The Shar Decision - Questioning "Their Lordships"`
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The Shar Decision - Questioning "Their Lordships"`
Ppruners!
Sea Harrier FA2 withdrawal from Service: the Decision
I have followed this debate with considerable interest and I note with great approval that there is overwhelming support for reversing the Sea Harrier FA2 withdrawal decision. That “approval” is a result of my background as a professional aviator and an acknowledged Air Warfare expert with considerable active experience.
The Sea Harrier FA2 is by the US and NATO as one of the most capable all weather BVR fighters in the world. It represents the first line of air defence for the Fleet and for Joint Task Force operations. It may also be seen as the eyes of the Task Force Commander, able to see all types of air movement within its extended radar coverage over land or sea. It is the one weapons system in UK service today that has the proven ability to detect, intercept and destroy all known air threats that might menace Task Force units – whether naval or on land.
But its most important capability is the ability to deter such threats. As such, it most definitely qualifies as an air superiority fighter that can deny the use of airspace to threat aircraft. Arguably, it is therefore an indispensable constituent of the expeditionary force policy that has been laid down by the Government in Defence Policy Statement 2001. (If you haven’t read this, you should do so – ask and I’ll send!)
What then is the operational argument for this FA2 withdrawal decision? Our Naval and Air Staff Chiefs have combined to support it strongly. They talk about learning from experience and applying the lessons learned from that experience.
Let us briefly examine their personal experience in the context of the last twenty years or so.
First Sea Lord (1SL), Admiral Sir Nigel Essenhigh has served with distinction as a Hydrographer. And he also served with “the grey funnel line” in the Gulf during the Kuwait crisis. That was when there was zero actual threat to our ships from Iraqi aircraft and when the US Navy and US Air Force had established air superiority over the Gulf area. (At the time, the RAF Tornado F3 flew CAP missions over the water well clear of hostilities – it didn’t have an effective weapon system, couldn’t fly high enough and is still the same on both counts.) This “active” experience obviously convinced 1SL that modern expeditionary force operations will always take place in a benign environment – i.e. when nestled under the umbrella of US firepower. His operational experience and, probably, his judgement rests on that Kuwait experience and, perhaps, because of that one might excuse his part in this appalling defence decision.
Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Squire is a very different animal. An ex Harrier GR3 pilot, he is a “mud-mover” and as such he flew several exacting war missions in the Falklands. (The GR3s flew 157 sorties when down South of which only about 59 were active missions over enemy territory. They lost 6 aircraft, five to enemy action. The Sea Harrier flew about 1600 missions, 90% of which were against the enemy. They lost six aircraft, two to enemy ground fire, three from pressing too hard and one just fell off the deck. Mind you it was rough!) So for every 12 low-level attack missions, one GR3 was lost to enemy fire. For every 800 Sea Harrier missions, one was lost to enemy fire – and none air-to-air. These statistics speak volumes about the outdated practice of low-level direct attack missions in the face of relatively simple ground-to-air defences.
None of Sir Peter’s missions were flown with any real threat of attack by enemy fighters. That was because the Sea Harrier deterred such attacks – just as it turned away 453 Argentinean attack missions that were destined to deliver their war load against our ships and ground forces.
In the light of this and of other MoD-accepted statistics from the Falklands campaign, one might justifiably assume the following to be true:
a. Sir Peter and his GR3 boys faced and put aside considerable personal danger when doing their gallant work down South;
b. In spite of this, and apart from a staged fire power demo over Goose Green in support of the Paras, in real military terms the GR3 did not destroy/achieve much (their contribution to the success of the campaign was therefore small but welcome);
c. The Sea Harrier knocked down a couple of dozen enemy aircraft;
d. The Sea Harrier prevented more than 450 enemy attack aircraft from reaching their targets and delivering up to 1,800 HEMC bombs against our Task Force Units;
e. The Sea Harrier provided a relatively benign air environment in which the GR3 could operate;
f. The Sea Harrier delivered at least as much ordnance against enemy ground targets as the GR3 (mainly from medium level);
g. The multi-role Sea Harrier achievements and presence made a most significant contribution to the Campaign success, facilitating the eventual victory by our ground forces.
Perhaps you can see a pattern emerging here. The Sea Harrier was vital to the success of the Falklands Task Force campaign. The GR3 was not.
Since then, the Sea Harrier has been involved in every expeditionary force type operation conducted by British forces. It has acquitted itself with distinction in Bosnia, Kosova, Sierra Leone and in policing the “No fly zone” over Iraq (F3s have also done this Iraq task – but only when escorted by proven all weather BVR fighters). It has successfully carried out air space denial, reconnaissance and ground attack missions.
In stark contrast and through no fault of its pilots (genuinely the “cream of the Royal Air Force”), the “chosen son” of 1SL and CAS, the Ground Attack Harrier (GR3/7) has not actually achieved very much at all. It hardly ever embarks in Her Majesty’s carriers and when it does, it faces many problems such as not being able to find its way back to the ship (Sierra Leone). This is hardly an enviable track record in Task Force terms compared to the FA2.
Yet 1SL and CAS have for reasons best known to themselves (but not enunciated publicly – one must ignore the verbage on financial imperatives and jointery – neither hold water) taken the operational judgement to throw away the FA2 and to keep the GR7. This judgement must be described as “appalling” especially when measured against CAS’ personal operational experience.
In very simple terms, the decision taken represents a very real threat to the security and survival of our Joint Task Force personnel (including the GR7 boys). It is not backed by operational experience, expertise or logic. As such it must be viewed as unacceptable.
It is my impression that 1SL and CAS are not paid to be politicians. They are paid to honour the Queen, defend her dominions and to provide our military personnel with the proper wherewithal to wage war without unnecessary loss of life.
Quite clearly they are failing to do this.
There is no doubt that when at the top in the MoD one faces many pressures. Some of these, I am acquainted with and some, perhaps not. But one should not attribute “black magic powers” to those who loftily tread the hallowed corridors of Whitehall. Instead, we should remind them that the decisions they take can indeed cost lives and that when alternative courses are open to them that provide much less risk to our servicemen and women, these are the courses that should be chosen.
With the threat to the homeland base being rated as very small in the SDR and DP2001, is it not illogical to be spending a lot of money on upgrading the impotent F3 when its successor, the Euro-fighter will enter service at about the same time that its upgrade is complete. And could we not “make do” with say, 250 Euro-fighters instead of about 330 in this low threat environment. Either or both options would easily release adequate funding to keep the FA2 in service and to ensure the viability and survivability of “Expeditionary Task Force Operations”.
Please reply if you would like to hear more!
Sea Harrier FA2 withdrawal from Service: the Decision
I have followed this debate with considerable interest and I note with great approval that there is overwhelming support for reversing the Sea Harrier FA2 withdrawal decision. That “approval” is a result of my background as a professional aviator and an acknowledged Air Warfare expert with considerable active experience.
The Sea Harrier FA2 is by the US and NATO as one of the most capable all weather BVR fighters in the world. It represents the first line of air defence for the Fleet and for Joint Task Force operations. It may also be seen as the eyes of the Task Force Commander, able to see all types of air movement within its extended radar coverage over land or sea. It is the one weapons system in UK service today that has the proven ability to detect, intercept and destroy all known air threats that might menace Task Force units – whether naval or on land.
But its most important capability is the ability to deter such threats. As such, it most definitely qualifies as an air superiority fighter that can deny the use of airspace to threat aircraft. Arguably, it is therefore an indispensable constituent of the expeditionary force policy that has been laid down by the Government in Defence Policy Statement 2001. (If you haven’t read this, you should do so – ask and I’ll send!)
What then is the operational argument for this FA2 withdrawal decision? Our Naval and Air Staff Chiefs have combined to support it strongly. They talk about learning from experience and applying the lessons learned from that experience.
Let us briefly examine their personal experience in the context of the last twenty years or so.
First Sea Lord (1SL), Admiral Sir Nigel Essenhigh has served with distinction as a Hydrographer. And he also served with “the grey funnel line” in the Gulf during the Kuwait crisis. That was when there was zero actual threat to our ships from Iraqi aircraft and when the US Navy and US Air Force had established air superiority over the Gulf area. (At the time, the RAF Tornado F3 flew CAP missions over the water well clear of hostilities – it didn’t have an effective weapon system, couldn’t fly high enough and is still the same on both counts.) This “active” experience obviously convinced 1SL that modern expeditionary force operations will always take place in a benign environment – i.e. when nestled under the umbrella of US firepower. His operational experience and, probably, his judgement rests on that Kuwait experience and, perhaps, because of that one might excuse his part in this appalling defence decision.
Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Squire is a very different animal. An ex Harrier GR3 pilot, he is a “mud-mover” and as such he flew several exacting war missions in the Falklands. (The GR3s flew 157 sorties when down South of which only about 59 were active missions over enemy territory. They lost 6 aircraft, five to enemy action. The Sea Harrier flew about 1600 missions, 90% of which were against the enemy. They lost six aircraft, two to enemy ground fire, three from pressing too hard and one just fell off the deck. Mind you it was rough!) So for every 12 low-level attack missions, one GR3 was lost to enemy fire. For every 800 Sea Harrier missions, one was lost to enemy fire – and none air-to-air. These statistics speak volumes about the outdated practice of low-level direct attack missions in the face of relatively simple ground-to-air defences.
None of Sir Peter’s missions were flown with any real threat of attack by enemy fighters. That was because the Sea Harrier deterred such attacks – just as it turned away 453 Argentinean attack missions that were destined to deliver their war load against our ships and ground forces.
In the light of this and of other MoD-accepted statistics from the Falklands campaign, one might justifiably assume the following to be true:
a. Sir Peter and his GR3 boys faced and put aside considerable personal danger when doing their gallant work down South;
b. In spite of this, and apart from a staged fire power demo over Goose Green in support of the Paras, in real military terms the GR3 did not destroy/achieve much (their contribution to the success of the campaign was therefore small but welcome);
c. The Sea Harrier knocked down a couple of dozen enemy aircraft;
d. The Sea Harrier prevented more than 450 enemy attack aircraft from reaching their targets and delivering up to 1,800 HEMC bombs against our Task Force Units;
e. The Sea Harrier provided a relatively benign air environment in which the GR3 could operate;
f. The Sea Harrier delivered at least as much ordnance against enemy ground targets as the GR3 (mainly from medium level);
g. The multi-role Sea Harrier achievements and presence made a most significant contribution to the Campaign success, facilitating the eventual victory by our ground forces.
Perhaps you can see a pattern emerging here. The Sea Harrier was vital to the success of the Falklands Task Force campaign. The GR3 was not.
Since then, the Sea Harrier has been involved in every expeditionary force type operation conducted by British forces. It has acquitted itself with distinction in Bosnia, Kosova, Sierra Leone and in policing the “No fly zone” over Iraq (F3s have also done this Iraq task – but only when escorted by proven all weather BVR fighters). It has successfully carried out air space denial, reconnaissance and ground attack missions.
In stark contrast and through no fault of its pilots (genuinely the “cream of the Royal Air Force”), the “chosen son” of 1SL and CAS, the Ground Attack Harrier (GR3/7) has not actually achieved very much at all. It hardly ever embarks in Her Majesty’s carriers and when it does, it faces many problems such as not being able to find its way back to the ship (Sierra Leone). This is hardly an enviable track record in Task Force terms compared to the FA2.
Yet 1SL and CAS have for reasons best known to themselves (but not enunciated publicly – one must ignore the verbage on financial imperatives and jointery – neither hold water) taken the operational judgement to throw away the FA2 and to keep the GR7. This judgement must be described as “appalling” especially when measured against CAS’ personal operational experience.
In very simple terms, the decision taken represents a very real threat to the security and survival of our Joint Task Force personnel (including the GR7 boys). It is not backed by operational experience, expertise or logic. As such it must be viewed as unacceptable.
It is my impression that 1SL and CAS are not paid to be politicians. They are paid to honour the Queen, defend her dominions and to provide our military personnel with the proper wherewithal to wage war without unnecessary loss of life.
Quite clearly they are failing to do this.
There is no doubt that when at the top in the MoD one faces many pressures. Some of these, I am acquainted with and some, perhaps not. But one should not attribute “black magic powers” to those who loftily tread the hallowed corridors of Whitehall. Instead, we should remind them that the decisions they take can indeed cost lives and that when alternative courses are open to them that provide much less risk to our servicemen and women, these are the courses that should be chosen.
With the threat to the homeland base being rated as very small in the SDR and DP2001, is it not illogical to be spending a lot of money on upgrading the impotent F3 when its successor, the Euro-fighter will enter service at about the same time that its upgrade is complete. And could we not “make do” with say, 250 Euro-fighters instead of about 330 in this low threat environment. Either or both options would easily release adequate funding to keep the FA2 in service and to ensure the viability and survivability of “Expeditionary Task Force Operations”.
Please reply if you would like to hear more!
Well posted. A clear and very readable summary of the essential need for SHAR2; a need which will hardly diminish given Blair's flawed logic of requiring global air power projection without having the the actual means to do so and without adequate force protection for those discharging this policy.
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'Bravo'
A fine summary of the disastrous decision on the SHAR. But I'm not sure that anyone on high will listen to reasoned argument.
Once upon a time, I was told that it was a sign of good leadership and honour to admit your mistakes - otherwise people will see you for the charlatan that you are and as someone who doesn't have the courage to admit 'sorry chaps, I cocked that one'! Unfortunately, a point lost on the 'leadership' of today, both political and military.
A fine summary of the disastrous decision on the SHAR. But I'm not sure that anyone on high will listen to reasoned argument.
Once upon a time, I was told that it was a sign of good leadership and honour to admit your mistakes - otherwise people will see you for the charlatan that you are and as someone who doesn't have the courage to admit 'sorry chaps, I cocked that one'! Unfortunately, a point lost on the 'leadership' of today, both political and military.
alphaleaderuk ,
Not disagreeing with your sentiments, but a couple of things: according to Falklands Air War (recommended by several ppruners as the best source on the war), the losses for the GR 3s are given as four, not six. One of these losses was not to enemy action (CAS himself discovering that it is awkward to fly without an engine). Also, I think it's only fair to point out that the GR 3s 'arrived late' (not their fault) and were only operational from 20 May - as they were there in smaller numbers too, it's only natural that they'd fly far fewer sorties.
The view that the three GR 3 losses to ground fire would have been 3 SHAR losses had the GR 3s not been there might also be put forward (I'm not sure about the validity of that, but it's a argument I've heard). Your point about the loss rates, though, is fair enough.
This said, you're quite right - it's frankly daft to remove SHAR capability, and coupled with the decision not to integrate ASRAAM (see another thread), the govt's contention that what AD that's required can be performed adequately looks even more threadbare than before. Of course, if a CVS gets sunk as a result, it will all be the fault of the ship's Captain/ CAS/ 1SL/ the woman who makes the tea in Sec State's Office, but most emphatically not the fault of anyone with the letters 'MP PC' after their name...
Not disagreeing with your sentiments, but a couple of things: according to Falklands Air War (recommended by several ppruners as the best source on the war), the losses for the GR 3s are given as four, not six. One of these losses was not to enemy action (CAS himself discovering that it is awkward to fly without an engine). Also, I think it's only fair to point out that the GR 3s 'arrived late' (not their fault) and were only operational from 20 May - as they were there in smaller numbers too, it's only natural that they'd fly far fewer sorties.
The view that the three GR 3 losses to ground fire would have been 3 SHAR losses had the GR 3s not been there might also be put forward (I'm not sure about the validity of that, but it's a argument I've heard). Your point about the loss rates, though, is fair enough.
This said, you're quite right - it's frankly daft to remove SHAR capability, and coupled with the decision not to integrate ASRAAM (see another thread), the govt's contention that what AD that's required can be performed adequately looks even more threadbare than before. Of course, if a CVS gets sunk as a result, it will all be the fault of the ship's Captain/ CAS/ 1SL/ the woman who makes the tea in Sec State's Office, but most emphatically not the fault of anyone with the letters 'MP PC' after their name...
Well argued but inaccurate in places! Some very dodgy analysis of the part played by the GR 3 in the Falklands (they were sent south mainly as FRS1 attrition replacements, remember, and weren't needed, and had they not done the low level BAI then SHars would have had to - a role in which they proved equally vulnerable). The SHar won the Falklands, but it has proved less vital in all subsequent operations. The GR3 did rather better than you infer, and the GR7 is anentirely different proposition, with a heavier warload, longer range and a genuine night attack and PGM capability, all capabilities sadly lacking in the SHar.
Also cutting back EF procurement from 330 to 250 would certainly save 'loadsamoney' but since the number being procured is 232 to support an active fleet of about 140 are you suggesting that we buy more?
No-one argues that the SHar isn't a great and useful bit of kit, only whether it's worth retaining in the face of other, more versatile and more useful priorities.
And we do have allies who can provide this level of air cover .............. if we need carrier aviation at all.
Also cutting back EF procurement from 330 to 250 would certainly save 'loadsamoney' but since the number being procured is 232 to support an active fleet of about 140 are you suggesting that we buy more?
No-one argues that the SHar isn't a great and useful bit of kit, only whether it's worth retaining in the face of other, more versatile and more useful priorities.
And we do have allies who can provide this level of air cover .............. if we need carrier aviation at all.
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Getting the Baseline Right
Ppruners,
GETTING THE BASELINE RIGHT
I am going to presume to take us all back to basics in this debate so that, hopefully, when you decide to write to the press or to your MP you will consider reminding your reader/s of such basics. MoD appears to have forgotten or disregarded some of them. I see the basics as:-
1. Our armed forces represent one of several tools that the Government uses to ensure that Britain’s interests at home and abroad are protected (other tools include politics, diplomacy, economic devices, counter-intelligence, etc.).
2. The foundation for the make-up of our armed forces is Defence Policy as given in the Strategic Defence Review (and follow-up amendments such as DP2001). It is against this Policy that decisions should be taken concerning the effective equipping of each of the three Services.
3. When a major shift in Defence Policy occurs (e.g. following the end of the Cold War) and because Defence spending is always tightly controlled, a review of existing assets should be made and balanced against the needs of the new Policy.
4. It is very clear that “offensive expeditionary force operations” are at the forefront of current Government Policy. As such, this JTF capability should be given high priority by our Service Chiefs and, where shortfalls in JTF funding occur, lesser priority projects/capabilities should be critically examined with a view to making any necessary financial savings. The last place that cuts in vital operational capability should be made is, logically, in the stated priority area -JTF weapon systems and personnel.
5. Too often, the different Services have to fight for limited funds – and frequently, the one with the loudest voice (the most desk officers in Whitehall) wins the day. Such inter-service funding battles often obscure the main issues of Policy. These lead not only to “empire building/conservation” but they can arguably become a tool for changing stated Government Policy via the back door (something which should be anathema to the House of Commons).
6. What then of the Central Staffs? Are they not there to moderate the otherwise adverse effects of inter-service funding battles and to ensure that MoD spending does indeed match the stated needs of Government Policy? If that is the case, then the Chief of Defence Staff and his “Central” subordinates have been suspiciously silent during the current FA2 debate. Could this be because CDS, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, does not wish to be seen in any way biased towards the needs of the Navy? Or, is it more likely that the partisan Financial/Empire Building squabbles between the three services have contaminated Central Staff judgement?
I trust that the above represents a reasonably accurate summary of the basics affecting this debate. Add to the above, the need to preserve the lives of our servicemen, to spend tax-payers’ money wisely and to protect our expensive equipment investments and you are then in the a position to analyse more accurately the MoD statement released at the time that the FA2 decision was made public – and to judge whether this decision was indeed as misguided as I believe it was.
I shall forward parts of that MoD statement with appropriate comment in my next post. Later, I shill look at expanding this debate to take a critical/clinical look at lesser priority projects/capabilities that should be examined with a view to making the essential financial savings needed to secure the future of the FA2.
Final Comment: “What Mr Ingram should have said concerning the FA2 decision.”
It could be concluded that the UK Armed Forces Minister, Adam Ingram, intentionally misled the Nation when making his announcements concerning the demise of the Sea Harrier. His statement is damning more by what he didn’t say than what he did. Let us review what he should have said but left out:
a. Elimination of the Sea Harrier FA2 force from Joint Force Harrier will deny the Fleet at large and its JTF operations its first line of air defence for at least 8 and probably more than 10 years.
b. The loss of this first line of air defence will be compounded by a gap in service between the current Type 42 Air Defence Destroyers and the new Type 45 Air Defence Destroyers; leaving the Fleet at sea vulnerable to even the least sophisticated air to surface weapon systems for up to 10 years.
c. The Harrier GR7 and GR9 do not have any form of Air-to-Air radar and will be fitted with a short range, fire and forget, Air-to-Air missile. These Harrier versions are very slow compared with any other fast jet attack/fighter aircraft. They will therefore be unable to get close to an attacking aircraft in order to engage it and will be unable to run away from any fast jet fighter aircraft. With their lack of radar and without a Beyond Visual Range weapon system (like the Sea Harrier FA2 Blue Vixen/AMRAAM system) they will be unable to provide the Fleet with a first line of air defence beyond the radar horizon.
d. Operational experience since 1980 has shown that Low Level Ground Attack Aircraft such as the Harrier GR7/9 and the Tornado GR1/4 are extremely vulnerable to ground fire. Without true stand-off SMART weapons and Airborne Electronic Warfare (Jamming) support, the GR7/9 force will not endow a JTF with any “credible expeditionary offensive capability”.
e. The Government is spending a large amount of money on the latest update to the Tornado F3. This update may at last, after twenty years in service endow the Tornado with a working Air-to-Air weapon system. However, the Euro-fighter is soon to enter service and will replace the Tornado. The money that is being spent on Tornado is therefore being wasted and it should be taken out of service. As neither Tornado nor Euro-fighter are capable of defending the Fleet at sea, the money being wasted on Tornado should be applied to running the Sea Harrier FA2 force on until the Future Joint Combat Aircraft (JSF) enters service.
f. The Nimrod is not an effective Anti-Submarine Warfare vehicle. Even with better avionic systems that may allow it to detect and prosecute a submarine threat, this will be of limited use to the Nation because:
i. The agreed submarine threat against the UK mainland is now low (Strategic Defence Review);
ii The Nimrod is a land based aircraft with limited range and can not therefore support Fleet/JTF operations away from the UK base “without prepositioning” (Defence Policy 2001 Statement).
The £3 billion (US$4.3 billion) being spent on the Nimrod upgrade would therefore be better spent on maintaining an effective first line of air defence for the Fleet and on upgrading the already proven Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare systems.
g. The RAF have three types of attack/reconnaissance fighters in service: the Tornado GR4, the Harrier GR7 and the Jaguar. If money has to be saved and spent on realistic military capability, the Jaguar should be withdrawn from service now and the strengths of the GR4 fleet and the Harrier GR7 fleets rationalised.
Logical thinkers, strategists and tacticians might well have formed the view that the UK Air Staff had not given up their efforts to deprive the Fleet of Organic Air Defence. Is this still their aim? And will the present UK Government now address these scandalous issues and begin to demonstrate a true intention to follow the principles laid down in Defence Policy 2001 Statement?
The UK has been lucky to survive without any real mainland air defence for over twenty years. Now that Euro-fighter is being procured to correct that situation, let us not now denude our Fleet of the capability to defend itself. “Maximising investment in one aircraft type” (Harrier GR7/9) will definitely bring “greater certainty” to JTF operations prior to the Future Joint Combat Aircraft and Britain’s two new aircraft carriers. That certainty will be the inability of a JTF to defend itself from air attack and the possible loss of many lives and ships in any limited war engagement.
GETTING THE BASELINE RIGHT
I am going to presume to take us all back to basics in this debate so that, hopefully, when you decide to write to the press or to your MP you will consider reminding your reader/s of such basics. MoD appears to have forgotten or disregarded some of them. I see the basics as:-
1. Our armed forces represent one of several tools that the Government uses to ensure that Britain’s interests at home and abroad are protected (other tools include politics, diplomacy, economic devices, counter-intelligence, etc.).
2. The foundation for the make-up of our armed forces is Defence Policy as given in the Strategic Defence Review (and follow-up amendments such as DP2001). It is against this Policy that decisions should be taken concerning the effective equipping of each of the three Services.
3. When a major shift in Defence Policy occurs (e.g. following the end of the Cold War) and because Defence spending is always tightly controlled, a review of existing assets should be made and balanced against the needs of the new Policy.
4. It is very clear that “offensive expeditionary force operations” are at the forefront of current Government Policy. As such, this JTF capability should be given high priority by our Service Chiefs and, where shortfalls in JTF funding occur, lesser priority projects/capabilities should be critically examined with a view to making any necessary financial savings. The last place that cuts in vital operational capability should be made is, logically, in the stated priority area -JTF weapon systems and personnel.
5. Too often, the different Services have to fight for limited funds – and frequently, the one with the loudest voice (the most desk officers in Whitehall) wins the day. Such inter-service funding battles often obscure the main issues of Policy. These lead not only to “empire building/conservation” but they can arguably become a tool for changing stated Government Policy via the back door (something which should be anathema to the House of Commons).
6. What then of the Central Staffs? Are they not there to moderate the otherwise adverse effects of inter-service funding battles and to ensure that MoD spending does indeed match the stated needs of Government Policy? If that is the case, then the Chief of Defence Staff and his “Central” subordinates have been suspiciously silent during the current FA2 debate. Could this be because CDS, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, does not wish to be seen in any way biased towards the needs of the Navy? Or, is it more likely that the partisan Financial/Empire Building squabbles between the three services have contaminated Central Staff judgement?
I trust that the above represents a reasonably accurate summary of the basics affecting this debate. Add to the above, the need to preserve the lives of our servicemen, to spend tax-payers’ money wisely and to protect our expensive equipment investments and you are then in the a position to analyse more accurately the MoD statement released at the time that the FA2 decision was made public – and to judge whether this decision was indeed as misguided as I believe it was.
I shall forward parts of that MoD statement with appropriate comment in my next post. Later, I shill look at expanding this debate to take a critical/clinical look at lesser priority projects/capabilities that should be examined with a view to making the essential financial savings needed to secure the future of the FA2.
Final Comment: “What Mr Ingram should have said concerning the FA2 decision.”
It could be concluded that the UK Armed Forces Minister, Adam Ingram, intentionally misled the Nation when making his announcements concerning the demise of the Sea Harrier. His statement is damning more by what he didn’t say than what he did. Let us review what he should have said but left out:
a. Elimination of the Sea Harrier FA2 force from Joint Force Harrier will deny the Fleet at large and its JTF operations its first line of air defence for at least 8 and probably more than 10 years.
b. The loss of this first line of air defence will be compounded by a gap in service between the current Type 42 Air Defence Destroyers and the new Type 45 Air Defence Destroyers; leaving the Fleet at sea vulnerable to even the least sophisticated air to surface weapon systems for up to 10 years.
c. The Harrier GR7 and GR9 do not have any form of Air-to-Air radar and will be fitted with a short range, fire and forget, Air-to-Air missile. These Harrier versions are very slow compared with any other fast jet attack/fighter aircraft. They will therefore be unable to get close to an attacking aircraft in order to engage it and will be unable to run away from any fast jet fighter aircraft. With their lack of radar and without a Beyond Visual Range weapon system (like the Sea Harrier FA2 Blue Vixen/AMRAAM system) they will be unable to provide the Fleet with a first line of air defence beyond the radar horizon.
d. Operational experience since 1980 has shown that Low Level Ground Attack Aircraft such as the Harrier GR7/9 and the Tornado GR1/4 are extremely vulnerable to ground fire. Without true stand-off SMART weapons and Airborne Electronic Warfare (Jamming) support, the GR7/9 force will not endow a JTF with any “credible expeditionary offensive capability”.
e. The Government is spending a large amount of money on the latest update to the Tornado F3. This update may at last, after twenty years in service endow the Tornado with a working Air-to-Air weapon system. However, the Euro-fighter is soon to enter service and will replace the Tornado. The money that is being spent on Tornado is therefore being wasted and it should be taken out of service. As neither Tornado nor Euro-fighter are capable of defending the Fleet at sea, the money being wasted on Tornado should be applied to running the Sea Harrier FA2 force on until the Future Joint Combat Aircraft (JSF) enters service.
f. The Nimrod is not an effective Anti-Submarine Warfare vehicle. Even with better avionic systems that may allow it to detect and prosecute a submarine threat, this will be of limited use to the Nation because:
i. The agreed submarine threat against the UK mainland is now low (Strategic Defence Review);
ii The Nimrod is a land based aircraft with limited range and can not therefore support Fleet/JTF operations away from the UK base “without prepositioning” (Defence Policy 2001 Statement).
The £3 billion (US$4.3 billion) being spent on the Nimrod upgrade would therefore be better spent on maintaining an effective first line of air defence for the Fleet and on upgrading the already proven Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare systems.
g. The RAF have three types of attack/reconnaissance fighters in service: the Tornado GR4, the Harrier GR7 and the Jaguar. If money has to be saved and spent on realistic military capability, the Jaguar should be withdrawn from service now and the strengths of the GR4 fleet and the Harrier GR7 fleets rationalised.
Logical thinkers, strategists and tacticians might well have formed the view that the UK Air Staff had not given up their efforts to deprive the Fleet of Organic Air Defence. Is this still their aim? And will the present UK Government now address these scandalous issues and begin to demonstrate a true intention to follow the principles laid down in Defence Policy 2001 Statement?
The UK has been lucky to survive without any real mainland air defence for over twenty years. Now that Euro-fighter is being procured to correct that situation, let us not now denude our Fleet of the capability to defend itself. “Maximising investment in one aircraft type” (Harrier GR7/9) will definitely bring “greater certainty” to JTF operations prior to the Future Joint Combat Aircraft and Britain’s two new aircraft carriers. That certainty will be the inability of a JTF to defend itself from air attack and the possible loss of many lives and ships in any limited war engagement.
You've been in the sun too long, chum!
Your view on the Jaguar is out-of-date and erroneous. You have a pre-TIALD/pre-EO Recce/Pre-Granby view of the aircraft, which has consistently proved to be the most deployable, flexible and economical OS platform available to force commanders in recent years.
Your view on the F3 is similarly behind the curve. With JTIDS and AMRAAM it does quite well enough, and with minor investment in ELS, TIALD and recce could have become a very useful multi-role aeroplane. It's Eurofighter by the way, not Euro-fighter.
Our post Cold War post SDR posture does NOT envisage autonomous national operations, so the lack of any one particular capability is not in itself a problem. The SHar just happens to be the easiest thing to ditch, and certainly represents a less useful capability than is offered by the Jag or the F3. If the Navy had been more realistic when it came to assessing the post Cold War usefulness of Trident, I'd be a little more sympathetic, but while it may be a bad choice to bin SHar, it's the 'least bad' choice if one fixed wing FJ fleet has to disappear.
Personally I'd have kept the SHar for land based air defence and binned the carriers, but there you are ..........
On a more serious note, were the forces serious about Smart procurement, and was best practise employed (following the Jag upgrade template rather than the GR4 template for other upgrades, for example) there might be more money in the kitty. Propping up BAE with inflated price contracts for gold-plated and often inappropriately Gucci programmes should not be a matter for the defence budget. If it's industrially necessary for BAE to prosper, then let the DTI pay for it.
WEBF,
I know you want to fly SHars. Get over it. Join the RAF and fly GR7s or if you must bob about on the briny, then fly a Lynx. You'd be lucky to do either job, and either job would give you just as much challenge and satisfaction.
Your view on the Jaguar is out-of-date and erroneous. You have a pre-TIALD/pre-EO Recce/Pre-Granby view of the aircraft, which has consistently proved to be the most deployable, flexible and economical OS platform available to force commanders in recent years.
Your view on the F3 is similarly behind the curve. With JTIDS and AMRAAM it does quite well enough, and with minor investment in ELS, TIALD and recce could have become a very useful multi-role aeroplane. It's Eurofighter by the way, not Euro-fighter.
Our post Cold War post SDR posture does NOT envisage autonomous national operations, so the lack of any one particular capability is not in itself a problem. The SHar just happens to be the easiest thing to ditch, and certainly represents a less useful capability than is offered by the Jag or the F3. If the Navy had been more realistic when it came to assessing the post Cold War usefulness of Trident, I'd be a little more sympathetic, but while it may be a bad choice to bin SHar, it's the 'least bad' choice if one fixed wing FJ fleet has to disappear.
Personally I'd have kept the SHar for land based air defence and binned the carriers, but there you are ..........
On a more serious note, were the forces serious about Smart procurement, and was best practise employed (following the Jag upgrade template rather than the GR4 template for other upgrades, for example) there might be more money in the kitty. Propping up BAE with inflated price contracts for gold-plated and often inappropriately Gucci programmes should not be a matter for the defence budget. If it's industrially necessary for BAE to prosper, then let the DTI pay for it.
WEBF,
I know you want to fly SHars. Get over it. Join the RAF and fly GR7s or if you must bob about on the briny, then fly a Lynx. You'd be lucky to do either job, and either job would give you just as much challenge and satisfaction.
Last edited by Jackonicko; 22nd May 2002 at 20:08.
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Gentlemen, in pure military terms the argument to keep FA2 until JCA is compelling. You all put the case well. However, your arguments would be even more compelling if you resisted the temptation to descend into tribalism by making statements about other forces that are not only derogatory but inaccurate. However(!) following your lead:
Fact 1:
I have read some utter rot about how well the FA2s performed during DELIBERATE FORCE. If you were there and supported this shame on you. If you were not don't comment. Do not get me wrong, the FA2 boys did well considering the weapon aiming systems they were using. But do be not fooled into believing their performance came close to the Harrier GR7/ Jaguar performance dropping LGBs. Furthermore, mounting a cap over Albania during ALLIED FORCE does not constitute 'a credible offensive capability'. Although the GR4/ GR7 made a greater contribution during ALLIED FORCE, I would ask those forces to look at their statistics before they crow too loud.
Fact 2:
I completely agree that the GR7 is not a credible air defence platform and the FA2 is. However, you that done it, know that even the 65% Lerx GR7 (let alone the 100% lerx) has superior manoeuvrability in the close fight (and I agree we do not necessarily end up there). That being said the boys in dark blue are probably better trained.
Fact 3:
Jacko the Jaguar message is wearing thin! Speak to the Norwich stano about survivability in anything other than a benign environment. Sorry but despite the quality of the pilots, and the fact it is a useful avionics testbed, the Jaguar is underpowered and has an ew suite that only the FA2 would envy. You do not have long left - the RN are correct; you are the weakest link good bye (if only because we need the money). Medium level at a push, with an attack/recce capability equal to or less than the others does not merit 'flexibility'. If its economy we want lets arm up those Hawks.
If only the FA2 had not been described as the only ac with a 'credible, expeditionary, offensive capability', I could have kept my normal place in the shadows. Sorry 'alphaleaderuk' I am not going to patronise you with my reasons for speaking with authority but I suspect you might recognise some home truths. The FA2 community has a lot of support don't spoil it by throwing inaccurate stones.
Thanks for the therapy. Pin out, roll grenade and step back to the sidelines...
Fact 1:
I have read some utter rot about how well the FA2s performed during DELIBERATE FORCE. If you were there and supported this shame on you. If you were not don't comment. Do not get me wrong, the FA2 boys did well considering the weapon aiming systems they were using. But do be not fooled into believing their performance came close to the Harrier GR7/ Jaguar performance dropping LGBs. Furthermore, mounting a cap over Albania during ALLIED FORCE does not constitute 'a credible offensive capability'. Although the GR4/ GR7 made a greater contribution during ALLIED FORCE, I would ask those forces to look at their statistics before they crow too loud.
Fact 2:
I completely agree that the GR7 is not a credible air defence platform and the FA2 is. However, you that done it, know that even the 65% Lerx GR7 (let alone the 100% lerx) has superior manoeuvrability in the close fight (and I agree we do not necessarily end up there). That being said the boys in dark blue are probably better trained.
Fact 3:
Jacko the Jaguar message is wearing thin! Speak to the Norwich stano about survivability in anything other than a benign environment. Sorry but despite the quality of the pilots, and the fact it is a useful avionics testbed, the Jaguar is underpowered and has an ew suite that only the FA2 would envy. You do not have long left - the RN are correct; you are the weakest link good bye (if only because we need the money). Medium level at a push, with an attack/recce capability equal to or less than the others does not merit 'flexibility'. If its economy we want lets arm up those Hawks.
If only the FA2 had not been described as the only ac with a 'credible, expeditionary, offensive capability', I could have kept my normal place in the shadows. Sorry 'alphaleaderuk' I am not going to patronise you with my reasons for speaking with authority but I suspect you might recognise some home truths. The FA2 community has a lot of support don't spoil it by throwing inaccurate stones.
Thanks for the therapy. Pin out, roll grenade and step back to the sidelines...
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Defending the Nimrod
Alpha,
You've gone and done it. You've forced me to stand up for the Nimrod. I must have spent too long up here all ready.
Your statement about the aircraft being an ineffective ASW platform willl have many a wetman up in arms. With the new processor the abilities have come on in leaps and bounds. It is true that the threat from submarines has diminished over the years, but it still remains. The threat from hoards of Russian bombers streaming in over the North Sea has diminished over the years but we still maintain a land based AEW network.
Indeed, the threat to a task group from an SSK may be increasing, with the ability for third world countries to purchase, maintain and run ex soviet kit ie Kilos. With task groups deploying to all areas of the world you never know who could be next door and sailing what little black boat he might have in international waters.
Task groups of course carry their own organic helo's which provide the groups own ASW protection. For the UK this is solely rotary so the protection is very localized. What about the sub surface SSN firer who could sit over 60 miles from your task group. Rotary ASW is not going to provide you with that level of coverage.
Weather considerations are also a factor. I was involved in an exercise the other day involving 2 ships plus their organic helos, a nimrod, all working against one sub. The helo's were grounded due to the fact that the sea state was too high to enable them to launch. Nimrod provide detection and targetting information for the group. Dont even let me get going about the Merlin claiming to be an MPA. It's not at the moment. It has a great potential but its going to take a while.
It is true that the aircraft has to pre position to support task groups, but there is a multitude of friendly nations all over the globe who can provide support. We've proved now that all we require is a long strip of concrete and we can pretty well supply the rest. With a crew working day of 19 hours (3 hours planning), say 5 hours on task you can quickly see we can travel vast distances to any AOI, albeit with AAR support.
The Nimrod is not just about ASW. It is an extremely efficient ASuW platform providing realtime surface picture reporting to commanders via Link11 (poormans Link16). The aircraft can also provide targetting information for over the horizon surface-surface attacks or vectoring in fast movers. This provides greater standoff freedom to units and placing fewer ships/aircraft in threat areas.
There are also several other roles which the aircraft undertakes which cant be repeated here. These are highly sensitive and alone prove the aircrafts worth. If you have access to the last (or could be the one previous now) CinC Strike Command's bulletin which concentrated on the Nimrod, have a read. It highlights some of the jobs not readily plublicised in the wider world.
Last (you'll be glad to hear), but by no means least, comes SAR. SAR trails, the ability to provide up to 8 MS10 dinghys plus container stores. The ability to locate a vessel in distress prior to the helicopter turning up. Vectoring in the helicopter so most fuel efficient extraction possible allowing greater working range for the helo's. Recently the Nimrod has been launched 4 times in the last 5 days (QEII, Princess Something (engine room fire, 800 POB)HMS Exeter (CASEVAC), two fishers (CASEVAC)). Probably more but I forget. What other aircraft has the ability to vector in helicopters to a burning ship (7 in total for the Princess), drop dinghys to distressed airmen. I could go on.
The MRA4 is going to be a another level above the capability of the MR2. Extended range, more sophisticated EO suite. Greater/more diverse weapon carrying capability. I feel the money is more than justified if only BAe can get their finger out and sort it.
You've had my thoughts. A bit of a ramble, but its late and I'm tired so all spelling is, of course, deliberate. I now lay myself open to ridicule........
You've gone and done it. You've forced me to stand up for the Nimrod. I must have spent too long up here all ready.
Your statement about the aircraft being an ineffective ASW platform willl have many a wetman up in arms. With the new processor the abilities have come on in leaps and bounds. It is true that the threat from submarines has diminished over the years, but it still remains. The threat from hoards of Russian bombers streaming in over the North Sea has diminished over the years but we still maintain a land based AEW network.
Indeed, the threat to a task group from an SSK may be increasing, with the ability for third world countries to purchase, maintain and run ex soviet kit ie Kilos. With task groups deploying to all areas of the world you never know who could be next door and sailing what little black boat he might have in international waters.
Task groups of course carry their own organic helo's which provide the groups own ASW protection. For the UK this is solely rotary so the protection is very localized. What about the sub surface SSN firer who could sit over 60 miles from your task group. Rotary ASW is not going to provide you with that level of coverage.
Weather considerations are also a factor. I was involved in an exercise the other day involving 2 ships plus their organic helos, a nimrod, all working against one sub. The helo's were grounded due to the fact that the sea state was too high to enable them to launch. Nimrod provide detection and targetting information for the group. Dont even let me get going about the Merlin claiming to be an MPA. It's not at the moment. It has a great potential but its going to take a while.
It is true that the aircraft has to pre position to support task groups, but there is a multitude of friendly nations all over the globe who can provide support. We've proved now that all we require is a long strip of concrete and we can pretty well supply the rest. With a crew working day of 19 hours (3 hours planning), say 5 hours on task you can quickly see we can travel vast distances to any AOI, albeit with AAR support.
The Nimrod is not just about ASW. It is an extremely efficient ASuW platform providing realtime surface picture reporting to commanders via Link11 (poormans Link16). The aircraft can also provide targetting information for over the horizon surface-surface attacks or vectoring in fast movers. This provides greater standoff freedom to units and placing fewer ships/aircraft in threat areas.
There are also several other roles which the aircraft undertakes which cant be repeated here. These are highly sensitive and alone prove the aircrafts worth. If you have access to the last (or could be the one previous now) CinC Strike Command's bulletin which concentrated on the Nimrod, have a read. It highlights some of the jobs not readily plublicised in the wider world.
Last (you'll be glad to hear), but by no means least, comes SAR. SAR trails, the ability to provide up to 8 MS10 dinghys plus container stores. The ability to locate a vessel in distress prior to the helicopter turning up. Vectoring in the helicopter so most fuel efficient extraction possible allowing greater working range for the helo's. Recently the Nimrod has been launched 4 times in the last 5 days (QEII, Princess Something (engine room fire, 800 POB)HMS Exeter (CASEVAC), two fishers (CASEVAC)). Probably more but I forget. What other aircraft has the ability to vector in helicopters to a burning ship (7 in total for the Princess), drop dinghys to distressed airmen. I could go on.
The MRA4 is going to be a another level above the capability of the MR2. Extended range, more sophisticated EO suite. Greater/more diverse weapon carrying capability. I feel the money is more than justified if only BAe can get their finger out and sort it.
You've had my thoughts. A bit of a ramble, but its late and I'm tired so all spelling is, of course, deliberate. I now lay myself open to ridicule........
By,
By and large the post Cold War environment IS benign, and Jaguar is more deployable that GR7 or GR4, cheaper to operate, and offers superior (not just equal to) recce capability (EO GP1 with PRISM IDM any time), superior TIALD, and has both gun and CRV 7. It's all about deployability and economy. Also the aircraft doesn't need a fortune spending on it to reach 7,500 FH (it's largely paperwork) and we still own Jags with less than 2,000 FH on them. Compare that to GR4 SLAP/SLEP or HMP3......
Yes it's underpowered and the 106 engine is a CRIME and yes it badly needs better EW, and no, it couldn't fight it's way out of a paper bag without assistance, but compared to the SHar.....
It's cheap, not much money there to be saved, and its retention positive in a community that's seen as vital to EF. Bin it at your peril!
And MOA has a point, the submarine/surface threat is probably more real than the air threat to our ships, while Nimrods potential as a general support platform (perhaps even with Storm Shadow) makes it a versatile post Cold War air power tool.
By and large the post Cold War environment IS benign, and Jaguar is more deployable that GR7 or GR4, cheaper to operate, and offers superior (not just equal to) recce capability (EO GP1 with PRISM IDM any time), superior TIALD, and has both gun and CRV 7. It's all about deployability and economy. Also the aircraft doesn't need a fortune spending on it to reach 7,500 FH (it's largely paperwork) and we still own Jags with less than 2,000 FH on them. Compare that to GR4 SLAP/SLEP or HMP3......
Yes it's underpowered and the 106 engine is a CRIME and yes it badly needs better EW, and no, it couldn't fight it's way out of a paper bag without assistance, but compared to the SHar.....
It's cheap, not much money there to be saved, and its retention positive in a community that's seen as vital to EF. Bin it at your peril!
And MOA has a point, the submarine/surface threat is probably more real than the air threat to our ships, while Nimrods potential as a general support platform (perhaps even with Storm Shadow) makes it a versatile post Cold War air power tool.
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The NAvy doesnt' want trident particularly - if you read any of the books on naval policy during the earlu 1980'd you'll see we did out damndest to shove the bill elsewhere. If we could get rid of it we would, its cost forced us to scrap lots of much more useful ships like escorts/SSN's = to say the Navy hasn't made sacrifices is untrue - we have.
Given that the Jaguar has a rapidly approaching out of service date, then it to me would have made more sense to scrap the jagur on purely cost grounds. I know its a useful plane to have around, but if its replacement is about to enter service, then surely it should be first up. Scrapping a plane who's replacement is 10-12 years away is idiotic. But since when has this Government done anything sensible? (other than order CVF
)
Given that the Jaguar has a rapidly approaching out of service date, then it to me would have made more sense to scrap the jagur on purely cost grounds. I know its a useful plane to have around, but if its replacement is about to enter service, then surely it should be first up. Scrapping a plane who's replacement is 10-12 years away is idiotic. But since when has this Government done anything sensible? (other than order CVF
)
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Bystanderish,
RE: "Fact 1"
I presume your reading of 'utter rot' about how well the FA2s performed in Op Deliberate Force over Bosnia in '95 was a reference to one of my postings on the subject.
Let's get a few things straight:
As I stated to Jacko, I no longer serve HM and have no axe to grind in this debate. I see my inputs simply as challenging incorrect facts about this and other aircrafts' capabilities.
I took part in Deliberate Force in '95, as well as Deny Flight both before and after DF. I had access to BDA imagery from DF. I also, like everybody, had access to the bolix rumours, spread by some individuals lacking self-confidence, throughout the FJ community about the FA2's bombing perf in theatre.
The DMPIs were chosen by the CAOC to match the platform. Those DMPIs got shacked. I don't think that anybody is trying to claim that the FA2 could tackle all the DMPIs a dedicated attack platform can handle.
I have always believed that if you have sufficient faith in your own argument, you don't need to exaggerate or twist the truth. I have posted nothing but independantly verifiable facts, if you care to find the appropriate archive.
I hope I didn't 'fool anyone into believing that the FA2's bombing performance came close to that of the Jags/GR7s dropping LGBs.' A careful read of my posting will show that I stated that the PUBLISHED CEPs of UNGUIDED weapons from the FA2 in its CURRENT CONDITION (using its RLG INS with embedded GPS) are in competition with all other UK assets' UNGUIDED WEAPON CEPs. If you don't believe me-go read the book. There's nothing more I can say.
"Fact 2" is essentially correct. The SHAR's agility has been exaggerated ever since '82
"fact 3" I can't imagine why the FA2 would envy the Jag's EW suite. Both aircraft have the same RWR. If the Jag is capable of carrying BOL LAUs (can't remember) then both aircraft have the same chaff carrying capacity. The FA2 is capable of carrying multiple GEN-X active decoys. Last time I looked, the Jag didn't have them. Have they fitted the Jag with some great new EW kit since I've been away?
Jacko,
Not many fighter pilots think much of the F3/ AMRAAM combination (apologies to my F3 brethren-not trying to be personal). Unfortunately we can't discuss the whys and wherefores in this forum.
MOA,
I once trailed all the way from Yeovilton to SW USA with a Nimrod along as SAR. They didn't need a suck of gas and were a very welcome and reassuring sight. Just wish they wouldn't keep showing you endless cups of coffee, hot chicken tikka wraps and mars bars through the window.............
Finally......
Best of luck to WE Branch Fanatic, who joins the Navy imminently
N
RE: "Fact 1"
I presume your reading of 'utter rot' about how well the FA2s performed in Op Deliberate Force over Bosnia in '95 was a reference to one of my postings on the subject.
Let's get a few things straight:
As I stated to Jacko, I no longer serve HM and have no axe to grind in this debate. I see my inputs simply as challenging incorrect facts about this and other aircrafts' capabilities.
I took part in Deliberate Force in '95, as well as Deny Flight both before and after DF. I had access to BDA imagery from DF. I also, like everybody, had access to the bolix rumours, spread by some individuals lacking self-confidence, throughout the FJ community about the FA2's bombing perf in theatre.
The DMPIs were chosen by the CAOC to match the platform. Those DMPIs got shacked. I don't think that anybody is trying to claim that the FA2 could tackle all the DMPIs a dedicated attack platform can handle.
I have always believed that if you have sufficient faith in your own argument, you don't need to exaggerate or twist the truth. I have posted nothing but independantly verifiable facts, if you care to find the appropriate archive.
I hope I didn't 'fool anyone into believing that the FA2's bombing performance came close to that of the Jags/GR7s dropping LGBs.' A careful read of my posting will show that I stated that the PUBLISHED CEPs of UNGUIDED weapons from the FA2 in its CURRENT CONDITION (using its RLG INS with embedded GPS) are in competition with all other UK assets' UNGUIDED WEAPON CEPs. If you don't believe me-go read the book. There's nothing more I can say.
"Fact 2" is essentially correct. The SHAR's agility has been exaggerated ever since '82
"fact 3" I can't imagine why the FA2 would envy the Jag's EW suite. Both aircraft have the same RWR. If the Jag is capable of carrying BOL LAUs (can't remember) then both aircraft have the same chaff carrying capacity. The FA2 is capable of carrying multiple GEN-X active decoys. Last time I looked, the Jag didn't have them. Have they fitted the Jag with some great new EW kit since I've been away?
Jacko,
Not many fighter pilots think much of the F3/ AMRAAM combination (apologies to my F3 brethren-not trying to be personal). Unfortunately we can't discuss the whys and wherefores in this forum.
MOA,
I once trailed all the way from Yeovilton to SW USA with a Nimrod along as SAR. They didn't need a suck of gas and were a very welcome and reassuring sight. Just wish they wouldn't keep showing you endless cups of coffee, hot chicken tikka wraps and mars bars through the window.............
Finally......
Best of luck to WE Branch Fanatic, who joins the Navy imminently
N
Jimlad,
The Jag force is cheaper to run (for three 13 aircraft squadrons) than the SHAR force (two seven aircraft squadrons), entirely excluding the huge cost of running the carriers and their hangers on. The Jaguar provides a broader range of capabilities. The capabilities it provides are the capabilities actually needed in the post Cold War environment, and that have been used AGAIN AND AGAIN during recent years.
Its replacement may or may not be imminent. Service entry next month, as originally scheduled, cannot happen. Certainly in the air-to-ground role, many believe that JSF could be in service before EF has a full spectrum of A-G capabilities.
The only alternative (if one had to withdraw an entire type) to removing the SHar would be the F3, and doing without UK AD for five years would be politically unacceptable.
Noz
My understanding is that the Jaguar's EW kit is being addressed in just the same way as its other capability gaps were, so we can expect a cost-effective and enviable solution fairly quickly, perhaps?
My understanding on F3 is that limitations should not be there and could be addressed very quickly and with a relatively small cash injection. It is however not fulfilling its potential at the moment but could be a useful asset. Perhaps they'll use the SHar savings to make it one?
The Jag force is cheaper to run (for three 13 aircraft squadrons) than the SHAR force (two seven aircraft squadrons), entirely excluding the huge cost of running the carriers and their hangers on. The Jaguar provides a broader range of capabilities. The capabilities it provides are the capabilities actually needed in the post Cold War environment, and that have been used AGAIN AND AGAIN during recent years.
Its replacement may or may not be imminent. Service entry next month, as originally scheduled, cannot happen. Certainly in the air-to-ground role, many believe that JSF could be in service before EF has a full spectrum of A-G capabilities.
The only alternative (if one had to withdraw an entire type) to removing the SHar would be the F3, and doing without UK AD for five years would be politically unacceptable.
Noz
My understanding is that the Jaguar's EW kit is being addressed in just the same way as its other capability gaps were, so we can expect a cost-effective and enviable solution fairly quickly, perhaps?
My understanding on F3 is that limitations should not be there and could be addressed very quickly and with a relatively small cash injection. It is however not fulfilling its potential at the moment but could be a useful asset. Perhaps they'll use the SHar savings to make it one?
Thanks Nozzles
Jacko, you might like to consider that the fleet is NOT just their to support the CVS. Often it is the way round. In any case, the RN will supposedly get Harrier GR9 aircraft to replace the Sea Harrier. So the savings involved are only the cost involved in the Sea Harriers upgrade - a paltry £109 million.
Jacko, you might like to consider that the fleet is NOT just their to support the CVS. Often it is the way round. In any case, the RN will supposedly get Harrier GR9 aircraft to replace the Sea Harrier. So the savings involved are only the cost involved in the Sea Harriers upgrade - a paltry £109 million.
The cost of the upgrade is neither here nor there, though £109m is far short of what will actually be required.
The important savings to be gained are from the running and support costs for the time during which the aircraft would have continued in service, and the savings from ending logs support for an entire aircraft type.
Besides which the Thai Navy need 'em!
And why do we need an Empire-driven Blue Water Fleet anyway?
I'm battening down my hatches and putting a funny white hood on right now.....
The important savings to be gained are from the running and support costs for the time during which the aircraft would have continued in service, and the savings from ending logs support for an entire aircraft type.
Besides which the Thai Navy need 'em!
And why do we need an Empire-driven Blue Water Fleet anyway?
I'm battening down my hatches and putting a funny white hood on right now.....
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Average pilot. If you don't give a monkeys then go elsewhere. AOL provide a lot of chat sites for people who want to trade snide remarks. As for the topic, it makes no difference how capable the SHAR is/was. All the "lordships" care about is money. If it is cheaper to bin them and hide behind Bush's coattails then that is what will happen. With the military yes men looking out for their own promotions and nothing else, the "lordships" can do what they want.