fdr
It would have been nice of you to acknowledge what the Approval Note does indeed say what I said it did. You might even speculate as to why the CAA didn't bother checking with MoD/RAF. Notably, at the same time (2008) the main evidence to the Nimrod Review had been submitted, demonstrating that the RAF/MoD had slashed the funding for such contracts by ~28% in the 3 years 1991-94, and it had never recovered. Waste of money apparently.
As to your new issue, at 1.18.15.2 the AAIB note that Martin-Baker withdrew all support for legacy seats in February 2015, six months before the accident. Their reason was that the design data had become obsolete, and what had been perfectly good documentation was now inadequate due to lack of training in how to apply it. (MoD denied this, saying lack of training is irrelevant). The AAIB reported that, like any good Design Authority, M-B took steps to assist an alternative source of support. What is lacking is an explanation as to how that evolved into someone being authorised to service the seats in his garden shed. Who was the Design Authority or Design Custodian for the seats at the time of the accident? As stated before, 'going there' would be highly inconvenient to the HSE and MoD, because the AAIB cited the information HSE and MoD had claimed M-B didn't provide in the Sean Cunningham case. And it raised the issue of whether the seats in Hawk T.1 were 'legacy' in this sense, because MoD chooses not to use the Design Authority approved ALARP build standard. Such a can of worms.
.