The author of the article is complaining about two related issues.
1. Component unavailability, of which one contributor is component obsolescence.
2. Maintaining the Build Standard, to enable Production.
The former is one of the 17 core components of the latter.
The procedures were set out in a Defence Standard mandated in every aviation contract. If you didn't know it backwards, any project you managed was likely to hit certain problems. Put another way, applying the standard correctly would have avoided the likes of Nimrod MRA4.
The work was mostly cancelled in June 1991. That was not a 'procurement' decision. In fact, the most vocal opponents were in MoD(PE). It was a decision made by AMSO(RAF) as part of its 'savings at the expense of safety' policy, reiterated by the Nimrod Review.
The Standard was later cancelled without replacement.
The case studies in the article are, I suspect, accurate. To hang them on 'procurement' failures is ludicrous, but I imagine convenient for the many who haven't bothered to try to understand the background.