UK Air Defence - Cold War
The only point I wil add is that during any 3 day AD exercise the force had always expended all it’s Mx stocks by the end of day one.
Working on historic kill rates from Vietnam/Arab-Israeli/Indo-Pakistan conflicts the general view was that in a shooting war they’d, hopefully, achieve 3-5 kills, and hopefully against any Kitchen/Kingfish Mx above and outside F-4 Sparrow snap-up range.
Working on historic kill rates from Vietnam/Arab-Israeli/Indo-Pakistan conflicts the general view was that in a shooting war they’d, hopefully, achieve 3-5 kills, and hopefully against any Kitchen/Kingfish Mx above and outside F-4 Sparrow snap-up range.
As regards the effectiveness of the system as compared to the Soviet systems and early models of Hawk, Bloodhound Mk 2 was streets ahead of them as regards ECCM. One major advantage was that the engagement controller had a view of what the missile was actually seeing shown on his console and the capability to control certain aspects of the missile's receiver systems operation while the missile was in flight. The Missile was fully capable of switching between semi active and passive homing (and vice versa) by itself and if it lost lock it would try and regain lock by itself on the last known good target Doppler shift which the EC could update in flight when jamming was quite. The system had only two major limitations and those were laws of physics related. The first and major one which was never fixed was target discrimination of two or more targets in close formation (and by close formation I'm talking about separations of around 1500 feet or less). The missile's dish had a field of view of around 4.5 degrees, thus if their were two targets within its field of view both of which were being illuminated equally by the radar, it would only see them as one target and the missile would fly through the gap in-between. If the missile missed either of them by more that 110 feet, the proximity fuze wouldn't detonate the warhead as the effectiveness of the Con Rod warhead dropped of massively as soon as the hoop of steel generated broke apart. The only other way that the missile could discriminate between targets was by target radial velocity (Doppler shift), but seeing its "speed gate" was around 48 knots wide, that not going to be much use if both targets were traveling in the same direction and speed. However when various formations of drones were engaged at different distances apart in firings at both Woomera and Aberporth, except for very close formations, the missile normally got a sniff of a stronger signal off one of the targets and successfully got within lethal warhead miss distance of that target. The RAF though this was a major problem as they were looking for an 80% success rate in trials and the best they got was around 58% in this trial condition. This problem was common for most radar guided weapons of the era anyway. The other issue was low level intercept over water. During the missile evaluation trials at Woomera in the first half of the 1960's, the missile successfully intercepted targets as low as 180 feet AGL. When they tried low level shots at Aberporth (below 400ft), the missile had a tenancy to dive into the sea in front of the target. The main cause of this was the target reflected a small bit of the illumination beam up into the air (the missile being well above it and diving down onto the target) and a larger part of the signal onto the sea. If the sea was calm, this signal was reflected back up into the air and was stronger than the signal off the target, so naturally the missile went for the stronger signal. At least 8 missiles ended up doing this, however at least one officer at Aberporth correctly identified that the main problem was Aberporth's radar being located 450ft above the sea on a cliff top and that the problem would be less of an issue at North Coates or Bawdsey.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
That was basically what the only study on the system's effectiveness in a general war that has been released to the National Archives and was produced in 1975 for the three 85 sqn sites said. shot out on day one. the projected kill number was 0.8!!!! As regards the ASM's, not a hope. The Radar's were fully capable of tracking them at useable ranges but the seeker in missile wasn't, plus 65000ft was about the limit for the missile's manoeuvrability and the warhead / fuze combination was very much designed to chop bombers in half.
As regards the effectiveness of the system as compared to the Soviet systems and early models of Hawk, Bloodhound Mk 2 was streets ahead of them as regards ECCM. One major advantage was that the engagement controller had a view of what the missile was actually seeing shown on his console and the capability to control certain aspects of the missile's receiver systems operation while the missile was in flight. The Missile was fully capable of switching between semi active and passive homing (and vice versa) by itself and if it lost lock it would try and regain lock by itself on the last known good target Doppler shift which the EC could update in flight when jamming was quite. The system had only two major limitations and those were laws of physics related. The first and major one which was never fixed was target discrimination of two or more targets in close formation (and by close formation I'm talking about separations of around 1500 feet or less). The missile's dish had a field of view of around 4.5 degrees, thus if their were two targets within its field of view both of which were being illuminated equally by the radar, it would only see them as one target and the missile would fly through the gap in-between. If the missile missed either of them by more that 110 feet, the proximity fuze wouldn't detonate the warhead as the effectiveness of the Con Rod warhead dropped of massively as soon as the hoop of steel generated broke apart. The only other way that the missile could discriminate between targets was by target radial velocity (Doppler shift), but seeing its "speed gate" was around 48 knots wide, that not going to be much use if both targets were traveling in the same direction and speed. However when various formations of drones were engaged at different distances apart in firings at both Woomera and Aberporth, except for very close formations, the missile normally got a sniff of a stronger signal off one of the targets and successfully got within lethal warhead miss distance of that target. The RAF though this was a major problem as they were looking for an 80% success rate in trials and the best they got was around 58% in this trial condition. This problem was common for most radar guided weapons of the era anyway. The other issue was low level intercept over water. During the missile evaluation trials at Woomera in the first half of the 1960's, the missile successfully intercepted targets as low as 180 feet AGL. When they tried low level shots at Aberporth (below 400ft), the missile had a tenancy to dive into the sea in front of the target. The main cause of this was the target reflected a small bit of the illumination beam up into the air (the missile being well above it and diving down onto the target) and a larger part of the signal onto the sea. If the sea was calm, this signal was reflected back up into the air and was stronger than the signal off the target, so naturally the missile went for the stronger signal. At least 8 missiles ended up doing this, however at least one officer at Aberporth correctly identified that the main problem was Aberporth's radar being located 450ft above the sea on a cliff top and that the problem would be less of an issue at North Coates or Bawdsey.
As regards the effectiveness of the system as compared to the Soviet systems and early models of Hawk, Bloodhound Mk 2 was streets ahead of them as regards ECCM. One major advantage was that the engagement controller had a view of what the missile was actually seeing shown on his console and the capability to control certain aspects of the missile's receiver systems operation while the missile was in flight. The Missile was fully capable of switching between semi active and passive homing (and vice versa) by itself and if it lost lock it would try and regain lock by itself on the last known good target Doppler shift which the EC could update in flight when jamming was quite. The system had only two major limitations and those were laws of physics related. The first and major one which was never fixed was target discrimination of two or more targets in close formation (and by close formation I'm talking about separations of around 1500 feet or less). The missile's dish had a field of view of around 4.5 degrees, thus if their were two targets within its field of view both of which were being illuminated equally by the radar, it would only see them as one target and the missile would fly through the gap in-between. If the missile missed either of them by more that 110 feet, the proximity fuze wouldn't detonate the warhead as the effectiveness of the Con Rod warhead dropped of massively as soon as the hoop of steel generated broke apart. The only other way that the missile could discriminate between targets was by target radial velocity (Doppler shift), but seeing its "speed gate" was around 48 knots wide, that not going to be much use if both targets were traveling in the same direction and speed. However when various formations of drones were engaged at different distances apart in firings at both Woomera and Aberporth, except for very close formations, the missile normally got a sniff of a stronger signal off one of the targets and successfully got within lethal warhead miss distance of that target. The RAF though this was a major problem as they were looking for an 80% success rate in trials and the best they got was around 58% in this trial condition. This problem was common for most radar guided weapons of the era anyway. The other issue was low level intercept over water. During the missile evaluation trials at Woomera in the first half of the 1960's, the missile successfully intercepted targets as low as 180 feet AGL. When they tried low level shots at Aberporth (below 400ft), the missile had a tenancy to dive into the sea in front of the target. The main cause of this was the target reflected a small bit of the illumination beam up into the air (the missile being well above it and diving down onto the target) and a larger part of the signal onto the sea. If the sea was calm, this signal was reflected back up into the air and was stronger than the signal off the target, so naturally the missile went for the stronger signal. At least 8 missiles ended up doing this, however at least one officer at Aberporth correctly identified that the main problem was Aberporth's radar being located 450ft above the sea on a cliff top and that the problem would be less of an issue at North Coates or Bawdsey.
Mainjafad. Fascinating, thank you. Not disagreeing with you for a moment. I heard about the buy back of Swedish and Swiss missiles. Now I heard that the missiles sold to them were 100% perfect. Now I heard the Swedes accepted the package on the basis that any modifications deemed essential by us would be incorporated by BAC. The other country accepted them as is.
Clearly it was not the Swedes or they didn't get all the mods.
Clearly it was not the Swedes or they didn't get all the mods.
Low level firing of Mk 1s were done at Aberporth in the August and September of 1963. According to the records 2 missiles were fired to the trial condition with involved a Jindivik at 2500 feet. only the first one on the 23rd August was successful and it was Missile 148 fired by a team from 247 Sqn. The Missile scored a direct hit and splashed the drone. The other missile failed in flight. That is about as low as anything that was recorded in any of the acceptance, Service or R&D firings for the Mk 1.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Thank y ou. If the number of ship-sets properly matched the number of targets . ..
Last edited by Pontius Navigator; 21st Aug 2018 at 06:37.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Pontius, the lecture was about RAF AD in 1978. He also stated that we would have run-out of AAMs by Day 3...
The shock when OOA Ops started up and we actual had to plan to supported life for more than 3 days was a major shock - which is why it took a MOB of 3 squadrons to support one deployed squadron on Ops - plus many others gutted to provide drivers, cooks, suppliers etc.
The RAF Fighter Orbat in 1976 as far as planning was (taken from a document at Kew written in 1974/75) :
Wattisham - 20 Phantom
Leuchars - 22 Phantom (RAF) + 18 Phantom (RN)
Coningsby - 32 Phantom (AD + OCU) + 10 Phantom (Recce)
Binbrook - 32 Lightning (Inc OCU)
That is 102 Phantoms with 4 x Sparrow and 4 x Sidewinder = 816 missiles of each type in the UK war stocks at minimum (1632 in total). There would have been more for a set number of rounds to be fired per year on MPC's over a set period.
32 Lightnings with 2 x AAM (Firestreak and Redtop). 128 rounds minimum, again there would have been additional missiles in the stocks for MPC firings.
At the time that the above was written, the estimated Soviet AF treat to the UK was (as at mid 1974) :-
Fencer 10
Bear 20 + (45 Nuclear only)
Bison 20
Badger 350
Blinder 70 + (100 Nuclear only)
Backfire 30
as regards the Soviet Naval AF the figures were
Badger 35 + (95 nuclear only)
Blinder 25
Backfire 0
Bear (recce) 25
Badger (Recce) 30
which meant that 605 conventional armed plus 238 nuclear strike aircraft were likely to be tasked against targets within the UKADR
The estimates for 1980 were
Soviet TAF / LRAF
Fencer 300
Bear 15 + (30)
Bison 20
Badger 200
Blinder 50 + (90)
Backfire 240
SNAF
Badger 35 + (85)
Blinder 25
Backfire 40
Bear (Recce) 25
Badger (Recce) 25
which took the total to 675 + (205)
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/...-defence-fears
Wasnt it subsequently learned that Blinder (perhaps amongst others) was a paper tiger?
Heard tell that once bombed up to do its dastardly deed, it couldnt actually carry enough juice to deliver it. And thats to say nothing about weapons efficacy.
Of course its all just arbitrary stats anyhow. I wonder how many would have headed south not west, planning a prolonged vacation in the (natural) sunshine instead
Cooch
Heard tell that once bombed up to do its dastardly deed, it couldnt actually carry enough juice to deliver it. And thats to say nothing about weapons efficacy.
Of course its all just arbitrary stats anyhow. I wonder how many would have headed south not west, planning a prolonged vacation in the (natural) sunshine instead
Cooch
Blinder was generally hated by both its air and ground crews according to stuff that came out after the wall came down, The early Backfires were also not known for their reliability, thus a play on its official designation (All Weather Missile Carrier) becoming a nickname (All Weather Defect Carrier).
Sparrow was never known for its reliability either, though I suspect that the AIM-9G would have done better that the early Sidewinders in Vietnam.
A look through the Aberporth ORB's may give a good idea of how effective the weapons would have been, I did an estimate of Bloodhound Mk 1 based on both the Service Acceptance Trials at Woomera, plus the service Firings at Aberporth, which I was later able to match up to an operational assessment of the System by HQ Fighter Command's Operational Research Branch done after the system was phased out of service in late 1964. My guesstimate and the HQFC figures ended up almost the same with the missile having a SSPK of around 25% for a single missile launch in Semi Active mode and 44% for a two round Salvo. The Missile also had a passive home on jam capability (though the missile couldn't switch between the semi active and passive modes automatically like the Mk 2 could, it had to be launched in one mode or the other). This worked quite well, however the proximity fuze had a nasty habit of spurious firing in flight before reaching the target and in the Semi Active mode a range gate system used normal operation of the guidance system was also used to isolate the warhead firing chain until the missile was close to the target. In the passive mode this range gate was disabled and in 12 firings in passive mode, only once did the fuze not fire before the missile got to the target.
Sparrow was never known for its reliability either, though I suspect that the AIM-9G would have done better that the early Sidewinders in Vietnam.
A look through the Aberporth ORB's may give a good idea of how effective the weapons would have been, I did an estimate of Bloodhound Mk 1 based on both the Service Acceptance Trials at Woomera, plus the service Firings at Aberporth, which I was later able to match up to an operational assessment of the System by HQ Fighter Command's Operational Research Branch done after the system was phased out of service in late 1964. My guesstimate and the HQFC figures ended up almost the same with the missile having a SSPK of around 25% for a single missile launch in Semi Active mode and 44% for a two round Salvo. The Missile also had a passive home on jam capability (though the missile couldn't switch between the semi active and passive modes automatically like the Mk 2 could, it had to be launched in one mode or the other). This worked quite well, however the proximity fuze had a nasty habit of spurious firing in flight before reaching the target and in the Semi Active mode a range gate system used normal operation of the guidance system was also used to isolate the warhead firing chain until the missile was close to the target. In the passive mode this range gate was disabled and in 12 firings in passive mode, only once did the fuze not fire before the missile got to the target.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Also relevant was the number of drop tanks for reloads. The F4 could also carry the gun which would give a few more K but also involved entering the gun EZ on the bombers - 500 yards.
It was good having 25 Sqn C Flt at Wattisham. Mainly because they were often asking for airfield attacks so that they could train their crews. This was much appreciated by the resident F-4 squadrons; unfortunately one crew came over the ATC tower and OC Ops office at about 500 KIAS and rather low, which resulted in speed / height / authorisation restrictions being applied by the fun detectors.
A few years earlier we used to practise attacking West Raynham in the Vulcan, trying to get inside the minimum engagement range before they could hoof off a rocket. Run in at low level on the bomb steer; as soon as the AEO detected radar lock, turn at 60 deg AoB and beam the spike, reversing to fly a constant radius turn around the site to achieve zero doppler. This was achieved using AEO commentary to harden / ease as necessary to stay 90 deg off the direct track to the site. Fly the constant radius turn for 10 sec, then reverse onto a new track from the Nav Rad, following the bomb steer until the Bloodhound locked again, then repeat the manoeuvre as oft as ye shall have need. Rather hard work, requiring a lot of crew coordination, but successful! As a result, we were asked to repeat the attack when 85 had some Air Wheel watching. So we did - and later heard that he hadn't been very impressed by 85's kit limitations.
But when I tried the same thing against 25 at Wattisham, it didn't work. It seems that in the period between our Vulcan attacks and my F-4 attempt, the Bloodhound squadrons had acquired some improved piece of kit which had defeated our efforts!
A few years earlier we used to practise attacking West Raynham in the Vulcan, trying to get inside the minimum engagement range before they could hoof off a rocket. Run in at low level on the bomb steer; as soon as the AEO detected radar lock, turn at 60 deg AoB and beam the spike, reversing to fly a constant radius turn around the site to achieve zero doppler. This was achieved using AEO commentary to harden / ease as necessary to stay 90 deg off the direct track to the site. Fly the constant radius turn for 10 sec, then reverse onto a new track from the Nav Rad, following the bomb steer until the Bloodhound locked again, then repeat the manoeuvre as oft as ye shall have need. Rather hard work, requiring a lot of crew coordination, but successful! As a result, we were asked to repeat the attack when 85 had some Air Wheel watching. So we did - and later heard that he hadn't been very impressed by 85's kit limitations.
But when I tried the same thing against 25 at Wattisham, it didn't work. It seems that in the period between our Vulcan attacks and my F-4 attempt, the Bloodhound squadrons had acquired some improved piece of kit which had defeated our efforts!
