UK F-35B Lost
I don't think this is an inter service thing. It is choosing the wrong horse for the course, or the wrong trainer. Marham, with the best efforts of both shades of blue, failed to deliver an effective seagoing Squadron. Why would anyone expect it to? It was asked to deliver something it was not experienced at. I suspect that if you gave Yeovilton the task of standing up the Typhoon force they would do just as badly.
That said, there used to be checks and opportunities to catch the errors. The Flight or Squadron formal ORI was the first. OST was the next. Hen it was over to the ship's QA team to make sure that QC was happening. To support that the Staff were out and about, reporting directly to the Admiral who was responsible.
This whole system appears to have fallen apart.
N
That said, there used to be checks and opportunities to catch the errors. The Flight or Squadron formal ORI was the first. OST was the next. Hen it was over to the ship's QA team to make sure that QC was happening. To support that the Staff were out and about, reporting directly to the Admiral who was responsible.
This whole system appears to have fallen apart.
N
The following 3 users liked this post by Bengo:
The cynic in me figures the end result will be to throw a few low ranking techs under the bus, develop some hugely bureaucratic and impractical to execute processes around the handling and stowage of aircraft protective covers and totally ignore the resource and manpower restraints that are IMO, the root cause of this accident......
I was rather intrigued by the vast importance given in day to day activities to making sure no-one, but no-one, saw inside the intakes. 
they were clearly paranoid about the bad guys taking some long range pics as they transited the Suez Canal and the emphasis on restricting access to the deck at all times seemed so important that it over-rode any reasonable efforts to prepare the aircraft properly
they were clearly paranoid about the bad guys taking some long range pics as they transited the Suez Canal and the emphasis on restricting access to the deck at all times seemed so important that it over-rode any reasonable efforts to prepare the aircraft properly
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I was rather intrigued by the vast importance given in day to day activities to making sure no-one, but no-one, saw inside the intakes.
they were clearly paranoid about the bad guys taking some long range pics as they transited the Suez Canal and the emphasis on restricting access to the deck at all times seemed so important that it over-rode any reasonable efforts to prepare the aircraft properly
they were clearly paranoid about the bad guys taking some long range pics as they transited the Suez Canal and the emphasis on restricting access to the deck at all times seemed so important that it over-rode any reasonable efforts to prepare the aircraft properly
And then include an unredacted photo of down the intake in the report (fig 1.4.4)
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Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
A good article - apart from the part suggesting that the RN is sharing their assets with the RAF.
As a reminder, the RN entered the JFH and started using the GR7/GR9 as they couldn’t afford to replace or man the SHar. It was the RAF who had to start sharing their Tornado strike replacement, not the other way round. And if the RAF starts to buy more Typhoons, or F-35A, as a strike assets, it is the RN who will lose their ability to quickly deploy to a carrier to reinforce the FAA…
And the RN can’t afford to buy, man or maintain the F-35B force out of their own budget.
https://x.com/edwardkeyjf/status/169...HhlFHGKbTPQr_A
The F-35 accident report – a reality check for UK Carrier Strike
As a reminder, the RN entered the JFH and started using the GR7/GR9 as they couldn’t afford to replace or man the SHar. It was the RAF who had to start sharing their Tornado strike replacement, not the other way round. And if the RAF starts to buy more Typhoons, or F-35A, as a strike assets, it is the RN who will lose their ability to quickly deploy to a carrier to reinforce the FAA…
And the RN can’t afford to buy, man or maintain the F-35B force out of their own budget.
https://x.com/edwardkeyjf/status/169...HhlFHGKbTPQr_A
The F-35 accident report – a reality check for UK Carrier Strike
Jeez - and I thought the RAF and the FAA were on the same side.....................
I think one has to place the FAA's inability to support SHAR in context.
The policy whereby all Air Systems support funding was transferred to the RAF (AMSO at the time) meant the FAA lost control of its own funding. AMSO took over all procurement. (You think MoD's procurers do the procurement?!)
AMSO immediately lumped the two pots into one, and said 'First come, first served'. There was a very long queue of RAF 'requirements', but few if any FAA because they didn't have a physical presence for anyone to actually get in the queue. They'd been told to butt out and let AMSO run the show.
Within a short time the SHAR fleet was down to half a squadron fitted with (e.g.) their full nav fit. To generate more funding for the queue AMSO had simply scrapped it, changing its classification from 'repairable' to 'consumable'. I had to give evidence to a BoI about why a SHAR didn't have the kit necessary to find its way home after a major problem. Most of the RN were completely oblivious to these goings on. One example among scores. SHAR never recovered.
As an important aside, this squandering of money on what was desirable, not what had been bid for and approved, is what led directly to Nimrod MRA4 being scrapped. AMSO (by now AML) would no longer deliver what the MRA4 programme had been told to assume they would. (Setting aside for a moment that there was no valid approval to proceed with a Nimrod upgrade).
The policy whereby all Air Systems support funding was transferred to the RAF (AMSO at the time) meant the FAA lost control of its own funding. AMSO took over all procurement. (You think MoD's procurers do the procurement?!)
AMSO immediately lumped the two pots into one, and said 'First come, first served'. There was a very long queue of RAF 'requirements', but few if any FAA because they didn't have a physical presence for anyone to actually get in the queue. They'd been told to butt out and let AMSO run the show.
Within a short time the SHAR fleet was down to half a squadron fitted with (e.g.) their full nav fit. To generate more funding for the queue AMSO had simply scrapped it, changing its classification from 'repairable' to 'consumable'. I had to give evidence to a BoI about why a SHAR didn't have the kit necessary to find its way home after a major problem. Most of the RN were completely oblivious to these goings on. One example among scores. SHAR never recovered.
As an important aside, this squandering of money on what was desirable, not what had been bid for and approved, is what led directly to Nimrod MRA4 being scrapped. AMSO (by now AML) would no longer deliver what the MRA4 programme had been told to assume they would. (Setting aside for a moment that there was no valid approval to proceed with a Nimrod upgrade).
The following 3 users liked this post by tucumseh:
As the report makes clear, naval aviation is an order of magnitude more complex than operating from a land base, and nothing like "just flying from a mobile airfield". It needs to be done by professionals, or not at all. Time for another Inskip, I feel. (Fat chance!!)
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1.3.72. ... the pilots wore their helmets throughout the walkaround. BK-18's pilot noticed the undercarriage pins were still installed, removed them and handed them to the see-off team.
1.4.42. ... the see-off13 team was cleaning the canopy as the pilot arrived at BK-18. The pilot then conducted a walkaround of the aircraft, electing to remove the undercarriage pins in the process.
I am not familiar with F35 see-off procedures but would the pilot have expected to see undercarriage pins still in as he did his walk round? Should they have been already removed at that point?
1.4.42. ... the see-off13 team was cleaning the canopy as the pilot arrived at BK-18. The pilot then conducted a walkaround of the aircraft, electing to remove the undercarriage pins in the process.
I am not familiar with F35 see-off procedures but would the pilot have expected to see undercarriage pins still in as he did his walk round? Should they have been already removed at that point?
It's not immediately clear, but the fact that it is mentioned wrt BK18 and nothing is said either way for BK21 suggests to me that the pilot would have expected them to have been removed.
I also note in the convening authority remarks at 1.6.11 it refers to "two recent incidents with undercarriage pins" while discussing failure to follow process which would also point to a potential irregularity, although i have no knowledge of those incidents.
I also note in the convening authority remarks at 1.6.11 it refers to "two recent incidents with undercarriage pins" while discussing failure to follow process which would also point to a potential irregularity, although i have no knowledge of those incidents.
It's not immediately clear, but the fact that it is mentioned wrt BK18 and nothing is said either way for BK21 suggests to me that the pilot would have expected them to have been removed.
I also note in the convening authority remarks at 1.6.11 it refers to "two recent incidents with undercarriage pins" while discussing failure to follow process which would also point to a potential irregularity, although i have no knowledge of those incidents.
I also note in the convening authority remarks at 1.6.11 it refers to "two recent incidents with undercarriage pins" while discussing failure to follow process which would also point to a potential irregularity, although i have no knowledge of those incidents.
F-35 lost
Can anyone confirm what should have happened to BK 18, the report begins, continues and ends in the same convoluted and unclear manner
Red Gear employment policies
1.4.58. To bring conformity to the see-off procedures at RAF Marham a see- off Air Engineering Standing Order (AESO) was created with more detail than the Joint-Service Technical Documentation (JTD) section for 'Aircraft Dispatch Actions (ADA) —Inspections'. The JTD instructions directed that the intake and exhaust should be inspected for FOD but did not explicitly state how to do this. In the REDACTED and the REDACTED who operated the F- 35B and F-35C respectively, the see-off team conducted a check immediately prior to the pilot getting into the aircraft. An engineer climbed into the common duct to check for FOD, a process known as 'diving the duct' which, when completed, was reported to the pilot on their arrival at the aircraft. The JTD did not explicitly instruct the engineer to 'dive the duct,' but the text did include instructions for entering the duct safely and matched those required for the engine intake inspection.
1.4.59. This action of 'diving the duct' was not stipulated in the AESO see- off procedure. In the UK, engineers inspected inside the common duct during a POS/BOS, but this servicing was valid for up to 24 hours. There was no further check in the intervening period before the aircraft went flying. Fitment of Red Gear should have subsequently protected against FOD entering the intake, but as Red Gear was not routinely fitted whilst aircraft were on the flight deck, continuity of protection was lost.
1.4.60. The AESO stated that the see off team should report to the pilot:
'... this is BK-** (as appropriate) all Red Gear has been removed and accounted for and the 3 groundlock safety pins have been removed, placed in the Pin Bag and stowed within the MIP Panel'.
Red Gear employment policies
1.4.58. To bring conformity to the see-off procedures at RAF Marham a see- off Air Engineering Standing Order (AESO) was created with more detail than the Joint-Service Technical Documentation (JTD) section for 'Aircraft Dispatch Actions (ADA) —Inspections'. The JTD instructions directed that the intake and exhaust should be inspected for FOD but did not explicitly state how to do this. In the REDACTED and the REDACTED who operated the F- 35B and F-35C respectively, the see-off team conducted a check immediately prior to the pilot getting into the aircraft. An engineer climbed into the common duct to check for FOD, a process known as 'diving the duct' which, when completed, was reported to the pilot on their arrival at the aircraft. The JTD did not explicitly instruct the engineer to 'dive the duct,' but the text did include instructions for entering the duct safely and matched those required for the engine intake inspection.
1.4.59. This action of 'diving the duct' was not stipulated in the AESO see- off procedure. In the UK, engineers inspected inside the common duct during a POS/BOS, but this servicing was valid for up to 24 hours. There was no further check in the intervening period before the aircraft went flying. Fitment of Red Gear should have subsequently protected against FOD entering the intake, but as Red Gear was not routinely fitted whilst aircraft were on the flight deck, continuity of protection was lost.
1.4.60. The AESO stated that the see off team should report to the pilot:
'... this is BK-** (as appropriate) all Red Gear has been removed and accounted for and the 3 groundlock safety pins have been removed, placed in the Pin Bag and stowed within the MIP Panel'.
