANS nav computer being in a mode commensurate with remaining in VMC.