Shoreham Airshow Crash Trial
Not sure I agree with this part. Yes, the pilot was given a non-airworthy aircraft. However, if he'd been given an airworthy aircraft the accident could still have happened.
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Last edited by Diff Tail Shim; 19th Jan 2024 at 19:21.
And let’s not forget that the safety case was predicated on there being no static traffic at the junction. The traffic lights were supposed to have been disabled. Without the traffic queue, the casualties would surely have been fewer.
And while advocating not forgetting material facts, let’s remember AH was found not guilty. Love it, hate it, our courts are generally very good.
And while advocating not forgetting material facts, let’s remember AH was found not guilty. Love it, hate it, our courts are generally very good.
And let’s not forget that the safety case was predicated on there being no static traffic at the junction. The traffic lights were supposed to have been disabled. Without the traffic queue, the casualties would surely have been fewer.
And while advocating not forgetting material facts, let’s remember AH was found not guilty. Love it, hate it, our courts are generally very good.
And while advocating not forgetting material facts, let’s remember AH was found not guilty. Love it, hate it, our courts are generally very good.
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fdr
It would have been nice of you to acknowledge what the Approval Note does indeed say what I said it did. You might even speculate as to why the CAA didn't bother checking with MoD/RAF. Notably, at the same time (2008) the main evidence to the Nimrod Review had been submitted, demonstrating that the RAF/MoD had slashed the funding for such contracts by ~28% in the 3 years 1991-94, and it had never recovered. Waste of money apparently.
As to your new issue, at 1.18.15.2 the AAIB note that Martin-Baker withdrew all support for legacy seats in February 2015, six months before the accident. Their reason was that the design data had become obsolete, and what had been perfectly good documentation was now inadequate due to lack of training in how to apply it. (MoD denied this, saying lack of training is irrelevant). The AAIB reported that, like any good Design Authority, M-B took steps to assist an alternative source of support. What is lacking is an explanation as to how that evolved into someone being authorised to service the seats in his garden shed. Who was the Design Authority or Design Custodian for the seats at the time of the accident? As stated before, 'going there' would be highly inconvenient to the HSE and MoD, because the AAIB cited the information HSE and MoD had claimed M-B didn't provide in the Sean Cunningham case. And it raised the issue of whether the seats in Hawk T.1 were 'legacy' in this sense, because MoD chooses not to use the Design Authority approved ALARP build standard. Such a can of worms. .
It would have been nice of you to acknowledge what the Approval Note does indeed say what I said it did. You might even speculate as to why the CAA didn't bother checking with MoD/RAF. Notably, at the same time (2008) the main evidence to the Nimrod Review had been submitted, demonstrating that the RAF/MoD had slashed the funding for such contracts by ~28% in the 3 years 1991-94, and it had never recovered. Waste of money apparently.
As to your new issue, at 1.18.15.2 the AAIB note that Martin-Baker withdrew all support for legacy seats in February 2015, six months before the accident. Their reason was that the design data had become obsolete, and what had been perfectly good documentation was now inadequate due to lack of training in how to apply it. (MoD denied this, saying lack of training is irrelevant). The AAIB reported that, like any good Design Authority, M-B took steps to assist an alternative source of support. What is lacking is an explanation as to how that evolved into someone being authorised to service the seats in his garden shed. Who was the Design Authority or Design Custodian for the seats at the time of the accident? As stated before, 'going there' would be highly inconvenient to the HSE and MoD, because the AAIB cited the information HSE and MoD had claimed M-B didn't provide in the Sean Cunningham case. And it raised the issue of whether the seats in Hawk T.1 were 'legacy' in this sense, because MoD chooses not to use the Design Authority approved ALARP build standard. Such a can of worms. .
Whether that is correctly actioned is a matter of process of the delegate of the CAA, it did not alter the airworthiness at the Time of issue.
As far as the MB seats go, you are giving a compelling basis to terminate all legacy fast jets from demonstration. Well done.
When those of us that have owned or operated ex mil aircraft do so, we are assuming risks inherent in their use. It doesn't matter if it is a Mustang, B-29, or Mosquito, to assume that they meet 2024 CS rules is asinine. The objective of a PTF is to manage risk to the public, there is no particular emphasis on the safety of the individual that is on board the aircraft. That is a risk that is accepted in taking aircraft that will have a 120-140 kt or greater approach speed and flying it without a hot seat. My most recent live seats have used FSR sourced pyros, and to have those live we actually had to get a production line restarted. Vlad's actions put that out of availability now. Without in date pyros, then the seats should be inerted. At that point, the choice is to fly with cold seats or not fly at all.
The seat state did not cause the accident. You are however insinuating a blame to the operator for what was a confusion in the process of the issuance of the PTF. The PTF did exist, had an inked signature on the document as far as the evidence that you presume I need to acknowledge states....exactly what???? It is Appendix L, it is signed, and whatever curiosity exists prior to signing that does not alter the fact that it exists. You refer on multiple occasions to facts that are not in evidence, perhaps you have the source documents for that, I do not know and really don't particularly care. The parties that may care are the CAA system that has oversight on the process of issuance of PTFs, and the review system within CAA.
The rest of the world will be quite happy taking some of the lower Vs aircraft that had seats in them that are precluded since 2022 in operating where they had MB seats, as the inerting of the seats, while increasing the risk to the crew only alters risk to the public by making the skies quiet in the absence of these exemplars of our history and service.
To the emergency services/RFF attending an accident scene where a live seat exists, there is risk, it is directly related to the seat. Where the pyros have timed, then the manner by which they are deactivated is normally by removal of the pyros. Should the seats have been inerted? As they were timex, and no approval existed to extend their life towards the shelf life, then yes, they should have been. Did that materially impact the casualties in this tragedy? No. The casualties were the direct consequence of an error in flightpath/energy management, and had nothing to do with the status of the seat, the curiosity in the PTF.
You are however acknowledged to be a component of the cadre that will remove flying examples of our aviation and military legacy from the air, so, well done, Sir! Kudos for removing the risk from the masses. However, as demonstrations (for reasons that are unfathomable) serve as a reminder of what those that served did in the past, whether a Hurricane, Ferret, or SLR, and are often a basis for some of those that serve thereafter as a point in time where their interest in service was piqued... then perhaps reinstating conscription would be also worthwhile.
While you are active in terminating ex-mil aircraft, perhaps you can turn your interest towards the more entertaining matters of RPT aircraft that kill more public for more inane reasons than stated in this case.
At this time, about the only supportable ejector seat is the FO-1, and that is only if Vlad stops his compensation for his stature.
Last edited by fdr; 19th Jan 2024 at 22:07.
Originally Posted by falcon900
And while advocating not forgetting material facts, let’s remember AH was found not guilty. Love it, hate it, our courts are generally very good.
Last edited by Easy Street; 19th Jan 2024 at 22:07.
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Appendix L includes a signed and authorised approval. What is your malfunction of note that is pertinent to the crash of this aircraft?
Whether that is correctly actioned is a matter of process of the delegate of the CAA, it did not alter the airworthiness at the Time of issue.
As far as the MB seats go, you are giving a compelling basis to terminate all legacy fast jets from demonstration. Well done.
When those of us that have owned or operated ex mil aircraft do so, we are assuming risks inherent in their use. It doesn't matter if it is a Mustang, B-29, or Mosquito, to assume that they meet 2024 CS rules is asinine. The objective of a PTF is to manage risk to the public, there is no particular emphasis on the safety of the individual that is on board the aircraft. That is a risk that is accepted in taking aircraft that will have a 120-140 kt or greater approach speed and flying it without a hot seat. My most recent live seats have used FSR sourced pyros, and to have those live we actually had to get a production line restarted. Vlad's actions put that out of availability now. Without in date pyros, then the seats should be inerted. At that point, the choice is to fly with cold seats or not fly at all.
The seat state did not cause the accident. You are however insinuating a blame to the operator for what was a confusion in the process of the issuance of the PTF. The PTF did exist, had an inked signature on the document as far as the evidence that you presume I need to acknowledge states....exactly what???? It is Appendix L, it is signed, and whatever curiosity exists prior to signing that does not alter the fact that it exists. You refer on multiple occasions to facts that are not in evidence, perhaps you have the source documents for that, I do not know and really don't particularly care. The parties that may care are the CAA system that has oversight on the process of issuance of PTFs, and the review system within CAA.
The rest of the world will be quite happy taking some of the lower Vs aircraft that had seats in them that are precluded since 2022 in operating where they had MB seats, as the inerting of the seats, while increasing the risk to the crew only alters risk to the public by making the skies quiet in the absence of these exemplars of our history and service.
To the emergency services/RFF attending an accident scene where a live seat exists, there is risk, it is directly related to the seat. Where the pyros have timed, then the manner by which they are deactivated is normally by removal of the pyros. Should the seats have been inerted? As they were timex, and no approval existed to extend their life towards the shelf life, then yes, they should have been. Did that materially impact the casualties in this tragedy? No. The casualties were the direct consequence of an error in flightpath/energy management, and had nothing to do with the status of the seat, the curiosity in the PTF.
You are however acknowledged to be a component of the cadre that will remove flying examples of our aviation and military legacy from the air, so, well done, Sir! Kudos for removing the risk from the masses. However, as demonstrations (for reasons that are unfathomable) serve as a reminder of what those that served did in the past, whether a Hurricane, Ferret, or SLR, and are often a basis for some of those that serve thereafter as a point in time where their interest in service was piqued... then perhaps reinstating conscription would be also worthwhile.
While you are active in terminating ex-mil aircraft, perhaps you can turn your interest towards the more entertaining matters of RPT aircraft that kill more public for more inane reasons than stated in this case.
At this time, about the only supportable ejector seat is the FO-1, and that is only if Vlad stops his compensation for his stature.
Whether that is correctly actioned is a matter of process of the delegate of the CAA, it did not alter the airworthiness at the Time of issue.
As far as the MB seats go, you are giving a compelling basis to terminate all legacy fast jets from demonstration. Well done.
When those of us that have owned or operated ex mil aircraft do so, we are assuming risks inherent in their use. It doesn't matter if it is a Mustang, B-29, or Mosquito, to assume that they meet 2024 CS rules is asinine. The objective of a PTF is to manage risk to the public, there is no particular emphasis on the safety of the individual that is on board the aircraft. That is a risk that is accepted in taking aircraft that will have a 120-140 kt or greater approach speed and flying it without a hot seat. My most recent live seats have used FSR sourced pyros, and to have those live we actually had to get a production line restarted. Vlad's actions put that out of availability now. Without in date pyros, then the seats should be inerted. At that point, the choice is to fly with cold seats or not fly at all.
The seat state did not cause the accident. You are however insinuating a blame to the operator for what was a confusion in the process of the issuance of the PTF. The PTF did exist, had an inked signature on the document as far as the evidence that you presume I need to acknowledge states....exactly what???? It is Appendix L, it is signed, and whatever curiosity exists prior to signing that does not alter the fact that it exists. You refer on multiple occasions to facts that are not in evidence, perhaps you have the source documents for that, I do not know and really don't particularly care. The parties that may care are the CAA system that has oversight on the process of issuance of PTFs, and the review system within CAA.
The rest of the world will be quite happy taking some of the lower Vs aircraft that had seats in them that are precluded since 2022 in operating where they had MB seats, as the inerting of the seats, while increasing the risk to the crew only alters risk to the public by making the skies quiet in the absence of these exemplars of our history and service.
To the emergency services/RFF attending an accident scene where a live seat exists, there is risk, it is directly related to the seat. Where the pyros have timed, then the manner by which they are deactivated is normally by removal of the pyros. Should the seats have been inerted? As they were timex, and no approval existed to extend their life towards the shelf life, then yes, they should have been. Did that materially impact the casualties in this tragedy? No. The casualties were the direct consequence of an error in flightpath/energy management, and had nothing to do with the status of the seat, the curiosity in the PTF.
You are however acknowledged to be a component of the cadre that will remove flying examples of our aviation and military legacy from the air, so, well done, Sir! Kudos for removing the risk from the masses. However, as demonstrations (for reasons that are unfathomable) serve as a reminder of what those that served did in the past, whether a Hurricane, Ferret, or SLR, and are often a basis for some of those that serve thereafter as a point in time where their interest in service was piqued... then perhaps reinstating conscription would be also worthwhile.
While you are active in terminating ex-mil aircraft, perhaps you can turn your interest towards the more entertaining matters of RPT aircraft that kill more public for more inane reasons than stated in this case.
At this time, about the only supportable ejector seat is the FO-1, and that is only if Vlad stops his compensation for his stature.
With respect to the Airworthiness of the Hunter, the UK CAA spoke to that in their action on terminating the safety directive that had grounded the aircraft.
Reference: SD-2015/003
Title: Hawker Hunter Series Aeroplanes on UK Civil Register
Description: On 6 July 2017 the CAA withdrew the Safety Directive which grounded all Hawker Hunter aircraft on the UK register. This Safety Directive was introduced in the immediate aftermath of the tragic Shoreham airshow accident as a precautionary and unprecedented measure.
This action is a result of the CAA concluding there were no airworthiness issues relating to the Hawker Hunter aircraft that caused or contributed to the accident. This is based on our own extensive review and the AAIB’s final accident report.
All aircraft of this type will have to comply with enhanced maintenance and inspection requirements and, following normal practice, secure all relevant permits and other approvals before they are allowed to fly again.
The restriction on aerobatic manoeuvres by ex-military jet aircraft, now including the Hawker Hunter, at overland airshows remains in place. This means that they continue to be restricted to flypasts and associated manoeuvres only.
Status: Cancelled on 6 July 2017
Like it or not, the UK CAA reviewed the AAIB report on Shoreham and made their determination which is being challenged by those on this forum. The UK CAA, like the signatory have the right to conduct their duties and make determinations. If those are disagreed with, then the party that is objecting to the manner by which the CAA conducts its duties can presumably make representations to the UK CAA or to the DoT, or to their local MP.
None of this alters the stubborn fact the aircraft itself didn't cause this accident.
There was a single PIC determining the aircraft's trajectory, and stuff happens. My concern is that where cognitive impairment was raised as a mitigation of the event previously, how does someone then believe that it is reasonable to return to flying status medically? Latches applies does it not?
Last edited by fdr; 20th Jan 2024 at 02:00.
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Appendix L includes a signed and authorised approval. What is your malfunction of note that is pertinent to the crash of this aircraft?
Whether that is correctly actioned is a matter of process of the delegate of the CAA, it did not alter the airworthiness at the Time of issue.
As far as the MB seats go, you are giving a compelling basis to terminate all legacy fast jets from demonstration. Well done.
.
a. Martin-Baker (correctly) withdrawing support for old seat designs in legacy aircraft, negating the Safety Cases and hence the airworthiness approval, and;
b. The apparent confusion caused by the CAA allowing inert seats in some aircraft, but not in others; and other EU countries mandating inert seats.
(I don't know what the CAA's argument is; they tend to state things without explanation or offering procedures for compliance. Like MoD's MAA. And it wasn't said how much notice Martin-Baker gave. The wording seems to indicate there was a hard cut-off in February 2015. Was there prior warning, and this was just the end-of life date? There seems little doubt this was in part influenced by the Hawk XX177 accident in 2011, where the evidence showed MoD had lost all corporate knowledge of how to maintain a seat with such an old design, and totally disregarded Martin-Baker's servicing instructions. M-B knew this immediately, when MoD visited the factory within days and admitted not using the correct tools, and not following correct procedures. That would have raised alarm bells, from which I infer they gave notice).
As a result of these decisions there MUST have been a major contract let on the Aircraft Design Authority to assess impact. If any aircraft type using the same seat, or variation thereof, was to be allowed to continue flying, then a decision had to be taken on various issues such as emergency egress. Who paid for that? Is there an 'Owner's Club' who share the costs by agreement? Perhaps the major user funds it and everyone else gets a freebie. Was the Shoreham accident aircraft flying under a Concession pending a decision? Given (e.g.) the cartridge issue outlined by the AAIB, I'm not sure I would have much faith in the Approved Maintenance Organisation knowing where to begin.
Which brings up the recurring point that many people miss. An Approved Maintenance Organisation is not necessarily a Design Authority. They can be, but there's a difference between Accreditation and Appointment. MoD's new regs make the same mistake, and it's dumbed down the entire safety management process to a dangerous level. Similarly, in this case, the CAA and AAIB, where the latter argued that the accident aircraft AMO was in every way an ADA. No, they 'do' (badly, according to the AAIB) continuing airworthiness, not maintaining airworthiness.
As for the rest of your post. Your first question rejects the premise upon which airworthiness approval is granted, and all accident investigations procedures. In that we shall have to agree to disagree. I happen to agree with the regulations and procedures, but also agree they are not implemented well. (The thrust of the Nimrod Review, which simply repeated the evidence presented to it). I think it is for you to explain why you don't, or which ones you would be willing to ditch. They're not always perfect by any means, but there is world-wide agreement on these two fundamental issues. A slightly different way of making the same point Dervish did above.
The AAIB report identifies the issue of the cartridges life as an airworthiness matter and it is however the timex status of the seat had no bearing on the accident. The state of supply of cartridges is a problem for this case, not that they don't exist, they are not available for purchase in general, and that constraint conflicts with the CAP requirement as stated. CAR 632 in the AAIB report is stated to indicate that swept wing aircraft must have their ejection seat serviceable:
"CAP 632 requires the pilot escape systems of swept-wing jet aircraft, such as the Hawker Hunter, to be ‘fully serviceable’. The use of time- expired ejection seat cartridges meant that the ejection seats fitted to G-BXFI did not meet this requirement." [section 3, p201 or the AAIB report] That is not what is stated in the CAP 632, at least at rev 8.
yet:
"If an aircraft is fitted with ejection seats that are an integral part of the aircrew escape system, these should be fully serviceable for all flights. New operators must seek approval from the CAA GAU at the earliest opportunity if it is intended to operate with inert ejection seats or other escape systems, prior to inclusion in their OCM". CAP 632 rev 8, §5.7, p25,
Whether this is post the event is unknown. There are PTF aircraft that it would be unwise to operate without a live seat, there are others that are tolerable risks to the occupants depending on the environment. Having operated both inert and live, there are merits to both cases, however, what they don't do is make the aircraft unsafe to operate, and the opportunity to inert the seats existed within the rules. I would be more concerned with the conduct of aerobatic operations without an operable G-meter, that is not a good look at all, particularly in the light of a botched vertical manoeuvre. The other noted non compliances are of a lesser form than the dropping of a plug from a Boeing, cowls opening up on engines in flight, and the rest of the saga of aircraft production we have grown accustomed to. In the report, there is enough to dwell on related to the processes of maintenance but nothing that was germaine to the failure to achieve entry speed, gate height, or energy over the top. A surprise admission was that the pilot was not trained in the escape manoeuver for missing the gate conditions.
The event was a horrific tragedy, however, IMHO, airworthiness and the PTF did not directly result in the accident.
In respect to Appendix L, what is stated is an issuance of a NPTF, duly signed on 6 July 2006, for the CAA. If there is some confusion on the background, that is a matter for internal review within the CAA or delegate system to correct, however there is a required signature on the document, and that would suggest that the aircraft was legally issued a PTF. The defect in the PTF does not itself invalidate the PTF. Consider the Max8 debacle, the plane was compliant with the TC as approved by the state of manufacture. The latent defect that existed was not known, and at the time of departure the aircraft was operated IAW the TC and associated requirements. After discovery, the issue of the AOM did not alter the airworthiness of the aircraft, that arose belatedly with the issue of an EAD.
The PTF, pyros didn't cause the accident. Running out of altitude did.
"CAP 632 requires the pilot escape systems of swept-wing jet aircraft, such as the Hawker Hunter, to be ‘fully serviceable’. The use of time- expired ejection seat cartridges meant that the ejection seats fitted to G-BXFI did not meet this requirement." [section 3, p201 or the AAIB report] That is not what is stated in the CAP 632, at least at rev 8.
yet:
"If an aircraft is fitted with ejection seats that are an integral part of the aircrew escape system, these should be fully serviceable for all flights. New operators must seek approval from the CAA GAU at the earliest opportunity if it is intended to operate with inert ejection seats or other escape systems, prior to inclusion in their OCM". CAP 632 rev 8, §5.7, p25,
Whether this is post the event is unknown. There are PTF aircraft that it would be unwise to operate without a live seat, there are others that are tolerable risks to the occupants depending on the environment. Having operated both inert and live, there are merits to both cases, however, what they don't do is make the aircraft unsafe to operate, and the opportunity to inert the seats existed within the rules. I would be more concerned with the conduct of aerobatic operations without an operable G-meter, that is not a good look at all, particularly in the light of a botched vertical manoeuvre. The other noted non compliances are of a lesser form than the dropping of a plug from a Boeing, cowls opening up on engines in flight, and the rest of the saga of aircraft production we have grown accustomed to. In the report, there is enough to dwell on related to the processes of maintenance but nothing that was germaine to the failure to achieve entry speed, gate height, or energy over the top. A surprise admission was that the pilot was not trained in the escape manoeuver for missing the gate conditions.
The event was a horrific tragedy, however, IMHO, airworthiness and the PTF did not directly result in the accident.
In respect to Appendix L, what is stated is an issuance of a NPTF, duly signed on 6 July 2006, for the CAA. If there is some confusion on the background, that is a matter for internal review within the CAA or delegate system to correct, however there is a required signature on the document, and that would suggest that the aircraft was legally issued a PTF. The defect in the PTF does not itself invalidate the PTF. Consider the Max8 debacle, the plane was compliant with the TC as approved by the state of manufacture. The latent defect that existed was not known, and at the time of departure the aircraft was operated IAW the TC and associated requirements. After discovery, the issue of the AOM did not alter the airworthiness of the aircraft, that arose belatedly with the issue of an EAD.
The PTF, pyros didn't cause the accident. Running out of altitude did.
However, the accident has served to highlight a whole number of safety issues / failings that otherwise may not have been noticed. I assume you are not suggesting that any "inconvenient" regulations should be ignored just so that historic fast jets can wow the crowds?
Also, as I have said earlier, I fail to see how in most circumstances pilots can have sufficient relevant currency on these types of aircraft to safely fly aerobatic routines in public. I have also mentioned the crash of the Gnat at a show less than a year before Shoreham. If I remember correctly the pilot had just enough total flying hours in the preceding year to maintain a PPL! Yet he was legally qualified to display a historic swept wing fast jet at a public show! Something very wrong with that situation.
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Also, as I have said earlier, I fail to see how in most circumstances pilots can have sufficient relevant currency on these types of aircraft to safely fly aerobatic routines in public. I have also mentioned the crash of the Gnat at a show less than a year before Shoreham. If I remember correctly the pilot had just enough total flying hours in the preceding year to maintain a PPL! Yet he was legally qualified to display a historic swept wing fast jet at a public show! Something very wrong with that situation.
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I have also mentioned the crash of the Gnat at a show less than a year before Shoreham. If I remember correctly the pilot had just enough total flying hours in the preceding year to maintain a PPL! Yet he was legally qualified to display a historic swept wing fast jet at a public show!
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It was also pointed out earlier in this thread that a tiny variation in the Gnat's trajectory could have lead to an even bigger catastrophe than the Shoreham crash.
One further related point....
Some years before the Shoreham (and Gnat) accidents I remember seeing the Hunter (and also the Jet Provost) being displayed at Old Warden on several occasions. From what I remember these were "flat" displays with some elegant top side passes round the famous curved display line. Surely this is a vastly safer way of displaying this type of aircraft for all kinds of obvious reasons?
Some years before the Shoreham (and Gnat) accidents I remember seeing the Hunter (and also the Jet Provost) being displayed at Old Warden on several occasions. From what I remember these were "flat" displays with some elegant top side passes round the famous curved display line. Surely this is a vastly safer way of displaying this type of aircraft for all kinds of obvious reasons?
The admission that the pilot had never trained the escape manoeuvre for the sequence he was flying pretty much sums up the risks that were being assumed. To do so would not have taken a great deal of flight time, and could have been accomplished at a height that would permit learning from errors. Seeing these aircraft fly does not need a show of exacting skills and daring. most of the crowd can't see the aircraft when it flies down close to the ground, and noise is not particular to much other than r^4. Conducting low level aeros with verticals benefits from a level of proficiency, however smoking holes exist in various locations from highly proficient operators who had bad days. Occasionally, level demonstrations go bad, but that is most often due to mechanical failure.
It's about 5 years since I strapped into a hot seat, (not an MB) and about 15 since last sitting in a MB seat, which was inert. In between, both live and inerted Russian seats of various voltages. MB has done what they think is a good idea, I personally disagree, but they are free to do what they do. There are aircraft that I would not taxi without a live seat, there are others that the seat is just a discomfort to the driver. In all of these cases, live or inert, the airworthiness was not affected, the operator had a choice as to what risk they were prepared to take for their occupants. As far as the CAP goes, unless thee is one that predates rev 8 that states otherwise, the UK CAA does not mandate the seat to be live, it is an election by the applicant for their conditions of the NPTF. There is no confusion in the CAA accepting one operator electing top paint their plane pink and another wanting their plain in plaid, nor is there with an election for a seat being inert or not. MB, while undertaking a CYA did nothing to further the interests of safety by denying support for what you refer to as old, and what the counter view is tried and tested. My greasy "old" wright cyclone may be old, but they are pretty well tested by time as well. Fortunately, there are parts of the world that permit the operator to determine the risk they are prepared to assume, where there is no increase in risk to the public. There are also a few other seats out there, once Vlad stops being uppity.
No, it is not I who is 'giving a compelling basis...' It is a combination of:
a. Martin-Baker (correctly) withdrawing support for old seat designs in legacy aircraft, negating the Safety Cases and hence the airworthiness approval, and;
b. The apparent confusion caused by the CAA allowing inert seats in some aircraft, but not in others; and other EU countries mandating inert seats.
a. Martin-Baker (correctly) withdrawing support for old seat designs in legacy aircraft, negating the Safety Cases and hence the airworthiness approval, and;
b. The apparent confusion caused by the CAA allowing inert seats in some aircraft, but not in others; and other EU countries mandating inert seats.
You have your experience flying aircraft, which I respect. I have mine, appointing and managing Design Authorities amongst other things. And, importantly, withdrawing that appointment if they don't abide by the regulations. The decision to withdraw an appointment is 100% one of safety. No notice is required. The last time I did it, I stopped a meeting, told the managing director I was suspending his appointment due to breach of contract (making his only experienced engineer on one product, a safety critical aircraft system, redundant) and said he could phone me any time to tell me when he'd reinstated him or employed someone of equal skill and experience. It took him 5 seconds to make his decision. These contracts are very expensive, for a reason. They are the means by which companies retain their corporate knowledge. And the means by which aircraft can be given certification, and retain it.
Martin-Baker acted as I would have expected and required them to. In being open and honest about their inability to support very old designs, which no longer meet modern standards, they met a OBLIGATION. If they didn't do that, I would deem them unfit to hold the appointment. In this sense, they are not free to do what they want to do.
As I said, I suspect an important factor was the MoD/RAF's decision to completely ignore their advice on how to maintain the seats, and then have to listen to MoD and the HSE perjure themselves in court in a (successful) effort to shift blame for a fatal accident.
Thanks for that. However my points relating to it remain and I still feel that in many respects (apart obviously from the outcome) it raised even more concerning issues than Shoreham, yet has received very little publicity.
It was also pointed out earlier in this thread that a tiny variation in the Gnat's trajectory could have lead to an even bigger catastrophe than the Shoreham crash.
It was also pointed out earlier in this thread that a tiny variation in the Gnat's trajectory could have lead to an even bigger catastrophe than the Shoreham crash.
Ironically both aircraft were operated out of North Weald.
One further related point....
Some years before the Shoreham (and Gnat) accidents I remember seeing the Hunter (and also the Jet Provost) being displayed at Old Warden on several occasions. From what I remember these were "flat" displays with some elegant top side passes round the famous curved display line. Surely this is a vastly safer way of displaying this type of aircraft for all kinds of obvious reasons?
Some years before the Shoreham (and Gnat) accidents I remember seeing the Hunter (and also the Jet Provost) being displayed at Old Warden on several occasions. From what I remember these were "flat" displays with some elegant top side passes round the famous curved display line. Surely this is a vastly safer way of displaying this type of aircraft for all kinds of obvious reasons?
fdr Post 1105:-
Just to be clear (and apologies for the late response), are you saying that as long as something is signed off then that the system (a/c, seat, whatever) can be assumed to be airworthy and in compliance with the regs? At the Operator's level perhaps, unless they suspect to the contrary of course, but that is surely the crux of this debate. What is being talked of here is the post accident process of an inquiry, and sadly of an inquest, into so many avoidable deaths. Chinook ZD576 was signed off by a Release to Service into RAF squadron operation, but this was contrary to the CA release and, inked signature or no, was illegal! As a result 29 people, the full complement of pax and crew, were killed. An MOD/RAF cover up has existed to this day, despite the SoS for Defence setting aside the infamous finding of Gross Pilot Negligence.
The point of an accident inquiry is to attempt to determine all the safety shortcomings involved in an aircraft accident, whether or not they were directly involved in the accident. This inquiry should have revealed that the aircraft was both unserviceable and unairworthy, and to determine why that was. It didn't do so and hence laid the foundations for the next accident, fatal or otherwise. In failing to do that it protected the Civil Aviation Regulator (and the Military one for that matter) from being shown as having failed in one of its prime responsibilities, to ensure that the aircraft it regulates are airworthy or, failing that, grounded. Whatever the certification type; RTS, CofA, PTF, etc, that is the most fundamental responsibility of the CAA and MAA. Both it seems have failed in that, the MAA at least being a serial offender. Now it seems this malignancy is also infecting civil aviation. That is why an Air Accident Investigator must always be entirely independent of the Air Regulator.
The seat state did not cause the accident. You are however insinuating a blame to the operator for what was a confusion in the process of the issuance of the PTF. The PTF did exist, had an inked signature on the document as far as the evidence that you presume I need to acknowledge states....exactly what???? It is Appendix L, it is signed, and whatever curiosity exists prior to signing that does not alter the fact that it exists. You refer on multiple occasions to facts that are not in evidence, perhaps you have the source documents for that, I do not know and really don't particularly care. The parties that may care are the CAA system that has oversight on the process of issuance of PTFs, and the review system within CAA.
The point of an accident inquiry is to attempt to determine all the safety shortcomings involved in an aircraft accident, whether or not they were directly involved in the accident. This inquiry should have revealed that the aircraft was both unserviceable and unairworthy, and to determine why that was. It didn't do so and hence laid the foundations for the next accident, fatal or otherwise. In failing to do that it protected the Civil Aviation Regulator (and the Military one for that matter) from being shown as having failed in one of its prime responsibilities, to ensure that the aircraft it regulates are airworthy or, failing that, grounded. Whatever the certification type; RTS, CofA, PTF, etc, that is the most fundamental responsibility of the CAA and MAA. Both it seems have failed in that, the MAA at least being a serial offender. Now it seems this malignancy is also infecting civil aviation. That is why an Air Accident Investigator must always be entirely independent of the Air Regulator.
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I read the full report and have followed with interest these discussions. I am a career aviator both military and civil but have never been involved in any form of display flying. My personal conclusions are quite straight forward.
1. Aircraft, some high performance, were being flown in, and in some cases are still being flown in a manner for which they were never designed outside combat operations.
2. There are some very clever lawyers out there.
3. The pilot in the Shoreham accident made a mistake which was perhaps predictable bearing in mind his apparent record.
4. There are no winners in this.
1. Aircraft, some high performance, were being flown in, and in some cases are still being flown in a manner for which they were never designed outside combat operations.
2. There are some very clever lawyers out there.
3. The pilot in the Shoreham accident made a mistake which was perhaps predictable bearing in mind his apparent record.
4. There are no winners in this.
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