JFZ90
I think the best way to summarise any reply to your points is to remind you that MoD admitted all the ‘claims’ made in the programme; and I think a statement to that effect should have been broadcast. It probably explains why MoD declined to take part.
The only slight error was I believe one of interpretation. The journalist you refer to, David Walmsley, who was the first one on the scene, implied the aircraft WOULD go right when a left turn a demanded. In fact, after the Review the Air Staff admitted that the evidence of Sqn Ldr Burke and Boscombe was true, that a control problem might only manifest after a straight run when the turn was attempted. Hitherto, Wratten and Day had denied this could happen. You also have to take this in the context of a Special Flying Instruction of March 1994, which was NOT shown to pilots, that;
‘The characteristic is manifested by very sharp uncommanded inputs to the yaw axis which result in a rapid 3-4 degree change in aircraft heading, in both the hover and when in forward flight when the aircraft is subject to high levels of vibration’.
Contrary to MoD’s claim, Boscombe had warned of high and unacceptable levels of vibration in the Mk2, and this had not been addressed by June 1994.
For the entire campaign the Government and MoD position was to demand ‘new evidence’. The ONLY new evidence set out in the Review by Lord Philip was confirmation that the aircraft was not airworthy, and not to be flown by the RAF. That, this was ’mandated’ upon the Air Staff. Again, MoD fully admitted this, in writing, after the Review. So, I’m not sure how that becomes a ‘witch hunt around wider airworthiness’. It’s simply a statement of known fact. The RAF’s Director of Flight Safety confirmed it for Mk1 in August 1992, and specifically warned of measures needed to ensure Mk2 would be airworthy. None were taken. Later, the RAF Chief Engineer denied this, but one need only compare DFS’s recommendations with the ZD576 BOI report, and the reports into subsequent accidents, such as Nimrod XV230, Tornado ZG710, Hawk XX177, etc. to see the common factors.
The Board did not, and could not, investigate the FADEC system in full, because so much was concealed from them. (And I include Wratten and Day in this). Once again, a simple known fact… There were no Certificates of Design, so it was strictly prohibited to accept it off-contract. Similarly, the whole Mk2 itself. If you study the evidence, and the regulations, FADEC was not even permitted to be in production. (There’s a reason why the Public Accounts and Defence Committees launched investigations into ‘Accepting Equipment Off-Contract’). With due respect to the Board members, not one of them would realise that, and those responsible weren’t about to tell them. The problems with FADEC were indeed well-known. But on the day of the accident they had become even greater, and the RAF was STILL not permitted to fly the Mk2. The actual concern was that Boscombe had underestimated the scale of the problems.
Balance of probabilities, given the known facts, the known problems with the Mk2, and specifically the known problems, faults and defects in ZD576? UFCM. (To which I’d add my own opinion, a cascading electrical failure; the various switch positions, and combinations thereof - which the BOI didn’t assess - pointing to them encountering a major problem). No-one can prove it, but this is a far more likely scenario than any other, and the supporting evidence is in MoD’s own hand. Many people THOUGHT this but regardless of their opinions and theories, it is trumped by MoD’s later admissions - not airworthy, not allowed not be flown, and UFCMs. I think that’s got to be the starting point for any comments.