Shoreham Airshow Crash Trial
The significance of the traffic lights is that the risk of a displaying aircraft crashing there had been identified before the show. The safety case upon which the decision to go ahead with the show was based called for the lights to be set to Green so there would not be the usual line of stationary cars waiting for them to change during displays.
The lights were not set to Green, nor as I understand it was this even requested of the council. As had been identified as a risk, an aircraft crashed into a line of cars waiting for the lights to change, with the tragic and significant loss of life which has kept this incident in the spotlight for so much longer than the Gnat incident.
The failure by the organisers to implement the safety case did not cause the aircraft to crash, but it was a major contributor to the magnitude of the consequences.
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I hear you, but the post office inquiry is still a work in progress. I am inclined to wait for it rather than hand complete sovereignty in the matter over to the ITV drama department. They are due credit for finally propelling the scandal into the full public consciousness ( with some help from the fact this is an election year!) but I suspect what will emerge will be much more nuanced. Listening to some of the evidence from hands on Fujitsu programmers during the week gave some hint of that. Not seeking to promote thread drift, just a word in defence of our Courts. They are not easily or often duped.
f900:-
Well they were duped enough to convict many of the PO scandal victims, and seemingly on perjured evidence. I wouldn't necessarily consider it thread drift either. Much of the evidence given to Coroners Courts, FAIs, Select Committees of both HoP, QCs, etc by MOD witnesses over the years have been somewhat selective with the truth/downright lies. Just as RAF VSOs have been protected by an Establishment cover up, not only by other RAF VSOs but; HSE, Asst Police Constables, even QC Reviews, one rather wonders if senior PO and FujitsuUK personnel will garner the same protection, rather than their subordinates. A lot in common so far with the RAF and PO scandals, it's the PBI that tends to cop it!
Not seeking to promote thread drift, just a word in defence of our Courts. They are not easily or often duped.
I hear you, but the post office inquiry is still a work in progress. I am inclined to wait for it rather than hand complete sovereignty in the matter over to the ITV drama department. They are due credit for finally propelling the scandal into the full public consciousness ( with some help from the fact this is an election year!) but I suspect what will emerge will be much more nuanced. Listening to some of the evidence from hands on Fujitsu programmers during the week gave some hint of that. Not seeking to promote thread drift, just a word in defence of our Courts. They are not easily or often duped.
- Mr Justice Fraser's 'Horizon Issues' judgement from the civil case in 2019
- His letter referring two of the expert witnesses from earlier prosecutions to the Director of Public Prosecutions
- The 'Clarke Advice' of 2013, disclosed in the Court of Appeal in late 2020
- The Court of Appeal judgement of 2021 quashing the first batch of convictions
All available through an easy Google search. The facts as collectively set out there are already damning enough for the reputation of the legal profession and expert witnesses, and the ongoing inquiry is making things worse, not better, in that regard. Accordingly I won't be joining you in sitting on the fence.
Edit: in the final paragraph I've muddled up the criminal trial with the High Court hearing at which the Coroner sought disclosure of cockpit video, to which a paediatric oncologist friend of AH's submitted a paper about cognitive impairment which was rightly given short shrift by the court. The criminal trial had genuine expert witnesses whose evidence helped to create reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds. Oddly enough nothing more has been heard of CI since.
Last edited by Easy Street; 27th Jan 2024 at 19:22.
The significance of the traffic lights is that the risk of a displaying aircraft crashing there had been identified before the show. The safety case upon which the decision to go ahead with the show was based called for the lights to be set to Green so there would not be the usual line of stationary cars waiting for them to change during displays
I took a very good look at the AAIB report before responding to your previous post on this topic here:
Shoreham Airshow Crash Trial
... so I would be very interested in finding out where this aspect of the safety case for the show was discussed *before* the accident.
The point is that there are others whose actions deserve scrutiny. I am most definitely not in the camp of those who may be seeking to exonerate him, but it would be fair to say that his actions have already been subject to a fair degree of scrutiny, including in a court of law.
The significance of the traffic lights is that the risk of a displaying aircraft crashing there had been identified before the show. The safety case upon which the decision to go ahead with the show was based called for the lights to be set to Green so there would not be the usual line of stationary cars waiting for them to change during displays.
The lights were not set to Green, nor as I understand it was this even requested of the council. As had been identified as a risk, an aircraft crashed into a line of cars waiting for the lights to change, with the tragic and significant loss of life which has kept this incident in the spotlight for so much longer than the Gnat incident.
The failure by the organisers to implement the safety case did not cause the aircraft to crash, but it was a major contributor to the magnitude of the consequences.
The significance of the traffic lights is that the risk of a displaying aircraft crashing there had been identified before the show. The safety case upon which the decision to go ahead with the show was based called for the lights to be set to Green so there would not be the usual line of stationary cars waiting for them to change during displays.
The lights were not set to Green, nor as I understand it was this even requested of the council. As had been identified as a risk, an aircraft crashed into a line of cars waiting for the lights to change, with the tragic and significant loss of life which has kept this incident in the spotlight for so much longer than the Gnat incident.
The failure by the organisers to implement the safety case did not cause the aircraft to crash, but it was a major contributor to the magnitude of the consequences.
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Your really are talking horse manure. Bloke was pole bending a control column on the edge of a stall. the video evidence was clean from the first day. If he had done that in a car, he would be in prison and no jury would have believed the rubbish from his defence Lawyer. It was the fault of the prosecution lawyers not to say that if he had "Blacked out" that the flight path of the aeroplane would have been like Jon Eggins Hawk at BOU and the aircraft unloaded in ptich. Hill was pulling the stick all the time. If he had been in a car , the jury would have sent him down.
For many G-LOC cases, if the aircraft is at a high bank angle, the speed stability (AOA stability) will result in increasing loads as the spiral tightens. In this case, the wings were level, and the aircraft would pitch to achieve the in trim speed one way or the other, without intervention by the pilot. However, the pitch angle at initial ground contact suggests that there was someone pulling strenuously on the controls at that time, and that means the pilot would most likely have been conscious at that moment. The exact condition would be determinable by measurement of the stabiliser actuator if it remained anywhere near intact.
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Those who think Andy Hill is solely to blame haven't been paying attention to pprune over the past 20 years!
I believe the AAIB report was not allowed in evidence? Yet was discussed at length here and available to anyone who wanted a look. Maybe the jury thought there was too much unheard evidence to convict on beyond reasonable doubt? It's a high bar when there's a report listing the defects and that the thing shouldn't have been flying.
I believe the AAIB report was not allowed in evidence? Yet was discussed at length here and available to anyone who wanted a look. Maybe the jury thought there was too much unheard evidence to convict on beyond reasonable doubt? It's a high bar when there's a report listing the defects and that the thing shouldn't have been flying.
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Your really are talking horse manure. Bloke was pole bending a control column on the edge of a stall. the video evidence was clean from the first day. If he had done that in a car, he would be in prison and no jury would have believed the rubbish from his defence Lawyer. It was the fault of the prosecution lawyers not to say that if he had "Blacked out" that the flight path of the aeroplane would have been like Jon Eggins Hawk at BOU and the aircraft unloaded in ptich. Hill was pulling the stick all the time. If he had been in a car , the jury would have sent him down.
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The admission that the pilot had never trained the escape manoeuvre for the sequence he was flying pretty much sums up the risks that were being assumed. To do so would not have taken a great deal of flight time, and could have been accomplished at a height that would permit learning from errors. Seeing these aircraft fly does not need a show of exacting skills and daring. most of the crowd can't see the aircraft when it flies down close to the ground, and noise is not particular to much other than r^4. Conducting low level aeros with verticals benefits from a level of proficiency, however smoking holes exist in various locations from highly proficient operators who had bad days. Occasionally, level demonstrations go bad, but that is most often due to mechanical failure.
It's about 5 years since I strapped into a hot seat, (not an MB) and about 15 since last sitting in a MB seat, which was inert. In between, both live and inerted Russian seats of various voltages. MB has done what they think is a good idea, I personally disagree, but they are free to do what they do. There are aircraft that I would not taxi without a live seat, there are others that the seat is just a discomfort to the driver. In all of these cases, live or inert, the airworthiness was not affected, the operator had a choice as to what risk they were prepared to take for their occupants. As far as the CAP goes, unless thee is one that predates rev 8 that states otherwise, the UK CAA does not mandate the seat to be live, it is an election by the applicant for their conditions of the NPTF. There is no confusion in the CAA accepting one operator electing top paint their plane pink and another wanting their plain in plaid, nor is there with an election for a seat being inert or not. MB, while undertaking a CYA did nothing to further the interests of safety by denying support for what you refer to as old, and what the counter view is tried and tested. My greasy "old" wright cyclone may be old, but they are pretty well tested by time as well. Fortunately, there are parts of the world that permit the operator to determine the risk they are prepared to assume, where there is no increase in risk to the public. There are also a few other seats out there, once Vlad stops being uppity.
It's about 5 years since I strapped into a hot seat, (not an MB) and about 15 since last sitting in a MB seat, which was inert. In between, both live and inerted Russian seats of various voltages. MB has done what they think is a good idea, I personally disagree, but they are free to do what they do. There are aircraft that I would not taxi without a live seat, there are others that the seat is just a discomfort to the driver. In all of these cases, live or inert, the airworthiness was not affected, the operator had a choice as to what risk they were prepared to take for their occupants. As far as the CAP goes, unless thee is one that predates rev 8 that states otherwise, the UK CAA does not mandate the seat to be live, it is an election by the applicant for their conditions of the NPTF. There is no confusion in the CAA accepting one operator electing top paint their plane pink and another wanting their plain in plaid, nor is there with an election for a seat being inert or not. MB, while undertaking a CYA did nothing to further the interests of safety by denying support for what you refer to as old, and what the counter view is tried and tested. My greasy "old" wright cyclone may be old, but they are pretty well tested by time as well. Fortunately, there are parts of the world that permit the operator to determine the risk they are prepared to assume, where there is no increase in risk to the public. There are also a few other seats out there, once Vlad stops being uppity.
….and personally I think MB. DID act correctly in withdrawing support from privately operated vintage jets. They have a very fine reputation to maintain, 7,700 lives saved including mine, and recent events convince me, at least, its not good for them to be associated with poor maintenance and pilot skills.
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Ironically, if display pilots were assumed to be 95% likely to crash then I suspect we'd have seen more effective oversight of DA issue and renewal, display sequence design, min heights, venue topography and infrastructure management before 2015... question is, is it any better now? Or do they just handcuff anyone who looks a bit like AH?
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'privately' operated' vintage jets
"... in withdrawing support from privately operated vintage jets."
"... its not good for them to be associated with poor maintenance ... "
Perhaps Martin Baker would have been better advised if they had also withdrawn support for the Scissors Shackle seats in the Hawk when MoD refused to upgrade them to Gas Shackle - but allowed the upgrade for Tornado etc.
Look where that got MBA - A cheapskate decision by MoD plus poor management and maintenance plus lies to everyone etc. Despite adequate evidence of all those and more - the only folks who got blamed and caned for the death of Flt Lt Sean Cunningham when his seat didn't work properly (XX177 - 8th November 2011) were Martin Baker, who were evidentially squeaky clean.
Still wondering what pressure was put on MBA to plead guilty when they weren't.
LFH
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Not quite 'privately' operated vintage jets - but quite relevant to this discussion ...
Perhaps Martin Baker would have been better advised if they had also withdrawn support for the Scissors Shackle seats in the Hawk when MoD refused to upgrade them to Gas Shackle - but allowed the upgrade for Tornado etc.
Look where that got MBA - A cheapskate decision by MoD plus poor management and maintenance plus lies to everyone etc. Despite adequate evidence of all those and more - the only folks who got blamed and caned for the death of Flt Lt Sean Cunningham when his seat didn't work properly (XX177 - 8th November 2011) were Martin Baker, who were evidentially squeaky clean.
Still wondering what pressure was put on MBA to plead guilty when they weren't.
LFH
Perhaps Martin Baker would have been better advised if they had also withdrawn support for the Scissors Shackle seats in the Hawk when MoD refused to upgrade them to Gas Shackle - but allowed the upgrade for Tornado etc.
Look where that got MBA - A cheapskate decision by MoD plus poor management and maintenance plus lies to everyone etc. Despite adequate evidence of all those and more - the only folks who got blamed and caned for the death of Flt Lt Sean Cunningham when his seat didn't work properly (XX177 - 8th November 2011) were Martin Baker, who were evidentially squeaky clean.
Still wondering what pressure was put on MBA to plead guilty when they weren't.
LFH
As to withdrawal of support for private older seats, there were and are alternatives that could have been entertained that would continue to provide an escape mechanism for that group of operations, and the removal of support results in the removal of many of these types from display. It will be quieter where in spite of relief being available for the operator to assume their own risk, it becomes unacceptable to the operator.
of display aerobatics at low level, then he was inadequately prepared for such flights.
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Ongoing debate…
I’m still convinced he reverted to his more familiar gate ht and entry speed for the JP with which he was more familiar and practiced. He achieved exactly those parameters in the Hunter……..A moment of stress and automatic reversion to type.
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