Hawker Hunter Crash at Shoreham Airshow

[Pontius Navigator]

Phil, that is why they have simulators.

[Tinribs]

Multi types

Salad Dodger
has opinions about the RAF's attitude to multi types, not so
We were encouraged to fly the chipmunk from squadrons for the ATC and at RAE Bedford we could easily fly several types in one day. I understand that as the Buc had no two seaters for squadrons the hunter was usually used for check flights
I found in practice there was no problem if the types were very dissimilar but if you flew two that had similar configurations, say the Varsity or Devon and the Dack, it was easy to get the speed limits mixed up so special care was needed but with that extra care, and a supervisors warning there was no problem

[Pittsextra]

I think this suggests that this panel took a differing view:-

https://www.gov.uk/government/upload...y_part_1_4.pdf

page 19 relates:-

The panel concluded that there was a plausible link between the amount of low level F3 training, competency checking and the Pilots light-ac flying experience that may have contributed to the accident

I think it was the use of rudder that was of focus.

[LOMCEVAK]

Pittsextra,

"... may have contributed to the accident". It was the panels opinion and if you read this report carefully I am sure you will agree that the postulations regarding use of rudder are not a typical control strategy in any aircraft. Therefore, did the panel really have the experience and knowledge to be qualified to comment on multi-typing or light aircraft flying?

To all of you who persistently pontificate about multi-typing:

I have flown multiple types of aircraft under military regulation plus civilian types for many years and still do. Even as a first tourist 35 years ago I was current on 3 types. 9 mil reg types at one time was probably the most during a couple of tours (plus about half a dozen civilian types). There is a lot of total BS written about multi-typing by those who have never done it or don't understand how to do it safely. There is a specific discipline in being able to multi-type safely and it needs to be discussed, taught, mentored and supervised. But it CAN be done safely if performed correctly although there are limits which need to be respected.

On the subject of multi-typing there appears to be a lot of 'why remain silent and be thought of as a fool when you can open your mouth and remove all reasonable doubt'. Rant over.

[Pittsextra]

Lomcevak - here is another saying...don't shoot the messenger!

I don't think AH's other flying is a factor. If currency was something to look at then I'd start with simply looking at the time on type doing aeros, and from a relevant height.

I merely linked the F3 report as someone asked the question.

Meanwhile this film shows the pilot and aircraft perform the initial (and relevant) part of the display in July 2015. It shows (I think?) the 1/4 clover with the rolling element downwards, is it different to the Shoreham display, where I see the rolling upwards? its not that easy to tell in the Bray film but it doesn't look as if its rolled anywhere near as much until the back side of the loop?

It certainly isn't a very easy figure to judge accurately as it doesn't seem to be clear what the figure really is. Although regardless of the heading change it should be clear if you are rolling up or down and I still don't see how that is a standard figure under CAP403. Just a view.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0P2TV2HZUss

[Finningley Boy]

I've since scanned through the appropriate page in my book 'The Royal Air Force At Home' (kindly pardon the plug) and I noted that in 1953, all aerobatics manoeuvres had to be complete above 1,500' by solo and formation teams. By 1963 this had been lowered to 1,000'. This was in Fighter Command Air Staff instructions. However, this, among other rules, could be relaxed for special occasions such as Farnborough etc.

Rose tinted memories always suggest otherwise and I am aware that display sequences were put together by the pilot crew with some degree of latitude but the C.O/Squadron Commanders' ruling or adjudication on anything at all was certainly not up for debate.

Nevertheless, it suggests a fair accommodation that 500' is the rule now. I've seen some photos of RAF flying displays, especially the Red Arrows from the '60s and '70s and frankly there is no way that the stipulated rules appear to be wholly satisfied.

FB

[Mach Two]

Originally Posted by Pittsextra

I think it was the use of rudder that was of focus.

Do you have any idea about the use of rudder in the F3? Do you also understand that the use of rudder did not contribute to the accident you have conveniently cited, presumably to make a minor point. A good friend of mine died in that accident and, for some inexplicable reason, I take exception to people using it just to prove a cheap point.

You a military pilot? If not, please show a little respect here before using military casualties to support your arguments in what is merely an online speculation competition.

[FJ2ME]

Sorry for the thread drift, but there have been a few red herrings discussed recently here.

In the case of the F3 accident, the pilots experience on type and level of experience on light aircraft undoubtedly DID have an effect on that accident. The fact of the matter is when you reduce the flying rate to minimum, the most affected are the pilots with the least experience. With so few F3 hours, and very few indeed at low level and in that stores fit, plus a far greater number of recent hours, flying in the same valleys, in light aircraft, it is simply impossible that the mismatch between the pilots expectation of turn performance and the reality of the aircraft abilities at the time did not factor in the accident.

This is a totally different case to AH on the Hunter in my belief, as he will have spent thousands of hours at the start of his career on fast jet types so has a huge bank of experience to draw on, albeit not in the Hunter. However, his much more frequent Airbus hours in recent years are pretty unlikely to have denigrated this earlier experience in the way it would for someone who had less experience to draw on. This is also why I think the issues here are quite different to the recent Gnat crash, where whatever your thought on KW, he definitely had far less total FJ experience to draw on in times of need.

None of this is meant in disrespect to the deceased or critically injured, I'm merely trying to prevent false parallels being drawn between these 3 quite unrelated accidents.

[wiggy]

FJ2ME

This is a totally different case to AH on the Hunter in my belief, as he will have spent thousands of hours at the start of his career on fast jet types so has a huge bank of experience to draw on, albeit not in the Hunter. However, his much more frequent Airbus hours in recent years are pretty unlikely to have denigrated this earlier experience in the way

I'll add that as mentioned briefly in the AAIB report in addition to his Airbus and light aircraft (propeller) flying AH continued to fly various marks of the JP - not fast jets I'd agree but not 90 knot bug smashers either.

[smarthawke]

I think it should be noted that AH's light aircraft experience was mostly in relatively high performance machines and much of it as part of a formation duo display team (as opposed to 'merely' flying around in 90 kt puddle jumpers).

[Lima Juliet]

From someone with lots of F3 time and puddle-jumper time - I wholeheartedly disagree with this comment:

With so few F3 hours, and very few indeed at low level and in that stores fit, plus a far greater number of recent hours, flying in the same valleys, in light aircraft, it is simply impossible that the mismatch between the pilots expectation of turn performance and the reality of the aircraft abilities at the time did not factor in the accident.

The biggest factor was that he was flying a heavyweight F3 (it was L fit) and he cut it too fine. Flying a L fit F3 and a puddle-jumper are so vastly diffrent that I cannot imagine how the two could ever blur - it's like a motorcycle versus a Transit van or windsurfer vs a yacht! Quite simply, I believe he did not have enough recency and implied skill to fly a heavyweight Lima-fit jet at low level - whether he flew puddle-jumpers or not.

In my mind there are similarities in the current Hunter accident, as well. A jet reportedly filled to full with underwing tanks, alleged low numbers of hours of recency and what appears to be cutting it too fine. I guess we will see when the AAIB release their final report.

Sadly, my disagreement about light aircraft and F3 will never bring back N & K from that tragic day. However, their passing provided a valuable lesson in minimum hours to stay recent on type - that day, with regret, we found out what that was.

LJ

[Pontius Navigator]

Full fuel load has been reported. What was the likely display load after the transit and loiter?

I would guess the AAIB would also investigate previous display fuel loads.

[sherif]

Just for comparison;

At a similar point in a display season on a fast jet, my recent experience on type was;
Previous 30 days: 25 hours (including 7 practices +3 displays),
Previous 90 days: 85 hours (including 16 practices + 8 displays),
Total : 400 hours in 17 months + 2000 hours on similar performance jet.

Lucky me!

[DITYIWAHP]

Mulit-type-ing is only a scary and mysterious risk for those who haven't done it and, therefore, don't understand it. The analogous situation would be to say that Formula 1 drivers should not be allowed to drive 'normal' performing cars on the open roads, or vice-versa, because of the unquantifiable risk of spacial disorientation.

[JFZ90]

Ref the 2600ft - 100kts, anyone have any info on what the gate should have been (to e.g. level out at 500ft?) if the move was intended to be a 1/4 clover.

I assume that if 2600ft/100kts was the actual height/speed, the fate of the AC was already set at the apex?

I'm not trying to invite speculation as to why the gate may have been missed.

PS I took SD to mean a minority of pilots who are over defensive, rather than all pilots. There certainly are some of those, and they are a minority, thankfully, but often quite noisy. The most professional/'best' pilots are almost never in that category in my experience.

[Alber Ratman]

Sherif, the CAA minimum for currency for flying an intermediate PtF Jet seems a little low compared to your requirement to stay current. I think there might be a change or two to the CAP post the review on the matter.

[Reheat On]

I see the bar is still open

That bulletin is interesting for between the line reading. It is a taken that the AAIB are competent, but even that must be tested.

Now we still do not not know why events occurred but these AAIB comments nudge my eyebrow, partly in understanding and partly in some worry-some thought.

He held a valid Display Authorisation (DA), issued by the UK CAA, to
display the Hawker Hunter to a minimum height of 100 ft during flypasts and 500 ft during Standard 3 category aerobatic manoeuvres.

The 100'/500' minima are normal in DAs and as this was a vertical manouver, the pilot would expect to reach gate height for a vertical recovery by 500' .

I am not sure I wholly agree with the AAIB stating

executing a Derry turn to the left and then commenced a descending left turn to 200 ft amsl, approaching the display line at an angle
of about 45º

My eyeball on the day [from a ringside 400m] and review of video footage with an Ordnance Survey map would have suggested he approached broadly on the A Axis and rolled off it. The crash is 45 degree of axis so he cannot have started at 45 degrees - seemples! But that is nit picking.

OTOH it but causes me to temper my interpretation of AAIB facts with a healthy pinch of salt a this time. Even AAIB can be guilty of some mild speculation.

A manoeuvre of change of axis [from some degree off A axis to a greater number of degrees off it is complicated by the 1000' restriction over the residential area to the West of the airfield.

It creates both a temptation and a requirement to 'keep it tight'.

From the pilot’s electronic logbook, it was established that the pilot had flown a total of 40.25 hours in the Hunter since 26 May 2011,

That being 10 hours per year. That, to my mind, may not affect the competency of an individual to both fly and low level aerobat the a/c, but it may affect future DA issues when viewed in the context a planned aerobatic display for the public.

An analysis of the information using photogrammetry techniques will be undertaken to establish the parameters of the aircraft manoeuvres, including flight path and speed.

In other words they have yet undertaken an analysis of flight path and speed. Interesting ... or they have but the outcome needs double and triple checking before they go hard.

The maximum altitude recorded during the final manoeuvre was 2,600 ft amsl (recorded by Heathrow radar),

and

Initial findings indicate that the minimum air speed of the aircraft was approximately 100 KIAS whilst inverted at the top of the manoeuvre.

Now AAIB would not state this if they were not sure as sure can be - so we may assume these are facts which would pass for government work.

So your homework for this week Bloggs:

Let's talk about that old aerodynamic monkey, the stall.

In particular an stall while inverted at a nudge under 3000'. With 10 seconds to sort it out.

Here's the pen, there's the marker board, you draw it. I'm off for a coffee.

[Stanwell]

Excellent post, Reheat.

[oldmansquipper]

Tragically Ironic?

From the AAIB report.

"It commenced a gentle climbing right turn to 1,600 ft amsl, executing a Derry turn to the left and then commenced a descending left turn to 200 ft amsl,..."

[deefer dog]

So your homework for this week Bloggs:

Let's talk about that old aerodynamic monkey, the stall.

In particular an stall while inverted at a nudge under 3000'. With 10 seconds to sort it out.

Here's the pen, there's the marker board, you draw it. I'm off for a coffee.

Airspeed has little to do with it - it's the acceleration that matters, but you knew that anyway, or was it a trick question? If the aircraft was close to zero G at the top, the stall speed would also have been close to zero. At the top, assuming the engine was still developing thrust, the aircraft would have started to accelerate in both senses of the word - thrust + vertical component of W increasing the airspeed, and the G acceleration of pulling around the curve.

From what I observed in the video the aircraft did not looked "distressed" due to low speed at the top, and I would strongly disagree with the notion that may only have been 10 seconds to sort something out at this point even if he had been concerned about his airspeed, or gate height. In any event, had there been a problem at the top, say as a result of loss of thrust, or whatever, I am sure the pilot would have pulled to an inverted 30 or 45 downline and then simply rolled erect, rather than consider an entire pull through.

There did however appear to be (to me at least) a rather more "gentle" pull from the vertical than I might have expected - until it became obvious that the ground was looming rapidly. Shortly prior to impact it appeared to me to be fully stalled in an accelerated state...and perhaps also the apparent wing rock immediately prior to impact was the aircraft saying "I'm about to let go." Terribly sad, and I am sure there is more to it than simply PE.