Shoreham Airshow Crash Trial
It troubles me that some seem to find Andy Hill almost blameless, and looking back through some posts that is how it reads to me. Whatever the regulatory issues, however they were set and how the show was organised, neither the CAA nor the show organisers were at the controls of that Hunter that day and making the final decisions that led to it hitting the ground.
It troubles me that some seem to find Andy Hill almost blameless, and looking back through some posts that is how it reads to me. Whatever the regulatory issues, however they were set and how the show was organised, neither the CAA nor the show organisers were at the controls of that Hunter that day and making the final decisions that led to it hitting the ground.
The only reason there are fatalities is that people were allowed to congregate where the risk to their lives had already been recognised, and the decision taken not to implement the mitigations which would have prevented them being in harms way. That has nothing to do with AH, and everything to do with the organisers and the CAA
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The point is that whatever happened in the air, the facts demonstrate with complete clarity that AH was able to survive the crash.
The only reason there are fatalities is that people were allowed to congregate where the risk to their lives had already been recognised, and the decision taken not to implement the mitigations which would have prevented them being in harms way. That has nothing to do with AH, and everything to do with the organisers and the CAA
The only reason there are fatalities is that people were allowed to congregate where the risk to their lives had already been recognised, and the decision taken not to implement the mitigations which would have prevented them being in harms way. That has nothing to do with AH, and everything to do with the organisers and the CAA
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"That has nothing to do with AH, "
the dead didn't crash the aircraft
the dead didn't crash the aircraft
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The point is that whatever happened in the air, the facts demonstrate with complete clarity that AH was able to survive the crash.
The only reason there are fatalities is that people were allowed to congregate where the risk to their lives had already been recognised, and the decision taken not to implement the mitigations which would have prevented them being in harms way. That has nothing to do with AH, and everything to do with the organisers and the CAA
The only reason there are fatalities is that people were allowed to congregate where the risk to their lives had already been recognised, and the decision taken not to implement the mitigations which would have prevented them being in harms way. That has nothing to do with AH, and everything to do with the organisers and the CAA
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The AAIB report confirmed it was neither airworthy, serviceable, nor fit for purpose. The pilot was not told this.
Regardless of any airmanship shortfalls (which I cannot and do not comment on), no pilot should be given an aircraft in such an appalling state.
We await an explanation from the CAA as to why the airworthiness certification was based on the premise that the RAF (not MoD) was the Hunter Design Authority, and therefore responsible for the Safety Case and an Aircraft Document Set which the AAIB reported was decades out-of-date.
MoD later confirmed it was NOT the Aircraft Design Authority, further proving significant liability on the part of the CAA.
You never just look at the final act. It's moronic.
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I'm afraid your claim as to serviceability is wrong.
The AAIB report confirmed it was neither airworthy, serviceable, nor fit for purpose. The pilot was not told this.
Regardless of any airmanship shortfalls (which I cannot and do not comment on), no pilot should be given an aircraft in such an appalling state.
We await an explanation from the CAA as to why the airworthiness certification was based on the premise that the RAF (not MoD) was the Hunter Design Authority, and therefore responsible for the Safety Case and an Aircraft Document Set which the AAIB reported was decades out-of-date.
MoD later confirmed it was NOT the Aircraft Design Authority, further proving significant liability on the part of the CAA.
You never just look at the final act. It's moronic.
The AAIB report confirmed it was neither airworthy, serviceable, nor fit for purpose. The pilot was not told this.
Regardless of any airmanship shortfalls (which I cannot and do not comment on), no pilot should be given an aircraft in such an appalling state.
We await an explanation from the CAA as to why the airworthiness certification was based on the premise that the RAF (not MoD) was the Hunter Design Authority, and therefore responsible for the Safety Case and an Aircraft Document Set which the AAIB reported was decades out-of-date.
MoD later confirmed it was NOT the Aircraft Design Authority, further proving significant liability on the part of the CAA.
You never just look at the final act. It's moronic.
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As mere self-loading freight, I keep up with this sad thread from time to time.
If ever "an accident waiting to happen" has ever applied to any accident, this one is surely it.
Unserviceable aircraft. Non-current pilot. Inadequate supervision. No ground mitigations present.
And seemingly nobody to take the rap. Why am I not surprised?
If ever "an accident waiting to happen" has ever applied to any accident, this one is surely it.
Unserviceable aircraft. Non-current pilot. Inadequate supervision. No ground mitigations present.
And seemingly nobody to take the rap. Why am I not surprised?
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I'm afraid your claim as to serviceability is wrong.
The AAIB report confirmed it was neither airworthy, serviceable, nor fit for purpose. The pilot was not told this.
Regardless of any airmanship shortfalls (which I cannot and do not comment on), no pilot should be given an aircraft in such an appalling state.
We await an explanation from the CAA as to why the airworthiness certification was based on the premise that the RAF (not MoD) was the Hunter Design Authority, and therefore responsible for the Safety Case and an Aircraft Document Set which the AAIB reported was decades out-of-date.
MoD later confirmed it was NOT the Aircraft Design Authority, further proving significant liability on the part of the CAA.
You never just look at the final act. It's moronic.
The AAIB report confirmed it was neither airworthy, serviceable, nor fit for purpose. The pilot was not told this.
Regardless of any airmanship shortfalls (which I cannot and do not comment on), no pilot should be given an aircraft in such an appalling state.
We await an explanation from the CAA as to why the airworthiness certification was based on the premise that the RAF (not MoD) was the Hunter Design Authority, and therefore responsible for the Safety Case and an Aircraft Document Set which the AAIB reported was decades out-of-date.
MoD later confirmed it was NOT the Aircraft Design Authority, further proving significant liability on the part of the CAA.
You never just look at the final act. It's moronic.
put this unqualified pilot in charge of the aricraft, and
approved a display plan that put the public at risk
but none of these were in any way related to airworthiness of the poor old hunter, the opportunity of flying which was no doubt enthusiasticly grabbed by the pilot concerned.
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Idle B (and Diff)
It's not that I 'may very well be right', it's that I'm simply repeating the conclusions of he AAIB, which I agree with. And where they did not comment or explain, I'm relaying the meaning of the evidence they reproduced. (e.g. the incorrect certification). Unfortunately, the legal ruling meant there was little opportunity to discuss technical details, like the fuel pump being completely buggered.
Had the CAA got the facts right, then the aircraft would not have been flying. That's a root cause, in the same way the pilot's actions were. (In saying that I'm accepting the word of pilots here, coupled with his own admissions). Elsewhere, there were many Contributory and Aggravating factors. Each is part of an insidious chain, and the opportunity was there to break that chain long before the pilot climbed in.
I'd like to understand the CAA's thinking when predicating the Airworthiness Approval Note on the RAF being the Aircraft Design Authority. If they were, that would be the largest project team in MoD. Did they not even ask MoD? Does someone not go through the certification and double check the assumptions? And it's pretty clear MoD weren't told of this assumption, because when it was pointed out they very quickly refuted it. Given the duties of a Design Authority, the required output, and the pilot's complete dependency on it, there was simply no legal authority to fly that aeroplane. I came to realise long ago that pilots tend not to think of this, because it's taken as a given that the legal and technical audit trail resulting to them being given an aircraft to fly has been satisfied. After all, the grown ups in the CAA tell them it has.
I think you're probably right when saying the pilot grabbed an opportunity. I guess many would. But I'd like to hear his response if asked 'What would you have done if told the aircraft was manisfestly unairworthy and unserviceable?' If he said 'Fly it', then that would be a far greater sin than the error of airmanship he made. The obvious question is - Why wasn't he given that opportunity?
It's not that I 'may very well be right', it's that I'm simply repeating the conclusions of he AAIB, which I agree with. And where they did not comment or explain, I'm relaying the meaning of the evidence they reproduced. (e.g. the incorrect certification). Unfortunately, the legal ruling meant there was little opportunity to discuss technical details, like the fuel pump being completely buggered.
Had the CAA got the facts right, then the aircraft would not have been flying. That's a root cause, in the same way the pilot's actions were. (In saying that I'm accepting the word of pilots here, coupled with his own admissions). Elsewhere, there were many Contributory and Aggravating factors. Each is part of an insidious chain, and the opportunity was there to break that chain long before the pilot climbed in.
I'd like to understand the CAA's thinking when predicating the Airworthiness Approval Note on the RAF being the Aircraft Design Authority. If they were, that would be the largest project team in MoD. Did they not even ask MoD? Does someone not go through the certification and double check the assumptions? And it's pretty clear MoD weren't told of this assumption, because when it was pointed out they very quickly refuted it. Given the duties of a Design Authority, the required output, and the pilot's complete dependency on it, there was simply no legal authority to fly that aeroplane. I came to realise long ago that pilots tend not to think of this, because it's taken as a given that the legal and technical audit trail resulting to them being given an aircraft to fly has been satisfied. After all, the grown ups in the CAA tell them it has.
I think you're probably right when saying the pilot grabbed an opportunity. I guess many would. But I'd like to hear his response if asked 'What would you have done if told the aircraft was manisfestly unairworthy and unserviceable?' If he said 'Fly it', then that would be a far greater sin than the error of airmanship he made. The obvious question is - Why wasn't he given that opportunity?
Last edited by tucumseh; 19th Jan 2024 at 03:12.
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I'm also amazed at their response to move the flight line (slightly ) further away from the crowd line and call it job done.
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Idle B (and Diff)
It's not that I 'may very well be right', it's that I'm simply repeating the conclusions of he AAIB, which I agree with. And where they did not comment or explain, I'm relaying the meaning of the evidence they reproduced. (e.g. the incorrect certification). Unfortunately, the legal ruling meant there was little opportunity to discuss technical details, like the fuel pump being completely buggered.
Had the CAA got the facts right, then the aircraft would not have been flying. That's a root cause, in the same way the pilot's actions were. (In saying that I'm accepting the word of pilots here, coupled with his own admissions). Elsewhere, there were many Contributory and Aggravating factors. Each is part of an insidious chain, and the opportunity was there to break that chain long before the pilot climbed in.
I'd like to understand the CAA's thinking when predicating the Airworthiness Approval Note on the RAF being the Aircraft Design Authority. If they were, that would be the largest project team in MoD. Did they not even ask MoD? Does someone not go through the certification and double check the assumptions? And it's pretty clear MoD weren't told of this assumption, because when it was pointed out they very quickly refuted it. Given the duties of a Design Authority, the required output, and the pilot's complete dependency on it, there was simply no legal authority to fly that aeroplane. I came to realise long ago that pilots tend not to think of this, because it's taken as a given that the legal and technical audit trail resulting to them being given an aircraft to fly has been satisfied. After all, the grown ups in the CAA tell them it has.
I think you're probably right when saying the pilot grabbed an opportunity. I guess many would. But I'd like to hear his response if asked 'What would you have done if told the aircraft was manisfestly unairworthy and unserviceable?' If he said 'Fly it', then that would be a far greater sin than the error of airmanship he made. The obvious question is - Why wasn't he given that opportunity?
It's not that I 'may very well be right', it's that I'm simply repeating the conclusions of he AAIB, which I agree with. And where they did not comment or explain, I'm relaying the meaning of the evidence they reproduced. (e.g. the incorrect certification). Unfortunately, the legal ruling meant there was little opportunity to discuss technical details, like the fuel pump being completely buggered.
Had the CAA got the facts right, then the aircraft would not have been flying. That's a root cause, in the same way the pilot's actions were. (In saying that I'm accepting the word of pilots here, coupled with his own admissions). Elsewhere, there were many Contributory and Aggravating factors. Each is part of an insidious chain, and the opportunity was there to break that chain long before the pilot climbed in.
I'd like to understand the CAA's thinking when predicating the Airworthiness Approval Note on the RAF being the Aircraft Design Authority. If they were, that would be the largest project team in MoD. Did they not even ask MoD? Does someone not go through the certification and double check the assumptions? And it's pretty clear MoD weren't told of this assumption, because when it was pointed out they very quickly refuted it. Given the duties of a Design Authority, the required output, and the pilot's complete dependency on it, there was simply no legal authority to fly that aeroplane. I came to realise long ago that pilots tend not to think of this, because it's taken as a given that the legal and technical audit trail resulting to them being given an aircraft to fly has been satisfied. After all, the grown ups in the CAA tell them it has.
I think you're probably right when saying the pilot grabbed an opportunity. I guess many would. But I'd like to hear his response if asked 'What would you have done if told the aircraft was manisfestly unairworthy and unserviceable?' If he said 'Fly it', then that would be a far greater sin than the error of airmanship he made. The obvious question is - Why wasn't he given that opportunity?
?
Whaaat? Are we saying that flying an aircraft that is a former military aircraft, withdrawn from service half a century ago, which flies under a PTF, is not airworthy as there is a question as to who was the approving office for the Military COA that the aircraft had around the time that the Wright Bros had tired of trying to chase flight attendants with bicycles and decided that a natty cap and bars would serve better?
I presume you wish to terminate the BBMF at the same time? After all, they are not CS-LIGHT/Part 23, or CS-LARGE/Part 25 and therefore should not be gracing the skies and threatening the public with the potential for a cloudy with a chance of meatball event. The Hunter crashed as the apogee of the manoeuvre did not have sufficient blue space below it for the speed that the aircraft was at, and the g that it could sustain to keep the shiny bits all in one piece. If the UK wishes to vacate the skies with the aircraft that are used to show the heritage of the country, which is a show of respect to those that have dedicated to protecting the very turf that your comment appears to be objecting to having their demonstration continue, then, please make sure I get an invite to the auction, there is a whole bunch of these that I would like to find a home in a country that is not run by tossers.
IMHO. If you can show any evidence that the aircraft crashed as the CAA or the RAF were remiss in 0.03 grams of paperwork stuck to the side of the cockpit, then I may reconsider the position that has been presented. I have less than 1,000 hours flying ex military high performance aircraft and only 5000 in uniform flying some state aircraft that were basely able to keep up with the ones I owned. If we enter a vertical manoeuvre and have failed to verify our energy state at the top of the manoeuvre, then in the unlikely event that we are still around to comment thereafter, I doubt that I would be complaining that the AFM was in Russian, and was last updated when Robin Olds was pushing tin over the highlands of North VietNam. To blame the CAA for this as far as the aircraft documentation goes is embarrassing. Again, if you guys don't want them, there are a lot of guys in other countries that would be happy to take them. (I prefer T-birds, it tempers one from getting too close to the edge of sanity). [The other 22,000 hours is common or garden heavies, R&D and certification, so maybe my opinion is irrelevant]
The Manoeuvre done on this occasion was badly done, and the fact that the pilot suggests that the event that took the lives of many other people was a medical condition that impacted his competency is not a grand basis to then come back and say, "I'm better now, whatever that was is over, can I go and do some more please?" If that is assumed to be prudent by the CAA and courts of the land, then perhaps y'all should turn up somewhere else where the barking mad is becoming the norm.
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It is rather depressing that after all the airworthiness related fatal accident threads to be found in this forum, people can still refer to airworthiness (or more appropriately the lack of it) in flippant and truculent ways. Those threads account for over 100 avoidable deaths, the Mull of Kintyre crash of Chinook ZD576 costing 29 deaths alone. The RAF/MOD has still failed to explain why that accident happened, given that the infamous finding of Pilot Gross Negligence by the Inquiry Reviewing Officers was overturned by SoS for Defence Liam Fox. It seems that RAF leadership shares the same cavalier views exhibited by some posting here.
Tucumseh (and I, FWIW) have not claimed that the display pilot involved was not culpable in any way for this tragedy. What he has claimed is that the aircraft was unserviceable and unairworthy. The latter can and does kill. It is a serious matter that has not only cost needless deaths but has eaten away at our national defence capability. That one lone ex-military aircraft flying on a PTF happened also to also be unairworthy would scarcely have merited comment were it not for the tragic accident it was involved in. fdr mentions the a/c of the BBMF. Like all aircraft, they should have a complete sequential library (a lot more than 0.03 grams!!!) of fully audited paperwork to confirm that they are airworthy. No point asking tucumseh about that, try the MAA (and good luck!).
This thread seems to have moved on somewhat from the OP. That is perhaps no bad thing. Instead of so much emotional and angry outcry, perhaps it is time to step back and see the wood for the trees. Whatever Hill's part in this accident, his aircraft was unairworthy and should not have been flying. How many other such aircraft are also unairworthy? No matter where the CAA places its flight line, if an aircraft is unairworthy it remains so in transit to a display, during a display, and from a display, and in an overcrowded island at that. It should be doing none of those things and remain on terra firma. That the CAA assumes ex RAF aircraft to be airworthy simply because they are ex RAF is risible. Better they be assumed to be unairworthy unless proved otherwise!
Tucumseh (and I, FWIW) have not claimed that the display pilot involved was not culpable in any way for this tragedy. What he has claimed is that the aircraft was unserviceable and unairworthy. The latter can and does kill. It is a serious matter that has not only cost needless deaths but has eaten away at our national defence capability. That one lone ex-military aircraft flying on a PTF happened also to also be unairworthy would scarcely have merited comment were it not for the tragic accident it was involved in. fdr mentions the a/c of the BBMF. Like all aircraft, they should have a complete sequential library (a lot more than 0.03 grams!!!) of fully audited paperwork to confirm that they are airworthy. No point asking tucumseh about that, try the MAA (and good luck!).
This thread seems to have moved on somewhat from the OP. That is perhaps no bad thing. Instead of so much emotional and angry outcry, perhaps it is time to step back and see the wood for the trees. Whatever Hill's part in this accident, his aircraft was unairworthy and should not have been flying. How many other such aircraft are also unairworthy? No matter where the CAA places its flight line, if an aircraft is unairworthy it remains so in transit to a display, during a display, and from a display, and in an overcrowded island at that. It should be doing none of those things and remain on terra firma. That the CAA assumes ex RAF aircraft to be airworthy simply because they are ex RAF is risible. Better they be assumed to be unairworthy unless proved otherwise!
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?
Whaaat? Are we saying that flying an aircraft that is a former military aircraft, withdrawn from service half a century ago, which flies under a PTF, is not airworthy as there is a question as to who was the approving office for the Military COA that the aircraft had around the time that the Wright Bros had tired of trying to chase flight attendants with bicycles and decided that a natty cap and bars would serve better?
Whaaat? Are we saying that flying an aircraft that is a former military aircraft, withdrawn from service half a century ago, which flies under a PTF, is not airworthy as there is a question as to who was the approving office for the Military COA that the aircraft had around the time that the Wright Bros had tired of trying to chase flight attendants with bicycles and decided that a natty cap and bars would serve better?
Read the AAIB report, Appendix L, Airworthiness Approval Note No:26172, Issue 2, paragraph 3.
'Approval basis. ... The Design Authority now rests with the RAF, and support is supplied, if requested, by British Aerospace, Farnborough'.
Plainly. 'if requested' applies to the RAF, as no-one else is mentioned, and it is they (the RAF, not MoD) who the CAA assume have British Aerospace under significant contract.
This was signed on 3 July 2008. It refers to that date, forward. Not decades ago. The premise is completely wrong, and always has been. MoD was asked to comment, and agreed.
Now go and read what an Aircraft Design Authority does, and delivers. Their output is a prerequisite to declaring airworthiness, which is a prerequisite to declaring serviceability. The reason why most pilots don't see what an ADA does is because these prerequisites should be done and dusted before you see the aircraft, and for the most part invisible to you. The tiny bit that is visible may indeed be 0.3 grams of paperwork. But the true ADA will have hundreds of people working on the task, at huge cost. The AAIB report is chock full of shortcuts being taken because the ADA output was simply not there.
The AAIB report identifies the issue of the cartridges life as an airworthiness matter and it is however the timex status of the seat had no bearing on the accident. The state of supply of cartridges is a problem for this case, not that they don't exist, they are not available for purchase in general, and that constraint conflicts with the CAP requirement as stated. CAR 632 in the AAIB report is stated to indicate that swept wing aircraft must have their ejection seat serviceable:
"CAP 632 requires the pilot escape systems of swept-wing jet aircraft, such as the Hawker Hunter, to be ‘fully serviceable’. The use of time- expired ejection seat cartridges meant that the ejection seats fitted to G-BXFI did not meet this requirement." [section 3, p201 or the AAIB report] That is not what is stated in the CAP 632, at least at rev 8.
yet:
"If an aircraft is fitted with ejection seats that are an integral part of the aircrew escape system, these should be fully serviceable for all flights. New operators must seek approval from the CAA GAU at the earliest opportunity if it is intended to operate with inert ejection seats or other escape systems, prior to inclusion in their OCM". CAP 632 rev 8, §5.7, p25,
Whether this is post the event is unknown. There are PTF aircraft that it would be unwise to operate without a live seat, there are others that are tolerable risks to the occupants depending on the environment. Having operated both inert and live, there are merits to both cases, however, what they don't do is make the aircraft unsafe to operate, and the opportunity to inert the seats existed within the rules. I would be more concerned with the conduct of aerobatic operations without an operable G-meter, that is not a good look at all, particularly in the light of a botched vertical manoeuvre. The other noted non compliances are of a lesser form than the dropping of a plug from a Boeing, cowls opening up on engines in flight, and the rest of the saga of aircraft production we have grown accustomed to. In the report, there is enough to dwell on related to the processes of maintenance but nothing that was germaine to the failure to achieve entry speed, gate height, or energy over the top. A surprise admission was that the pilot was not trained in the escape manoeuver for missing the gate conditions.
The event was a horrific tragedy, however, IMHO, airworthiness and the PTF did not directly result in the accident.
In respect to Appendix L, what is stated is an issuance of a NPTF, duly signed on 6 July 2006, for the CAA. If there is some confusion on the background, that is a matter for internal review within the CAA or delegate system to correct, however there is a required signature on the document, and that would suggest that the aircraft was legally issued a PTF. The defect in the PTF does not itself invalidate the PTF. Consider the Max8 debacle, the plane was compliant with the TC as approved by the state of manufacture. The latent defect that existed was not known, and at the time of departure the aircraft was operated IAW the TC and associated requirements. After discovery, the issue of the AOM did not alter the airworthiness of the aircraft, that arose belatedly with the issue of an EAD.
The PTF, pyros didn't cause the accident. Running out of altitude did.
"CAP 632 requires the pilot escape systems of swept-wing jet aircraft, such as the Hawker Hunter, to be ‘fully serviceable’. The use of time- expired ejection seat cartridges meant that the ejection seats fitted to G-BXFI did not meet this requirement." [section 3, p201 or the AAIB report] That is not what is stated in the CAP 632, at least at rev 8.
yet:
"If an aircraft is fitted with ejection seats that are an integral part of the aircrew escape system, these should be fully serviceable for all flights. New operators must seek approval from the CAA GAU at the earliest opportunity if it is intended to operate with inert ejection seats or other escape systems, prior to inclusion in their OCM". CAP 632 rev 8, §5.7, p25,
Whether this is post the event is unknown. There are PTF aircraft that it would be unwise to operate without a live seat, there are others that are tolerable risks to the occupants depending on the environment. Having operated both inert and live, there are merits to both cases, however, what they don't do is make the aircraft unsafe to operate, and the opportunity to inert the seats existed within the rules. I would be more concerned with the conduct of aerobatic operations without an operable G-meter, that is not a good look at all, particularly in the light of a botched vertical manoeuvre. The other noted non compliances are of a lesser form than the dropping of a plug from a Boeing, cowls opening up on engines in flight, and the rest of the saga of aircraft production we have grown accustomed to. In the report, there is enough to dwell on related to the processes of maintenance but nothing that was germaine to the failure to achieve entry speed, gate height, or energy over the top. A surprise admission was that the pilot was not trained in the escape manoeuver for missing the gate conditions.
The event was a horrific tragedy, however, IMHO, airworthiness and the PTF did not directly result in the accident.
In respect to Appendix L, what is stated is an issuance of a NPTF, duly signed on 6 July 2006, for the CAA. If there is some confusion on the background, that is a matter for internal review within the CAA or delegate system to correct, however there is a required signature on the document, and that would suggest that the aircraft was legally issued a PTF. The defect in the PTF does not itself invalidate the PTF. Consider the Max8 debacle, the plane was compliant with the TC as approved by the state of manufacture. The latent defect that existed was not known, and at the time of departure the aircraft was operated IAW the TC and associated requirements. After discovery, the issue of the AOM did not alter the airworthiness of the aircraft, that arose belatedly with the issue of an EAD.
The PTF, pyros didn't cause the accident. Running out of altitude did.
Last edited by fdr; 19th Jan 2024 at 10:22.
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fdr
It would have been nice of you to acknowledge what the Approval Note does indeed say what I said it did. You might even speculate as to why the CAA didn't bother checking with MoD/RAF. Notably, at the same time (2008) the main evidence to the Nimrod Review had been submitted, demonstrating that the RAF/MoD had slashed the funding for such contracts by ~28% in the 3 years 1991-94, and it had never recovered. Waste of money apparently.
As to your new issue, at 1.18.15.2 the AAIB note that Martin-Baker withdrew all support for legacy seats in February 2015, six months before the accident. Their reason was that the design data had become obsolete, and what had been perfectly good documentation was now inadequate due to lack of training in how to apply it. (MoD denied this, saying lack of training is irrelevant). The AAIB reported that, like any good Design Authority, M-B took steps to assist an alternative source of support. What is lacking is an explanation as to how that evolved into someone being authorised to service the seats in his garden shed. Who was the Design Authority or Design Custodian for the seats at the time of the accident? As stated before, 'going there' would be highly inconvenient to the HSE and MoD, because the AAIB cited the information HSE and MoD had claimed M-B didn't provide in the Sean Cunningham case. And it raised the issue of whether the seats in Hawk T.1 were 'legacy' in this sense, because MoD chooses not to use the Design Authority approved ALARP build standard. Such a can of worms.
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It would have been nice of you to acknowledge what the Approval Note does indeed say what I said it did. You might even speculate as to why the CAA didn't bother checking with MoD/RAF. Notably, at the same time (2008) the main evidence to the Nimrod Review had been submitted, demonstrating that the RAF/MoD had slashed the funding for such contracts by ~28% in the 3 years 1991-94, and it had never recovered. Waste of money apparently.
As to your new issue, at 1.18.15.2 the AAIB note that Martin-Baker withdrew all support for legacy seats in February 2015, six months before the accident. Their reason was that the design data had become obsolete, and what had been perfectly good documentation was now inadequate due to lack of training in how to apply it. (MoD denied this, saying lack of training is irrelevant). The AAIB reported that, like any good Design Authority, M-B took steps to assist an alternative source of support. What is lacking is an explanation as to how that evolved into someone being authorised to service the seats in his garden shed. Who was the Design Authority or Design Custodian for the seats at the time of the accident? As stated before, 'going there' would be highly inconvenient to the HSE and MoD, because the AAIB cited the information HSE and MoD had claimed M-B didn't provide in the Sean Cunningham case. And it raised the issue of whether the seats in Hawk T.1 were 'legacy' in this sense, because MoD chooses not to use the Design Authority approved ALARP build standard. Such a can of worms.
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As an aside, given the danger these seats pose in the event of an accident where they haven't been fired, for whatever reason, and indeed the risk of accidental activation on the ground (as demonstrated tragically by the Red Arrows accident) should they even be allowed in vintage aircraft in civilian hands? After all the Red Arrows seat accident happened to very current professionals with ever resource at their disposal.
As an aside, given the danger these seats pose in the event of an accident where they haven't been fired, for whatever reason, and indeed the risk of accidental activation on the ground (as demonstrated tragically by the Red Arrows accident) should they even be allowed in vintage aircraft in civilian hands? After all the Red Arrows seat accident happened to very current professionals with ever resource at their disposal.
Seems to me that rather than wanting safety to be managed properly, some are advocating that it’s okay to somehow retrospectively waive parts of the process after an accident. Surely the general principle of not compromising on safety applies, and also taking equally seriously safety failures that the investigation identifies, even if not directly related to the immediate cause?The pilot was given a non-airworthy aircraft. If he hadn’t been, the accident wouldn’t have happened.
Sorry, unfamiliar with today’s terms. “Airworthiness certification” can’t be issued until the regulator is satisfied the aircraft can be put to safe use, which requires aircrew and groundcrew training. So training is a consideration in certification. If Mr Hill wasn’t properly trained, then the certification and safety cases were no longer sound. Looks like the CAA issue a lot of regulations, but don’t make sure they’re implemented. That rings a bell!!
Sorry, unfamiliar with today’s terms. “Airworthiness certification” can’t be issued until the regulator is satisfied the aircraft can be put to safe use, which requires aircrew and groundcrew training. So training is a consideration in certification. If Mr Hill wasn’t properly trained, then the certification and safety cases were no longer sound. Looks like the CAA issue a lot of regulations, but don’t make sure they’re implemented. That rings a bell!!
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