UK F-35B Lost
Easily done I suppose, assuming someone else had removed it.
I remember an incident mid 70s where the blank went down the intake of an RAF Phantom on an exercise scramble start at night. Funny enough the pilot was a RN exchange. They made a flight safety film of the events that followed.
I remember an incident mid 70s where the blank went down the intake of an RAF Phantom on an exercise scramble start at night. Funny enough the pilot was a RN exchange. They made a flight safety film of the events that followed.
It's massively complicated by the fact that not all of the F35 intake duct is visible from outside. And I'm led to believe that F35 has some covers which are not visible from outside even when properly fitted. So the crucial question in relation to culpability is whether there is a procedure in place to show all blanks and covers to the commander, to prove they aren't lying somewhere hidden from sight. If there is no such procedure, then the commander is reliant on the word of the flight deck crew that all covers have been removed. (I assume the flight deck crew don't sign the tech log to that effect, as the covers would be off for too long a time). The commander doesn't become responsible for other 'invisible' faults, like loose hydraulic joints or wiring errors, simply by signing for the jet. And crawling down the intake wearing flying kit is not going to do much good for the surface finish!
"All aircrew are to ensure they remove all blanks on pre-flt walkround.
Any issues are to be directed to the undersigned.
Sqn QFI"
Nipped.
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Probably lobbed the rest of the blanks over the side, problem sorted.
It reminds me of the stupidity of putting Silica Gel in the intakes of a Vulcan instead of the jetpipe.
It reminds me of the stupidity of putting Silica Gel in the intakes of a Vulcan instead of the jetpipe.
So on the basis of a single report from 'a reputable source' published by the Sun and repeated subsequently by a number of other media outlets, an overlooked intake blank has been established in some minds as the definitive cause, leading to a discussion of an anticipated cover-up (no pun intended) by a Navy investigation (they are joint investigations, it will not be a Navy inquiry), a suggestion that a Leading Hand will be found blameworthy (even though there is no indication RN personnel other than the pilot were involved) and an assumption that those above said Leading Hand are actually at fault. As for 'negligence on the flight deck', there is a big difference between someone making a mistake and negligence - is there no room for fatigue, distractions, expectation or confirmation bias, or other human factor mechanisms any more?
Not at the price of losing (as in not being able to recover) such an expensive asset.
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LB - I trust no Leading Hand is going to be made to carry the can; those placed in authority over him or her should take the blame. If (and until all investigations and SIs/BOIs are finished it's a big if) the loss was caused by negligence on the flightdeck, then I think most of us know where the buck stops. The MAA is pretty clear on the subject:
Transfer of Custody of Air Systems
2301(1) Custody of, and responsibility for, an Air System shall transfer to the Aircraft Commander from the time the acceptance certificate is signed until the after-flight declaration is completed.
Transfer of Custody of Air Systems (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
1. The Aircraft Commander should ensure that they are satisfied with the declared condition of the Air System when the acceptance certificate is signed. If they are not satisfied, they should declare the Air System unserviceable.
2. Once custody of the Air System has been accepted, the Aircraft Commander should authorize and monitor any subsequent Maintenance activity that may be required prior to, or during flight.
3. The Aircraft Commander should ensure that the technical log (MOD Form 700 or equivalent) has been updated to reflect the condition of the Air System when the after-flight declaration is completed and that the symptoms of any new Air System faults have been adequately briefed to the receiving Maintenance organization.
Transfer of Custody of Air Systems
2301(1) Custody of, and responsibility for, an Air System shall transfer to the Aircraft Commander from the time the acceptance certificate is signed until the after-flight declaration is completed.
Transfer of Custody of Air Systems (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
1. The Aircraft Commander should ensure that they are satisfied with the declared condition of the Air System when the acceptance certificate is signed. If they are not satisfied, they should declare the Air System unserviceable.
2. Once custody of the Air System has been accepted, the Aircraft Commander should authorize and monitor any subsequent Maintenance activity that may be required prior to, or during flight.
3. The Aircraft Commander should ensure that the technical log (MOD Form 700 or equivalent) has been updated to reflect the condition of the Air System when the after-flight declaration is completed and that the symptoms of any new Air System faults have been adequately briefed to the receiving Maintenance organization.
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Out of interest, where are all the "remove before flight" items including engine blanks stored? Is there a requirement for ground crew to show them to the pilot prior to taxi ?
For what it's worth, someone posted this on ARRSE:
"Work mate of mine is ex sea harrier maintainer and still has a lot of contacts on the F35 circuit, apparently there are inner and outer intake blanks and its common for the blank to be used as a knee pad while inspecting the first stage compressor disc."
I couldn't see how a properly fitted intake blank could be missed by the aircraft start groundcrew, pilot on walk round, flight deck marshallers, Flight Deck Officer and those in FLYCO.
However, if the malpractice described has been going on, I can see how a folded blank laying in the intake might get missed, particularly if at night, and then not get sucked in until powered right up just prior to the take off roll. I'm still surprised anything laying folded in the intake wasn't sucked in immediately on start.
"Work mate of mine is ex sea harrier maintainer and still has a lot of contacts on the F35 circuit, apparently there are inner and outer intake blanks and its common for the blank to be used as a knee pad while inspecting the first stage compressor disc."
I couldn't see how a properly fitted intake blank could be missed by the aircraft start groundcrew, pilot on walk round, flight deck marshallers, Flight Deck Officer and those in FLYCO.
However, if the malpractice described has been going on, I can see how a folded blank laying in the intake might get missed, particularly if at night, and then not get sucked in until powered right up just prior to the take off roll. I'm still surprised anything laying folded in the intake wasn't sucked in immediately on start.
The F135 engine has a pretty substantial set of stators before the first compressor stage, so it might not be inconceivable for a folded blank to not fully disrupt proceedings until higher power settings?
In REALITY - the thing would have been shredded on Idle - and reported in EICAS.
I think its time to withdraw from a Blanking Plug Theory - it just doesn't sit with the scant evidence so far.
Something more structural happened but, at the same time, something specific to the Pre-Takeoff, etc, etc, that won't necessarily necessitate the grounding of the whole program for gad's sake . . .
Yes, obviously something structural happened, specific to an event which happens on every sortie, which resulted in absolutely no pause in F35 ops anywhere 🙄
Just who's Mechanicals and bits, washers, oil seals, lock nuts, spinning bits and stuff - we'll probably never know.
But it's far too obvious that it was a bright red piece of foam with a "Remove Before Flight" flag hanging off it.
And I'm well acquainted with a certain Mister Murphy - who wrote his one and only Law.
$100M buys you an aircraft with a Checklist procedure you surely cannot screw up on.
Originally they were separate blanks (ie not tied together) and one day early on in Hawk flying at Brawdy - on the 'Armed' Line - the stbd blank was missed by G/crew and Pilot,engine started ok and taxied round to rwy threshold ok - when the pilot shoved the throttle forward to roll,the blank gave up the ghost and shattered - thence into the engine and wrecked it.
Result - Blanks tied together.
I am not saying it is relevant to this incident but just an illustration of ''if something can be done wrong - somebody will eventually do it wrong''.