UK Strategic Defence Review 2020 - get your bids in now ladies & gents
Thread Starter
"so in classic fashion it looks like the refresh will be smuggled out immediately beforehand"
or even afterwards - there's no sign of the spinmeisters at work yet so it must be at least a week away minimum. They normally start spinning on weekends swhen "sources close to..." appear in teh Snday press and on Sunday a/m TV
or even afterwards - there's no sign of the spinmeisters at work yet so it must be at least a week away minimum. They normally start spinning on weekends swhen "sources close to..." appear in teh Snday press and on Sunday a/m TV
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
HoC Intelligence & Security report on China - press release.
https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-co...ss-Release.pdf
…”The Government has no strategy on China, let alone an effective one”….
https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-co...ss-Release.pdf
…”The Government has no strategy on China, let alone an effective one”….
Thread Starter
yeah but they're opening an engine factory in the UK - we don't want to drive them away do we?
Renault and Geely are forming a joint venture company to develop and manufacture new hybrid engines, and it is to have its headquarters in the UK.
Existing Renault and Geely factories in about a dozen countries will be the manufacturing element controlled from the UK headquarters.
Thread Starter
the question now is how will the Govt pay fro the increase in salaries across the Public Sector
I see "budget Savings" are the plan
We all know what that means.....................................................
I see "budget Savings" are the plan
We all know what that means.....................................................
The PM mentioned a freeze in recruitment of MOD civil servants as a starter. Although the headline 5% looks like the armed forces are bottom of the heap, with the consolidated £1,000 it's 7% at £50K and a shade under 8.4% at £30k. A 5% rise in MOD personnel costs based on 2021/22 would be £670 million.
£13.4 billion Service and civilian personnel costs in 2021/22.
This is nominally unchanged from the previous year and represents 29% of defence expenditure, down from 32% in 2020/21.
Source - MOD Departmental Resources: 2022 (ONS)
This is nominally unchanged from the previous year and represents 29% of defence expenditure, down from 32% in 2020/21.
Source - MOD Departmental Resources: 2022 (ONS)
Last edited by SLXOwft; 14th Jul 2023 at 10:42.
I recall the recruitment and promotion freeze of 1990. Nobody worried about civil service posts not being filled, so there was no big headline. But the small print was, if you can't recruit, projects are frozen or at best delayed. It's intended as a huge stealth cut to the defence budget.
In late 1994 I was handed a job, OR saying it was highest priority support helicopter requirement. It had been endorsed in January 1990. There was one file, with nearly 60 monthly reports, each reporting one month slippage due to lack of manpower. It needed re-endorsement, as in the interim the cost had gone up by the DTI Index - around 10% per year. Saving that half civil service post cost MoD about £20M.
Monthly reporting ceased, to conceal progress. It was placed under contract within 48 hours, and re-endorsed in July that year. In January 1997 the first 5 production sets were delivered. In February 1997, the Chief of Defence Procurement was asked to approve it entering development. (Think about that). I can tell you one post that didn't need filling.
In late 1994 I was handed a job, OR saying it was highest priority support helicopter requirement. It had been endorsed in January 1990. There was one file, with nearly 60 monthly reports, each reporting one month slippage due to lack of manpower. It needed re-endorsement, as in the interim the cost had gone up by the DTI Index - around 10% per year. Saving that half civil service post cost MoD about £20M.
Monthly reporting ceased, to conceal progress. It was placed under contract within 48 hours, and re-endorsed in July that year. In January 1997 the first 5 production sets were delivered. In February 1997, the Chief of Defence Procurement was asked to approve it entering development. (Think about that). I can tell you one post that didn't need filling.
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Hopefully one will have detected the sarcasm in my earlier post.
One of the single biggest delays in MoD procurement projects is because there aren't enough suitably experienced CS to hold up the MoDs side of contractual bargains - in particular the ability to supply GFX, which can range from providing assets to allow a contractor to provide a service (think Hawk T2 for MFTS) to something as simple as taking a decision in the timescale required. That's down to a combination of over-elaborate process because the experiential base has decayed and the commercial teams see dragons everywhere, coupled with a real shortage of staff. The number of gapped roles in some projects is eye-watering.
A recruitment freeze will please the Daily Fail, but exacerbate issues elsewhere. I wonder if they're going to go for the bonus ball and run a VR programme...........
One of the single biggest delays in MoD procurement projects is because there aren't enough suitably experienced CS to hold up the MoDs side of contractual bargains - in particular the ability to supply GFX, which can range from providing assets to allow a contractor to provide a service (think Hawk T2 for MFTS) to something as simple as taking a decision in the timescale required. That's down to a combination of over-elaborate process because the experiential base has decayed and the commercial teams see dragons everywhere, coupled with a real shortage of staff. The number of gapped roles in some projects is eye-watering.
A recruitment freeze will please the Daily Fail, but exacerbate issues elsewhere. I wonder if they're going to go for the bonus ball and run a VR programme...........
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Perhaps the most infamous GFX failure was MoD's inability to provide (x) airworthy Nimrod MR2s for the MRA4 programme. The day that was known, in 1995 at latest, was the day 'Replacement MPA' should have been taken literally. One could write a book....
Thread Starter
The Times this morning says they're looking at cutting Inheritance tax - that's another £ 7Bn that will have to be found somewhere
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
https://news.sky.com/story/uks-abili...-warn-12921630
UK's ability to arm itself 'is broken' amid increasing security threats, MPs warn
The Ministry of Defence must admit its ability to arm the military is broken and urgently needs fixing at a time of growing security threats, a group of MPs has warned.…
"In short, it is broke - and it's time to fix it," a sub-committee of parliament's defence select committee said in a report published on Sunday following a six-month inquiry into defence procurement.
The MPs said they had "discovered a UK procurement system which is highly bureaucratic, overly stratified, far too ponderous, with an inconsistent approach to safety, very poor accountability and a culture which appears institutionally averse to individual responsibility"….
"The Ministry of Defence must finally admit, once and for all, that there is a real problem across UK defence procurement: the current system is indeed broken and multiple, successive reviews have not yet fixed it. With a major war now under way in Ukraine, now is the time to act," the MPs said.
Their report made 22 recommendations to fix the problem, including the need for the MoD to adopt a sense of urgency that has in the past enabled speedy, successful procurements in a crisis to become the norm.
It said the MoD needed a system that "places a much greater value on time, promotes a sense of urgency rather than institutional lethargy, and prevents endless 'requirements creep' by our own military".
The Ministry of Defence denied the allegations.….
https://publications.parliament.uk/p...9/summary.html
https://committees.parliament.uk/pub...99247/default/
UK's ability to arm itself 'is broken' amid increasing security threats, MPs warn
The Ministry of Defence must admit its ability to arm the military is broken and urgently needs fixing at a time of growing security threats, a group of MPs has warned.…
"In short, it is broke - and it's time to fix it," a sub-committee of parliament's defence select committee said in a report published on Sunday following a six-month inquiry into defence procurement.
The MPs said they had "discovered a UK procurement system which is highly bureaucratic, overly stratified, far too ponderous, with an inconsistent approach to safety, very poor accountability and a culture which appears institutionally averse to individual responsibility"….
"The Ministry of Defence must finally admit, once and for all, that there is a real problem across UK defence procurement: the current system is indeed broken and multiple, successive reviews have not yet fixed it. With a major war now under way in Ukraine, now is the time to act," the MPs said.
Their report made 22 recommendations to fix the problem, including the need for the MoD to adopt a sense of urgency that has in the past enabled speedy, successful procurements in a crisis to become the norm.
It said the MoD needed a system that "places a much greater value on time, promotes a sense of urgency rather than institutional lethargy, and prevents endless 'requirements creep' by our own military".
The Ministry of Defence denied the allegations.….
https://publications.parliament.uk/p...9/summary.html
https://committees.parliament.uk/pub...99247/default/
The Times this morning says they're looking at cutting Inheritance tax - that's another £ 7Bn that will have to be found somewhere
b. they're not going to get in
https://news.sky.com/story/uks-abili...-warn-12921630
Their report made 22 recommendations to fix the problem,
Their report made 22 recommendations to fix the problem,
Once again the Committee avoids the elephants in the room, because it's too embarrassing.
1. Instead of fixating on unsuccessful programmes, also ask why more complex ones are delivered to time, cost and performance, with effortless competence.
2. Most of the recommendations are, or have been, mandated policy. Why were they not implemented? One of the key witnesses oversaw this for some years. I wonder if he gets paid for continually being asked to mark his own homework?
Frankly, Nice but Tobias and the Tubster had already decided what they were going to write before they had held any of their comedy evidence sessions.
Ajax is indefensible, but it isn't the norm. These are the same people who would have canned Wedgetail in favour of some non-existent Euro solution because they don't like Boeing.
Ajax is indefensible, but it isn't the norm. These are the same people who would have canned Wedgetail in favour of some non-existent Euro solution because they don't like Boeing.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
War in Europe & we can't afford 44 Helicopters
UK reducing New Medium Helicopter buy to 25-35 aircraft: Airbus exec
UK reducing New Medium Helicopter buy to 25-35 aircraft: Airbus exec
Thread Starter
NOTE a MAX of 35 units...........
RIAT 2023 — The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has decided to slash the number of aircraft set to be acquired under the £1 billion ($1.3 billion) New Medium Helicopter (NMH) program to a maximum of 35 units, an industry official told Breaking Defense today.
An upper limit of 44 aircraft had originally been set in November 2021, but funding issues have led to a much lower target.
“They’ve [MoD] said between 25 to 35 [aircraft], see what you can do in industry,” Lenny Brown, managing director of Airbus Helicopters UK, said in an interview at the Royal International Air Tattoo. “It’s a kind of best effort with the funding available. The acquisition calls for the replacement of Puma helicopters and a number of smaller rotary fleets, including Bell 212, Bell 412 and AS365 Dauphins, but delays have led to an Invitation to Negotiate (ITN) phase, initially scheduled for Q1 2023, being pushed to later this year.
The new phase, which will define full requirements and costs, will only happen “at the earliest” in September this year, added Brown.
The UK has also still to confirm when a production contract award will happen or an NMH entry to service date.
RIAT 2023 — The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has decided to slash the number of aircraft set to be acquired under the £1 billion ($1.3 billion) New Medium Helicopter (NMH) program to a maximum of 35 units, an industry official told Breaking Defense today.
An upper limit of 44 aircraft had originally been set in November 2021, but funding issues have led to a much lower target.
“They’ve [MoD] said between 25 to 35 [aircraft], see what you can do in industry,” Lenny Brown, managing director of Airbus Helicopters UK, said in an interview at the Royal International Air Tattoo. “It’s a kind of best effort with the funding available. The acquisition calls for the replacement of Puma helicopters and a number of smaller rotary fleets, including Bell 212, Bell 412 and AS365 Dauphins, but delays have led to an Invitation to Negotiate (ITN) phase, initially scheduled for Q1 2023, being pushed to later this year.
The new phase, which will define full requirements and costs, will only happen “at the earliest” in September this year, added Brown.
The UK has also still to confirm when a production contract award will happen or an NMH entry to service date.
War in Europe & we can't afford 44 Helicopters
UK reducing New Medium Helicopter buy to 25-35 aircraft: Airbus exec
UK reducing New Medium Helicopter buy to 25-35 aircraft: Airbus exec
https://committees.parliament.uk/pub...99247/default/
Have just read the HCDC report. Possibly best summarised as "they're messing with forces they don't understand"......
Their case studies are largely whinge-based. At no stage do they actually try and understand why (for example) T26 and Wedgetail were delayed / curtailed.
There's lots of witter about requirementeering and volume of requirements, as if this is just something people make up to pass the time - or to be exquisite. At no point in the report could I find a reference to either safety or DLODS, both of which tend to add all sorts of requirements, without which you end up with bad things happening and subsequent inquiries blaming "someone who cut corners" or similar. Nor do they tend to differentiate between the operational User Requirement generated by the FLC/TLB which ought to state something like "kill this type of target at that range with a Pk of >90%, preferably while looking ally" or similar and the detailed system requirements that determine the actual configuration of the equipment and its DLOD elements. Last time I looked DE&S most definitely had responsibility for those requirements - usually with a dedicated RM (often from the relevant service) embedded in the DE&S team at ABW.
Not that I disagree with some of the recommendations - but they are largely statements of the bleeding obvious, rather than arising naturally from "the evidence" they claim to have taken.
Have just read the HCDC report. Possibly best summarised as "they're messing with forces they don't understand"......
Their case studies are largely whinge-based. At no stage do they actually try and understand why (for example) T26 and Wedgetail were delayed / curtailed.
There's lots of witter about requirementeering and volume of requirements, as if this is just something people make up to pass the time - or to be exquisite. At no point in the report could I find a reference to either safety or DLODS, both of which tend to add all sorts of requirements, without which you end up with bad things happening and subsequent inquiries blaming "someone who cut corners" or similar. Nor do they tend to differentiate between the operational User Requirement generated by the FLC/TLB which ought to state something like "kill this type of target at that range with a Pk of >90%, preferably while looking ally" or similar and the detailed system requirements that determine the actual configuration of the equipment and its DLOD elements. Last time I looked DE&S most definitely had responsibility for those requirements - usually with a dedicated RM (often from the relevant service) embedded in the DE&S team at ABW.
Not that I disagree with some of the recommendations - but they are largely statements of the bleeding obvious, rather than arising naturally from "the evidence" they claim to have taken.
Thread Starter
"It is a fascinating and repeated theme in the Civil Service that when faced with an emergency they are sometimes able to devise mechanisms for addressing the crisis. However, rather than develop these as advances to change the system and to spread best practice the tendency is to revert to the previous failed practice. However that is not just a matter for the Ministry of Defence but the wider public sector."