UK Strategic Defence Review 2020 - get your bids in now ladies & gents
Watching the Committee on TV, its fairly obvious Ellwood sees his job as protecting MoD from its most embarrassment failures, and perpetuating the party line on certain key issues. Such as their recent report on procurement, claiming there have been no safety problems in the RAF post-Nimrod Review. Tell that to the families of the Red Arrows personnel who lost their lives since then. Nimrod Review headline: no valid safety case. Hawk headline: no safety case. Glider headline: no safety case. They say they can't identify who made the decisions. Here's a clue. MoD has organisational charts, and a telephone directory. And in case that 's not enough, it's released the information under FOI.
It doesn't surprise me he has upset some members. He very openly doesn't like witnesses being asked awkward questions. His horrified facial expressions whenever Johnny Mercer used to speak were a picture, and it's the same now with Dave Doogan. (ex MoD engineer). There's some very poor members (Spellar for one), but also some good ones who probably don't like the direction the Committee takes.
It doesn't surprise me he has upset some members. He very openly doesn't like witnesses being asked awkward questions. His horrified facial expressions whenever Johnny Mercer used to speak were a picture, and it's the same now with Dave Doogan. (ex MoD engineer). There's some very poor members (Spellar for one), but also some good ones who probably don't like the direction the Committee takes.
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Thread Starter
"The other thing Blair and his increasingly lefty lawyer cabal did was to commit the UK to two enduring operations way beyond the scale of the defence planning assumptions"
But the Tories abcked them as did almost all the press - you can't have it both ways. Labour has done some pretty dreadful things in defence but I don't think that overall there's a scrap of difference bewteen the parties. Neither funds the armed forces properly.
But the Tories abcked them as did almost all the press - you can't have it both ways. Labour has done some pretty dreadful things in defence but I don't think that overall there's a scrap of difference bewteen the parties. Neither funds the armed forces properly.
"The other thing Blair and his increasingly lefty lawyer cabal did was to commit the UK to two enduring operations way beyond the scale of the defence planning assumptions"
But the Tories abcked them as did almost all the press - you can't have it both ways. Labour has done some pretty dreadful things in defence but I don't think that overall there's a scrap of difference bewteen the parties. Neither funds the armed forces properly.
But the Tories abcked them as did almost all the press - you can't have it both ways. Labour has done some pretty dreadful things in defence but I don't think that overall there's a scrap of difference bewteen the parties. Neither funds the armed forces properly.
In other news, Nice But Tobias has been given a vote of no confidence by Tubster, Jones, Drax and Twigg.
committees.parliament.uk/publications/41005/documents/199678/default/
Ben Wallace’s farewell revelations are indefensible
Long (depressing) article by Juliet Samuel in the Comment section of The Times today - well worth reading.
The Ukraine war has shown how shrivelled Britain’s defence sector has become, to the point where we struggle to rearm
It’s one of those awkward dilemmas on which Debrett’s is just no help. You’ve just given away nearly all your anti-tank missiles to a friend and when you call up to order some more you find that some key parts are not just out of stock but completely out of production. “But I love those missiles!” you tell the factory. “They’re my favourites.” “News to us,” they say. What is a defence secretary to do?
This, more or less, is now the dilemma for large parts of the West’s military industrial complex. There is a global shortage of gunpowder and 5mm shells, for example. And if you want to buy stocks of percussion caps (gun ignition parts) on any scale, there’s a three-year waiting list. When it comes to refitting nuclear submarines such as HMS Vanguard, it turns out one of the parts used to fire its missiles was originally made by adapting an American corn blower that hasn’t been made for decades. The said part had to be made from scratch, contributing to a delay that took the sub’s 2015 maintenance stoppage from three to seven years.
MPs are quite right to take Ben Wallace to task for his department’s abysmal procurement record, as the defence select committee did this week. Backbenchers are right to say out loud what we all know Wallace really thinks: we are not spending enough on defence by a long way. But Wallace is also justified in arguing that Britain’s dwindling ammunition stocks and ill-equipped, shrunken military are not just the problems of shoddy contract lawyers and blundering civil servants. As Britain’s industrial base has shrunk, so has its defence industry. For example, research by Paul Mulvihill, an engineer at the munitions maker Primetake, shows that whereas we had seven pyrotechnics firms in 1990, we now have just two. So it’s a similar story for all sorts of other parts, from gunpowder to shells to detonators.
In short, many of the problems faced by our military are the same as those in our energy sector, our medical supply chains and our tech industry. We have lost the capacity to make what we need affordably. But as the pandemic, the gas crisis and the Ukraine war have revealed, we can no longer trust others to make it all for us.
Take the handheld missiles, or Nlaws, mentioned above, which Wallace successfully argued we must donate to Ukraine at the start of the war and which were critical to stopping Russia’s tanks. As the defence secretary revealed in parliament on Tuesday, the military has been trying to replenish its stock of Nlaws but when it came to place a new order last year, “it turned out that the optics had stopped being made ten years before”. A critic might note that the period “ten years before” today was one in which the Tories were in charge. But, as Wallace was keen to emphasise to the Labour MP challenging him: “The stockpiles of our ammunition started depleting around about 1997.”
The cost of rectifying this, laid out in the defence command paper this week, is now estimated at £2.5 billion. If there is one thing we know for sure, given the MoD’s record, it is that the final bill will be much higher.
There is nothing for it but to build capacity back up again, no doubt at vast cost. The US has made a strong start by declaring it will increase its total ammunition production fivefold in the next two years — at a cost of more than £13 billion. Our government recently placed an order with BAE that will increase production of one type of ammunition eightfold, in addition to ordering thousands more Nlaws. But more broadly across Europe, defence contractors are nervous about expanding capacity on this scale in case our fickle governments stop ordering after a few years, leaving them with no customers.
This is not just about guns and steel. Modern military technology relies more than ever on all sorts of complex civilian technologies, which Britain has been enthusiastically selling off to precisely the wrong people for years. In 2008, for example, UK authorities took little interest in the sale of Dynex Semiconductor, a chipmaker, to a Chinese rail company. In 2018 it emerged that Dynex’s technology had likely been used to design a new type of ultra-powerful cannon mounted on a Chinese assault ship. In 2012, Huawei bought the Centre for Integrated Photonics from an arm of the British government. British security officials now say this gave them “a head start” in a key technology. This is before we even get to the dubious partnerships between British universities and Chinese military conglomerates.
This, more or less, is now the dilemma for large parts of the West’s military industrial complex. There is a global shortage of gunpowder and 5mm shells, for example. And if you want to buy stocks of percussion caps (gun ignition parts) on any scale, there’s a three-year waiting list. When it comes to refitting nuclear submarines such as HMS Vanguard, it turns out one of the parts used to fire its missiles was originally made by adapting an American corn blower that hasn’t been made for decades. The said part had to be made from scratch, contributing to a delay that took the sub’s 2015 maintenance stoppage from three to seven years.
MPs are quite right to take Ben Wallace to task for his department’s abysmal procurement record, as the defence select committee did this week. Backbenchers are right to say out loud what we all know Wallace really thinks: we are not spending enough on defence by a long way. But Wallace is also justified in arguing that Britain’s dwindling ammunition stocks and ill-equipped, shrunken military are not just the problems of shoddy contract lawyers and blundering civil servants. As Britain’s industrial base has shrunk, so has its defence industry. For example, research by Paul Mulvihill, an engineer at the munitions maker Primetake, shows that whereas we had seven pyrotechnics firms in 1990, we now have just two. So it’s a similar story for all sorts of other parts, from gunpowder to shells to detonators.
In short, many of the problems faced by our military are the same as those in our energy sector, our medical supply chains and our tech industry. We have lost the capacity to make what we need affordably. But as the pandemic, the gas crisis and the Ukraine war have revealed, we can no longer trust others to make it all for us.
Take the handheld missiles, or Nlaws, mentioned above, which Wallace successfully argued we must donate to Ukraine at the start of the war and which were critical to stopping Russia’s tanks. As the defence secretary revealed in parliament on Tuesday, the military has been trying to replenish its stock of Nlaws but when it came to place a new order last year, “it turned out that the optics had stopped being made ten years before”. A critic might note that the period “ten years before” today was one in which the Tories were in charge. But, as Wallace was keen to emphasise to the Labour MP challenging him: “The stockpiles of our ammunition started depleting around about 1997.”
The cost of rectifying this, laid out in the defence command paper this week, is now estimated at £2.5 billion. If there is one thing we know for sure, given the MoD’s record, it is that the final bill will be much higher.
There is nothing for it but to build capacity back up again, no doubt at vast cost. The US has made a strong start by declaring it will increase its total ammunition production fivefold in the next two years — at a cost of more than £13 billion. Our government recently placed an order with BAE that will increase production of one type of ammunition eightfold, in addition to ordering thousands more Nlaws. But more broadly across Europe, defence contractors are nervous about expanding capacity on this scale in case our fickle governments stop ordering after a few years, leaving them with no customers.
This is not just about guns and steel. Modern military technology relies more than ever on all sorts of complex civilian technologies, which Britain has been enthusiastically selling off to precisely the wrong people for years. In 2008, for example, UK authorities took little interest in the sale of Dynex Semiconductor, a chipmaker, to a Chinese rail company. In 2018 it emerged that Dynex’s technology had likely been used to design a new type of ultra-powerful cannon mounted on a Chinese assault ship. In 2012, Huawei bought the Centre for Integrated Photonics from an arm of the British government. British security officials now say this gave them “a head start” in a key technology. This is before we even get to the dubious partnerships between British universities and Chinese military conglomerates.
The author of the article is complaining about two related issues.
1. Component unavailability, of which one contributor is component obsolescence.
2. Maintaining the Build Standard, to enable Production.
The former is one of the 17 core components of the latter.
The procedures were set out in a Defence Standard mandated in every aviation contract. If you didn't know it backwards, any project you managed was likely to hit certain problems. Put another way, applying the standard correctly would have avoided the likes of Nimrod MRA4.
The work was mostly cancelled in June 1991. That was not a 'procurement' decision. In fact, the most vocal opponents were in MoD(PE). It was a decision made by AMSO(RAF) as part of its 'savings at the expense of safety' policy, reiterated by the Nimrod Review.
The Standard was later cancelled without replacement.
The case studies in the article are, I suspect, accurate. To hang them on 'procurement' failures is ludicrous, but I imagine convenient for the many who haven't bothered to try to understand the background.
1. Component unavailability, of which one contributor is component obsolescence.
2. Maintaining the Build Standard, to enable Production.
The former is one of the 17 core components of the latter.
The procedures were set out in a Defence Standard mandated in every aviation contract. If you didn't know it backwards, any project you managed was likely to hit certain problems. Put another way, applying the standard correctly would have avoided the likes of Nimrod MRA4.
The work was mostly cancelled in June 1991. That was not a 'procurement' decision. In fact, the most vocal opponents were in MoD(PE). It was a decision made by AMSO(RAF) as part of its 'savings at the expense of safety' policy, reiterated by the Nimrod Review.
The Standard was later cancelled without replacement.
The case studies in the article are, I suspect, accurate. To hang them on 'procurement' failures is ludicrous, but I imagine convenient for the many who haven't bothered to try to understand the background.
Goes to show how dumb the budget is being used. The MOD has released 3 tenders for construction of trench networks for training at 3 locations. Isn't this the stuff the army and specifically the royal engineers should be learning to do, you know the actual guys who in be in a time war actually building these fortifications
https://www.forces.net/politics/mod-...ing-facilities
https://www.forces.net/politics/mod-...ing-facilities
"It is a fascinating and repeated theme in the Civil Service that when faced with an emergency they are sometimes able to devise mechanisms for addressing the crisis. However, rather than develop these as advances to change the system and to spread best practice the tendency is to revert to the previous failed practice. However that is not just a matter for the Ministry of Defence but the wider public sector."
They'll probably build quicker and cheaper to.
Thread Starter
Goes to show how dumb the budget is being used. The MOD has released 3 tenders for construction of trench networks for training at 3 locations. Isn't this the stuff the army and specifically the royal engineers should be learning to do, you know the actual guys who in be in a time war actually building these fortifications
https://www.forces.net/politics/mod-...ing-facilities
https://www.forces.net/politics/mod-...ing-facilities
Schapps
With our new Minister of Defence taking office on the eve of Ben Wallace's resignation, I wonder what he will do to SDSR.....
If anything I will be very interested in his views assuming he sticks around past xmas, judging his migrating from one department to another in a single year...
cheers
If anything I will be very interested in his views assuming he sticks around past xmas, judging his migrating from one department to another in a single year...
cheers
Thread Starter
" I wonder what he will do to SDSR....."
Immediately call it in for his personal review to avoid upsetting anyone - which will last up to the date he leaves the job - as you say - around Christmas
Immediately call it in for his personal review to avoid upsetting anyone - which will last up to the date he leaves the job - as you say - around Christmas
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Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
The Senior Responsible Owner for New Medium Helicopter has been published.
Key dates are redacted, but by October 2024 (end of SRO mandate) the Invitation to Negotiate will have been issued and Full Business Case approved and RAF-Army joint force structure is to be agreed.
SRO is in place also for Chinook Capability Sustainment Programme.
As i had guessed by the signs before the Review refresh, a reworked delivery schedule for the 14 new Block II machines is being firmed up.
New financial profile for Chinook CSP is up for approval in December.
Key dates are redacted, but by October 2024 (end of SRO mandate) the Invitation to Negotiate will have been issued and Full Business Case approved and RAF-Army joint force structure is to be agreed.
SRO is in place also for Chinook Capability Sustainment Programme.
As i had guessed by the signs before the Review refresh, a reworked delivery schedule for the 14 new Block II machines is being firmed up.
New financial profile for Chinook CSP is up for approval in December.
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SRO is Commodore Joylon Woodard, Head of Combat Aviation Programmes British Army Headquarters. He is an ex-Jungly (Splot 846, CO 845, commander of Ocean's Air Group during OP Ellamy) and former Commanding Officer BRNC.
He was already acting SRO.
Extract fom appointment letter, duplicates some of ORAC's post.
He was already acting SRO.
Extract fom appointment letter, duplicates some of ORAC's post.
4. You are to allocate 50% of your time to your SRO responsibilities and that you will
remain in post until October 2024 when a successor will have been identified.
During your tenure, it is anticipated that you will achieve the following outcomes:
a. Release Invitation to Negotiate – xxxxxxxxx xxxx
b. Complete Infrastructure Feasibility Study – xxxxxxxxxx
c. Secure Full Business Case approval – xxxxxxxxxx
d. Contract Award – xxxxxxxxx
e. Secure Army/Royal Air Force final agreement on Joint Force Structure –
xxxxxxxxx
(...)
The New Medium Helicopter Programme
8. The aim of the New Medium Helicopter Programme is to deliver a modernised Lift
Helicopter to Joint Helicopter Command by replacing increasingly obsolete medium
platforms across the Army, the Royal Air Forces, and UK Strategic Command operating
bases. It will do this by:
a. Rationalising five rotary wing requirements under one aircraft-type to
maximise commonality allowing improvements in efficiency and operational
flexibility.
b. Delivering an open systems architecture to allow for rapid employment of
different role-fits and carry-on equipment, enabling efficient future
development to meet the demands of a changing threat environment.
c. Creating training and support solutions that will adopt a Whole Force
Approach to streamline maintenance, logistics and the training helicopter
aircrew, ground crew and engineers.
remain in post until October 2024 when a successor will have been identified.
During your tenure, it is anticipated that you will achieve the following outcomes:
a. Release Invitation to Negotiate – xxxxxxxxx xxxx
b. Complete Infrastructure Feasibility Study – xxxxxxxxxx
c. Secure Full Business Case approval – xxxxxxxxxx
d. Contract Award – xxxxxxxxx
e. Secure Army/Royal Air Force final agreement on Joint Force Structure –
xxxxxxxxx
(...)
The New Medium Helicopter Programme
8. The aim of the New Medium Helicopter Programme is to deliver a modernised Lift
Helicopter to Joint Helicopter Command by replacing increasingly obsolete medium
platforms across the Army, the Royal Air Forces, and UK Strategic Command operating
bases. It will do this by:
a. Rationalising five rotary wing requirements under one aircraft-type to
maximise commonality allowing improvements in efficiency and operational
flexibility.
b. Delivering an open systems architecture to allow for rapid employment of
different role-fits and carry-on equipment, enabling efficient future
development to meet the demands of a changing threat environment.
c. Creating training and support solutions that will adopt a Whole Force
Approach to streamline maintenance, logistics and the training helicopter
aircrew, ground crew and engineers.
Last edited by SLXOwft; 1st Sep 2023 at 14:17. Reason: Some details
Thread Starter
So the Responsible Officer is there for another 13 months - and then someone else has t learn the job. You can't believe that any commercial operation would allow that
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I see the replacement for the VIP A109 has been cancelled too. what I cannot understand is Risi was getting slaughtered in the press for using it, hence it went. But when looking at the replacement contract of some £30mil ish, it was on the assumption of utilisation of 500 hrs per year, so surely it was costing nothing in real terms to use the A109 in real terms as the contract would have covered up to the 500 Hrs a year, so as long as you do not exceed that it has already been paid for? And if you did under utilise it, it ends up costing you more?
I see the replacement for the VIP A109 has been cancelled too. what I cannot understand is Risi was getting slaughtered in the press for using it, hence it went. But when looking at the replacement contract of some £30mil ish, it was on the assumption of utilisation of 500 hrs per year, so surely it was costing nothing in real terms to use the A109 in real terms as the contract would have covered up to the 500 Hrs a year, so as long as you do not exceed that it has already been paid for? And if you did under utilise it, it ends up costing you more?
'Sunak could have gone to Norwich by train it would have been greener.' Yeah, right and all the necessary vehicles at the other end for him, his PS, his security detail, SPAD etc. would have been teleported there, and all the passengers excluded for security reasons would be chuffed because he wasn't flying. This and all the additional pollution caused by disruption to traffic would apparently be greener. I bet the most of the complainers think its OK to fly to their holiday destinations even if they would be possible to reach by high speed train and ferry.</RANT>
According to Wikipedia 'Helicopters are seen as not only cheaper and more cost effective but also more convenient than a motorcade.' probably true but no supporting evidence given
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Boeing B737-33A
Beech 350
Guflstream G550
Bombardier CL-605
Airbus Helicopters EC725
Sikorsky UH-60M
Before the shake up from the current head of state, his predecessors flew
Boeing 757-225 XC-UJM TP-01 Boeing 737-300 XC-UJB TP-02 Boeing 737-322 XC-LJG TP-03 Gulfstream III XC-UJN TP-06 Gulfstream III XC-UJO TP-07 Learjet 35A XC-IPP TP-104 Rockwell Turbocommander 695A XC-UTA TP-216 Super Puma AS332 XC-UHV TPH-01 Super Puma AS332 XC-UHU TPH-02 Super Puma AS332 XC-UHO TPH-03 Super Puma AS332 XC-UHM TPH-05 Super Puma AS332 XC-UHP TPH-06 Puma SA330 XC-UHC TPH-08 Puma SA330 and chuck in the 787-9
cheers
However, in this case he has been acting SRO since October '21 so will have been effectively in post for three years and is tasked with contract award before then.